On May 25, 2012 11:10 PM, "Elliot Temple" <curi-h468vE2XxCs@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On May 25, 2012, at 4:55 PM, brian_scurfield wrote:
> > On May 25, 2012, at 12:25 AM, Elliot Temple wrote:
> >> On May 24, 2012, at 11:22 AM, Henry Sturman wrote:
> >>> On 24-5-2012 9:53, Brian Scurfield wrote:
> >>>
> >>>> So, what is the difference between a virtual Windows PC instantiated on an iMac and an actual Windows PC?
> >>>>
> >>>> -- Brian Scurfield
> >>>>
> >>> if you look only at information output, and information output happens  to be all we want from a computer,
> >>
> >> This is the wrong way to look at computer programs.
> >>
> >> Programs with the same outputs for the same input are **not the same program**.
> >>
> >> For example they may have different run times, be differently hard to re-use components of in other programs, be differently hard to add features too, and many other differences. They may be arriving at these same outputs by different internal algorithms (e.g. recursion vs iteration).
> >
> > The same knowledge can be structured in many different ways and the structure affects our ability to use and to modify the knowledge. Knowing good ways to structure knowledge is therefore important. Once again, philosophy is called for, but the field of structural epistemology is relatively undeveloped. So, what are some important problems in structural epistemology?
>
> A good place to start would be a bunch of non-programming examples and implications.
>
> Here is part of one, with some questions:
>
> We know in general terms that most school-learned knowledge is very *fragile*. That word fragile refers to its *structure*. It means that people have trouble modifying it and adapted it to different situations. It has a bad structure and is hard to use except in just the right context for it. It's not very resilient to different contexts or changes.
>
> If you don't know what I mean, look up Feynman's attempts to teach physics in Brazil. His students have very fragile knowledge and memorize a lot of stuff exactly rather than learning more general concepts.

In Physics and Math, people tend to memorize formulas; I guess cause
they think its easier. And this requires that they memorize which
formulas apply to which problems. But this means that if they are
presented with a new kind of problem, they won't know which formula to
use. And this happens a lot on physics tests. So they end up using the
wrong formulas and/or inputting the numbers in them incorrectly.

So how can someone know which formulas apply to which problems, and
what the formulas mean in order to use them correctly? He must know
the principles. They explain the meaning behind which the formulas
were created and which problems the formulas apply to; even for
problems you've never seen before. Note that the number of problems
[in physics or any other field] are infinite. So how could someone
*memorize* which formulas apply to which problems if you can't
possibly know all the problems?

This applies to all knowledge. So in physics we have principles,
formulas, and problems. I've renamed these to logics, rules, and
situations.

Consider a business environment. There are situations that employees
are presented with and they need to apply the rules that their
employers created. But without the logic, employees can not know which
rules apply to which situations. They end up applying their own logic,
which may contradict their employers logic, and that causes them to
apply the wrong rule. Or they apply the appropriate rule but they do
so incorrectly. To solve this problem, employers should explain the
logic behind the rules, so that employees can figure out which
situations to apply them and how to apply them in said situations.

> So I've described something in abstract terms but there's all sorts of more concrete issues here: how can we actually describe the structure of this knowledge directly?

All knowledge exists in one network structure. The situations can be
represented as points in an N-dimensional space. The situations'
properties define the position of the points in that space. The rules
are vectors. So the points [situations] that lie along a vector
[rule], are the situations that that rule apply to. The logics are
superstructures of vectors.

> Could we write down the ideas and diagram them and show how it's fragile and what would be a better organization?

Well most people's knowledge of physics is just rules and situations.
Its like a data table with 2 columns, one for rules and one for
situations. So they memorize which rules apply to which situations.
The issue with this is that the number of situations is infinite. So
its a futile attempt because no one can learn *all* the possible
relationships between rules and situations since the number of
situations is infinite thus making the number of relationships
infinite.

But in the network structure, the vectors [rules] apply to an infinite
number of situations because a line has an infinite number of points
[situations] along its trajectory. Note that the structure doesn't
require that the situations are known. All somebody has to do is
determine the properties of a newly-found situation [thereby
determining its position in the space], thereby determining which
rule(s) apply to it.

> What should teachers and students do differently?

Every time a student or teacher thinks about a problem, they should
discuss the principles before discussing which formulas apply to said
problem. So before solving a problem, first ask these questions:

- What principle should we be thinking about?

- How does that principle explain which formula we should use in this
type of problem?

- How does that principle explain how to apply that formula in this
type of problem?

Once the student has answered these questions correctly, then they
should continue with solving the specific problem.

> How can people fix their fragile knowledge?

Its important to relate each situation with a rule, and each rule with
a logic. But we can't be aware of all situations all the time. So we
can prioritize by paying attention to situations that we see problems
with. So say I notice a problem with a situation, I should ask:

- What rule am I following?

- What logic explains that this is the correct rule to apply in this situation?

If I can't immediately answer these questions, then there is work to
do. I can consider other similar situations or rules and try to create
an abstraction from them, thus creating a new logic. Then I can apply
that tentative logic in other known situations and rules with the aim
of finding contradictions. If I [or others] find contradictions, then
either my new logic is wrong, or it is right, which means that the
contradicting logic [the older one] is wrong.

Note that the creation of the abstraction is a guess and that looking
for contradictions is criticism.

If I do immediately answer those questions, there is still work to do.
The fact that I noticed a problem in a situation suggests that a logic
is incorrect. I can try to find the error in my logic, i.e. a
contradiction in the network structure. Once that is found, then I can
make guesses and criticisms similar to above until I've fixed the
logic thus resolving the contradiction, i.e. solving the problem.

-- Rami

• New Members 2

There are two issues facing both A.I. and the Turing Principle:

Firstly...forget consciousness for a moment and rewrite his principle
more simply "if a computer program accurately emulates another computer
program then any meaningful characteristic that program has, the
emulation also has".

No particular problem with that.

But now substitue "a cup of coffee" for the other program. If a computer
program accurately emulates a cup of coffee...does it become a cup of
coffee?

The answer could be yes or no. It could be yes,but with different
hardware and much more complex software. Or it could be no because
Turing's principle is only computational not physical.

Turning back to consciousness, what this shows is that embedded into the
Turing Principle is the assumption that consciousness is analogous to a
computer program, and not at all physical/structural like a cup of
coffee. That may be true...but it's a big assumption, and for that
reason, all this talk about "if the Turing Principle is wrong universal
computation is falsified" is totally flawed, for the simple reason the
Universal Computation law is not falsified by the problems created by
that cup of coffee, and the Turing Principle - if it fails on
consciousness - may fail for the same sort of reason.

The second problem relates to the assumptions about what is accurate
emulation of consciousness and what sort of interface through which
should this be ascertained. But come to the problem from a different
direction. Let's say a computer program suddenly becomes conscious and
says to itself "Wow...I'm here".

That thought/experience, even if it is pure 'software' still has to be
facilitated by the computer hardware. This means that processing time
needs to be allocated to it. It means registry and disk space needs to
be allocated and pointers and references lined up. All of these
processes are hardwired at lower levels of the computer architecture. In
order that software can access those levels it must be put through a
process of compilation, first into - usually - an intermediate language
and then into machine code. From there the hardware processes can be
accessed.

But this is a problem for the A.I. concept. If that thought "Wow, I'm
here" happens, then....does it get written, and compiled first, in which
case...does a new thread get created? In which case what causes that to
happen? And when does the thought "Wow, I'm here" really happen...before
the compilation, or after?

Alternatively, if the consciousness somehow controls the hardwire in a
new way...that is very complex and technical...and would probably have
to happen at lower levels before higher levels. So how would that
happen..how would low level machine code become sentient. It is
incredible inflexible and hardwired stuff. In humans and animals, lower
level controls evolved way back when the hardware was also lower level.
As the hardware evolved...this triggered and was symbiotic with further
evolution of control/software processes, resulting in new layers,
essentially performing new higher level functions while receiving some
other services from pre-existing lower level functioins, which continued
to do a lot of the lower level work.

There is nothing like this happening in computers as they currently
stand. There is nothing instrinsically like this in the very
conceptualization of a hardware/software divide. There is no
evolutionary engine available from a purely software conception of
consciousness.

• New Members 2

Hi FoR folk,

I thought you might be interested in the first signs of the impact, on science itself, of 20 years of a 'science of consciousness'. The ignition point for the change is obviously in the neurosciences. However, it will track down through the physical sciences towards physics in time. Have a read and let me know what you think:

http://theconversation.edu.au/learning-experience-lets-take-consciousness-in-from-the-cold-6739

cheers

Colin Hales, PhD
Researcher
Centre for Neural Engineering (http://www.cfne.eng.unimelb.edu.au/)
University of Melbourne, Australia

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

• New Members 1

freeman dyson says:
A Cultural History of Physics is a grand monument to the life of its author. Karoly Simonyi was teacher first, scholar second, and scientist third. His book likewise has three components. First a text, describing the history of science over the last four thousand years in a rich context of philosophy, art and literature. Second, a collection of illustrations, many of them taken from Hungarian archives and museums unknown to Western readers, giving concrete reality to historical events.Third an anthology of quotations from writers in many languages, beginning with Aeschylus in "Prometheus Bound", describing how his hero brought knowledge and technical skills to mankind, and ending with Blaise Pascal in "Pensées", describing how our awareness of our bodies and minds remains an eternal mystery. Different readers will have different preferences. For me, the quotations are the most precious part of the book. Dip anywhere among these pages, and you will find a quotation that is surprising and illuminating.

I have a vivid memory of my one meeting with the author. I came with his son Charles Simonyi to visit him in his home in Budapest. He had an amazing collection of books that had survived centuries of turbulent history. Several of them had bullet holes from the various battles that were fought in the neighboring streets. Many of them were historically important relics from the early days of printing. He proudly showed me these treasures, and even more proudly showed me the German edition of A Cultural History of Physics, which he had recently translated from the Hungarian original. I had only a few minutes to explore the beauties of this work, but I recognized it at once as a unique and magnificent achievement. Now it is finally available in English, and we can enjoy it at our leisure.

Thank you, Charles, for making this happen.

60 page excerpt of cultural history of physics available here:

http://edge.org/3rd_culture/simonyi12/CulturalHistoryOfPhysics_Excerpt.pdf

From Deutsch's presumably a document advocating scientism at best and
immorality/evil at worst. Will he be registering his protest with, or
resigning from, the Royal Society?

http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/proje\
cts/people-planet/2012-04-25-PeoplePlanet.pdf
<http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/proj\
ects/people-planet/2012-04-25-PeoplePlanet.pdf>

[Non-text portions of this message have been removed]

• New Members 3

http://curi.us/1564-zubrin-replies

-- Elliot Temple
http://curi.us/

• New Members 3

http://www.kurzweilai.net/a-boost-for-quantum-reality

A boost for quantum reality

May 9, 2012

The authors show that wavefunctions are real physical states with a
joint measurement on n qubits, with the property that each outcome has
probability zero on one of the input states. Such a measurement can be
performed by implementing the quantum circuit shown above. (Credit:
Matthew F. Pusey, Jonathan Barrett, Terry Rudolph)

In a controversial paper in Nature Physics, theorists claim they can
prove that wavefunctions — the entity that determines the
probability of different outcomes of measurements on quantum-mechanical
particles — are real states.

The paper is thought by some to be one of the most important in quantum
foundations in decades. The authors say that the mathematics leaves no
doubt that the wavefunction is not just a statistical tool, but rather,
a real, objective state of a quantum system.

Matt Leifer, a physicist at University College London who works on
quantum information, says that the theorem tackles a big question in a
simple and clean way. He also says that it could end up being as useful
as Bell's theorem, which turned out to have applications in quantum
information theory and cryptography.

But it's incompatible with quantum mechanics, so the theorem also
raises a deeper question: could quantum mechanics be wrong?

Ref.: Matthew F. Pusey, Jonathan Barrett, Terry Rudolph, On the reality
of the quantum state, Nature Physics, 2012, DOI: 10.1038/nphys2309
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nphys2309>

Ref.: Matthew F. Pusey, Jonathan Barrett, Terry Rudolph, On the reality
of the quantum state, 2011, arXiv:1111.3328v2
<http://lanl.arxiv.org/abs/1111.3328v2>

• New Members 3

http://curi.us/1562-bad-scholarship-population-control-by-steven-w

http://curi.us/1563-bad-scholarship-fatal-misconception-by-matthew

-- Elliot Temple
http://beginningofinfinity.com/

• New Members 3

I would be interested to know more of how synesthesia is regarded from
the perspective of this philosophy. Are there ways that it could be a
real phenomenon that would be consistent with already firmed-up
philosophical positions on the brain.

There is no dispute here that I know of that the perceptive senses
involve their own dedicated wiring. Synesthesia is a theory explaining
subjective experiences reported by some people, that they experience,
say, smells when looking at colors, or colors when hearing sounds, and
so on. If it happens at that level of the mental wiring - the level of
sensory inputs - it seems possible that such cross-wirings could occur,
without contradicting any of the consequences of universal explainer.

Does anyone have any thoughts about this? Not necessarily hard and fast
positions in the philosophy. Personal opinion/judgement would be
welcome.

The reason I am interested in this matter is because I believe I have a
life-long synesthesia-like effect, however not involving input senses.
Since young, I experience some abstract concepts....really strongly...as
kind of highly symbolic visual/network forms.

For example, I strongly experience this philosphy in such terms.

From the popper/deutsch perspective I should try to explain this
inner-phenomenon in terms of ideas. I have tried to do this, but I come
up against some some difficulties.

Which, in principle, I would be willing to explain. However, that would
be messy...inherently about personal testimony.... so possibly not very
interesting to others.

However, something that would help me would be to know whether other,
BoI-consistent, explanations are possible for synesthesia-like effects,
or not? At least then I can know where I stand philosophically.

As an aside, does anyone see possible ways that this philosphy could be
abstractly represented as a network structure, such that it would also
be a productive/useful/revealing thing to do?

• New Members 3

On Mon, May 7, 2012 at 5:06 PM, Elliot Temple <curi-h468vE2XxCs@public.gmane.org> wrote:
> On May 7, 2012, at 2:22 PM, hibbsa wrote:
> > --- In Fabric-of-Reality-hHKSG33TihhbjbujkaE4pw@public.gmane.org,
> > Elliot Temple <curi <at> ...> wrote:
> >>
> >> _Merchants of Despair_ is badly researched. Do not
> >> trust it on any specific details.
> >>
> >> http://curi.us/1561-bad-scholarship-merchants-of-despair-by-robert->zubrin
> >>
> >
> > - His idea about 'moral restraint' (e.e. don't have families if you can't pay for them etc). what do you think of this? It looks pretty reasonable to me. It looks like the sort of thing the extended popper philosophy would come up with.
>
> yeah from what I've read so far, that part basically looks reasonable. and he relates it to his criticism of the poor laws subsidizing marriage/kids, and that connection makes sense too.

Why do we subsidize marriage/kids? Why do we have a system that allows
people intentionally have kids and not work? I'll cause these people
the welfare-abusers. The rest of us pay for them to live this way. The
rest of us don't want to have 5 kids because we know the investment
required [financial and otherwise]. The welfare-abusers want to have
more kids because then they get more money.

So the welfare-abusers are dependent on the welfare system. They
aren't learning responsibility and they aren't learning
wealth-generating skills. And their kids tend to learn the same
lifestyle.

Now consider the population growth rates of each group. Now move
forward a decade and compare the populations. Move forward another
decade and again compare. This is going to collapse. How long before
the rest of us can't afford to support the welfare-abusers?

What do you think?

-- Rami

• New Members 1

that question I just asked about creativity/theory..the point is this...

Although the various philosophical efforts by people in science, to
explain what is going on with science...have been wrong. And the
Popper/deutsch philosphy has been right in the corrections made (e.g.
inductivism, foundationalism, positivism, justificationalism etc)

In fact, at the methodological level science doesn't enforce any of
those bad approaches. Science doesn't constrain the creative process in
any way at all. What matters is the theory that comes out the other end.

So far as that goes, the philosophy and science are fairly much on the
same page. But popper/deutsch philosophy goes further, and does
somethign science doesn't do. It actually creates a methological process
that constrains the process of how a theory is come up with. It asks
that explanations precede study of data, for an example.

So really.....the philosophy is making assumptions about human
psychology, in a way that science doesn't.

The question is.....why is this not a weakness? Given science does not
constrain, or make assumptions about how our brains are working (in the
methodological, not philosophical sense), because of fallibilism surely
science is stronger (because the popper/deutsch theorising about human
psychology is fallible and will contain some misconceptions).

• New Members 1