3 Jan 2010 22:02
Santiago: MS 318 or...
Benjamin Udell <budell <at> nyc.rr.com>
2010-01-03 21:02:43 GMT
2010-01-03 21:02:43 GMT
List,
Brent said that Peirce started using "Santiago" honor of James in May 1909,
and referred to MS 318, where such information fails to appear. Brent
thought he saw the information somewhere, and suspected a mixup between
manuscript numbering systems. I noticed that MS 318 was dated "c.1907" by Robin.
Now why would Peirce in a 1907 MS explain why he starts using "Santiago" in
May 1909? It occurred to me that, if Brent really did see such information,
maybe it was in a 1909 manuscript. And of course, one would expect that Peirce
didn't say that he "adopted" the name "in 1909" - but maybe he said in 1909 that
he's been using it in honor of James (even though he adopted it years earlier
for some other reason). He'd been using it in Monist articles since 1906, and
his name appeared in print with "Santiago" back in 1890.
Below I've copied all the 1909 manuscript listings from the Robin Catalog.
I also included letters and draft letters from Peirce dated 1909.
L 318 ("318" a la MS 318) seems unlikely: "New York Herald (editor). One
letter draft, signed "Constant Reader," [c. 1906]."
MS 619, *620 (the asterisk indicates a numbering discrepancy), and maybe
621 which continues *620, all dated 1909, look particularly interesting, with
autobiographical material, pragmatism, Peirce's intellectual autobiography, the
Metaphysical Club, etc.
I doubt that anybody with access to the manuscripts or the microfilm will
want to go through all the manuscripts and letters listed below, but it might be
worth it for somebody with access to look through MSS 619 and *620 and whatever
else seems a likely candidate from the list below. - Best, Ben
The greater part of the Peirce Collection, exclusive of the correspondence,
was microfilmed in 1963 - 64. Upon completion of the microfilming, errors in
cataloguing were discovered. Because any extensive revision of the microfilm was
prohibited by the expense involved, the microfilm, apart from a very few
changes, was left alone. Asterisks placed before manuscript numbers have called
attention to discrepancies between what was filmed and the revised catalogue
descriptions, except where an entire manuscript was removed from the folder
reserved for it, in which case, for the sake of convenience, the catalogue
description and the microfilm correspond.
339. Logic
A. MS., notebook, n.p., November 12, 1865-November 1, 1909.
CSP kept this notebook from 1865 until his death, recording in it (and dating) many of his investigations in their first stages: "Here I write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in the process of forming a conception." The sheets have been ordered and numbered by Professor Don Roberts, and a page by page index has been provided by him and is kept with the notebook. Among the topics included are: real definition, the categorical syllogism, intension and extension, the logic of relatives, existential graphs, collections, the theory of signs, induction and hypothesis, the history of science, scepticism and common sense, the nature of truth, liberty and necessity.
A. MS., notebook, n.p., November 12, 1865-November 1, 1909.
CSP kept this notebook from 1865 until his death, recording in it (and dating) many of his investigations in their first stages: "Here I write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in the process of forming a conception." The sheets have been ordered and numbered by Professor Don Roberts, and a page by page index has been provided by him and is kept with the notebook. Among the topics included are: real definition, the categorical syllogism, intension and extension, the logic of relatives, existential graphs, collections, the theory of signs, induction and hypothesis, the history of science, scepticism and common sense, the nature of truth, liberty and necessity.
* 514. [Fragments on Existential Graphs]
A. MS., n.p., [1909], 53 pp.
A. MS., n.p., [1909], 53 pp.
618. Introduction (Meaning Introd.)
A. MS., n.p., March 28-29, 1909, pp. 1-3, incomplete.
This is one of several attempts by CSP in 1909 to write an introduction to a collection of his papers on pragmatism. This introduction defines "science" in terms of what it is that animates the true scientist; namely, the dedicated search for truth for its own sake. CSP rejects both the Aristotelian notion that science is syllogistically demonstrated knowledge and the notion that science is systematized knowledge. Reference to Lady Welby's "significs."
A. MS., n.p., March 28-29, 1909, pp. 1-3, incomplete.
This is one of several attempts by CSP in 1909 to write an introduction to a collection of his papers on pragmatism. This introduction defines "science" in terms of what it is that animates the true scientist; namely, the dedicated search for truth for its own sake. CSP rejects both the Aristotelian notion that science is syllogistically demonstrated knowledge and the notion that science is systematized knowledge. Reference to Lady Welby's "significs."
619. Studies in Meaning (Meaning)
A. MS., G-1909-1, March 25-28, pp. 1-14, with 2 rejected pp.
Only the first paragraph published, with minor editorial changes, as 5.358n*. Autobiographical material: persons with whom the Peirce family were acquainted; CSP and his father; CSP's emotional instability; CSP's early interest in chemistry and his discovery of Whately's Logic at the age of 13; the study of Schiller's Aesthetische Briefe, followed by a study of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena, out of which came CSP's lifelong devotion to the study of logic. Members of the Metaphysical Club.
A. MS., G-1909-1, March 25-28, pp. 1-14, with 2 rejected pp.
Only the first paragraph published, with minor editorial changes, as 5.358n*. Autobiographical material: persons with whom the Peirce family were acquainted; CSP and his father; CSP's emotional instability; CSP's early interest in chemistry and his discovery of Whately's Logic at the age of 13; the study of Schiller's Aesthetische Briefe, followed by a study of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena, out of which came CSP's lifelong devotion to the study of logic. Members of the Metaphysical Club.
* 620. Essays Toward the Interpretation of our Thoughts. My Pragmatism
(Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., G-1909-1, April 6-May 24, 1909, pp. 1-51 (pp. 40-41 missing), with 45 pp. of variants.
Only the first sentence of the "Preface" published (7.313n1). CSP's intellectual autobiography: the Metaphysical Club and the influence of Chauncey Wright and Nicholas St. John Green on his thinking. Abbot, who attended but one meeting of the Metaphysical Club, heard CSP on that occasion arguing in favor of Scholastic realism. Half a generation later, Abbot, in a book entitled "Scientific Theism" urged the same opinion. CSP recalls the occasion of writing the 1877-78 articles for the Popular Science Monthly. Pragmatism and pragmatisism distinguished. The fallibility of human reasoning. Sound reasoning and moral virtue. The plight of university instruction in logic. Whewell and J. S. Mill. Biographical notes on Duns Scotus and Ockham. Realism versus nominalism. Nominalism, concludes CSP, leads to absolute sceptisism. The meaning of "real"; the meaning of "universal."
A. MS., G-1909-1, April 6-May 24, 1909, pp. 1-51 (pp. 40-41 missing), with 45 pp. of variants.
Only the first sentence of the "Preface" published (7.313n1). CSP's intellectual autobiography: the Metaphysical Club and the influence of Chauncey Wright and Nicholas St. John Green on his thinking. Abbot, who attended but one meeting of the Metaphysical Club, heard CSP on that occasion arguing in favor of Scholastic realism. Half a generation later, Abbot, in a book entitled "Scientific Theism" urged the same opinion. CSP recalls the occasion of writing the 1877-78 articles for the Popular Science Monthly. Pragmatism and pragmatisism distinguished. The fallibility of human reasoning. Sound reasoning and moral virtue. The plight of university instruction in logic. Whewell and J. S. Mill. Biographical notes on Duns Scotus and Ockham. Realism versus nominalism. Nominalism, concludes CSP, leads to absolute sceptisism. The meaning of "real"; the meaning of "universal."
621. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., n.p., May 24-September 1, 1909, pp. 21-36.6, with 2 rejected pp.; plus pp. 37-42.
This manuscript continues p. 20 of MS. 620. The nominalism-realism controversy. Auguste Comte and J. S. Mill.
A. MS., n.p., May 24-September 1, 1909, pp. 21-36.6, with 2 rejected pp.; plus pp. 37-42.
This manuscript continues p. 20 of MS. 620. The nominalism-realism controversy. Auguste Comte and J. S. Mill.
622. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., n.p., May 26-June 3, 1909, pp. 34-70 (p. 50 missing), 42-43, 51, and fragments.
History of logic: Mill's nominalism; individualism as only one particular variety of nominalism; Bolzano's treatise on logic; Boole's logic; Augustus De Morgan; and the logicians, A. B. Kempe and Josiah Royce.
A. MS., n.p., May 26-June 3, 1909, pp. 34-70 (p. 50 missing), 42-43, 51, and fragments.
History of logic: Mill's nominalism; individualism as only one particular variety of nominalism; Bolzano's treatise on logic; Boole's logic; Augustus De Morgan; and the logicians, A. B. Kempe and Josiah Royce.
623. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., G-1909-1, June 5-7, 1909, pp. 43-50.
Published, in part, as 1.27 (pp. 48-50). Unpublished: an historical explanation of the popularity of nominalism in CSP's day. The union of humanists and Ockhamists in opposition to the position of Duns Scotus.
A. MS., G-1909-1, June 5-7, 1909, pp. 43-50.
Published, in part, as 1.27 (pp. 48-50). Unpublished: an historical explanation of the popularity of nominalism in CSP's day. The union of humanists and Ockhamists in opposition to the position of Duns Scotus.
624. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., n.p., June 7, 1909, pp. 51-56, with a rejected p. 53.
Essence of the method of science lies in hypotheses whose predictions turn into verifications. Mill and the false doctrine of nominalism. Law of the Uniformity of Nature and Mill's attempt to justify it by induction. Doctrine of chances.
A. MS., n.p., June 7, 1909, pp. 51-56, with a rejected p. 53.
Essence of the method of science lies in hypotheses whose predictions turn into verifications. Mill and the false doctrine of nominalism. Law of the Uniformity of Nature and Mill's attempt to justify it by induction. Doctrine of chances.
625. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., n.p., June 12-24, 1909, pp. 51-58, 58-82, incomplete.
Mill and nominalism. What makes nominalism attractive? Mill's contradictory position: he holds with Pearson and Poincare, on the one side, and yet he stands with Whately on induction, on the other side. The Uniformity of Nature Principle. CSP regards inference as possible only because of real connections in re. Characteristics of mathematical reasoning.
A. MS., n.p., June 12-24, 1909, pp. 51-58, 58-82, incomplete.
Mill and nominalism. What makes nominalism attractive? Mill's contradictory position: he holds with Pearson and Poincare, on the one side, and yet he stands with Whately on induction, on the other side. The Uniformity of Nature Principle. CSP regards inference as possible only because of real connections in re. Characteristics of mathematical reasoning.
626. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., n.p., June 12, 1909, pp. 52-56.
Alternate draft of pp. 52-56 of MS. 625.
A. MS., n.p., June 12, 1909, pp. 52-56.
Alternate draft of pp. 52-56 of MS. 625.
627. (Meaning Pragmatism)
A. MS., n.p., June 14, 1909, pp. 59-65.
Probable continuation of pp. 51-58 of MS. 625.
A. MS., n.p., June 14, 1909, pp. 59-65.
Probable continuation of pp. 51-58 of MS. 625.
628. Studies in the Meanings of our Thought. What is the Aim of Thinking?
considered in Two Chapters. Chapter I. The Fixation of Belief (Meaning)
A. MS., n.p., March 1909, pp. 1-2, 2-5.
The aim of reasoning: "to find out, from the consideration of matters and things already known, something else that we had not before known." Good reasoning gives true conclusions from true premises.
A. MS., n.p., March 1909, pp. 1-2, 2-5.
The aim of reasoning: "to find out, from the consideration of matters and things already known, something else that we had not before known." Good reasoning gives true conclusions from true premises.
629. Studies in the Meanings of Our Thoughts. What is the Aim of Thinking,
considered in Two Chapters. Chapter I. The Fixation of Belief (Meaning)
A. MS., n.p., March 1909, pp. 1-2.
The importance of studying logic. Brief comment on the history of instruction in logic.
A. MS., n.p., March 1909, pp. 1-2.
The importance of studying logic. Brief comment on the history of instruction in logic.
630. Studies of Meaning (Meaning)
A. MS., n.p., March 22-25, 1909, pp. 1, 3-6; plus an alternative p. 2 and an unnumbered page.
Reference to the Popular Science Monthly articles of 1877-78 and the formulation of a principle called "pragmatism." Disagreement with James who pressed the matter of pragmatism "further than Mr. Peirce, who continues to acknowledge, not the existence, but yet the reality of the Absolute, as set forth, for example, by Royce." The Metaphysical Club and some of its leading members. CSP's intellectual development. The purpose (and the success) of CSP's attempt to master several of the special sciences.
A. MS., n.p., March 22-25, 1909, pp. 1, 3-6; plus an alternative p. 2 and an unnumbered page.
Reference to the Popular Science Monthly articles of 1877-78 and the formulation of a principle called "pragmatism." Disagreement with James who pressed the matter of pragmatism "further than Mr. Peirce, who continues to acknowledge, not the existence, but yet the reality of the Absolute, as set forth, for example, by Royce." The Metaphysical Club and some of its leading members. CSP's intellectual development. The purpose (and the success) of CSP's attempt to master several of the special sciences.
631. Preface (Meaning Preface to the Volume)
A .MS., n.p., August 24, 1909, pp. 1-4 (for p. 5, see MS. 632).
CSP writes of his many undertakings in science, ranging from chemistry to the history of science. He speaks of his own natural powers of mind as "rather below than above mediocrity," but mentions that his three strongest points have been "self-criticism, persistence, and logical analysis."
A .MS., n.p., August 24, 1909, pp. 1-4 (for p. 5, see MS. 632).
CSP writes of his many undertakings in science, ranging from chemistry to the history of science. He speaks of his own natural powers of mind as "rather below than above mediocrity," but mentions that his three strongest points have been "self-criticism, persistence, and logical analysis."
632. Preface (Meaning Preface to the Book)
A. MS., n.p., August 24-29, 1909, pp. 1-27, plus fragments.
CSP's estimation of his own mental powers. He speaks of having heard "the most extravagant estimates placed upon my mental powers." ". . . my principal deficiency, which is that my brain is small. This renders me incapable of thoroughly grasping together any considerable number of details; and one consequence is that I do not readily pass from one subject, or occupation of thought, to another; whence my persistency." Linguistic expression is not natural to CSP, who claims never to think in words, but always in some kind of diagram. His difficulties with foreign languages. "In college, I received the most humiliating marks for my themes.... My amicable teacher Professor Francis James Child . . . thought I took no pains. But I did." CSP attributes his awkwardness of linguistic expression to his left-handedness, noting that he once wrote with facility right-handed. To grasp what abstract thought is about requires more than reading about doing something - it requires actually doing it. The "literary" habit - CSP's term for it - is ruinous.
A. MS., n.p., August 24-29, 1909, pp. 1-27, plus fragments.
CSP's estimation of his own mental powers. He speaks of having heard "the most extravagant estimates placed upon my mental powers." ". . . my principal deficiency, which is that my brain is small. This renders me incapable of thoroughly grasping together any considerable number of details; and one consequence is that I do not readily pass from one subject, or occupation of thought, to another; whence my persistency." Linguistic expression is not natural to CSP, who claims never to think in words, but always in some kind of diagram. His difficulties with foreign languages. "In college, I received the most humiliating marks for my themes.... My amicable teacher Professor Francis James Child . . . thought I took no pains. But I did." CSP attributes his awkwardness of linguistic expression to his left-handedness, noting that he once wrote with facility right-handed. To grasp what abstract thought is about requires more than reading about doing something - it requires actually doing it. The "literary" habit - CSP's term for it - is ruinous.
633. Preface (Meaning Preface to the volume)
A. MS., n.p., September 4-6, 1909, pp. 1.1-1.8.
Logical and psychological analysis sharply separated, without minimizing the importance of either. Logic does not rest upon psychology, although it is true to say that in the synthetical (methodeutic) part of logic, certain psychological principles ought to be considered. Logic does appeal, however, to mathematics, phenomenology, and esthetics.
A. MS., n.p., September 4-6, 1909, pp. 1.1-1.8.
Logical and psychological analysis sharply separated, without minimizing the importance of either. Logic does not rest upon psychology, although it is true to say that in the synthetical (methodeutic) part of logic, certain psychological principles ought to be considered. Logic does appeal, however, to mathematics, phenomenology, and esthetics.
634. Preface (Meaning Preface to the Book)
A. MS., n.p., September 8-17, 1909, pp. 1-27, with 3 pp. rejected; plus p. 1 of an earlier draft, dated September 7, 1909.
Criticism of the current psychological approach to logic. Ultimate assurance of the truth of the conclusion of any reasoning is faith in the governance of the universe by an Active Reason. The distinction between object of thought and the object thought about. The real object, unlike the object of thought, is not subject to the modifications of thought. Logic as general semiotic; logic considers signs in general. Relationship among object, sign, interpretant. Signs as substitutes for objects and capable of interpretation through the mind. Nothing is able to represent itself exclusively.
A. MS., n.p., September 8-17, 1909, pp. 1-27, with 3 pp. rejected; plus p. 1 of an earlier draft, dated September 7, 1909.
Criticism of the current psychological approach to logic. Ultimate assurance of the truth of the conclusion of any reasoning is faith in the governance of the universe by an Active Reason. The distinction between object of thought and the object thought about. The real object, unlike the object of thought, is not subject to the modifications of thought. Logic as general semiotic; logic considers signs in general. Relationship among object, sign, interpretant. Signs as substitutes for objects and capable of interpretation through the mind. Nothing is able to represent itself exclusively.
635. (Meaning Preface)
A. MS., n.p., September 19 - October 2, 1909, pp. 2-7.7, 8-8 2/3 (p. 8 following p. 7.1), 6-8 (p. 6 following p. 5 of the first sequence).
Logic and psychology. Logic is not concerned with what passes in consciousness, and no person's confidence in an argument is any sure sign of the argument's validity. Doctrine of chances serves to illustrate these points.
A. MS., n.p., September 19 - October 2, 1909, pp. 2-7.7, 8-8 2/3 (p. 8 following p. 7.1), 6-8 (p. 6 following p. 5 of the first sequence).
Logic and psychology. Logic is not concerned with what passes in consciousness, and no person's confidence in an argument is any sure sign of the argument's validity. Doctrine of chances serves to illustrate these points.
636. (Meaning Preface)
A. MS., n.p., September 22-30, 1909, pp. 6-31, plus 2 pp. of variants.
Whether there is any reason for absolute faith. Kant's criticism of Aristotle (<ber die falsche Spitzfindigkeit de vier syllogistischen Figuren") is deemed ludicrous. Kant makes validity of inference dependent on the manner in which facts are thought rather than on the facts themselves. The relationship between logic and psychology. The distinction between "assertion" and "urtheil."
A. MS., n.p., September 22-30, 1909, pp. 6-31, plus 2 pp. of variants.
Whether there is any reason for absolute faith. Kant's criticism of Aristotle (<ber die falsche Spitzfindigkeit de vier syllogistischen Figuren") is deemed ludicrous. Kant makes validity of inference dependent on the manner in which facts are thought rather than on the facts themselves. The relationship between logic and psychology. The distinction between "assertion" and "urtheil."
637. (Meaning Preface)
A. MS., n.p., October 3-13, 1909, pp. 9-36, 27-30, 28-29, 31-36.
Tendency to guess right (but not necessarily on the first guess). Pure logic supports the general assertion that a cautious presumption may be credited if no contrary evidence is available. The discussion of such presumptions is relegated to methodeutic. Criticism of Kant's criticism of Aristotle (Kant's "<ber die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistische Figuren"). Criticism of Sigwart's views that existence is the only form of reality, that any inference from thought to real objects is invalid, and that we know immediately our own thought. Unity of thought as consisting in the continuity of the life of a growing idea. An introduction to CSP's theory of signs which doesn't get beyond the elementary distinctions of the theory. Iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs.
A. MS., n.p., October 3-13, 1909, pp. 9-36, 27-30, 28-29, 31-36.
Tendency to guess right (but not necessarily on the first guess). Pure logic supports the general assertion that a cautious presumption may be credited if no contrary evidence is available. The discussion of such presumptions is relegated to methodeutic. Criticism of Kant's criticism of Aristotle (Kant's "<ber die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistische Figuren"). Criticism of Sigwart's views that existence is the only form of reality, that any inference from thought to real objects is invalid, and that we know immediately our own thought. Unity of thought as consisting in the continuity of the life of a growing idea. An introduction to CSP's theory of signs which doesn't get beyond the elementary distinctions of the theory. Iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs.
638. (Meaning Preface)
A. MS., n.p., October 4-6, 1909, pp. 14-21.
Justification of retroduction. Pure logic encourages inquiry based on hypotheses which we accept on impulse. Practical and scientific retroduction.
A. MS., n.p., October 4-6, 1909, pp. 14-21.
Justification of retroduction. Pure logic encourages inquiry based on hypotheses which we accept on impulse. Practical and scientific retroduction.
639. Essays on Meaning. Preface (Meaning Preface)
A. MS., n.p., October 20, [1909], pp. 1-4.
Condemnation of present day logicians. The importance of restoring logic as the foundation of a liberal education (as was the case in medieval times).
A. MS., n.p., October 20, [1909], pp. 1-4.
Condemnation of present day logicians. The importance of restoring logic as the foundation of a liberal education (as was the case in medieval times).
640. Essays on Meaning. Preface (Meaning Preface)
A. MS., n.p., October 22-23, 1909, pp. 1-12 (with several other pages fitting into the sequence).
The division of logic into three studies: universal grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Mill's distinction between connotation and denotation discussed. CSP's opposition to the leading schools of logic of his day that tie rationality to human consciousness by regarding human consciousness as the author of rationality. For CSP, there is no distinction more momentous than that between "is" and "would be."
A. MS., n.p., October 22-23, 1909, pp. 1-12 (with several other pages fitting into the sequence).
The division of logic into three studies: universal grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Mill's distinction between connotation and denotation discussed. CSP's opposition to the leading schools of logic of his day that tie rationality to human consciousness by regarding human consciousness as the author of rationality. For CSP, there is no distinction more momentous than that between "is" and "would be."
641. Significs and Logic (Significs and Logic)
A. MS., n.p., November 3-18, 1909, pp. 1-24 25/26, plus 4 pp. (November 2-23).
Purpose: analysis of the relations between semeiotic (physiology of signs) and logic (theory of reasoning). Meaning of "argument." Doctrine of chances. Nominalism and realism. The meaning of the word "real." CSP refers to his review of Frazer's edition of Berkeley, in which he took the qualified realist position of Duns Scotus. Here CSP comes out for an unqualified version of realism. CSP regards himself as a disciple of Berkeley, although he is opposed to Berkeley's denial of matter as well as to his nominalism. The distinction between God's reality and God's existence. God's reality, apart from the question of God's existence, canont be doubted by anyone who meditates upon the question. Belief in God is a natural instinct. The nature of God: God is both intelligible and incomprehensible. All atheists are nominalists. Is nominalism consistent? Substance and accident. Indefiniteness: The indefinite is not subject to the principle of contradiction. Modal logic. Analogy between modes of being and modes of meaning. Biographical material: CSP writes of the conferences in Paris of leading geodesists, and he recalls an incident involving Sylvester.
A. MS., n.p., November 3-18, 1909, pp. 1-24 25/26, plus 4 pp. (November 2-23).
Purpose: analysis of the relations between semeiotic (physiology of signs) and logic (theory of reasoning). Meaning of "argument." Doctrine of chances. Nominalism and realism. The meaning of the word "real." CSP refers to his review of Frazer's edition of Berkeley, in which he took the qualified realist position of Duns Scotus. Here CSP comes out for an unqualified version of realism. CSP regards himself as a disciple of Berkeley, although he is opposed to Berkeley's denial of matter as well as to his nominalism. The distinction between God's reality and God's existence. God's reality, apart from the question of God's existence, canont be doubted by anyone who meditates upon the question. Belief in God is a natural instinct. The nature of God: God is both intelligible and incomprehensible. All atheists are nominalists. Is nominalism consistent? Substance and accident. Indefiniteness: The indefinite is not subject to the principle of contradiction. Modal logic. Analogy between modes of being and modes of meaning. Biographical material: CSP writes of the conferences in Paris of leading geodesists, and he recalls an incident involving Sylvester.
642. Significs and Logic (Significs and Logic)
A. MS., n.p., November 25-28, 1909, pp. 8-25.
This manuscript continues the preceding one. The meaning of "real." The distinction between the externality and internality of fact supported by common sense. Signification of reality compared with externality of fact. Three kinds of modality. The three modes of assertion of law, of actual fast, of freedom. Principle of excluded middle does not apply to assertions of law; principle of contradiction does not apply to assertions of freedom. Both principles apply to assertions of actual fast. Sophistries of nominalism. Some of Locke's views present difficulties for CSP.
A. MS., n.p., November 25-28, 1909, pp. 8-25.
This manuscript continues the preceding one. The meaning of "real." The distinction between the externality and internality of fact supported by common sense. Signification of reality compared with externality of fact. Three kinds of modality. The three modes of assertion of law, of actual fast, of freedom. Principle of excluded middle does not apply to assertions of law; principle of contradiction does not apply to assertions of freedom. Both principles apply to assertions of actual fast. Sophistries of nominalism. Some of Locke's views present difficulties for CSP.
643. Studies of Logical Analysis, or Definition (Definition 1st
notes)
A. MS., n.p., December 12-13, 1909, pp. 1-7, incomplete.
Purpose: discovery of the methods of dissecting the meaning of a sign. Meanings and chemical substances. The notion of valence, or attachment (the "pegs" of CSP's existential graphs). The difference between various attachments of a concept and the valences of carbon: The attachments are unlike each other; the valences are not qualitatively different. Is it the case that we always think in signs? Signs and ideas.
A. MS., n.p., December 12-13, 1909, pp. 1-7, incomplete.
Purpose: discovery of the methods of dissecting the meaning of a sign. Meanings and chemical substances. The notion of valence, or attachment (the "pegs" of CSP's existential graphs). The difference between various attachments of a concept and the valences of carbon: The attachments are unlike each other; the valences are not qualitatively different. Is it the case that we always think in signs? Signs and ideas.
644. On Definition or The Analysis of Meaning (Definition: 2nd
Draught)
A. MS., n.p., December 21, 1909, 1 p.
What it means to say that anything is dependent. What it means to say that any predicate is essentially true. Importance of the notion of "would be" for philosophy.
A. MS., n.p., December 21, 1909, 1 p.
What it means to say that anything is dependent. What it means to say that any predicate is essentially true. Importance of the notion of "would be" for philosophy.
645. How to Define (Definition: 3rd Draught)
A. MS., n.p., December 22 - January 12, 1910, pp. 1-26, with a variant p. 20.
Three studies distinguished (phaneroscopy, logic, and psychology) and their order of dependence established. Feeling, volition, and thought. In regard to feeling, Hume is in error, for he is committed to the view that vividness is an element of a sensequality. The three modes of separating the elements of a thought-object are precision, dissociation, and discrimination. Volition and purpose. Resemblances as residing in the interpretation of secondary feelings. CSP's essential conservatism. He warns, however, that self-criticism, carried too far, leads to exaggerated distrust.
A. MS., n.p., December 22 - January 12, 1910, pp. 1-26, with a variant p. 20.
Three studies distinguished (phaneroscopy, logic, and psychology) and their order of dependence established. Feeling, volition, and thought. In regard to feeling, Hume is in error, for he is committed to the view that vividness is an element of a sensequality. The three modes of separating the elements of a thought-object are precision, dissociation, and discrimination. Volition and purpose. Resemblances as residing in the interpretation of secondary feelings. CSP's essential conservatism. He warns, however, that self-criticism, carried too far, leads to exaggerated distrust.
L 36. Barnet, Samuel. Fragments of letter drafts from CSP, two of which are
dated, December 8, 1909 and February 16, 1910.
L 80. Century Company (Century Dictionary). Forty-seven letters to CSP and
Juliette Peirce, April 12, 1890-May 18, 1932; nine letter drafts from CSP, April
10, 1901 June 20, 1909, and n.d. One letter (J. R. Buchanan) to the editor of
the Century Dictionary, June 24, n. yr.
L 187. Harvard Cooperative Society. One letter draft from CSP, January 1,
1909.
L 224. James, William. One letter (fragment) to CSP, n.d.; one postal card
to CSP, Rome November 26, 1900; one telegram to CSP, March 20, 1903; several
letter drafts and fragments of drafts from, most of which are dated or have been
dated, with the dates ranging from [April 1897] to [December 25, 1909].
L 366. Quincy, Josiah ("Cousin Jo"). Five letter drafts from CSP, June
25-July 15, 1909, and n.d. Fragment, n.d.
L 387. Russell, Francis C. Thirty-three letters to CSP, January 16,
1888-December 10, 1908; two letters (copies) from, September 17, 1887 and n.d.;
sixty letter drafts and three postal cards from, September 12, 1887-January 23,
1909, and n.d.; four telegrams from, February 6, 1893-May 13, 1896. One letter
draft from CSP to Carus, n.d.; one letter draft from CSP to the Editor of the
Monist, October 7, 1904. Also: a copy of a letter (Edward C. Higilen) to
Russell, September 19, 1894 and Agapetos' article on religion (sent to CSP by
Russell).
L 424. Story, William Edward. Three letters to CSP, June 13, 1899-December
1, 1900; nine
letter drafts from, March 22, 1896-January 26, 1909.
letter drafts from, March 22, 1896-January 26, 1909.
L 463. Welby, Lady Victoria. Eighteen letters to CSP, May 24, 1903 - June
27, 1911; two postal cards to, November 20 and December 17, 1903; three letters
to Juliette Peirce, October 18, 1909 - February 25, (1912), the last of which is
from Maria L. H. Welby, daughter-in-law of Lady Welby; thirteen letter drafts
from CSP, May 4, 1904 - March 14, 1909, and n.d.; one letter draft (Juliette
Peirce, but in CSP's hand), n.d. Fragment, n.d. (February 9, 1909 in upper right
corner applies to some independent calculations). One letter (Open Court) to
CSP, November 1, 1898. Two letters (J. W. Slaughter) to CSP, August 20, 1909 and
April 25, 1911.
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