Re: [peirce-l] André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

RE: [peirce-l] André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

Re: [peirce-l] RE: [peirce-l] André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

Gary has suggested a categorial analysis of Peirce's phenomenology as 
follows:

Phaneroscopy (1ns)
|> Category theory (3ns)
Iconoscopy (2ns)

But as we have already discussed, Peirce decided c.1904 to use the term 
"phaneroscopy" where he had been using "phenomenology". This could 
entail -- if we accept Gary's analysis as implicit in our reading of both 
Peirce and De Tienne (though neither of them make it explicit) -- that 
"phaneroscopy" sometimes refers to the whole triad and sometimes to the 
Firstness of it. The term then has the same sort of ambiguity as the term 
"sign", which sometimes refers to the whole semiotic triad and sometimes 
to the representamen only. It seems to me that if we read the De Tienne 
statements which Joe has cited in this way, our conception of the 
phaneron is not thereby obscured, but the problem of whether 
"phaneroscopy" is a science or not simply vanishes.

This is not a special hermeneutic devised to solve a special problem; 
rather it is the normal way of reading, relying on context to resolve or 
prevent ambiguities. Perhaps it employs a principle of charity, as some 
call it, but not to any greater degree than normal scientific discourse. 
Perhaps, Joe, you can clarify why this way of reading De Tienne does not 
solve the problem you've raised? If it does, then we can turn our 
attention more directly to elucidating the relations among Phaneroscopy, 
Iconoscopy and category theory.

        gnox

----- Original Message ----- 

Martin, Gary, Gnox, Auke, Steven, Ben, list generally:

Thanks, Martin, for your introductory statement (included below) 
describing Andre's work on the phaneron-sign relationship and the nature 
of phaneroscopy, which provides a succinct and informative indication of 
what he is attempting to do.  So far as I know Andre was the first to 
break the ground for getting at the problematics connected with the 
category theory by insisting on the prior independence of the phaneron, 
which of course raises the question of how to understand its relation to 
the sign, i.e. to the three-term representation relation.  The reason for 
Andre's special concern with my view of the matter is that I had 
inadvertently obscured that problem by identifying in an unqualified way 
the conception of manifestation with the conception of a sign.  I accept 
his critique of that as a misidentification on my part.  Actually, I had 
not thought of my view as involving a simple identification of the two 
conceptions but only as providing a helpful way of understanding what a 
sign is supposed to be doing, regarded functionally, namely, making 
something cognitively available, whether directly or indirectly, 
depending on the type of sign it is. But still, I should have been more 
circumspect in my statement.

As regards the entity's status as phenomenon as distinct from its status 
as sign, this topic simply didn't catch my attention since I was 
primarily focused on the early published writings of Peirce in the late 
l860's, above all the New List of categories of 1867 and the three papers 
on the theory of cognition in the Jourrnal of Speculative Philosophy 
1868-69, and it didn't occur to me that the topic of the nature of the 
phenomenon as such might ever have to be addressed by me, given that my 
interest was primarily in Peirce's logic and epistemology (or what takes 
the place of epistemology in his philosophy). And as regards the idea of 
phenomenology as a science, Peirce himself didn't think of there being 
such a thing as a distinct science of phenomenology until much later, 
apparently no earlier than 1902 or maybe even 1903 -- up until then he 
was thinking of what he does in the New List as a part of speculative 
grammar, and I assumed there really wasn't much more to be done under 
that heading than what had already been done earlier on in the New List 
without assuming that there was any special science of the phenomena to 
handle it.  I was mistaken about there being no need for a special 
science, as I now realize, but that mistake was not a bone of contention 
between Andre and me as far as I was concerned, even though I noticed 
that Andre apparently thought there is some important disagreement there; 
but I thought that what he had to say about that sort of thing was much 
ado about nothing of real importance to me, at any rate.  The only thing 
that really concerned me in connection with his critique of my view was 
whether or not it put into question what I thought important in what I 
had argued for, which was the special role iconicity could play in the 
solution of the problem of reconciling immediate and representative 
perception, and it looked to me as if that was not seriously endangered 
by anything he was saying, though I could see that what he had figured 
out about the phaneron might complicate the matter beyond anything that 
had occurred to me thus far.

That was how I was thinking of these things up until only a few days ago 
when I suddenly realized that there was something obviously amiss, and 
seriously so, in Andre's notion of what a Peircean phenomenology would be 
like as a science, which had struck me earlier as odd and perhaps 
somewhat questionable but which I had dismissed as not being of any great 
importance, as far as I was concerned.  So phaneroscopy would be 
primarily observational rather than theoretical, descriptive rather than 
explanatory, etc.:  So what?  Peirce had always recognized that there are 
a number of different types of sciences as regards what sort of 
methodology they rely upon most heavily (inductive, 
hypothetico-deductive, deductive), what sort of results they are aiming 
at (classification, explanation, narration, prediction),  and so on.  But 
I hadn't noticed how obviously and profoundly contradictory Peirce's 
conception of science is to what Andre was imputing to him as being his 
view of what phaneroscopy is.

The reason this seems to go unnoticed by others as well may be that, 
stylistically, Andre has a flair for the dramatic which combines with a 
willingness to find in the seemingly paradoxical a challenge for him to 
address and overcome, and I read him at first as merely doing that: 
addressing zestfully the apparent self-contradictions on Peirce's part by 
showing that their paradoxicality has a point to it, much as, say, how 
one might explain why Kant made use of the paralogisms and antinomies of 
reason in the first Critique or perhaps even how one might explain 
Wittgenstein's famous concluding remark in the Tractatus about the 
Tractatus itself being nonsense.  But then I realized that although Andre 
was perhaps doing something like that to some extent, he was not 
overcoming all of the apparent paradoxes by any means, but actually 
defending a conception of phaneroscopy as a science which is as radically 
contradictory of what Peirce's view of science is as it could possibly 
be: namely, that phaneroscopy is acritical, that it is not concerned with 
truth, that it makes no assertions, that the "single-minded and honest" 
phaneroscopist is incapable of error, that his or her research results 
cannot be questioned but merely accepted, and this without any reason 
being given for putting them forth as results because the phaneroscopist 
makes no claims at all.  These things are not explained away by him.

Of course Andre thinks he has ample textual warrant for so characterizing 
phaneroscopy, and we will have to see if that is really so by looking 
very closely at what Peirce says, and if Andre is justified in his 
interpretation then Peirce will, in my opinion, have to be adjudged as 
having lost his mental grip at this point.  For in that case we ought not 
to find what he says acceptable, and it is just too wild to be brushed 
aside as a trivial self-contradiction.  Why should we refuse to find it 
acceptable?  Because to accept it would be to attack his philosophy at 
its strongest point, which is his understanding of how science works. 
Who is going to take Peirce's view of science seriously if he can rightly 
be construed as recognizing such a thing as Andre describes as being a 
science?

When I saw your message in the mail, I was about to post another message 
that goes into this matter in some detail, trying to bring it to the 
attention of others on the list -- Gary and Gnox in particular -- who 
seem not to want to look all that closely at what it is that they are 
affirming when they affirm Andre's view.  The purpose of the present 
message, though, is just to apprise you of my view of this since I think 
it might be a good idea to settle this first before getting into what is 
really of importance in what Andre has done, and I believe it is to his 
advantage, too, to dispose of it quickly, if at all possible, and then 
move on.  If we don't do this then it will, I believe, seriously affect 
our understanding of much of what Andre says, for example, about the use 
of diagrams in the process of phaneroscopic observation by making it 
quite impossible to understand what that is really all about, which 
cannot possibly be understood as activity that can dispense with 
assertion and conclusion drawing, with concern for truth, proceed 
infallibly, and restrict itself to mere iconic showing in lieu of logical 
attribution and denial, and so forth.

Unfortunately, I can't finish off that other message until tomorrow, as 
time has run out on me for today, given other obligations.  But you can 
look over what I have already said to Gary and Gnox and I suggest that 
you re-read particularly closely the quotes from Andre.

Joe

-----
**
** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is 
** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web: 
**            http://csp3.blogspot.com/ 
**
-----

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Re: [peirce-l] André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

gnox, list,

Just a quick note on the chronology of Peirce's terminology here, and one more concerning the
pervasiveness of trichotomies in the classification of the sciences. gnox wrote:

[gnox] "But as we have already discussed, Peirce decided c.1904 to use the term "phaneroscopy" where he had
been using "phenomenology"

But he does not always do so after 1904. For example, as late as August 1911, in an unfinished manuscript
titled "A Sketch of Logical Critics" Peirce writes:

"Under Philosophy, we shall find ourselves again forced,--unless we wrench matters,--to make a
trichotomy; recognizing first, Phenomenology; second, the Critical, or Normative, Sciences, and
third, Metaphysics, the science of Reality" (EP2:459).

Note also that this manuscript is one of several places where Peirce remarks on the trichotomic structure
of, if not all, at least most all of his classification. And, I have noted elsewhere, that even though the
Special Sciences, for example, are divided into two branches, the Psychical and the Physical, the
subdivision of each of these is into three, namely, the descriptive, classificatory, and nomonological.

Best,

Gary

 
>
>Gary has suggested a categorial analysis of Peirce's phenomenology as 
>follows:
>
>Phaneroscopy (1ns)
>|> Category theory (3ns)
>Iconoscopy (2ns)
>
>But as we have already discussed, Peirce decided c.1904 to use the term 
>"phaneroscopy" where he had been using "phenomenology". This could 
>entail -- if we accept Gary's analysis as implicit in our reading of both 
>Peirce and De Tienne (though neither of them make it explicit) -- that 
>"phaneroscopy" sometimes refers to the whole triad and sometimes to the 
>Firstness of it. The term then has the same sort of ambiguity as the term 
>"sign", which sometimes refers to the whole semiotic triad and sometimes 
>to the representamen only. It seems to me that if we read the De Tienne 
>statements which Joe has cited in this way, our conception of the 
>phaneron is not thereby obscured, but the problem of whether 
>"phaneroscopy" is a science or not simply vanishes.
>
>This is not a special hermeneutic devised to solve a special problem; 
>rather it is the normal way of reading, relying on context to resolve or 
>prevent ambiguities. Perhaps it employs a principle of charity, as some 
>call it, but not to any greater degree than normal scientific discourse. 
>Perhaps, Joe, you can clarify why this way of reading De Tienne does not 
>solve the problem you've raised? If it does, then we can turn our 
>attention more directly to elucidating the relations among Phaneroscopy, 
>Iconoscopy and category theory.
>
>        gnox
>
>----- Original Message ----- 
>
>Martin, Gary, Gnox, Auke, Steven, Ben, list generally:
>
>Thanks, Martin, for your introductory statement (included below) 
>describing Andre's work on the phaneron-sign relationship and the nature 
>of phaneroscopy, which provides a succinct and informative indication of 
>what he is attempting to do.  So far as I know Andre was the first to 
>break the ground for getting at the problematics connected with the 
>category theory by insisting on the prior independence of the phaneron, 
>which of course raises the question of how to understand its relation to 
>the sign, i.e. to the three-term representation relation.  The reason for 
>Andre's special concern with my view of the matter is that I had 
>inadvertently obscured that problem by identifying in an unqualified way 
>the conception of manifestation with the conception of a sign.  I accept 
>his critique of that as a misidentification on my part.  Actually, I had 
>not thought of my view as involving a simple identification of the two 
>conceptions but only as providing a helpful way of understanding what a 
>sign is supposed to be doing, regarded functionally, namely, making 
>something cognitively available, whether directly or indirectly, 
>depending on the type of sign it is. But still, I should have been more 
>circumspect in my statement.
>
>As regards the entity's status as phenomenon as distinct from its status 
>as sign, this topic simply didn't catch my attention since I was 
>primarily focused on the early published writings of Peirce in the late 
>l860's, above all the New List of categories of 1867 and the three papers 
>on the theory of cognition in the Jourrnal of Speculative Philosophy 
>1868-69, and it didn't occur to me that the topic of the nature of the 
>phenomenon as such might ever have to be addressed by me, given that my 
>interest was primarily in Peirce's logic and epistemology (or what takes 
>the place of epistemology in his philosophy). And as regards the idea of 
>phenomenology as a science, Peirce himself didn't think of there being 
>such a thing as a distinct science of phenomenology until much later, 
>apparently no earlier than 1902 or maybe even 1903 -- up until then he 
>was thinking of what he does in the New List as a part of speculative 
>grammar, and I assumed there really wasn't much more to be done under 
>that heading than what had already been done earlier on in the New List 
>without assuming that there was any special science of the phenomena to 
>handle it.  I was mistaken about there being no need for a special 
>science, as I now realize, but that mistake was not a bone of contention 
>between Andre and me as far as I was concerned, even though I noticed 
>that Andre apparently thought there is some important disagreement there; 
>but I thought that what he had to say about that sort of thing was much 
>ado about nothing of real importance to me, at any rate.  The only thing 
>that really concerned me in connection with his critique of my view was 
>whether or not it put into question what I thought important in what I 
>had argued for, which was the special role iconicity could play in the 
>solution of the problem of reconciling immediate and representative 
>perception, and it looked to me as if that was not seriously endangered 
>by anything he was saying, though I could see that what he had figured 
>out about the phaneron might complicate the matter beyond anything that 
>had occurred to me thus far.
>
>That was how I was thinking of these things up until only a few days ago 
>when I suddenly realized that there was something obviously amiss, and 
>seriously so, in Andre's notion of what a Peircean phenomenology would be 
>like as a science, which had struck me earlier as odd and perhaps 
>somewhat questionable but which I had dismissed as not being of any great 
>importance, as far as I was concerned.  So phaneroscopy would be 
>primarily observational rather than theoretical, descriptive rather than 
>explanatory, etc.:  So what?  Peirce had always recognized that there are 
>a number of different types of sciences as regards what sort of 
>methodology they rely upon most heavily (inductive, 
>hypothetico-deductive, deductive), what sort of results they are aiming 
>at (classification, explanation, narration, prediction),  and so on.  But 
>I hadn't noticed how obviously and profoundly contradictory Peirce's 
>conception of science is to what Andre was imputing to him as being his 
>view of what phaneroscopy is.
>
>The reason this seems to go unnoticed by others as well may be that, 
>stylistically, Andre has a flair for the dramatic which combines with a 
>willingness to find in the seemingly paradoxical a challenge for him to 
>address and overcome, and I read him at first as merely doing that: 
>addressing zestfully the apparent self-contradictions on Peirce's part by 
>showing that their paradoxicality has a point to it, much as, say, how 
>one might explain why Kant made use of the paralogisms and antinomies of 
>reason in the first Critique or perhaps even how one might explain 
>Wittgenstein's famous concluding remark in the Tractatus about the 
>Tractatus itself being nonsense.  But then I realized that although Andre 
>was perhaps doing something like that to some extent, he was not 
>overcoming all of the apparent paradoxes by any means, but actually 
>defending a conception of phaneroscopy as a science which is as radically 
>contradictory of what Peirce's view of science is as it could possibly 
>be: namely, that phaneroscopy is acritical, that it is not concerned with 
>truth, that it makes no assertions, that the "single-minded and honest" 
>phaneroscopist is incapable of error, that his or her research results 
>cannot be questioned but merely accepted, and this without any reason 
>being given for putting them forth as results because the phaneroscopist 
>makes no claims at all.  These things are not explained away by him.
>
>Of course Andre thinks he has ample textual warrant for so characterizing 
>phaneroscopy, and we will have to see if that is really so by looking 
>very closely at what Peirce says, and if Andre is justified in his 
>interpretation then Peirce will, in my opinion, have to be adjudged as 
>having lost his mental grip at this point.  For in that case we ought not 
>to find what he says acceptable, and it is just too wild to be brushed 
>aside as a trivial self-contradiction.  Why should we refuse to find it 
>acceptable?  Because to accept it would be to attack his philosophy at 
>its strongest point, which is his understanding of how science works. 
>Who is going to take Peirce's view of science seriously if he can rightly 
>be construed as recognizing such a thing as Andre describes as being a 
>science?
>
>When I saw your message in the mail, I was about to post another message 
>that goes into this matter in some detail, trying to bring it to the 
>attention of others on the list -- Gary and Gnox in particular -- who 
>seem not to want to look all that closely at what it is that they are 
>affirming when they affirm Andre's view.  The purpose of the present 
>message, though, is just to apprise you of my view of this since I think 
>it might be a good idea to settle this first before getting into what is 
>really of importance in what Andre has done, and I believe it is to his 
>advantage, too, to dispose of it quickly, if at all possible, and then 
>move on.  If we don't do this then it will, I believe, seriously affect 
>our understanding of much of what Andre says, for example, about the use 
>of diagrams in the process of phaneroscopic observation by making it 
>quite impossible to understand what that is really all about, which 
>cannot possibly be understood as activity that can dispense with 
>assertion and conclusion drawing, with concern for truth, proceed 
>infallibly, and restrict itself to mere iconic showing in lieu of logical 
>attribution and denial, and so forth.
>
>Unfortunately, I can't finish off that other message until tomorrow, as 
>time has run out on me for today, given other obligations.  But you can 
>look over what I have already said to Gary and Gnox and I suggest that 
>you re-read particularly closely the quotes from Andre.
>
>Joe
>
>
>-----
>**
>** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is 
>** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web: 
>**            http://csp3.blogspot.com/ 
>**
>-----
>
>
>To UNSUBSCRIBE click here: http://lyris.ttu.edu/u?id=32317.70a46919ffec2a1fe70c2d18aa6289d3&n=T&l=peirce-l&o=13776268
>
>(It may be necessary to cut and paste the above URL if the line is broken)
>
>or send a blank email to leave-13776268-32317.70a46919ffec2a1fe70c2d18aa6289d3 <at> lyris.ttu.edu

-----
**
** Click on the following URL link for THE PEIRCE BLOG, which is 
** the central pointer and guide for Peirce resources on the web: 
**            http://csp3.blogspot.com/ 
**
-----

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Andre DeTienne on Phaneron and Phenomenology

* Posted for Martin LeFebvre  (by Joseph Ransdell)

-------------------------------------------------
From Martin LeFebvre  (Aug 4, 2009)

Joe, Listers,

I'll respond to Joe first (as I'm still working on the responses for Gary and Ben -- though several issues
overlap) :

What you raise is very interesting, but it also begs the question of mathematics. According to the
principles of the classification of sciences mathematics cannot appeal to semiotic for its operative
principles (which is obviously not to say that there are no signs in mathematics). And though there is
something observation-like or perception-like in mathematics (surprise is possible) as well as
mathematical truth (errors are possible), it is not concerned with positive representation: there are
no positive facts outside of its own system to assert. Categorially (or positively) speaking all its
propositions (dicent signs) are rhemas. The mathematician is only interested in what would be the case.
Therefore, in some sense, it is an error of language to say that mathematics makes assertions. I say "in
some sense" because Peirce clearly realized the difficulty with such a claim and in his Baldwin
Dictionary entry for Truth he wrote:

"A proposition is not a statement of perfectly pure mathematics until it is devoid of all definite meaning,
and comes to this < that a property of a certain icon is pointed out and is declared to belong to anything like
it, of which instances are given. The perfect truth cannot be stated, except in the sense that it confesses
its imperfection. The pure mathematician deals exclusively with hypotheses. Whether or not there is any
corresponding real thing, he does not care. His hypotheses are creatures of his own imagination ; but he
discovers in them relations which surprise him sometimes. A metaphysician may hold that this very
forcing upon the mathematician's acceptance of propositions for which he was not prepared, proves, or
even constitutes, a mode of being independent of the mathematician's thought, and so a reality. But
whether there is any reality or not, the truth of the pure mathematical proposition is constituted by the
impossibility of ever finding a case in which it fails. This, however, is only possible if we confess the
impossibility of precisely defining it" (Baldwin Dictionary, pp. 718-719).

One also needs to keep in mind that phaneroscopy is situated between mathematics and esthetic -- the latter
being the First of the normative sciences. The three normative sciences (esthetic, ethic, logic) are
concerned with "the universal and necessary laws of the [dyadic] relation of Phenomena to Ends" (EP II:
197, 1903). To put it differently, the normative sciences predominantly display dyadicity as the
condition of conformity of phenomena to ends (or ideals). Now neither mathematics nor phaneroscopy are
normative in this sense -- phaneroscopy studies the phenomena regardless of any "ought". In a piece on
Peirce's esthetics (in TCSPS -- vol. 43, no. 2, 2007) I tried to show how esthetics not only offers ethics
and logic the ground for their normativity and rationality but constitutes itself truly as a rational and
normative science. Now imagine that you could "extract" the normativity from esthetics, what would you
be left with? You would be left with the phenomena regardless on any "ought", regardless of their dyadic
relation to ends; you would be left with appearance or seeming -- that, regardless of its metaphysical
status, which appears through the agency of the categories.

How is this pertinent to a discussion on phaneroscopy? In your post, Joe, you mention that phaneroscopy as
characterized by André amounts to a conception   "which is as radically contradictory of what Peirce's
view of science is as it could possibly be". And yet, if one considers that phaneroscopy categorially
"precedes" esthetics it ought to be obvious that it can't study phenomena's conformity to ends or ideals.
If this is the case, then there is none of the normativity of the normative sciences to be had in it.
Consequently, it cannot be a "science" in quite the same sense. One might say that it is a study of the
conditions of possibility of science, which lie in the (categorially-laden) possibility of phenomena.

But none of this answers the question of "what sort of science this might be"? A non-normative science of
feeling? What could that be? André writes that phaneroscopists can claim that "what they observe and
describe can be equally observed and described by any other phaneroscopists". And he adds:

"Peirce is confident that everybody will find the same general elements in the phaneron as his; and if
phaneroscopists do not have to insist on the universality of those elements, it is precisely because
everybody's individual experience is a replica of the same general experience, and each individual
description will be a replica of the same general description attached to the general Phaneron ("Is
Phaneroscopy as a Pre-Semiotic Science Possible", Semiotiche, p. 27).

And in the Harvard Lectures of 1903 Peirce wrote: "[...] there is considerable evidence that colors, for
example, and sounds have the same character for all mankind." (EP II, 192) He goes on to talk of the blind man
who imaged that "red was something like the blare of a trumpet" (ibid) and he added about this
characterization: "the fact that I can see a certain analogy [in the blind man's description] shows me not
only that my feeling of redness is something like the feelings of the persons whom he [the blind man] had
heard talk [discussing "red"] but also that his feeling of a trumpet's blare was very much like mine" (p. 193).

Now, criticism requires a good deal of Secondness -- as can be seen by Peirce's treatment of the normative
sciences; a Secondness that is lacking in phaneroscopy. And yet not everyone is a "good" phaneroscopist.
To use a metaphor I would say that it's not because one can play in tempo all the notes of a tune on the piano
that one is a great piano player: playing all the right notes of a Chopin piece does not necessarily make for
a great piano performance. In the same way, Peirce discussed his training in recognizing his feelings:

"For I have gone through a systematic course of training in recognizing my feelings. I have worked with
intensity for so many hours a day every day for long years to train myself to this; and it is a training which I
would recommend to all of you. The artist has such a training; but most of his effort goes to reproducing in
one form or another what he sees or hears, which is in every art a very complicated trade; while I have
striven simply to see what it is that I see. That this limitation of the task is a great advantage is proved to
me by finding that the great majority of artists are extremely narrow. Their esthetic appreciations are
narrow; and this comes from their only having the power of recognizing the qualities of their percepts in
certain directions (Ibid, p. 190).

Good artists and good scientists -- as well as good art critics! -- must be good phaneroscopists -- this
implies the possibility of growth and a course of self- and hetero-criticism (to borrow a phrase from
CSP). This means that the good phaneroscopist is an "esthete" to begin with. But before being a good
phaneroscopist, he is... a phaneroscopist like everybody else. This is not to say that the "bad" (or
rather "amateur") phaneroscopist makes errors or false observations (and descriptions). His
perceptual judgments are just as irresistible as those of the "trained" phaneroscopist. It seems to me
that the phaneroscopist must describe his feelings and their conditions of possibility regardless of
any ideal -- and that this is what distinguishes phaneroscopy from esthetics. Is phaneroscopy a science?
Well maybe only in the sense that, say, medicine was once called an art. It would be an art out of which ideals
could grow: this being where phaneroscopy turns into esthetics (which requires it in the first place).
And it is certainly the condition of possibility for science in our contemporary understanding of that term.

Finally: a mental association (an analogy?). The resistance to phaneroscopy as a "science" in Joe's
response brings to my mind Karl Popper's resistance to considering abduction as part of science. For
Popper the source of theories is a psychological problem that has nothing to do with science altogether --
and is not to be accounted for by science. Peirce, however, thought otherwise. I can also think of T. L.
Short's resistance to Peirce's cosmology or Nathan Houser's resistance to the Neglected Argument. I
can't help but feel they are all related, though it would take way more time that I have at my disposal to show
exactly how.

Best,

Martin

Andre De Tienne on phaneron and phenomenology

* Posted for Gary Richmond  (by Joseph Ransdell)
* Note: this was written several days ago

Martin, List,

When Joe remarked here that some of Andre DeTienne's work on phaneroscopy
would be put up at Arisbe, and that you, Martin, had suggested that you
might be willing to discuss phenomenology/phaneroscopy on the peirce-list, =
I
couldn't have been more pleased and eager to have that discussion begin and
to actively participate in it. Joe seems to have an uncanny sense of what
topics might *now* be productively discussed on peirce-l.

As I recently posted a longish preview of my thought on the topic, I won't
rehash any of that now (still, I am most certainly eager to read list
members reaction to those ideas). However, today I would like only to
respond to certain passages in your message below, Martin, and will
interleave my remarks within that.

But permit me just one word before that. Joe has soundly argued here that
phaneroscopy--and so, I would imagine, iconoscopy as well--cannot in
themselves be considered sciences. This I hope at least is beyond dispute a=
t
this stage of the discussion, at least for phaneroscopy (it seems to me
that iconoscopy remains an unsettled question in this regard).

So, if these 'scopics' are not sciences, what are they? And what are they i=
n
relation to a putative 'category theory'? Could category theory be conceive=
d
as *completing* these 'scopes', explicating the findings of these pheneral
observations? Can these three together (phaneroscopy, iconoscopy, and
category theory) be seen as an authentic cenoscopic science preparing the
way not only for semeiotic, but perhaps for all three normative sciences? A=
t
any rate, that's how I see the principal problematics of the discussion up
to the point of reading your letter to Joe. Please permit me the following
remarks and questions.

You wrote to Joe: =20

[ML]I think it would be worthwhile to discuss Andre De Tienne's views on
Phaneroscopy. I admit I initially had some resistance to his views when he
first published his piece in RS/SI (I recall thinking that he was bringing
Peirce too close to certain aspects of Husserlian phenomenology -- though
I'm no specialist of the latter), but he's written further essays (some of
which are on Arisbe) that, together with the 2000 piece, make a very strong
and documented case.

[GR] I wholeheartedly agree that De Tienne's work on phaneroscopy offers "a
very strong and documented case" for the importance of that activity (and,
indeed, for the one following it, iconoscopy) to the development of this
altogether 'peculiar' science, Peircean phenomenology (or whatever it may
eventually come to be called).

[GR] By the way, I do not see much--if any--Husserlian phenomenology being
introduced into De Tienne's analysis (although I myself think these
aforementioned scopes require, to be practiced at all, something like an
epoche (or, perhaps, something not unlike the meditational standpoint Auke
spoke of). The main thrust of Husserlian (or, for that matter, Hegelian)
phenomenology is entirely unlike Peirce's.

You continued:

[ML] In an interesting move he [De Tienne] distinguishes between the "lived=
"
phaneron -- of which no assertion can be made since it constitutes a
continuum =8B- and the "objectified" phaneron which is best represented
through an icon (a diagram). The "Phaneronal" continuum, moreover, is seen
as a virtual semeiotic continuum.

[GR] I agree. Perhaps there are several distinctions to be made here. First=
,
the one you mentioned above, that between the "lived" phaneron, as you put
it, and the "objectified" one, the image or icon. In addition, if what is
discovered in iconoscopy is "a virtual semeiotic continuum", it is, ipso
facto, not an actual semeiotic one; thus, semeiotic has all its work before
it (so to speak). Semeioticians have nothing to fear from the development o=
f
a full-blown Peircean phenomenology, and everything to be gained from it, i=
n
my opinion.

But it seems to me that that "full-blown" phenomenology needs something lik=
e
category theory (tricategorial theory) to gather up the findings of these
'scopics' in the interest of preparing for the normative sciences,
especially semeiotic.=20

You wrote:

[ML] 1. Phenaroscopy is the first science concerned with (the possibility o=
f
worldly) experience. It investigates the quality of experience, that is to
say how experience is made possible through the agency of the categories. I=
t
seeks to describe the phaneron which makes possible the emergence of
experience (and that of semiosis). According to De Tienne, the phaneron is,
in a manner of speaking, a reworking of the concept of Substance found in
the New List.

I agree that the phaneron is "a reworking of the concept of Substance found
in the New List." Out of that vague Substance (now, the phaneron) come the
perceptual judgments which may become signs (or are they already signs, or
perhaps proto-signs until they become subject to semeiotic analysis)

Continuing:

[ML] 2. As "lived", however, the phaneron cannot be described. It
corresponds to the continuous background of consciousness, that which I am
directly (though not mediately) aware. But it is also that which I may
become conscious of as it enters the semiosic stream or continuum.

[GR] Again the question of the transition from the phaneron through the
image or icon to the sign arises. Your example is most telling:

[ML] For instance, as I write this e-mail I begin to notice that it has
started to rain [skipping ahead] [. . . ] In other words, the taping on the
roof had already started and I've just now realized that I was aware of it
even though I had so far paid no attention to it whatsoever

[GR] But then, having paid no attention, perhaps you now do pay attention.
As you wrote:

[ML] ". . . my mind was busy attending [to] some other matter. Through
perception a passage has taken place from the "lived" to the "objectified"
phaneron and, in so doing, this passage introduced the phaneron into the
semiosic continuum."

[GR] This fine, decidedly cenoscopic description is as instructive as any
I've read. Indeed I would recommend that interested person study your entir=
e
"raindrop" example. What you've described exemplifies a kind of ordinary
experience which each of us passes through most each day, moving from
perceptual 'coalescence' (De Tienne) through perceptual judgments,
perceptual facts (the percipuum) to more clearly semiosic events. I would
only suggest that when we consider what cenoscopic science  might best
analyze this process,  iconoscopy seems insufficient, and a real--albeit,
'peculiar'--(partial)science, what I'm calling 'category theory', is needed=
.

Concluding your 'rain drop' example, you wrote:

[ML] This objectifiable selection is, on the phaneronal side, a potential o=
r
virtual sign; on the "objectified" semiotic side this corresponds to the
percipuum as that which is represented by the perceptual judgment.

[GR] But what one arrives at here is, at best, I think, something
term-*like*, a more or less 'raw' firstness, tending towards a semeiotic
analysis, perhaps, but yet not quite there.

Continuing:

[ML] 3. Following De Tienne's reading of Peirce, the passage from phaneron
to sign is based on the fact that the phaneron -- as that which is
immediately present to the mind -- is structured by the three categories.
For nothing can be present to the mind -- immediately or mediately -- that
isn't structured by them.

[GR] Or, there are *only* three universes of experience. Immediately
following:

[ML] It is precisely this structure, moreover, that makes possible the
passage from phaneron to sign, the passage from negative generality (the
phaneron as potential sign, as Qualitatively Third) to positive generality
(the sign in actu). Furthermore, this passage from virtuality to actuality
is modeled on Peirce's own account of cosmological evolution (or growth) as
discussed, among other places, in "New Elements".

[GR] I do see in De Tienne's account the firstness of 1ns and the (seemingl=
y
impossible. but really not so) secondness of 1ns. But I do not so far see
the (equally seemingly impossible) thirdness of 1ns there. Determining the
character of this thirdness as particular genuinely tricategorial relations
seems to me to be the general purpose and value of establishing category
theory.

Leaping ahead to your consideration of what phaneroscopy might "do", you
write:

[ML] [. . .] As soon as the phaneron is iconically repre-sented in a
diagram, its ingredients having been separated and classified according to
their categorial distribution, the observer can begin to scrutinize with
=B3minute accuracy=B2 (CP 1.287, 1905) the interplay and agency of the
categories within the diagram, displaying the part(s) played by each, the
effects created through their commingling, and the types of experience that
each of their guises actualize.=20

[GR] I believe that this analysis [following De Tienne] may conflate two
steps in this process: First there will be 'images' of what is 'separated'
from the 'phaneral coalescence'--and this is the work of iconoscopy. But, a=
s
a separate step, I have been arguing that the relations holding between
these various 'images' is to be observed as a diagram which explicates
(principally) genuine trichotomic relations, vectorial relations of movemen=
t
through the categories, etc. This, I believe, is the work of category
theory.

[GR] I'll not get into "the algorithm of the procedure", as you phrased it,
as this introduces complexities which will not be easily settled as the
question of the firstness of each of the three categories is a crucial, but
difficult one to grasp on many fronts. Still, I found your next comment
quite helpful here:

[ML] Now, categorial analysis or =B3prescissive abstraction=B2 is only one
portion of phaneroscopic work. One cannot simply reduce phaneroscopy to the
determination of the valency of different portions of the diagram; this is
useful, but there is much more to do in phaneroscopy (or molecular analysis=
)
than that, much more than keeping =B3rediscovering=B2 the three categories,=
 as
it were. The phaneroscopist would also want to exhibit how these categories
actually combine and cooperate to shape experience, or the emergence of the
manifest. He asks: =B3How are the elements concurring to form this or that
particular portion of the phaneron?=B2 He no longer looks for unknown
categories but strives to find out where and how they come into play within
the phaneron.

[GR] Following Parmentier, I have termed what you've pointed to as 'vector
analysis' in my work, *trikonic* (a proposed practical science of
Trichotomic in diagrammatic form which I won't even try to introduce here).

You write:

[ML] A deeper and deeper analysis requires that those questions be repeated
over and over again, hence Peirce's recurrent method of inquiry.

[GR] In my opinion, "Peirce's recurrent method of inquiry" ought be seen as
but nascent here, even in a vectorial analysis moving through the categorie=
s
(for example, evolution as commencing in chance 'sporting' (1ns), leading t=
o
the forming of new habits (3ns), resulting in a structural change (2ns). We
can observe diagrams of trichotomic relations, and perhaps retrospectively
(i.e., after engaging in logic as semeiotic) begin to make some sense of
them through employing a logica utens. Still, no science is required to do
all the work, and it seems to me that category theory need only explicate
all tricategorial relations (cf. Hegel's unsuccessful attempt in his
Encyclopedia), vectorial movement through these, trichotomies of
trichotomies, strings of these, etc. Category theory does not, in a word,
need to logically analyze them in the formal sense of logic as semeiotic.

[GR] And I would agree that [ML] "One has just to catch a glimpse of
Peirce's many descriptions of the categories to realize the scope of the
work."

[GR] This represents the principal reason why I have strenuously opposed
Joe's tendency to reduce all analysis to semeiotic analysis.

The rich,  suggestive complexities od the rest of your message (especially
in your camera example, which I again would recommend list members
interested in this topic to study) seem to me matters best taken up in
semeiotic, not category theory, certainly not iconoscopy. However, I remain
quite 'muddy' regarding much of the above, so that Ilook forward to a
critique of all this.

Best.

Gary

Re: Andre De Tienne on phaneron and phenomenology

Dear Joe/list,

If a sign is defined as I specified earlier, as a differentiated  
experience,  and the structural basis of that differentiation is  
established in biophysics, systematically and rigorously  
characterized, then this would, it seems to me, be a science of the  
phaneron.

With respect,
Steven

--
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://IASE.info
http://senses.info

On Aug 4, 2009, at 1:10 PM, Joseph Ransdell

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RE: [peirce-l] Re: [peirce-l] RE: [peirce-l] André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

Ben says:

>> I have a lot of trouble believing that Peirce was "losing his mental
grip." <<

[JR] > As do I, Ben, but given that Peirce was by that time in his '60's,
after a decade or so of what must have been an impoverished diet, it
wouldn't be surprising if he was indeed losing it a bit now and again, as
might show up in notebook material, fugitive drafts, etc. In fact, though,
I've never seen anything that suggested this to me.  But then again, I am
accustomed to finding Peirce saying things across his entire career that
seem to me at first to be pretty wild, though it usually turns out to seem
reasonable enough once one understands the relevant context and, usually,
something about his terminology as well.  
     Anyway, the point is that I agree that one should look for ways to
account for the really questionable statements, and you get off to a good
start on the kind of distinction drawing that will require.  You capture
very deftly one distinction that should be drawn when you say:  

[BU] > He talks about not deciding whether phenomena are "true"
> -- that is, whether they are illusions, psycho-physiological 
> effects, etc., attending to them irregardlessly of whether 
> they're real or figments, etc. I think that that is the sense 
> in which he means that phaneroscopy is not concerned with 
> truth. I don't think that he means that the phaneroscopist is 
> not concerned to arrive at truths.

[JR] > I have in mind particularly the distinction between the
phaneroscopist being concerned to ARRIVE AT truth and being concerned with
truth as a property of the subject-matter. It is a common mistake and easy
to make, and I think I see this kind of mistake occurring quite a lot in
these discussions.   
     But let's consider the passage in Peirce which seems to support Andre's
interpretation most straightforwardly. This is from the unpublished Minute
Logic, editorially dated "c. 1902":

* * * * * * * * PEIRCE CP 2.187 * * * * * * 
Logic can be of no avail to mathematics; but mathematics lays the foundation
on which logic builds; and those mathematical chapters will be quite
indispensable. After them, it is my purpose to invite the reader to take up
the study of Phenomenology. In the derivation of this word, "phenomenon" is
to be understood in the broadest sense conceivable; so that phenomenology
might rather be defined as the study of what seems than as the statement of
what appears. It describes the essentially different elements which seem to
present themselves in what seems. Its task requires and exercises a singular
sort of thought, a sort of thought that will be found to be of the utmost
service throughout the study of logic. It can hardly be said to involve
reasoning; for reasoning reaches a conclusion, and asserts it to be true
however matters may seem; while in Phenomenology there is no assertion
except that there are certain seemings; and even these are not, and cannot
be asserted, because they cannot be described. Phenomenology can only tell
the reader which way to look and to see what he shall see. The question of
how far Phenomenology does reason will receive special attention. We shall
next take up the logic of the normative sciences, of which logic itself is
only the third, being preceded by Esthetics and Ethics. [Remainder of
paragraph temporarily omitted; see below] (CP 2.197 c. 1902)
 * * * * * * END QUOTE * * * * * * * * * 

[JR] > Phenomenology is said to describe something,  namely, certain
"elements" which seem to "present themselves" in "what seems".  Now these
elements are the categories, I believe, and they are said to be located in
what seems to appear. But a number of rather odd things are being said in
this passage: 

(1) To talk in terms of seeming is to talk is terms of uncertainty, not of
acritical conviction, much less infallibility: To say that something seems
to be this or that is to say that it may or may not be this or that, one
doesn’t know, can’t be sure, etc.   
(2) phenomenology is said to require and exercise a singular sort of thought
that is also of service throughout logic, though it is not said that it
consists solely of this singular sort of thought, which is said to be used
also in logic.  It is not, then, a differentiating feature of phenomenology.

(3) He says that it can hardly be said to involve reasoning, and the grammar
of the sentence disambiguates the word "it" as referring to phenomenology.
So Peirce is saying that although phenomenology does assert that there are
certain seemings, it does not describe them since they supposedly cannot be
described.  But wait a minute!  Why would he say this when seemings are
actually quite easily described: "It seemed like a rope (though it was
really a snake)".  Seeming like a rope is just looking like a rope and it is
easy to describe what a rope looks like.  In fact, the word “seems” requires
some sort of description.  “It seems” doesn’t say anything, just as “It is”
doesn’t say anything.   “Hey, what is that thing doing over there?  Oh,
don’t worry about it, it is just seeming.”  That’s a joke, not a statement. 
(4)  He says that phenomenology "can only tell the reader which way to look
and to see what he shall see."  But this would be true of any observational
science, insofar as such an activity could reasonably be regarded as a
science.  In fact, that is what the pragmatic maxim requires of us, namely,
that we specify the conditions to be realized in consequence of which such
and such a perception is to be expected. (Peirce surely doesn't mean that
the phenomenological observation statement leaves it open to the reader
addressed to perceive just anything whatsoever: "Look over there and see
what you perceive: it could be anything!".  Surely this is not what he
means.)         

[JR] > This is a pretty weak basis for imputing anything to Peirce unless
these things are cleared up somehow.  But we need to examine further
passages cited in support of the prevailing view to see if they help either
in clarifying and supporting this passage or providing some further basis.  
     Here is the rest of the paragraph quoted above.  I don’t find anything
in it of much help but you or others might see something there:

* * * * * * * PEIRCE continued * * * * * * * * *
It is now forty-seven years ago that I undertook to expound Schiller's
Aesthetische Briefe to my dear friend, Horatio Paine.^1 We spent every
afternoon for long months upon it, picking the matter to pieces as well as
we boys knew how to do. In those days, I read various works on esthetics;
but on the whole, I must confess that, like most logicians, I have pondered
that subject far too little. The books do seem so feeble. That affords one
excuse. And then esthetics and logic seem, at first blush, to belong to
different universes. It is only very recently that I have become persuaded
that that seeming is illusory, and that, on the contrary, logic needs the
help of esthetics. The matter is not yet very clear to me; so unless some
great light should fall upon me before I reach that chapter, it will be a
short one filled with doubts and queries mainly.
* * * * * * * * END QUOTE * * * * * * * * *

The one thing I do notice is his remark about just recently becoming
persuaded that a certain seeming is illusory. Thus, again, we can see that
the association of seeming with certainty, infallibility, etc. is apparently
a mistake. Stage magicians, con artists, and tricksters generally can fairly
be called masters of seeming. Or is it possible that THIS was the reason for
changing from appearance to seeming as the basic conception of the
phenomenon?  I am just mentioning that in passing, not arguing for it. 

Joe

PS: For some reason the reply button didn't reproduce a copy of your message
so I just copied it in below.

------------------------------------------

MESSAGE FROM BEN UDELL  AUG 3, 2009

Andre DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology

Joe, Martin, Gary, Gnox, Auke, Steven, list,

I have a lot of trouble believing that Peirce was "losing his mental grip." 

He talks about the lack of assertions, etc., in phaneroscopy, yet also talks
about generalizations and (1903 & 1904) proofs in phaneroscopy. So the "ban"
on assertions must be in some particular context. Maybe he means that
phaneroscopy doesn't make 1st-intentional assertions about its primary
subject-matter, phenomena in general. The categories are predicates of
predicates and are 2nd-intentional. Not only is it hard to describe
something so overwhelming and so in flux as the phaneron, but, even in
generalizing about it, rather than directly describing, what descriptors do
you use which don't assume the conceptions which you're trying to form
afresh? In a sense it is more like pointing with familiar labels, and giving
examples and hoping that the reader will get the general gist. The latter is
how Peirce once discussed the conception of the interpretant.

He talks about not deciding whether phenomena are "true" - that is, whether
they are illusions, psycho-physiological effects, etc., attending to them
irregardlessly of whether they're real or figments, etc. I think that that
is the sense in which he means that phaneroscopy is not concerned with
truth. I don't think that he means that the phaneroscopist is not concerned
to arrive at truths. 

The acritical statements sound like the propositions beyond criticism which
he discusses in "Presuppositions of Logic" in various drafts of the Carnegie
Application
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/l75/ver1/l75v1-04.htm. There he
mentions various kinds of propositions that are beyond criticism. He says
that the claim that certain kinds of propositions are beyond criticism is
not itself beyond criticism, so it seems that he doesn't think that there is
nothing for logic to say about them. It seem plausible there may be further
inroads which inquiry could make into such propositions at the phaneroscopic
level; it would certainly be remarkable and ironic if Peirce erected
barriers to inquiry in the acritical propositions, and I'm pretty doubtful
that he did so. Peirce was long concerned with the issue of propositions
which are indubitable or beyond criticism, and it appears that he considered
them important not only in logic at its presuppositional stage but also in
phaneroscopy. (Didn't he discuss them in "Some Consequences of Four
Incapacities"?
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm - a number of
things in the "Presuppositions of Logic" discussion seem to echo "Some
Consequences...".)  But I don't think that he means that phaneroscopy
doesn't get beyond acritical propositions. He might not see acritical
propositions as a problematic basis when he doesn't think that differences
between different minds will make a real difference:
  Peirce, Adirondack Lectures, CP 1.284, 1905,
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/phaneron.html: Phaneroscopy is
the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the collective
total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite
regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask
present _when_, and to _whose_ mind, I reply that I leave these questions
unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the
phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all
minds. 
Best, Ben

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Re: [peirce-l] RE: [peirce-l] Re: [peirce-l] RE: [peirce-l] André DeTienne on phaneron and phenomenology