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Benjamin Udell | 2 Aug 2010 23:45
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Re: Re:[Peirce-l] Induction, Deduction, or Abduction: was Deduction versus Induction

Gary, list,
 
It turns out that my idea of a "strategic" abduction is not original. (Just as well!). From pp. 1-2, "Abduction in Logic Programming," Marc Denecker and Antonis Kakas, Department of Computer Science, K.U.Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200A, B-3001 Heverlee, Belgium, perhaps not formally published, I can't find the year. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.13.7065
In the context of logic programming, the study of abductive inference started at the end of the eighties as an outcome of different attempts to use logic programming for solving AI-problems. Facing the limitations of standard logic programming for solving these problems, different researchers proposed to extend logic programming with abduction. Eshghi [28] introduced abduction in logic programming in order to solve planning problems in the Event Calculus [65]. In this approach, abduction solves a planning goal by _explaining_ it by an ordered sets of events - a plan - that entails the planning goal. This approach was further explored by Shanahan [110], Missiaen et al. [72, 71], Denecker [21], Jung [48] and recently in [59, 60]. Kakas and Mancarella showed the application of abduction in logic programming for deductive database updating and knowledge assimilation [53, 55]. The application of abduction to diagnosis has been studied in [10, 11] within an abductive logic programming framework whose semantics was defined by a suitable extension of the completion semantics of LP. [yellow background added - BU]
I should also make a semi-correction, regarding what I said about a norm's or rule's being "alluded to" (by the word "course") in Peirce's 1903 form. One way or another, that does happen, though the rule in question may be a rule merely of 1st-order logic. Putting the 1903 form into correspondence with the earlier categorical-syllogistic form makes it seem that a rule is something to which the abduction only alludes:
 
The surprising fact (result), C, is observed;
  But if A (case) were true, C (result) would be a matter of course (rule, but only alluded-to),
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A (case) is true.
 
However, as Peirce came to say, one shouldn't be too rigid about the rules with abduction, especially when that leads one to misdirect one's attention. Much less should one focus too rigidly on corresondences which one asserts to hold between various abductive forms, as if that would always be the main focus of attention in the analysis of abductions. Above in the 1903 form, that which I labeled "(case)" may itself be substantially a rule or norm. Now, that was always so, even with the categorical syllogisms, e.g., Barbara: All mammals are animals (rule), all horses are mammals (case which is itself a rule), ergo all horses are animals (result which itself is a rule). However, a rule which one uses to help explain a phenomenon may be already acknowledged (the alluded-to rule) and combined with some peculiar state of facts ("A," which I correlated to case) or instead, the explanatory rule may be newly hypothesized ("A," case, now itself a rule or norm, hypothesized). Or, I think, one could make "A" stand for the combination of a peculiar state of facts and an acknowledged rule (and then "course" could refer to a more simply logical rule) and so on. From "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2:287, 1903, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/abduction.html :
The whole operation of reasoning begins with _Abduction_, which is now to be descibed. Its occasion is a _surprise_. That is, some belief, active or passive, formulated or unformulated, has just been broken up. It may be in real experience or it may equally be in pure mathematics, which has its marvels, as nature has. The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _generalization_. In other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. [....]
Best, Ben

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Joseph Ransdell | 3 Aug 2010 13:18

FW: Peirce Society: 2010-11 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions

Message below is forwarded for your information by Joseph Ransdell

-----Original Message-----
From: Charles S. Peirce Society [mailto:PEIRCE-SOCIETY <at> westga.edu] On Behalf
Of Robert Lane
Sent: Monday, August 02, 2010 8:28 AM
To: PEIRCE-SOCIETY <at> westga.edu
Subject: Peirce Society: 2010-11 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions

CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS

2010-11 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Contest

Topic: Any topic on or related to the work of Charles Sanders Peirce.

Awards: $500 cash prize; presentation at the Society's next annual  
meeting, held in conjunction with the Pacific APA (in San Diego,  
California, April 20-23, 2011); possible publication, subject to  
editorial revision, in the Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce  
Society.

Submission Deadline: January 23, 2011

Length: Because the winning essay may be published in the  
Transactions, the length of contest submissions should be about the  
length of an average journal article. The maximum acceptable length is  
10,000 words, including notes. The presentation of the winning  
submission at the annual meeting cannot exceed 30 minutes reading time.

Open to: Graduate students and persons who have held a Ph.D. or its  
equivalent for no more than seven years. Entries from students who  
have not yet begun their graduate training will not be considered.  
Past winners of the contest are ineligible. Joint submissions are  
allowed provided that all authors satisfy the eligibility requirements.

Advice to Essay Contest Entrants:

The winning entry will make a genuine contribution to the literature  
on Peirce. Therefore, entrants should become familiar with the major  
currents of work on Peirce to date and take care to locate their views  
in relation to published material that bears directly on their topic.

Entrants should note that scholarly work on Peirce frequently benefits  
from the explicit consideration of the historical development of his  
views. Even a submission that focuses on a single stage in that  
development can benefit from noting the stage on which it focuses in  
reference to other phases of Peirce's treatment of the topic under  
consideration. (This advice is not intended to reflect a bias toward  
chronological studies, but merely to express a strong preference for a  
chronologically informed understanding of Peirce's philosophy.)
We do not require but strongly encourage, where appropriate, citation  
of the Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition.  
Ideally, citation of texts found in both the Collected Papers and the  
Writings should be to both CP and W.

Submissions should be prepared for blind evaluation and must not be  
under consideration for publication elsewhere.

Cover letter or email should include complete contact information,  
including mailing address and phone numbers, and a statement that the  
entrant meets the eligibility requirements of the contest.

Electronic submissions are preferred. Submissions should be sent as  
email attachments (Microsoft Word documents, RTF files, or PDF files  
only) to Robert Lane, secretary-treasurer of the Society:  
rlane <at> westga.edu . Please include "Peirce Essay Contest Submission" in  
the subject line of your email.

Submissions by traditional mail are also acceptable. Please mail  
submissions to:
Robert Lane
Philosophy Program
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118
Attn: Peirce Essay Contest

[To be removed from the Charles S. Peirce Society list-serv, please  
respond to this email with the word "remove" in the subject line.]

-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy
Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

678 839 4745
rlane <at> westga.edu
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

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Gary Richmond | 3 Aug 2010 20:59
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Re: Re:[Peirce-l] Induction, Deduction, or Abduction: was Deduction versus Induction

Ben, list,
 
Thanks for this message which includes the findings of your most recent research into abduction, an area I know is of considerable interest to you, and one which seems especially important for inquiry, Peircean or otherwise.
 
That what you called "strategic" abduction has been a proposal to extend logic programming through a plan "that entails the planning goal" rang some bells for me. (I seem to recall hearing something about this in connection with some AI project at a workshop of ICCS one year; I'll have to see if I can hunt up any of that material.)
 
At least as interesting, and closely connected to it, I think, is your suggestion--supported by the Peirce quotation you gave at the end of your post--that in abduction the rule can be (in some cases) but "alluded to" or, as Peirce wrote, "no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite likely, or even would be a necessary result."
 
So, comparing these two notions, if a plan "entails the planning goal" then that goal must, necessarily, be known, just as "no new law" or rule is necessarily needed, "and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis." At the moment these notions seem, contradictorily, to both clarify and complicate the idea of abduction for me. But, then, as you noted, perhaps we should follow Peirce's lead and begin to imagine that  "one shouldn't be too rigid about the rules with abduction." Still, thinking through abduction, in such ways as you've been doing recently, seems to me to be important research which can only eventually help to clarify the role of abduction in inquiry.
 
Best,
 
Gary

>>> "Benjamin Udell" <budell <at> nyc.rr.com> 8/2/2010 5:45 PM >>>
Gary, list,
 
It turns out that my idea of a "strategic" abduction is not original. (Just as well!). From pp. 1-2, "Abduction in Logic Programming," Marc Denecker and Antonis Kakas, Department of Computer Science, K.U.Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200A, B-3001 Heverlee, Belgium, perhaps not formally published, I can't find the year. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.13.7065
In the context of logic programming, the study of abductive inference started at the end of the eighties as an outcome of different attempts to use logic programming for solving AI-problems. Facing the limitations of standard logic programming for solving these problems, different researchers proposed to extend logic programming with abduction. Eshghi [28] introduced abduction in logic programming in order to solve planning problems in the Event Calculus [65]. In this approach, abduction solves a planning goal by _explaining_ it by an ordered sets of events - a plan - that entails the planning goal. This approach was further explored by Shanahan [110], Missiaen et al. [72, 71], Denecker [21], Jung [48] and recently in [59, 60]. Kakas and Mancarella showed the application of abduction in logic programming for deductive database updating and knowledge assimilation [53, 55]. The application of abduction to diagnosis has been studied in [10, 11] within an abductive logic programming framework whose semantics was defined by a suitable extension of the completion semantics of LP. [yellow background added - BU]
I should also make a semi-correction, regarding what I said about a norm's or rule's being "alluded to" (by the word "course") in Peirce's 1903 form. One way or another, that does happen, though the rule in question may be a rule merely of 1st-order logic. Putting the 1903 form into correspondence with the earlier categorical-syllogistic form makes it seem that a rule is something to which the abduction only alludes:
 
The surprising fact (result), C, is observed;
  But if A (case) were true, C (result) would be a matter of course (rule, but only alluded-to),
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A (case) is true.
 
However, as Peirce came to say, one shouldn't be too rigid about the rules with abduction, especially when that leads one to misdirect one's attention. Much less should one focus too rigidly on corresondences which one asserts to hold between various abductive forms, as if that would always be the main focus of attention in the analysis of abductions. Above in the 1903 form, that which I labeled "(case)" may itself be substantially a rule or norm. Now, that was always so, even with the categorical syllogisms, e.g., Barbara: All mammals are animals (rule), all horses are mammals (case which is itself a rule), ergo all horses are animals (result which itself is a rule). However, a rule which one uses to help explain a phenomenon may be already acknowledged (the alluded-to rule) and combined with some peculiar state of facts ("A," which I correlated to case) or instead, the explanatory rule may be newly hypothesized ("A," case, now itself a rule or norm, hypothesized). Or, I think, one could make "A" stand for the combination of a peculiar state of facts and an acknowledged rule (and then "course" could refer to a more simply logical rule) and so on. From "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2:287, 1903, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/abduction.html :
The whole operation of reasoning begins with _Abduction_, which is now to be descibed. Its occasion is a _surprise_. That is, some belief, active or passive, formulated or unformulated, has just been broken up. It may be in real experience or it may equally be in pure mathematics, which has its marvels, as nature has. The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _generalization_. In other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. [....]
Best, Ben

--------

Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, the

central pointer and guide to Peirce resources on the web:

                  http://csp3.blogspot.com/


-------          

If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L send a

message to the list manager at the following address:

     joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com

No reason need be given, just say "unsub", followed by your address

--------

Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, the

central pointer and guide to Peirce resources on the web:

                  http://csp3.blogspot.com/


-------          

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Benjamin Udell | 4 Aug 2010 21:16
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Re: Re:[Peirce-l] Induction, Deduction, or Abduction: was Deduction versus Induction

Gary, list,
 
Thanks for the comments and for calling what I do "research". I wanted to link abductive inference to planning and I'm glad to see that some AI researchers found the idea natural or at least not too strange. Both planning and abductive inference aim at simplicity, facility, feasibility, naturalness, cogency, efficiency, optimality, etc. On one hand, planning and plotting (e.g., plotting a course of movements or doings) do not always proceed by abductive inference - they can proceed deductively and mathematically, e.g. via the mathematics of graph theory, Morse theory, calculus of variations, linear & nonlinear programming (in all of which my knowledge is superficial, to put it generously). Mathematical extremization plays some basic roles (or so I've read) in both classical and quantum mechanics. On the other hand, I would no more expect abductive inference to be reducible to some sort of maths of optimization, than induction to be reducible to probability theory. One uses induction to estimate parameters of a larger or total population that one doesn't already know - so it can't be handled by probability theory alone. One uses abduction to guess at constraints, extremizational rules, or the like, in a regime that one doesn't already know - so it can't be handled by maths of optimization alone.
 
Etymological side lights:  Apparently the word "plan" is not fully cognate with words like "explain," "plain," and "plane." Instead it comes from French _planter_ (to fix or put in place) as influenced by French _plan_ (flat surface). The word "plot" comes from Old English where it meant a small piece of ground. It took on senses of ground plan, map, chart, and plan or scheme, perhaps by accidental similarity to Old French _comploter_. Eventually "plot" acquired the sense of a set of events in a story. As a verb it came to mean to lay plans (for something) and to make a map or diagram. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=plot.
 
One can also conceive of _inducing_ to a larger or more-encompassing set of constraints, (extremizational) rules, etc.; that sort of induction would seem to be a specialty of inverse or multi-objective optimization, but I don't know where that field stands in that regard; my hunch is that it would find itself led to focus on the inductive way, since my hunch is also that the focus on abductive inference as a specialty would belong to the special sciences themselves - physics, chemistry, biology, human and social studies.
 
In trying to figure out where inductive inference is an actually practiced specialty in the way that it is in (inferential) statistics (and arguably philosophy, with its inductive generalizations though they usually seem rough and qualitative), I've noticed an area called "inverse problems" or "ill-posed problems," regarding which a community of researchers has identified itself - its researchers have networked together and have published in the field. The Wikipedia article ("Inverse problem"), where some of the researchers seem to have done some editing, says "An inverse problem is the task that often occurs in many branches of science and mathematics where the values of some model parameter(s) must be obtained from the observed data." Them sounds like inducin' words to me! Also: "Many instances of regularized inverse problems can be interpreted as special cases of Bayesian inference." So it's not necessarily Bayesian, despite the use of the word "inverse." On the talk page a few years ago, somebody told me that the methods are not always statistical. Really, if the definition which they've actually formulated were all that mattered, I wouldn't see why that area isn't considered to _encompass_ statistics among other things, unless the word "model" is being used in some narrow sense. Anyway, it is not clear to me whether the field of "inverse problems" or "ill-posed problems" in fact has been focusing (like inferential statistics) on using inductive inference or also on coming up with explanatory hypotheses. I have a feeling, amounting to no certainty, that they aren't interested in tightening their job descriptions in that way; and perhaps in that field there's not much recognition of abductive inference as a distinct mode of inference.
 
If somebody's reading but hasn't read the whole thread:
 
Categorical-syllogistic form of abductive inference¹:
 
Rule: All the beans from this bag are white.
[Curious] Result: These beans are white.
Ergo: [Hypothetical] Case: These beans are from this bag.
 
1903 form²:
 
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
  But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
 
1.^ Peirce, C. S. (1878), "Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis",
Popular Science Monthly, v. 13, pp. 470–82, see 472.
Collected Papers 2.619–44, see 623.
2.^ Peirce, C. S. (1903), Harvard lectures on pragmatism,
Collected Papers v. 5, paragraphs 188–189.
Regarding abductive inference and rules: My suggestion that one can think of the already-known rule as merely alluded-to in Peirce's 1903 abductive form comes from identifying the rule in the categorical-syllogistic form with the "course" in the phrase "matter of course." C is the surprising result that would be a _matter_ of course if A were true. The course itself is not C. The course is rule-like insofar as it is& that whereby A (a hypothetical case, like a hypothesized cause) would lead to C (an already observed result, like an observed effect). The course doesn't even get its own letter - we go straight from A to C without a named B; hence I speak of an allusion. I suppose that the use of an allusive reference also indicates that one doesn't necessarily start with a clear and articulate idea of the course and may formulate it only later. In "A Neglected Argument," Peirce says that, with higher forms of plausibility of hypothesis, it is through the hypothesis that one reaches a fuller characterization of the surprising phenomenon itself; such a hypothesis explains not only why it is, but what it is. 
 
Moreover, and maybe I'm getting too complicated with this, Peirce's form leaves the door open to including an already-known rule (say a rule of cell development) as part of A, A then referring to the combination of that known rule with a peculiar set of circumstances. Then the course will still be at least an (also already known) rule/course of simple logical, probabilitative, or statistical implication, something like that. Or instead one could regard both a cell-development rule and a statistical form of implication as the "course" and A as only the peculiar set of circumstances. So the form seems pretty flexible. Insofar as the categorical-syllogistic _case_ and _result_ can be, in a substantial sense, rules or norms as well, I think that Peirce came to think that too much attention to the categorical-syllogistic form would tend to direct one's attention away from some of the various rules, norms, etc., with which one may actually be concerned in abductive inference, though I think that categorical-syllogistic form's difficulty at distinguishing abductive inference from induction of characters was weighing on him as well. Anyway he came to think that his focus on categorical syllogistic forms and on attribution of characters to objects (doctrine of comprehension and extension) had ultimately hampered his understanding of abductive inference, though they had helped get his understanding going in the first place and are still valuable today (for my part, I find myself continually using the categorical-syllogistic form to shed light on the 1903 form).
 
Best, Ben
 
----- Original Message -----
From: Gary Richmond
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Tuesday, August 03, 2010 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: Re:[peirce-l] [Peirce-l] Induction, Deduction, or Abduction: was Deduction versus Induction
 
Ben, list,
 
Thanks for this message which includes the findings of your most recent research into abduction, an area I know is of considerable interest to you, and one which seems especially important for inquiry, Peircean or otherwise.
 
That what you called "strategic" abduction has been a proposal to extend logic programming through a plan "that entails the planning goal" rang some bells for me. (I seem to recall hearing something about this in connection with some AI project at a workshop of ICCS one year; I'll have to see if I can hunt up any of that material.)
 
At least as interesting, and closely connected to it, I think, is your suggestion--supported by the Peirce quotation you gave at the end of your post--that in abduction the rule can be (in some cases) but "alluded to" or, as Peirce wrote, "no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite likely, or even would be a necessary result."
 
So, comparing these two notions, if a plan "entails the planning goal" then that goal must, necessarily, be known, just as "no new law" or rule is necessarily needed, "and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis." At the moment these notions seem, contradictorily, to both clarify and complicate the idea of abduction for me. But, then, as you noted, perhaps we should follow Peirce's lead and begin to imagine that  "one shouldn't be too rigid about the rules with abduction." Still, thinking through abduction, in such ways as you've been doing recently, seems to me to be important research which can only eventually help to clarify the role of abduction in inquiry.
 
Best,
 
Gary

>>> "Benjamin Udell" 8/2/2010 5:45 PM >>>
Gary, list,
 
It turns out that my idea of a "strategic" abduction is not original. (Just as well!). From pp. 1-2, "Abduction in Logic Programming," Marc Denecker and Antonis Kakas, Department of Computer Science, K.U.Leuven, Celestijnenlaan 200A, B-3001 Heverlee, Belgium, perhaps not formally published, I can't find the year. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.13.7065
In the context of logic programming, the study of abductive inference started at the end of the eighties as an outcome of different attempts to use logic programming for solving AI-problems. Facing the limitations of standard logic programming for solving these problems, different researchers proposed to extend logic programming with abduction. Eshghi [28] introduced abduction in logic programming in order to solve planning problems in the Event Calculus [65]. In this approach, abduction solves a planning goal by _explaining_ it by an ordered sets of events - a plan - that entails the planning goal. This approach was further explored by Shanahan [110], Missiaen et al. [72, 71], Denecker [21], Jung [48] and recently in [59, 60]. Kakas and Mancarella showed the application of abduction in logic programming for deductive database updating and knowledge assimilation [53, 55]. The application of abduction to diagnosis has been studied in [10, 11] within an abductive logic programming framework whose semantics was defined by a suitable extension of the completion semantics of LP. [yellow background added - BU]
I should also make a semi-correction, regarding what I said about a norm's or rule's being "alluded to" (by the word "course") in Peirce's 1903 form. One way or another, that does happen, though the rule in question may be a rule merely of 1st-order logic. Putting the 1903 form into correspondence with the earlier categorical-syllogistic form makes it seem that a rule is something to which the abduction only alludes:
 
The surprising fact (result), C, is observed;
  But if A (case) were true, C (result) would be a matter of course (rule, but only alluded-to),
  Hence, there is reason to suspect that A (case) is true.
 
However, as Peirce came to say, one shouldn't be too rigid about the rules with abduction, especially when that leads one to misdirect one's attention. Much less should one focus too rigidly on corresondences which one asserts to hold between various abductive forms, as if that would always be the main focus of attention in the analysis of abductions. Above in the 1903 form, that which I labeled "(case)" may itself be substantially a rule or norm. Now, that was always so, even with the categorical syllogisms, e.g., Barbara: All mammals are animals (rule), all horses are mammals (case which is itself a rule), ergo all horses are animals (result which itself is a rule). However, a rule which one uses to help explain a phenomenon may be already acknowledged (the alluded-to rule) and combined with some peculiar state of facts ("A," which I correlated to case) or instead, the explanatory rule may be newly hypothesized ("A," case, now itself a rule or norm, hypothesized). Or, I think, one could make "A" stand for the combination of a peculiar state of facts and an acknowledged rule (and then "course" could refer to a more simply logical rule) and so on. From "A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic", EP 2:287, 1903, http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/abduction.html :
The whole operation of reasoning begins with _Abduction_, which is now to be descibed. Its occasion is a _surprise_. That is, some belief, active or passive, formulated or unformulated, has just been broken up. It may be in real experience or it may equally be in pure mathematics, which has its marvels, as nature has. The mind seeks to bring the facts, as modified by the new discovery, into order; that is, to form a general conception embracing them. In some cases, it does this by an act of _generalization_. In other cases, no new law is suggested, but only a peculiar state of facts that will "explain" the surprising phenomenon; and a law already known is recognized as applicable to the suggested hypothesis, so that the phenomenon, under that assumption, would not be surprising, but quite likely, or even would be a necessary result. This synthesis suggesting a new conception or hypothesis, is the Abduction. [....]
Best, Ben
 
[For previous posts in this thread, have Javascript enabled and see

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Clark Goble | 4 Aug 2010 22:16

JSTOR & Transactions

Anyone notice that the old Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society are gone from JSTOR?  What's weird is that if you do a Google search you still find them. i.e. this page:

http://www.jstor.org/pss/40319754

However when you go into JSTOR these articles aren't there anymore.  When you go to browse journals the Transactions aren't there.  Is this a new thing?  I know SAGE has the Transactions since 2006 but doesn't have back issues.  Yet I can't find any repository with the back issues.  Anyone know what is going on or where to look up back issues?




--------

Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, the

central pointer and guide to Peirce resources on the web:

                  http://csp3.blogspot.com/


-------          

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Robert Lane | 4 Aug 2010 22:32
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Re: JSTOR & Transactions

Hi Clark,

I just tried accessing the Transactions through JSTOR and found  
everything to be there (well, everything from 1965 to 2006). I'm  
accessing JSTOR through my institution's library website. Maybe what  
JSTOR makes available differs based on the specific license under  
which a given user (or that user's organization) is accessing it? Or  
maybe it was just a temporary glitch?

Various runs of the Transactions are also available through EBSCOhost  
(the full run), Project Muse (from 2006), and Chadwyck PAO Complete  
(1965 to 1995).

Best regards,
Bob

-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy
Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

678 839 4745
rlane <at> westga.edu
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

Quoting Clark Goble <clark <at> lextek.com>:

> Anyone notice that the old Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce   
> Society are gone from JSTOR?  What's weird is that if you do a   
> Google search you still find them. i.e. this page:
>
> http://www.jstor.org/pss/40319754
>
> However when you go into JSTOR these articles aren't there anymore.   
>  When you go to browse journals the Transactions aren't there.  Is   
> this a new thing?  I know SAGE has the Transactions since 2006 but   
> doesn't have back issues.  Yet I can't find any repository with the   
> back issues.  Anyone know what is going on or where to look up back   
> issues?
>
>
>
>
>
> -----
> **
> ** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is
> ** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web:
> **            http://csp3.blogspot.com/
> ** -------
> **
> ** If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L
> ** send a message to the list manager at:
> **
> **      joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
> **
> ** Just say "unsub", followed by your address
>
>
> joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
>
> --
>
>

-----
**
** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is 
** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web: 
**            http://csp3.blogspot.com/ 
** -------
**
** If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L  
** send a message to the list manager at:   
**
**      joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
**
** Just say "unsub", followed by your address

joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
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Benjamin Udell | 4 Aug 2010 22:52
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Re: JSTOR & Transactions

Clark, list,
 
The Charles S. Peirce Society Website seems to be down right now too. Here's the grand TOC as preserved on www.archive.org/ up till VOLUME 44, NO. 1 WINTER 2008: http://web.archive.org/web/20080617193954/http://www.peircesociety.org/contents.html
 
 
Unfortunately archive.org seems not to have preserved the Website's pages from later than mid-2008. Maybe somebody added a robots.txt thingy at that point. Archive.org doesn't have the Excel file listing the reviews from earlier years but I have that in Google spreadsheet form somewhere.
 
Best, Ben
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, August 04, 2010 4:16 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] JSTOR & Transactions

Anyone notice that the old Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society are gone from JSTOR?  What's weird is that if you do a Google search you still find them. i.e. this page:

http://www.jstor.org/pss/40319754

However when you go into JSTOR these articles aren't there anymore.  When you go to browse journals the Transactions aren't there.  Is this a new thing?  I know SAGE has the Transactions since 2006 but doesn't have back issues.  Yet I can't find any repository with the back issues.  Anyone know what is going on or where to look up back issues?

--------

Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, the

central pointer and guide to Peirce resources on the web:

                  http://csp3.blogspot.com/


-------          

If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L send a

message to the list manager at the following address:

     joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com

No reason need be given, just say "unsub", followed by your address

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headers
Clark Goble | 4 Aug 2010 23:46

Re: JSTOR & Transactions


On Aug 4, 2010, at 2:32 PM, Robert Lane wrote:

Maybe what  JSTOR makes available differs based on the specific license under which a given user (or that user's organization) is accessing it? Or maybe it was just a temporary glitch?

That makes a kind of sense although is annoying.  Although I find the whole way journals are administered to be a huge mess and kind of against the heart of academics.  (Look at how physics handles things now with arXiv.org - why can't the humanities do that?)  

It doesn't appear to be a temporary glitch.  It's been this way for some time.  Although last year I could access it without trouble.  The Transactions doesn't even show up in the list although the institution I access JSTOR through probably is affecting this.

C'est la vie I guess.  I found access an other way although the other database I access doesn't have search.  (Which isn't that big a deal since I typically know what issue the article I'm looking for)




--------

Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, the

central pointer and guide to Peirce resources on the web:

                  http://csp3.blogspot.com/


-------          

If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L send a

message to the list manager at the following address:

     joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com

No reason need be given, just say "unsub", followed by your address

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Robert Lane | 5 Aug 2010 01:01
Favicon

Re: JSTOR & Transactions

Ben,

Thanks for pointing out the problem with the Peirce Society web site.  
I've contacted our web hosting company, and they tell me that they're  
experiencing a hardware problem that should be resolved tonight. So  
hopefully the site will be back up in a few hours.

Best,
Bob

-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy
Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

678 839 4745
rlane <at> westga.edu
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

Quoting Benjamin Udell <budell <at> nyc.rr.com>:

> Clark, list,
>
> The Charles S. Peirce Society Website seems to be down right now   
> too. Here's the grand TOC as preserved on www.archive.org/ up till   
> VOLUME 44, NO. 1 WINTER 2008:   
> http://web.archive.org/web/20080617193954/http://www.peircesociety.org/contents.html
>
> Preserved main page   
> http://web.archive.org/web/20080803173556/http://www.peircesociety.org/index.html (August
3, 2008 http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.peircesociety.org/   
> )
>
> Unfortunately archive.org seems not to have preserved the Website's   
> pages from later than mid-2008. Maybe somebody added a robots.txt   
> thingy at that point. Archive.org doesn't have the Excel file   
> listing the reviews from earlier years but I have that in Google   
> spreadsheet form somewhere.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Clark Goble
> To: Peirce Discussion Forum
> Sent: Wednesday, August 04, 2010 4:16 PM
> Subject: [peirce-l] JSTOR & Transactions
>
>
> Anyone notice that the old Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce   
> Society are gone from JSTOR?  What's weird is that if you do a   
> Google search you still find them. i.e. this page:
>
> http://www.jstor.org/pss/40319754
>
> However when you go into JSTOR these articles aren't there anymore.   
>  When you go to browse journals the Transactions aren't there.  Is   
> this a new thing?  I know SAGE has the Transactions since 2006 but   
> doesn't have back issues.  Yet I can't find any repository with the   
> back issues.  Anyone know what is going on or where to look up back   
> issues?
> -----
> **
> ** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is
> ** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web:
> **            http://csp3.blogspot.com/
> ** -------
> **
> ** If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L
> ** send a message to the list manager at:
> **
> **      joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
> **
> ** Just say "unsub", followed by your address
>
>
> joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
>
> --
>
>

-----
**
** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is 
** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web: 
**            http://csp3.blogspot.com/ 
** -------
**
** If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L  
** send a message to the list manager at:   
**
**      joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
**
** Just say "unsub", followed by your address

joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
Permalink | Reply | 1 comment |
headers
Benjamin Udell | 5 Aug 2010 01:11
Picon

Re: JSTOR & Transactions

Bob,

That's good to know!

Meanwhile I found that Google has nothing cached from the Website, but Yahoo! does.

Best, Ben

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Robert Lane"
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum"; "Benjamin Udell"
Sent: Wednesday, August 04, 2010 7:01 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] JSTOR & Transactions

Ben,

Thanks for pointing out the problem with the Peirce Society web site.  
I've contacted our web hosting company, and they tell me that they're  
experiencing a hardware problem that should be resolved tonight. So  
hopefully the site will be back up in a few hours.

Best,
Bob

-- 
Robert Lane, Ph.D.
Secretary-Treasurer, Charles S. Peirce Society
Associate Professor and Director of Philosophy
Department of English and Philosophy
University of West Georgia
Carrollton, GA 30118

678 839 4745
rlane <at> westga.edu
http://www.westga.edu/~rlane

Quoting Benjamin Udell 

> Clark, list,
>
> The Charles S. Peirce Society Website seems to be down right now too. Here's the grand TOC as preserved on
www.archive.org/ up till VOLUME 44, NO. 1 WINTER 2008:   
> http://web.archive.org/web/20080617193954/http://www.peircesociety.org/contents.html
>
> Preserved main page   
> http://web.archive.org/web/20080803173556/http://www.peircesociety.org/index.html (August
3, 2008 http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.peircesociety.org/   
> )
>
> Unfortunately archive.org seems not to have preserved the Website's pages from later than mid-2008.
Maybe somebody added a robots.txt thingy at that point. Archive.org doesn't have the Excel file listing
the reviews from earlier years but I have that in Google spreadsheet form somewhere.
>
> Best, Ben
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: Clark Goble
> To: Peirce Discussion Forum
> Sent: Wednesday, August 04, 2010 4:16 PM
> Subject: [peirce-l] JSTOR & Transactions
>
>
> Anyone notice that the old Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society are gone from JSTOR?  What's weird
is that if you do a Google search you still find them. i.e. this page:
>
> http://www.jstor.org/pss/40319754
>
> However when you go into JSTOR these articles aren't there anymore.   
>  When you go to browse journals the Transactions aren't there.  Is this a new thing?  I know SAGE has the
Transactions since 2006 but doesn't have back issues.  Yet I can't find any repository with the back
issues.  Anyone know what is going on or where to look up back issues?

-----
**
** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is 
** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web: 
**            http://csp3.blogspot.com/ 
** -------
**
** If you want to cancel your subscription to PEIRCE-L  
** send a message to the list manager at:   
**
**      joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
**
** Just say "unsub", followed by your address

joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
Permalink | Reply | 0 comments |

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