Santiago: MS 318 or...
2010-01-03 21:02:43 GMT
A. MS., notebook, n.p., November 12, 1865-November 1, 1909.
CSP kept this notebook from 1865 until his death, recording in it (and dating) many of his investigations in their first stages: "Here I write but never after read what I have written for what I write is done in the process of forming a conception." The sheets have been ordered and numbered by Professor Don Roberts, and a page by page index has been provided by him and is kept with the notebook. Among the topics included are: real definition, the categorical syllogism, intension and extension, the logic of relatives, existential graphs, collections, the theory of signs, induction and hypothesis, the history of science, scepticism and common sense, the nature of truth, liberty and necessity.
A. MS., n.p., , 53 pp.
A. MS., n.p., March 28-29, 1909, pp. 1-3, incomplete.
This is one of several attempts by CSP in 1909 to write an introduction to a collection of his papers on pragmatism. This introduction defines "science" in terms of what it is that animates the true scientist; namely, the dedicated search for truth for its own sake. CSP rejects both the Aristotelian notion that science is syllogistically demonstrated knowledge and the notion that science is systematized knowledge. Reference to Lady Welby's "significs."
A. MS., G-1909-1, March 25-28, pp. 1-14, with 2 rejected pp.
Only the first paragraph published, with minor editorial changes, as 5.358n*. Autobiographical material: persons with whom the Peirce family were acquainted; CSP and his father; CSP's emotional instability; CSP's early interest in chemistry and his discovery of Whately's Logic at the age of 13; the study of Schiller's Aesthetische Briefe, followed by a study of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Prolegomena, out of which came CSP's lifelong devotion to the study of logic. Members of the Metaphysical Club.
A. MS., G-1909-1, April 6-May 24, 1909, pp. 1-51 (pp. 40-41 missing), with 45 pp. of variants.
Only the first sentence of the "Preface" published (7.313n1). CSP's intellectual autobiography: the Metaphysical Club and the influence of Chauncey Wright and Nicholas St. John Green on his thinking. Abbot, who attended but one meeting of the Metaphysical Club, heard CSP on that occasion arguing in favor of Scholastic realism. Half a generation later, Abbot, in a book entitled "Scientific Theism" urged the same opinion. CSP recalls the occasion of writing the 1877-78 articles for the Popular Science Monthly. Pragmatism and pragmatisism distinguished. The fallibility of human reasoning. Sound reasoning and moral virtue. The plight of university instruction in logic. Whewell and J. S. Mill. Biographical notes on Duns Scotus and Ockham. Realism versus nominalism. Nominalism, concludes CSP, leads to absolute sceptisism. The meaning of "real"; the meaning of "universal."
A. MS., n.p., May 24-September 1, 1909, pp. 21-36.6, with 2 rejected pp.; plus pp. 37-42.
This manuscript continues p. 20 of MS. 620. The nominalism-realism controversy. Auguste Comte and J. S. Mill.
A. MS., n.p., May 26-June 3, 1909, pp. 34-70 (p. 50 missing), 42-43, 51, and fragments.
History of logic: Mill's nominalism; individualism as only one particular variety of nominalism; Bolzano's treatise on logic; Boole's logic; Augustus De Morgan; and the logicians, A. B. Kempe and Josiah Royce.
A. MS., G-1909-1, June 5-7, 1909, pp. 43-50.
Published, in part, as 1.27 (pp. 48-50). Unpublished: an historical explanation of the popularity of nominalism in CSP's day. The union of humanists and Ockhamists in opposition to the position of Duns Scotus.
A. MS., n.p., June 7, 1909, pp. 51-56, with a rejected p. 53.
Essence of the method of science lies in hypotheses whose predictions turn into verifications. Mill and the false doctrine of nominalism. Law of the Uniformity of Nature and Mill's attempt to justify it by induction. Doctrine of chances.
A. MS., n.p., June 12-24, 1909, pp. 51-58, 58-82, incomplete.
Mill and nominalism. What makes nominalism attractive? Mill's contradictory position: he holds with Pearson and Poincare, on the one side, and yet he stands with Whately on induction, on the other side. The Uniformity of Nature Principle. CSP regards inference as possible only because of real connections in re. Characteristics of mathematical reasoning.
A. MS., n.p., June 12, 1909, pp. 52-56.
Alternate draft of pp. 52-56 of MS. 625.
A. MS., n.p., June 14, 1909, pp. 59-65.
Probable continuation of pp. 51-58 of MS. 625.
A. MS., n.p., March 1909, pp. 1-2, 2-5.
The aim of reasoning: "to find out, from the consideration of matters and things already known, something else that we had not before known." Good reasoning gives true conclusions from true premises.
A. MS., n.p., March 1909, pp. 1-2.
The importance of studying logic. Brief comment on the history of instruction in logic.
A. MS., n.p., March 22-25, 1909, pp. 1, 3-6; plus an alternative p. 2 and an unnumbered page.
Reference to the Popular Science Monthly articles of 1877-78 and the formulation of a principle called "pragmatism." Disagreement with James who pressed the matter of pragmatism "further than Mr. Peirce, who continues to acknowledge, not the existence, but yet the reality of the Absolute, as set forth, for example, by Royce." The Metaphysical Club and some of its leading members. CSP's intellectual development. The purpose (and the success) of CSP's attempt to master several of the special sciences.
A .MS., n.p., August 24, 1909, pp. 1-4 (for p. 5, see MS. 632).
CSP writes of his many undertakings in science, ranging from chemistry to the history of science. He speaks of his own natural powers of mind as "rather below than above mediocrity," but mentions that his three strongest points have been "self-criticism, persistence, and logical analysis."
A. MS., n.p., August 24-29, 1909, pp. 1-27, plus fragments.
CSP's estimation of his own mental powers. He speaks of having heard "the most extravagant estimates placed upon my mental powers." ". . . my principal deficiency, which is that my brain is small. This renders me incapable of thoroughly grasping together any considerable number of details; and one consequence is that I do not readily pass from one subject, or occupation of thought, to another; whence my persistency." Linguistic expression is not natural to CSP, who claims never to think in words, but always in some kind of diagram. His difficulties with foreign languages. "In college, I received the most humiliating marks for my themes.... My amicable teacher Professor Francis James Child . . . thought I took no pains. But I did." CSP attributes his awkwardness of linguistic expression to his left-handedness, noting that he once wrote with facility right-handed. To grasp what abstract thought is about requires more than reading about doing something - it requires actually doing it. The "literary" habit - CSP's term for it - is ruinous.
A. MS., n.p., September 4-6, 1909, pp. 1.1-1.8.
Logical and psychological analysis sharply separated, without minimizing the importance of either. Logic does not rest upon psychology, although it is true to say that in the synthetical (methodeutic) part of logic, certain psychological principles ought to be considered. Logic does appeal, however, to mathematics, phenomenology, and esthetics.
A. MS., n.p., September 8-17, 1909, pp. 1-27, with 3 pp. rejected; plus p. 1 of an earlier draft, dated September 7, 1909.
Criticism of the current psychological approach to logic. Ultimate assurance of the truth of the conclusion of any reasoning is faith in the governance of the universe by an Active Reason. The distinction between object of thought and the object thought about. The real object, unlike the object of thought, is not subject to the modifications of thought. Logic as general semiotic; logic considers signs in general. Relationship among object, sign, interpretant. Signs as substitutes for objects and capable of interpretation through the mind. Nothing is able to represent itself exclusively.
A. MS., n.p., September 19 - October 2, 1909, pp. 2-7.7, 8-8 2/3 (p. 8 following p. 7.1), 6-8 (p. 6 following p. 5 of the first sequence).
Logic and psychology. Logic is not concerned with what passes in consciousness, and no person's confidence in an argument is any sure sign of the argument's validity. Doctrine of chances serves to illustrate these points.
A. MS., n.p., September 22-30, 1909, pp. 6-31, plus 2 pp. of variants.
Whether there is any reason for absolute faith. Kant's criticism of Aristotle (<ber die falsche Spitzfindigkeit de vier syllogistischen Figuren") is deemed ludicrous. Kant makes validity of inference dependent on the manner in which facts are thought rather than on the facts themselves. The relationship between logic and psychology. The distinction between "assertion" and "urtheil."
A. MS., n.p., October 3-13, 1909, pp. 9-36, 27-30, 28-29, 31-36.
Tendency to guess right (but not necessarily on the first guess). Pure logic supports the general assertion that a cautious presumption may be credited if no contrary evidence is available. The discussion of such presumptions is relegated to methodeutic. Criticism of Kant's criticism of Aristotle (Kant's "<ber die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistische Figuren"). Criticism of Sigwart's views that existence is the only form of reality, that any inference from thought to real objects is invalid, and that we know immediately our own thought. Unity of thought as consisting in the continuity of the life of a growing idea. An introduction to CSP's theory of signs which doesn't get beyond the elementary distinctions of the theory. Iconic, indexical, and symbolic signs.
A. MS., n.p., October 4-6, 1909, pp. 14-21.
Justification of retroduction. Pure logic encourages inquiry based on hypotheses which we accept on impulse. Practical and scientific retroduction.
A. MS., n.p., October 20, , pp. 1-4.
Condemnation of present day logicians. The importance of restoring logic as the foundation of a liberal education (as was the case in medieval times).
A. MS., n.p., October 22-23, 1909, pp. 1-12 (with several other pages fitting into the sequence).
The division of logic into three studies: universal grammar, critic, and methodeutic. Mill's distinction between connotation and denotation discussed. CSP's opposition to the leading schools of logic of his day that tie rationality to human consciousness by regarding human consciousness as the author of rationality. For CSP, there is no distinction more momentous than that between "is" and "would be."
A. MS., n.p., November 3-18, 1909, pp. 1-24 25/26, plus 4 pp. (November 2-23).
Purpose: analysis of the relations between semeiotic (physiology of signs) and logic (theory of reasoning). Meaning of "argument." Doctrine of chances. Nominalism and realism. The meaning of the word "real." CSP refers to his review of Frazer's edition of Berkeley, in which he took the qualified realist position of Duns Scotus. Here CSP comes out for an unqualified version of realism. CSP regards himself as a disciple of Berkeley, although he is opposed to Berkeley's denial of matter as well as to his nominalism. The distinction between God's reality and God's existence. God's reality, apart from the question of God's existence, canont be doubted by anyone who meditates upon the question. Belief in God is a natural instinct. The nature of God: God is both intelligible and incomprehensible. All atheists are nominalists. Is nominalism consistent? Substance and accident. Indefiniteness: The indefinite is not subject to the principle of contradiction. Modal logic. Analogy between modes of being and modes of meaning. Biographical material: CSP writes of the conferences in Paris of leading geodesists, and he recalls an incident involving Sylvester.
A. MS., n.p., November 25-28, 1909, pp. 8-25.
This manuscript continues the preceding one. The meaning of "real." The distinction between the externality and internality of fact supported by common sense. Signification of reality compared with externality of fact. Three kinds of modality. The three modes of assertion of law, of actual fast, of freedom. Principle of excluded middle does not apply to assertions of law; principle of contradiction does not apply to assertions of freedom. Both principles apply to assertions of actual fast. Sophistries of nominalism. Some of Locke's views present difficulties for CSP.
A. MS., n.p., December 12-13, 1909, pp. 1-7, incomplete.
Purpose: discovery of the methods of dissecting the meaning of a sign. Meanings and chemical substances. The notion of valence, or attachment (the "pegs" of CSP's existential graphs). The difference between various attachments of a concept and the valences of carbon: The attachments are unlike each other; the valences are not qualitatively different. Is it the case that we always think in signs? Signs and ideas.
A. MS., n.p., December 21, 1909, 1 p.
What it means to say that anything is dependent. What it means to say that any predicate is essentially true. Importance of the notion of "would be" for philosophy.
A. MS., n.p., December 22 - January 12, 1910, pp. 1-26, with a variant p. 20.
Three studies distinguished (phaneroscopy, logic, and psychology) and their order of dependence established. Feeling, volition, and thought. In regard to feeling, Hume is in error, for he is committed to the view that vividness is an element of a sensequality. The three modes of separating the elements of a thought-object are precision, dissociation, and discrimination. Volition and purpose. Resemblances as residing in the interpretation of secondary feelings. CSP's essential conservatism. He warns, however, that self-criticism, carried too far, leads to exaggerated distrust.
letter drafts from, March 22, 1896-January 26, 1909.
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