John Quay | 1 Nov 2011 10:58
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community of inquiry

Hi Peirce-listers

Just wondering if anyone can help me.

The phrase "community of inquiry" is often attributed to Peirce and yet I
cannot find any instance of his actually using this phrase. Sources of this
attribution can be drawn to Matthew Lipman (amongst others), associated with
his work in Philosophy for Children
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Lipman)

Peirce definitely speaks often of the importance of community and of
inquiry, but does not tend to use these words in close association.

I was wondering if anyone knew of a passage (or passages) in Peirce's work
that would speak clearly to the association between community and inquiry?

I understand that Peirce draws a close connection between notions of
community and scientific or pragmatic truth, for example when he states that
³the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
investigate, is what we mean by the truth²  (Peirce, 1878, p. 299, CP
5.407). But is this the main source of the phrase "community of inquiry"?

Any help appreciated.

Kind regards
--

-- 
John Quay, PhD
Lecturer
Melbourne Graduate School of Education
234 Queensberry Street
(Continue reading)

Michael J. DeLaurentis | 1 Nov 2011 13:55
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Re: community of inquiry

By no means based on an exhaustive search, John, here are three passages
which spring to mind, though not using the very phrase "community of
inquiry." (1) "On the Doctrine of Chances..." : passim, including the
following -- "...three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite
community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made
supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of the intellectual activity,
as indispensable requirements of logic." (2) "Some Consequences of Four
Incapacities": "Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY [caps in
original], without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in
knowledge."  (3) "Critical Review of Berkeley's Idealism": "And the catholic
consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in
this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion
of minds to which we belong...."  You may be well aware of these already, in
which case, my apologies. But these are the passages (in addition to what
you cite below) I have found frequently cited in connection with "the
community of inquiry."  Ben Udell is usually quite adept at scouring the
entire oeuvre and coming up with relevant passages, so I expect, if he has
the time, he may again come up with an exhaustive sourcing. 

-----Original Message-----
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of John Quay
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 5:59 AM
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] community of inquiry

Hi Peirce-listers

Just wondering if anyone can help me.
(Continue reading)

Maughn Gregory | 1 Nov 2011 14:42

"Community of Inquiry"

Some years ago our library subscribed to the "Past Masters" service, which allowed electronic searching through Peirce's entire Collected Papers. I conducted a proximity search of the terms "community" and "inquiry" within 1-10 words of each other, and found no matches.  I concluded that the phrase "community of inquiry" does not occur in Peirce's works.  I would be glad to have others dis/confirm this.

Maughn Gregory


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John Quay | 1 Nov 2011 23:24
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Re: community of inquiry

Thank you very much for sharing these Michael - they are very helpful.

One thought that has been with me lately is that such references do not
merely point to a "community of inquiry," but rather to a "community of
practice" for which inquiry is indispensible, whether this community is
limited to a particular community or expanded to a generalized community
(issue of truth). 

I suppose I am raising as a question Peirce's meaning of the term
"community" as this connects with inquiry and practice - ?

Does anyone else perceive such an issue?

Kind regards

John Quay

On 1/11/11 11:55 PM, "Michael J. DeLaurentis" <michaeljad <at> comcast.net>
wrote:

> By no means based on an exhaustive search, John, here are three passages
> which spring to mind, though not using the very phrase "community of
> inquiry." (1) "On the Doctrine of Chances..." : passim, including the
> following -- "...three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite
> community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made
> supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of the intellectual activity,
> as indispensable requirements of logic." (2) "Some Consequences of Four
> Incapacities": "Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
> that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY [caps in
> original], without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in
> knowledge."  (3) "Critical Review of Berkeley's Idealism": "And the catholic
> consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in
> this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion
> of minds to which we belong...."  You may be well aware of these already, in
> which case, my apologies. But these are the passages (in addition to what
> you cite below) I have found frequently cited in connection with "the
> community of inquiry."  Ben Udell is usually quite adept at scouring the
> entire oeuvre and coming up with relevant passages, so I expect, if he has
> the time, he may again come up with an exhaustive sourcing.
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of John Quay
> Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 5:59 AM
> To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: [peirce-l] community of inquiry
> 
> Hi Peirce-listers
> 
> Just wondering if anyone can help me.
> 
> The phrase "community of inquiry" is often attributed to Peirce and yet I
> cannot find any instance of his actually using this phrase. Sources of this
> attribution can be drawn to Matthew Lipman (amongst others), associated with
> his work in Philosophy for Children
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Lipman)
> 
> Peirce definitely speaks often of the importance of community and of
> inquiry, but does not tend to use these words in close association.
> 
> I was wondering if anyone knew of a passage (or passages) in Peirce's work
> that would speak clearly to the association between community and inquiry?
> 
> I understand that Peirce draws a close connection between notions of
> community and scientific or pragmatic truth, for example when he states that
> ³the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
> investigate, is what we mean by the truth²  (Peirce, 1878, p. 299, CP
> 5.407). But is this the main source of the phrase "community of inquiry"?
> 
> Any help appreciated.
> 
> Kind regards

--

-- 
John Quay, PhD
Lecturer
Melbourne Graduate School of Education
234 Queensberry Street
The University of Melbourne
VIC, 3010, Australia
T: +61 3 8344 8533 / M: 0438 048 955
E: jquay <at> unimelb.edu.au
http://www.edfac.unimelb.edu.au/profile/John.Quay
www.education.unimelb.edu.au
CRICO Provider code 00116K

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Benjamin Udell | 2 Nov 2011 00:33
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Re: community of inquiry

John, Michael, list,
 
I'd look harder, but right now I've a nasty cold. I've looked and don't find Peirce speaking in so many words of a community of inquiry, inquirers, research, researchers, investigation, or investigators.
 
It's occurred to me that, given that Peirce (in the "Fixation of Belief") defines inquiry as any struggle to move from uncertainty to belief, be it by tenacity, authority, congruence, or science, it wouldn't be surprising if Peirce regarded a 'community of inquiry' as no special kind of community; every community would be a community of inquiry among other things. On thee other hand, a scientific community would be a special kind of community.
"I do not call the solitary studies of a single man a science. It is only when a group of men, more or less in intercommunication, are aiding and stimulating one another by their understanding of a particular group of studies as outsiders cannot understand them, that I call their life a science."
C. S. Peirce, "The Nature of Science", MS 1334, Adirondack Summer School Lectures, 1905. http://www.unav.es/gep/index-en.html
Best, Ben
 
----- Original Message -----
From: "John Quay" <jquay <at> UNIMELB.EDU.AU>
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 6:24 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] community of inquiry

Thank you very much for sharing these Michael - they are very helpful.

One thought that has been with me lately is that such references do not
merely point to a "community of inquiry," but rather to a "community of
practice" for which inquiry is indispensible, whether this community is
limited to a particular community or expanded to a generalized community
(issue of truth).

I suppose I am raising as a question Peirce's meaning of the term
"community" as this connects with inquiry and practice - ?

Does anyone else perceive such an issue?

Kind regards

John Quay




On 1/11/11 11:55 PM, "Michael J. DeLaurentis" <michaeljad <at> comcast.net>
wrote:

> By no means based on an exhaustive search, John, here are three passages
> which spring to mind, though not using the very phrase "community of
> inquiry." (1) "On the Doctrine of Chances..." : passim, including the
> following -- "...three sentiments, namely, interest in an indefinite
> community, recognition of the possibility of this interest being made
> supreme, and hope in the unlimited continuance of the intellectual activity,
> as indispensable requirements of logic." (2) "Some Consequences of Four
> Incapacities": "Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
> that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY [caps in
> original], without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in
> knowledge."  (3) "Critical Review of Berkeley's Idealism": "And the catholic
> consent which constitutes the truth is by no means to be limited to men in
> this earthly life or to the human race, but extends to the whole communion
> of minds to which we belong...."  You may be well aware of these already, in
> which case, my apologies. But these are the passages (in addition to what
> you cite below) I have found frequently cited in connection with "the
> community of inquiry."  Ben Udell is usually quite adept at scouring the
> entire oeuvre and coming up with relevant passages, so I expect, if he has
> the time, he may again come up with an exhaustive sourcing.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
> Behalf Of John Quay
> Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 5:59 AM
> To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: [peirce-l] community of inquiry
>
> Hi Peirce-listers
>
> Just wondering if anyone can help me.
>
> The phrase "community of inquiry" is often attributed to Peirce and yet I
> cannot find any instance of his actually using this phrase. Sources of this
> attribution can be drawn to Matthew Lipman (amongst others), associated with
> his work in Philosophy for Children
> (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_Lipman)
>
> Peirce definitely speaks often of the importance of community and of
> inquiry, but does not tend to use these words in close association.
>
> I was wondering if anyone knew of a passage (or passages) in Peirce's work
> that would speak clearly to the association between community and inquiry?
>
> I understand that Peirce draws a close connection between notions of
> community and scientific or pragmatic truth, for example when he states that
> ³the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
> investigate, is what we mean by the truth²  (Peirce, 1878, p. 299, CP
> 5.407). But is this the main source of the phrase "community of inquiry"?
>
> Any help appreciated.
>
> Kind regards

--
John Quay, PhD
Lecturer
Melbourne Graduate School of Education
234 Queensberry Street
The University of Melbourne
VIC, 3010, Australia
T: +61 3 8344 8533 / M: 0438 048 955
E: jquay <at> unimelb.edu.au
http://www.edfac.unimelb.edu.au/profile/John.Quay
www.education.unimelb.edu.au
CRICO Provider code 00116K

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Benjamin Udell | 2 Nov 2011 00:49
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Fw: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: 2nd Call for Submissions

Duly forwarded, from Robert Lane of the Charles S. Peirce Society http://www.peircesociety.org/. - Ben
 
----- Original Message -----
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 11:43 AM
Subject: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: 2nd Call for Submissions
 
2ND CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
 
2011-12 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Contest
 
Topic: Any topic on or related to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.
 
Awards: $500 cash prize; presentation at the Society's next annual
meeting, held in conjunction with the Pacific APA (in Seattle,
Washington, April 4-7, 2012); possible publication, subject to
editorial revision, in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce
Society.
 
Submission Deadline: January 16, 2012.
 
Length: Because the winning essay may be published in the
Transactions, the length of contest submissions should be about the
length of an average journal article. The maximum acceptable length is
10,000 words, including notes. The presentation of the winning
submission at the annual meeting cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time.
 
Open to: Graduate students and persons who have held a Ph.D. or its
equivalent for no more than seven years. Entries from students who
have not yet begun their graduate training will not be considered. 
Past winners of the contest are ineligible. Joint submissions are
allowed provided that all authors satisfy the eligibility requirements.
 
Advice to Essay Contest Entrants:
 
The winning entry will make a genuine contribution to the literature
on Peirce. 
Therefore, entrants should become familiar with the major currents of
work on Peirce to date and take care to locate their views in relation
to published material that bears directly on their topic.
 
Entrants should note that scholarly work on Peirce frequently benefits
from the explicit consideration of the historical development of his
views. Even a submission that focuses on a single stage in that
development can benefit from noting the stage on which it focuses in
reference to other phases of Peirce's treatment of the topic under
consideration. (This advice is not intended to reflect a bias toward
chronological studies, but merely to express a strong preference for a
chronologically informed understanding of Peirce's philosophy.) 
We do not require but strongly encourage, where appropriate, citation
of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition. 
Ideally, citation of texts found in both the Collected Papers and the
Writings should be to both CP and W.
 
Submissions should be prepared for blind evaluation and must not be
under consideration for publication elsewhere.
 
Cover letter or email should include complete contact information,
including mailing address and phone numbers, and a statement that the
entrant meets the eligibility requirements of the contest.
 
Electronic submissions are preferred. Submissions should be sent as
email attachments (Microsoft Word documents, RTF files, or PDF files
only) to Robert Lane, secretary-treasurer of the Society: 
[see contact info at http://www.westga.edu/~rlane] 
 
Please include "Peirce Essay Contest Submission" in the subject line
of your email.
 
Submissions by traditional mail are also acceptable. Please mail
submissions to:
 
Robert Lane
Philosophy Program
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118
Attn: Peirce Essay Contest
 
--
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
ssociate Professor and Director of Philosophy
 
Editor, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society
 
Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118
 

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Aaron Massecar | 2 Nov 2011 00:55
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"Community of Inquiry"

Hi Maughn, John, List,

I tried to send this earlier today, but it didn't go through for some reason. I am trying it again...

After a search through the collected papers and the Chronological Writings (I have electronic versions of both), I could not find those three words put together. That said, I did find a lot of quotes that, without stretching too much, would get you close to a "community of inquiry" or a "community of inquirers." In general, you can find the notion of a community the Some Consequences of Four Incapacities (1868) and Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities (1869). I am sure that there are more out there, but here some that I found. 

In general, you could say that philosophers are inquirers and thus a community of philosophers is a community of inquirers, which might give you what you are looking for, but this could run into problems depending on your understanding of philosophers. I understand Peirce to be saying that philosophers are inquirers in a broad sense of inquiry. Once you tie this into his conception of scientific inquiry as a way of fixing belief, then you get a sufficiently broad notion of inquiry that would apply to both science and philosophy (as if there was a separation between the two).

Please let me know if I missed anything

Aaron

--
Aaron Massecar, PhD
Department of Philosophy
University of Guelph
Guelph, ON
N1G 2W1

Some Consequences of Four Incapacities 
P 27:
 Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 
2(1868): 140–57

2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: "Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true." If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—only they can agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (W 2:213)

The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite seriess of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognitions—the real and the unreal —consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. (W 2:239)

But scientific progress is to a large extent public and belongs to the community of scientific men of the same department, its conclusions are unanimous, its interpretations of nature are no private interpretations, and so much must always be published to the world as will suffice to enable the world to adopt the individual investigator's conclusions (W 2:339)

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man, 

proud man,

Most ignorant of what he's most assured,

His glassy essence. (W 2:241-242)




From: "Maughn Gregory" <gregorym <at> MAIL.MONTCLAIR.EDU>
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, 1 November, 2011 9:42:17 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"

Some years ago our library subscribed to the "Past Masters" service, which allowed electronic searching through Peirce's entire Collected Papers. I conducted a proximity search of the terms "community" and "inquiry" within 1-10 words of each other, and found no matches.  I concluded that the phrase "community of inquiry" does not occur in Peirce's works.  I would be glad to have others dis/confirm this.

Maughn Gregory


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John Welch | 2 Nov 2011 01:56
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Re: "Community of Inquiry": maybe incorporated in Royce?

Maybe we should look in Royce, in what he wrote after listening carefully to Peirce. Problems of Christianity and, maybe, in the exchange with Dewey…in the complete Dewey, a nasty misunderstanding from a philosophy congress, around 1912 or ’13. Royce’s reply is a footnote to Dewey’s attack.

 

Regards,

 

John W.

 

 

From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Aaron Massecar
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 7:56 PM
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"

 

Hi Maughn, John, List,

I tried to send this earlier today, but it didn't go through for some reason. I am trying it again...

 

After a search through the collected papers and the Chronological Writings (I have electronic versions of both), I could not find those three words put together. That said, I did find a lot of quotes that, without stretching too much, would get you close to a "community of inquiry" or a "community of inquirers." In general, you can find the notion of a community the Some Consequences of Four Incapacities (1868) and Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities (1869). I am sure that there are more out there, but here some that I found. 

 

In general, you could say that philosophers are inquirers and thus a community of philosophers is a community of inquirers, which might give you what you are looking for, but this could run into problems depending on your understanding of philosophers. I understand Peirce to be saying that philosophers are inquirers in a broad sense of inquiry. Once you tie this into his conception of scientific inquiry as a way of fixing belief, then you get a sufficiently broad notion of inquiry that would apply to both science and philosophy (as if there was a separation between the two).

 

Please let me know if I missed anything

Aaron

--
Aaron Massecar, PhD
Department of Philosophy
University of Guelph
Guelph, ON
N1G 2W1

 

Some Consequences of Four Incapacities 
P 27: Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy 2(1868): 140–57

2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: "Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true." If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—only they can agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (W 2:213)

The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite seriess of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognitions—the real and the unreal —consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. (W 2:239)

But scientific progress is to a large extent public and belongs to the community of scientific men of the same department, its conclusions are unanimous, its interpretations of nature are no private interpretations, and so much must always be published to the world as will suffice to enable the world to adopt the individual investigator's conclusions (W 2:339)

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man, 

proud man,

Most ignorant of what he's most assured,

His glassy essence. (W 2:241-242)

 

 

From: "Maughn Gregory" <gregorym <at> MAIL.MONTCLAIR.EDU>
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, 1 November, 2011 9:42:17 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"

Some years ago our library subscribed to the "Past Masters" service, which allowed electronic searching through Peirce's entire Collected Papers. I conducted a proximity search of the terms "community" and "inquiry" within 1-10 words of each other, and found no matches.  I concluded that the phrase "community of inquiry" does not occur in Peirce's works.  I would be glad to have others dis/confirm this.

Maughn Gregory


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Jonathan DeVore | 2 Nov 2011 03:36
Picon

Re: "Community of Inquiry": maybe incorporated in Royce?

Brief review, but possibly of interest:

http://www.deakin.edu.au/dro/eserv/DU:30003655/jacobs-modelsofscientific-2006.pdf

"Models of scientific community: Charles Sanders Peirce to Thomas Kuhn"

Quoting John Welch <john-w-welch <at> NYC.RR.COM>:

> Maybe we should look in Royce, in what he wrote after listening  
> carefully to Peirce. Problems of Christianity and, maybe, in the  
> exchange with Dewey…in the complete Dewey, a nasty misunderstanding  
> from a philosophy congress, around 1912 or ’13. Royce’s reply is a  
> footnote to Dewey’s attack.
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
>
>
> John W.
>
>
>
>
>
> From: C S Peirce discussion list  
> [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Aaron Massecar
> Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 7:56 PM
> To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"
>
>
>
>
> Hi Maughn, John, List,
>
>
> I tried to send this earlier today, but it didn't go through for  
> some reason. I am trying it again...
>
>
>
> After a search through the collected papers and the Chronological  
> Writings (I have electronic versions of both), I could not find  
> those three words put together. That said, I did find a lot of  
> quotes that, without stretching too much, would get you close to a  
> "community of inquiry" or a "community of inquirers." In general,  
> you can find the notion of a community the Some Consequences of Four  
> Incapacities (1868) and Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic:  
> Further Consequences of Four Incapacities (1869). I am sure that  
> there are more out there, but here some that I found.
>
>
>
> In general, you could say that philosophers are inquirers and thus a  
> community of philosophers is a community of inquirers, which might  
> give you what you are looking for, but this could run into problems  
> depending on your understanding of philosophers. I understand Peirce  
> to be saying that philosophers are inquirers in a broad sense of  
> inquiry. Once you tie this into his conception of scientific inquiry  
> as a way of fixing belief, then you get a sufficiently broad notion  
> of inquiry that would apply to both science and philosophy (as if  
> there was a separation between the two).
>
>
>
> Please let me know if I missed anything
>
>
> Aaron
>
>
> --
> Aaron Massecar, PhD
> Department of Philosophy
> University of Guelph
> Guelph, ON
> N1G 2W1
>
>
>
>
> Some Consequences of Four Incapacities
> P 27: Journal of
> Speculative Philosophy 2(1868): 140–57
>
>
> 2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which  
> amounts to this: "Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true." If I  
> were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should  
> require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals  
> absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that  
> metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch  
> of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—only they can  
> agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement,  
> when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation  
> until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question  
> of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who  
> doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the  
> ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore,  
> for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid  
> minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought  
> to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (W  
> 2:213)
>
> The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite seriess of  
> inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante  
> logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in  
> time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose  
> objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we  
> mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had  
> when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is,  
> when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which  
> alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to  
> private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to  
> idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The  
> real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and  
> reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore  
> independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of  
> the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially  
> involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and  
> capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so those two  
> series of cognitions—the real and the unreal —consist of those  
> which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always  
> continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions,  
> will ever after be denied. (W 2:239)
>
> But scientific progress is to a large extent public and belongs to  
> the community of scientific men of the same department, its  
> conclusions are unanimous, its interpretations of nature are no  
> private interpretations, and so much must always be published to the  
> world as will suffice to enable the world to adopt the individual  
> investigator's conclusions (W 2:339)
>
> Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to  
> be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that  
> reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so  
> thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future  
> thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though  
> more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends  
> on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential  
> existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.The  
> individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by  
> ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his  
> fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation.  
> This is man,
>
>
> proud man,
>
>
> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
>
>
> His glassy essence. (W 2:241-242)
>
>
>
>
>
>   _____
>
> From: "Maughn Gregory" <gregorym <at> MAIL.MONTCLAIR.EDU>
> To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
> Sent: Tuesday, 1 November, 2011 9:42:17 AM
> Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"
>
> Some years ago our library subscribed to the "Past Masters" service,  
> which allowed electronic searching through Peirce's entire Collected  
> Papers. I conducted a proximity search of the terms "community" and  
> "inquiry" within 1-10 words of each other, and found no matches.  I  
> concluded that the phrase "community of inquiry" does not occur in  
> Peirce's works.  I would be glad to have others dis/confirm this.
>
> Maughn Gregory
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
> You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the  
> PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message  
> to LISTSERV <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in  
> the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to  
> PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message  
> to LISTSERV <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU with the line "SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L" in  
> the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to  
> PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>
>
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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> PEIRCE-L listserv.  To remove yourself from this list, send a  
> message to LISTSERV <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU with the line "SIGNOFF  
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> list, send it to PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
>

--

-- 
Jonathan DeVore
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Anthropology
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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Terry Bristol | 2 Nov 2011 05:45
Favicon

Re: "Community of Inquiry": maybe incorporated in Royce?

One of my favorite books on the early pragmatists is John E. Smith's great summary/review of Josiah Royce:

Royce's Social Infinite: The Community of Interpretation


Pertaining to other comments, Popper wrote an essay on the impossibility of scientific advance by Robinson Crusoe.
Popper argued that without the benefit of critical interaction with others one could not 'think outside the box' – to put it simply in more modern jargon.
I like the hypothesis that if you put a group of republicans on an island they would soon divide into republicans and democrats, and likewise a group of democrats would soon divide into republicans and democrats.
But with just one person this can't happen (presumably). Crusoe could find correlations and so forth of course, but he could not make a conceptual advance – what Popper and Kuhn et al. thought of as 'real' learning. (In quasi-Hegelian terms, you need to encounter the anti-thesis to your thesis to be able to find the synthesis.)

From the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (google Karl Popper and Robinson Crusoe)

9. Critical Rationalist Sociology of Science

"A crucial feature of critical rationalism is the theory that social norms determine the degree of rationality which individuals are able to exercise. This is a direct outgrowth of Popper’s use of methodological rules to explain the growth of science. Because science is a social activity, Popper argued, Robinson Crusoe could not do science. One individual, he suggested, cannot both put forth and criticize theories adequately. Rationality comes from cooperation. To be effective in bringing about the growth of knowledge, criticism should follow social rules."

In brief, I think that the argument is tied to the notion that we are all naturally bias. One common formulation of this in the philosophy of science literature is the notion of the theory-ladenness of all observation.

One might speculation that certain republicans (or democrats) see the world and the solution to the world's problems only from their biased perspective.
Attempts to present evidence from another perspective doesn't work because the evidence from the other perspective simply doesn't make sense in terms of the original perspective (viz 'way of understanding the world'). One clear and commonly observed phenomenon is two people with different political (or scientific) perspectives 'talking past each other' – even though each imagines they are presenting evidence that the other should understand as they do.

One must wonder then how communication and common agreement ever happens. That is a really good and difficult question – once you accept that there isn't just one way to understand the world.

Here  is a rather unsettling assessment from Max Planck, just before he died, reflecting on scientific advance in the 20th century:  "A new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar with it."

Wissenschaftliche Selbstbiographie. Mit einem Bildnis und der von Max von Laue gehaltenen Traueransprache., Johann Ambrosius Barth Verlag, (Leipzig 1948), p. 22, as translated in Scientific Autobiography and Other Papers, trans. F. Gaynor (New York, 1949), pp.33-34 (as cited in T.S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions).

Kuhn suggests, I think, that when communication does not occur then the victory of one research program over another is by brute force.
Kuhn suggests, I think, that the history of 20th century science is still unsettled and untold.

Terry

=====================================================
On Nov 1, 2011, at 7:36 PM, Jonathan DeVore wrote:

Brief review, but possibly of interest:

http://www.deakin.edu.au/dro/eserv/DU:30003655/jacobs-modelsofscientific-2006.pdf

"Models of scientific community: Charles Sanders Peirce to Thomas Kuhn"



Quoting John Welch <john-w-welch <at> NYC.RR.COM>:

Maybe we should look in Royce, in what he wrote after listening carefully to Peirce. Problems of Christianity and, maybe, in the exchange with Dewey…in the complete Dewey, a nasty misunderstanding from a philosophy congress, around 1912 or ’13. Royce’s reply is a footnote to Dewey’s attack.



Regards,



John W.





From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf Of Aaron Massecar
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 7:56 PM
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"




Hi Maughn, John, List,


I tried to send this earlier today, but it didn't go through for some reason. I am trying it again...



After a search through the collected papers and the Chronological Writings (I have electronic versions of both), I could not find those three words put together. That said, I did find a lot of quotes that, without stretching too much, would get you close to a "community of inquiry" or a "community of inquirers." In general, you can find the notion of a community the Some Consequences of Four Incapacities (1868) and Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences of Four Incapacities (1869). I am sure that there are more out there, but here some that I found.



In general, you could say that philosophers are inquirers and thus a community of philosophers is a community of inquirers, which might give you what you are looking for, but this could run into problems depending on your understanding of philosophers. I understand Peirce to be saying that philosophers are inquirers in a broad sense of inquiry. Once you tie this into his conception of scientific inquiry as a way of fixing belief, then you get a sufficiently broad notion of inquiry that would apply to both science and philosophy (as if there was a separation between the two).



Please let me know if I missed anything


Aaron


--
Aaron Massecar, PhD
Department of Philosophy
University of Guelph
Guelph, ON
N1G 2W1




Some Consequences of Four Incapacities
P 27: Journal of
Speculative Philosophy 2(1868): 140–57


2. The same formalism appears in the Cartesian criterion, which amounts to this: "Whatever I am clearly convinced of, is true." If I were really convinced, I should have done with reasoning, and should require no test of certainty. But thus to make single individuals absolute judges of truth is most pernicious. The result is that metaphysicians will all agree that metaphysics has reached a pitch of certainty far beyond that of the physical sciences;—only they can agree upon nothing else. In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached, it is considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached. After it is reached, the question of certainty becomes an idle one, because there is no one left who doubts it. We individually cannot reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it, therefore, for the community of philosophers. Hence, if disciplined and candid minds carefully examine a theory and refuse to accept it, this ought to create doubts in the mind of the author of the theory himself. (W 2:213)

The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite seriess of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time) are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are real and those whose objects are unreal. And what do we mean by the real? It is a conception which we must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is, when we first corrected ourselves. Now the distinction for which alone this fact logically called, was between an ens relative to private inward determinations, to the negations belonging to idiosyncrasy, and an ens such as would stand in the long run. The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of knowledge. And so those two series of cognitions—the real and the unreal —consist of those which, at a time sufficiently future, the community will always continue to reaffirm; and of those which, under the same conditions, will ever after be denied. (W 2:239)

But scientific progress is to a large extent public and belongs to the community of scientific men of the same department, its conclusions are unanimous, its interpretations of nature are no private interpretations, and so much must always be published to the world as will suffice to enable the world to adopt the individual investigator's conclusions (W 2:339)

Finally, as what anything really is, is what it may finally come to be known to be in the ideal state of complete information, so that reality depends on the ultimate decision of the community; so thought is what it is, only by virtue of its addressing a future thought which is in its value as thought identical with it, though more developed. In this way, the existence of thought now, depends on what is to be hereafter; so that it has only a potential existence, dependent on the future thought of the community.The individual man, since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a negation. This is man,


proud man,


Most ignorant of what he's most assured,


His glassy essence. (W 2:241-242)





 _____

From: "Maughn Gregory" <gregorym <at> MAIL.MONTCLAIR.EDU>
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, 1 November, 2011 9:42:17 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] "Community of Inquiry"

Some years ago our library subscribed to the "Past Masters" service, which allowed electronic searching through Peirce's entire Collected Papers. I conducted a proximity search of the terms "community" and "inquiry" within 1-10 words of each other, and found no matches.  I concluded that the phrase "community of inquiry" does not occur in Peirce's works.  I would be glad to have others dis/confirm this.

Maughn Gregory


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--
Jonathan DeVore
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Anthropology
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

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Gmane