Skagestad, Peter | 2 Jan 2009 23:42
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RE: SV: SV: In Defense of True Science

List,

I am grateful for Torkild's kind acknowledgment of my early writing on Peirce's views on science and
usefulness, although I did not immediately recognize the below quotation or its source, identified only
by the year 1978 and the page number. I now realize that it is a translation from my book "Vitenskap og
menneskebilde: Charles Peirce og amerikansk pragmatisme" (Universitetsforlaget 1978), written in
Norwegian and thus also accessible to speakers of Danish and Swedish, but not to the international Peirce
community in general. I am thus prompted to add that I also discussed the subject, at about the same time, in
my article "C.S. Peirce on Biological Evolution and Scientific Progress," Synthese, Vol. 41, No. 1
(1979), reprinted in E. Freeman, ed., The Relevance of Charles Peirce, The Monist Library of Philosophy
1983. The article contains several pertinent quotations from Peirce, as well as the following assessment:

"When a man goes out of his way to contest such obvious facts as the practical usefulness of science, one is
curious to know what, concretely, is the point of his assertion. [Noting Peirce's preoccupation with
mathematics and logic.] . . . Peirce had a genuine and general concern, both for the freedom of science from
political intervention, and for the integrity of non-scientific modes of cognition, exemplified by
i.a. common-sense knowledge and religious belief. When Peirce denies that science is, or should be,
useful, he is not in the silly position of either denying or deploring the existence of technology. On the
one hand, he is warning against the threat to scientific progress of placing science under externally
imposed social and political goals, a threat implicit in Karl Pearson's pronouncement that the goal of
science is "to strengthen social stability." On the other hand, he is arguing against the intrusion of
provisional and tentative scientific conclusions, such as those of the higher historical criticism,
into practical affairs, such as religion. Peirce makes both these points by claiming that the internal
growth of scientific knolwledge cannot be reconstructed with reference to any extra-scientific goal,
but only with reference to truth, and to the approximation to truth through hypothesis and
experimentation." (Freeman, p. 361)

I may have written things 30 years ago that I do not necessarily wish to be reminded of, but this still seems to
me a fair summing-up of Peirce's views on the matter, views that were seriously and deeply held, albeit
occasionally expressed in an exaggerated and paradoxical form.
(Continue reading)

Joseph Ransdell | 13 Jan 2009 03:24
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FW: Peirce Society: Minutes of 2008 Business Meeting

Forwarded for your information.  And of very special interest to anyone
interested in the present and future of Peirce Studies: click on the link
Robert Lane provides to the minutes of the recent business meeting of the
Peirce society.    

Joseph Ransdell 
ransdell <at> cspeirce.com 
ARISBE website:   http://www.cspeirce.com/ 
PEIRCE-L archives: 
   http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/?forum=peirce-l 
   http://news.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce

-----Original Message-----
From: Charles S. Peirce Society [mailto:PEIRCE-SOCIETY <at> westga.edu] On Behalf
Of Robert Lane
Sent: Saturday, January 10, 2009 9:42 AM
To: PEIRCE-SOCIETY <at> westga.edu
Subject: Peirce Society: Minutes of 2008 Business Meeting

Dear Members of the Charles S. Peirce Society,

The minutes of the Society's 2008 business meeting, which was held on  
December 28 in Philadelphia, PA, are now online:

http://www.peircesociety.org/minutes/minutes-2008-12-28.html

Other information about the Society, including minutes from earlier  
business meetings, is available at the Society's website:

http://www.peircesociety.org/
(Continue reading)

gnox | 13 Jan 2009 14:54
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Lowell Lectures of 1903

Joe,

Thanks very much for this pointer to the Peirce Society minutes -- i 
wouldn't have known how interesting they were if you hadn't said so and 
passed the link along.

Especially interesting to me was the news about W22, the volume devoted 
to the Lowell Lectures of 1903, which is projected to be published out of 
sequence (but is apparently still some years away). In the past year i've 
been trying to read as much as i could of the Lowell Lectures, and the 
"Syllabus" which was printed as a "supplement" to them, using only the CP 
and EP2. (The EP volume printed only the first lecture, but gives quite a 
lot of the "Syllabus" -- a major part of which was for some reason dated 
"c. 1902" by the CP editors.)

Nonprofessionals like myself might have some use for the little 
bibliographic guide i put together for the purpose of reading substantial 
chunks of the Lowell Lectures in something like the order Peirce 
intended. I reproduce it here -- it's basically from the electronic CP 
with EP references inserted. (If there are other bits of the Lowell 
Lectures accessible online, i'd like to hear about them!)

================================
Peirce: CP 8 Bibliography General 1903

* 2. LOWELL LECTURES of 1903 and supplementary materials.
(a) The eight lectures were given the general title, "Some Topics of 
Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed." This title and the titles and 
dates for the individual lectures were taken from a ticket in Widener 
VA2; the material printed in [CP] VII is in Widener IB2-4. Cf. [Perry] 
(Continue reading)

Torkild Thellefsen | 13 Jan 2009 21:00
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Brent's email


Dear List,

Is there anyone who has a valid e-mail address to Joseph Brent

Best wishes

Torkild 

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Skagestad, Peter | 13 Jan 2009 22:33
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RE: Brent's email

Torkild,

I have not tried this one lately, so I do not know if it is current, but the address I have for him is amgjlb <at> worldnet.att.net<mailto:amgjlb <at> worldnet.att.net>.

Peter

  _____

From: Torkild Thellefsen [mailto:torkild <at> stofanet.dk]
Sent: Tue 1/13/2009 3:00 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Brent's email

Dear List,

Is there anyone who has a valid e-mail address to Joseph Brent

Best wishes

Torkild

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Caridad Cruzado | 14 Jan 2009 19:10
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Meaning of "the purpose of all"



Peirce-l,
 
I would like to ask for your help regarding the meaning of a word in this passage:
 
"In my latter papers, I have seen more thoroughly than I used to do that it is not mere action as brute exercise of strength that is the purpose of all, but say generalization, such action as tends towards regularization, and the actualization of the thouhtht which without action remains unthought..." (CP 8.250)
 
Specifically, I can't see which is the exact reference of "all" in the quote above. The passage appears in the first letter to William James compiled in the Collected Papers. Maybe it's necessary to quote the beginning of the paragraph as well:

"That everything is to be tested by its practical results was the great text of my early papers; so, as far as I get your general aim in so much of the book (The Will to Believe) as I have looked at, I am quite with you in the main. In my later papers, I have seen more thoroughly than I used to do that..."
 
Thank you very much for your help.
 
Caridad

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Gary Richmond | 14 Jan 2009 21:29
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Re: Meaning of "the purpose of all"

Caridad,

You ask what "the exact reference of  'all' " is in the passage from the 
letter to William James you quoted. I would suggest perhaps a cosmic 
answer, that is, Peirce is referring to the purpose of the universe, of 
all-that-is. There is a kind of quasi-categoriality present and a kind 
of quasi-semiosis acting in the proto-evolution from the tohu bohu to 
all that will come to be (prior to actual biological evolution on Earth) 
in Peirce's prescientific cosmological reflections on the origins of the 
universe. This is just my guess, yet it seems to fit in also with the 
purpose of his letter, responding to James' dedication of The Will to 
Believe to him, and Peirce's having just read the first chapter of that 
book. Soon he will become much more critical of the will to believe, but 
always, it would seem, he holds that intelligence is alive in the 
cosmos, so that there is a tendency through generalization and 
regularization (lawfulness) for thought itself to be realized as three 
universes of experience.

Best,

Gary

Caridad Cruzado wrote:
>
>
> Peirce-l,
>  
> I would like to ask for your help regarding the meaning of a word 
> in this passage:
>  
> "In my latter papers, I have seen more thoroughly than I used to do 
> that _it is not mere action as brute exercise of strength that is the 
> purpose of all_, but say generalization, such action as tends towards 
> regularization, and the actualization of the thouhtht which without 
> action remains unthought..." (CP 8.250)
>  
> Specifically, I can't see which is the exact reference of "all" in the 
> quote above. The passage appears in the first letter to William James 
> compiled in the Collected Papers. Maybe it's necessary to quote the 
> beginning of the paragraph as well:
>
> "That everything is to be tested by its practical results was the 
> great text of my early papers; so, as far as I get your general aim in 
> so much of the book (The Will to Believe) as I have looked at, I am 
> quite with you in the main. In my later papers, I have seen more 
> thoroughly than I used to do that..."
>  
> Thank you very much for your help.
>  
> Caridad
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Joseph Ransdell | 19 Jan 2009 15:23
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Is Obama a pragmatist?

Dear list:

I'm picking up here on an earlier thread on the topic of Obama as pragmatist
-- (True or false? and if true to what extent, in what sense, etc.) -- which
was initiated by Gary Richmond a month or two ago. It seems worth continuing
or attempting to resuscitate that thread because of the remarkable extent to
which Obama's putative pragmatism has come to be taken for granted in
current mass-media, and because of the likelihood that there are others on
the list who have yet to weigh in on this topic who might very well have
some important and interesting comments to make on this.  It is not the sort
of issue which necessarily tends toward degeneration into purely persuasive
rhetorical (partisan, ideological) discourse since it is certainly possible
to agree or disagree with this characterization of Obama's views and
attitudes regardless of whether or not one thinks this is an accurate
description of them.  This is because what is primarily of interest here on
this particular list is understanding what is, can be, or should be meant by
talking about pragmatism, the pragmatic, the pragmatist, etc., to begin
with.

In his later attempts to come to grips with the problem that James' adoption
of the term for his own view posed for him, Peirce seems finally to have
come to think that the best bet was simply to accept a much looser or more
vague use of the term "pragmatism" that could legitimate its application to
the many somewhat differing forms it was being used to reform to at that
time, while, of course, limiting the "uglier" term "pragmaticism" to
reference to Peirce's view in particular.  (I am thinking of this in
contrast with the view that only an authentically Peircean understanding
should be referred to in speaking of something as being "pragmatic".)  How
to characterize this more vague sense has yet to be specified here, but
perhaps we can work out a general but vague characterization of it here,
while at the same time getting clear on what distinguishes Peircean from
Deweyan, Deweyan from Jamesian, and even, perhaps, what could fairly be
identified as a Rortyan form of pragmatism.  If Peirce enthusiasts can't do
that, who can? -- and that could be very useful, both for philosophical and
for practical political purposes. 

What I find most remarkable about this is that doing so in connection with
Obama, the practical politician, actually seems feasible without much real
danger that the attempt to do so will degenerate into the kind of political
discourse which would make it not worth discussing here at all.   I would
have thought that quite impossible before now.  When I was in graduate
school back in the early 1960's at Columbia U in New York, I became
convinced that the word "pragmatism" (and its conjugates and cognates) was
definitively corrupted in popular usage to the extent that there was simply
no hope for rehabilitation of its use.   What it meant then, in popular
discourse, was roughly the same as "expedient", where this was construed in
the narrowest way as roughly the same as "unprincipled".  It meant, roughly,
what is usually meant by "sophistical" in the sense given to that by the
figure of Thrasymachus (cf. Karl Rove, Roger Ailes), the sophistical
king-mater in Plato's Republic, or the figure of Kallikles (the prospective
king-to-made) in the Gorgias dialogue.  Richard Nixon was (rightly or
wrongly) regarded as the paradigm pragmatist in this depraved sense of the
word -- rightly, in my opinion, but one can disagree with that and still
agree with my point, I think -- given Nixon's bad reputation among those who
disapproved of him strongly.  Thus Nixon's arch-rival Kennedy might at that
time also be accused -- and "accused" is the appropriate word for it -- of
being a pragmatist, for example, but this was understood to mean that he was
really no different from Nixon or any other pure opportunist, quick to make
the most politically expedient move regardless of further consequences:
completely "unprincipled", as we might say. This meaning seemed to me, at
least, to be so deeply associated with the word "pragmatist" that it would
be quite unrealistic to expect that it could ever recover from that
debased usage.  But it now seems to me that it has recovered from it and I
don't get the sense now that people have that in mind at all when they refer
to Obama as "pragmatic".  Thus conservatives and liberals seem to feel
equally at ease in so characterizing him.

It is also true at present, I think, that the terms "conservative" and
"liberal" are being increasingly regarded as inappropriate for capturing the
major political oppositions in the U.S., and even that "right" and "left"
are somehow more and more off the point now, though not so much so as
"conservative" and "liberal".  "Pragmatic" and "ideological" seem to be
sliding into place for the kind of contrast felt to be most appropriate,
though "ideological" has negative and not merely oppositional connotation, I
think.  The more partisan Obama devotees seem also to be increasingly making
use of the term "progressive" -- I've seen Obama referred to a number of
times as a "pragmatic progressive" in the past couple of weeks -- but
pursuing these verbal contrasts might get into unprofitable subtleties too
ephemeral to be worth working with.  

Perhaps the best way to go instead would be to focus on the relevant
difference between Dewey and Peirce, and it occurs to me that the most
pertinent verbal distinction to be drawn in this connection might be Dewey's
distinction between the public and the private, i.e. the idea that political
government is properly concerned with and only with what is a matter of
genuinely public concern.  But I am sure that there are others on the list
who understand that distinction, as Dewey draws it, better than I do and I
won't say anything further on that in the present message.

Joe Ransdell

Joseph Ransdell 
ransdell <at> cspeirce.com 
ARISBE website:   http://www.cspeirce.com/ 
PEIRCE-L archives: 
   http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/?forum=peirce-l 
   http://news.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce

-----Original Message-----
From: Gary Richmond [mailto:garyrichmond <at> rcn.com] 
Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2008 3:51 PM
To: joseph ransdell
Subject: Joe, this is the article (on the Hayes piece) I meant to send you,
rather than the Czech attachment.

What Kind of Pragmatism?

December 13th, 2008 http://toojb.com/what-kind-of-pragmatism/

Christopher Hayes has an article in the Nation on Obama's pragmatism 
(h/t Ron Chusid). I like two things about this piece:

1) It identifies the ambiguous nature of the term, and lists several 
theories meant by the word and

2) It concludes that the kind of pragmatism compatible with 
progressivism is that espoused by John Dewey, whose work is heavily 
based on Charles Peirce.

I've written before on both of these claims.

The problem with the Hayes piece is that it doesn't come to the "right" 
kind of pragmatism until the end. This leaves Hayes trying to discuss 
pragmatism before defining it coherently, and leaves him opens to 
criticisms like this one from Ron Chusid:

Hayes looks at the view that Barack Obama is a pragmatist as opposed to 
an ideologue. The problem with this evaluation is that the choice is not 
one of pure pragmatism versus pure ideology. Obama does not appear to be 
an ideologue such as George Bush and the Republicans who governed based 
upon their ideology regardless of whether the facts showed that their 
policies were wrong. This does not mean that a pragmatist is, or should 
be, acting without any principles.

If by 'pragmatism' Hayes means one of the first definitions he posits 
that is actually closer to Machiavellianism, then Chusid is right. But 
the definition of pragmatism that Hayes likes isn't "without 
principles," rather, it just determines what those principles are via 
the pragmatic method. I've previously discussed the relationship between 
pragmatism properly defined and ideology:

Ideologies are theories of politics that present certain assumptions as 
answers to empirical questions. In that sense, pragmatism can be 
considered to be opposed to any ideology. On any given topic, however, 
pragmatism admits that it is an open and empirical question as to what 
the 'best' solution is, and therefore might or might not agree with any 
given ideology.

I still think this claim is correct. Moreover, it responds to Chusid's 
claim that pragmatism is opposed to ideology.

The problem for Hayes, myself, or anyone else trying to describe exactly 
what flavor of pragmatism Obama endorses is that there's not much real 
evidence. Basically, people are trying to put a unique interpretation on 
Obama's cabinet appointments and forgiving of Liebermann when these few 
events are equally amenable to interpretations of pragmatism proper and 
Machiavellianism, among other themes. Like I've said, there just isn't 
enough evidence out there to offer a unique interpretation, and we 
really just have to wait until Obama's actually in office making policy.

One thing we writers/pragmatist groupies can do right now to clarify 
this debate when it happens is cease to be equivocal or ambiguous about 
what we mean by 'pragmatism.'

Peirce, later in his life, renamed his philosophy 'pragmaticism' because 
he famously claimed it was a name so ugly that it would not be usurped 
by those who disagree with him. Peirce was prescient: the term 
pragmatism has come to refer, even within philosophy, to ambiguous 
ideas. Richard Rorty, for instance, really did argue that the truth is 
'what works' in a crude sense, based on 'solidarity' which is basically 
communal agreement rather than understanding the necessity of a 
community to balance out the systematic irrationalities of the 
individual, as Peirce did. And he called his philosophy pragmatism, 
although it is really nothing like that of Peirce, Dewey, or William James.

I can only speak for myself, so I promise that when I discuss pragmatism 
either as a philosophical school of thought or a descriptor for the 
Obama Administration, I will use it following Peirce, James and Dewey. 
By pragmatism, I roughly mean just that the best epistemic method is the 
scientific method. I'll refer to Rorty, or the colloquial 
Machiavellianism as pseudo-pragmatisms.

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H.G. Callaway | 19 Jan 2009 17:18

RE: Is Obama a pragmatist?



Philadelphia, PA
January 19, 2009
 
Joe & list,
 
I hesitate to get too involved in a thread quite this political. I should say, to start as well, that I am a big Obama fan. I supported his candidacy both financially (within limited means) and in many discussions here in Philadelphia and elsewhere. I strongly preferred Obama over Senator Clinton and over the Republican candidate--though I though McCain the best among the Republicans. Obama is a man of vision, as I see the matter, and I like his high rhetoric. I say this not to open a discussion on these points but merely to indicate my own overall perspective. I am a committed Independent and I belong to no political party. (By the way, I like Senator Clinton as Secretary of State, so long as Obama is calling the shots.)
 
What struck me as important is the degree to which Obama is "pragmatic" by being anti-ideological. That seems one firm point in attempting to define or get at what is meant by calling him pragmatic--on the working assumption that defining or understanding what is meant in calling him pragmatic may ultimately be fruitful. That he is anti-ideological seems one of the great positive points about him. (Let's finally end the "culture wars.") It amounts to a general advocacy of principle. In contrast to this, the prevalent notion that one must be ideological in order to be effective, seems to have lost some ground. I take it that people doing this sort of thing know the damage it does intellectually and morally, but have seen no alternative, or were not greatly concerned by acting without principle; but I also think that this is, in fact, a very damaging type of practice. I have particularly noticed the emphasis on expediency in the common phrase, which I have heard reiterated endlessly, in word, on bumper stickers, and even on refrigerator magnets: "Whatever it takes." That is the popular expression of the cult of expediency, and it exists as well in every ideological coloring. Particularly in the primaries, Obama seemed to make a clear stand against "whatever it takes." That, at least, was my firm conviction and perception of his stand.
 
The issues that repeatedly arose concerning Obama's relationship to the pastor of his long-time congregation is perhaps a good talking point in relation to the theme of expediency and principle. I thought that Obama did well to stand by the fellow as long as he did. He demonstrated loyalty and conviction in doing so. He saw it as an issue of principle. But I think he was also right to finally distance himself from the pastor's public pronouncements. The entire affair strikes me as somewhat like the brief issue of Obama's flag pin. It seemed clear to me that if Obama couldn't have put on his flag pin, then, though he might still have been elected and he would have pleased some on the left of his party, it would have greatly diminished his ability to govern. I suppose that Obama didn't change his religious beliefs in distancing himself from the pastor, that he indicated his willingness to listen to the sort of thing which made the pastor a doubtful advocate of Obama, and in the end, he saw that being seen as a man who could be the President of the entire country, as contrasted with its leftward critics, was more important. Obama is calling for unity, and I believe that is the right thing to do. That implies being willing to listen to all sides, but being unwilling to engage in ideology and "movement" psychology--as contrasted with drawing on the best in traditional American values and commitments. If the word "pragmatic" is to ultimately be properly in place, then it must be a principled pragmatism.
 
I am much encouraged that the Attorney-General designate knows the meaning of the word "torture." This point doubtlessly helped him get through the Senate Judiciary Committee. The prior, unprincipled quibbling, was a crucial part of a very big mistake in U.S. policy. I hope we will now also recall the damage done, to M. L. King in particular, by indiscriminate federal government wire-taps on citizens. Down with the snooper-state!
 
H.G. Callaway
 

 
EMAILING FOR THE GREATER GOOD
Join me


> From: joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
> To: peirce-l <at> lyris.ttu.edu
> Subject: [peirce-l] Is Obama a pragmatist?
> Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 08:23:14 -0600
>
> Dear list:
>
> I'm picking up here on an earlier thread on the topic of Obama as pragmatist
> -- (True or false? and if true to what extent, in what sense, etc.) -- which
> was initiated by Gary Richmond a month or two ago. It seems worth continuing
> or attempting to resuscitate that thread because of the remarkable extent to
> which Obama's putative pragmatism has come to be taken for granted in
> current mass-media, and because of the likelihood that there are others on
> the list who have yet to weigh in on this topic who might very well have
> some important and interesting comments to make on this. It is not the sort
> of issue which necessarily tends toward degeneration into purely persuasive
> rhetorical (partisan, ideological) discourse since it is certainly possible
> to agree or disagree with this characterization of Obama's views and
> attitudes regardless of whether or not one thinks this is an accurate
> description of them. This is because what is primarily of interest here on
> this particular list is understanding what is, can be, or should be meant by
> talking about pragmatism, the pragmatic, the pragmatist, etc., to begin
> with.
>
> In his later attempts to come to grips with the problem that James' adoption
> of the term for his own view posed for him, Peirce seems finally to have
> come to think that the best bet was simply to accept a much looser or more
> vague use of the term "pragmatism" that could legitimate its application to
> the many somewhat differing forms it was being used to reform to at that
> time, while, of course, limiting the "uglier" term "pragmaticism" to
> reference to Peirce's view in particular. (I am thinking of this in
> contrast with the view that only an authentically Peircean understanding
> should be referred to in speaking of something as being "pragmatic".) How
> to characterize this more vague sense has yet to be specified here, but
> perhaps we can work out a general but vague characterization of it here,
> while at the same time getting clear on what distinguishes Peircean from
> Deweyan, Deweyan from Jamesian, and even, perhaps, what could fairly be
> identified as a Rortyan form of pragmatism. If Peirce enthusiasts can't do
> that, who can? -- and that could be very useful, both for philosophical and
> for practical political purposes.
>
> What I find most remarkable about this is that doing so in connection with
> Obama, the practical politician, actually seems feasible without much real
> danger that the attempt to do so will degenerate into the kind of political
> discourse which would make it not worth discussing here at all. I would
> have thought that quite impossible before now. When I was in graduate
> school back in the early 1960's at Columbia U in New York, I became
> convinced that the word "pragmatism" (and its conjugates and cognates) was
> definitively corrupted in popular usage to the extent that there was simply
> no hope for rehabilitation of its use. What it meant then, in popular
> discourse, was roughly the same as "expedient", where this was construed in
> the narrowest way as roughly the same as "unprincipled". It meant, roughly,
> what is usually meant by "sophistical" in the sense given to that by the
> figure of Thrasymachus (cf. Karl Rove, Roger Ailes), the sophistical
> king-mater in Plato's Republic, or the figure of Kallikles (the prospective
> king-to-made) in the Gorgias dialogue. Richard Nixon was (rightly or
> wrongly) regarded as the paradigm pragmatist in this depraved sense of the
> word -- rightly, in my opinion, but one can disagree with that and still
> agree with my point, I think -- given Nixon's bad reputation among those who
> disapproved of him strongly. Thus Nixon's arch-rival Kennedy might at that
> time also be accused -- and "accused" is the appropriate word for it -- of
> being a pragmatist, for example, but this was understood to mean that he was
> really no different from Nixon or any other pure opportunist, quick to make
> the most politically expedient move regardless of further consequences:
> completely "unprincipled", as we might say. This meaning seemed to me, at
> least, to be so deeply associated with the word "pragmatist" that it would
> be quite unrealistic to expect that it could ever recover from that
> debased usage. But it now seems to me that it has recovered from it and I
> don't get the sense now that people have that in mind at all when they refer
> to Obama as "pragmatic". Thus conservatives and liberals seem to feel
> equally at ease in so characterizing him.
>
> It is also true at present, I think, that the terms "conservative" and
> "liberal" are being increasingly regarded as inappropriate for capturing the
> major political oppositions in the U.S., and even that "right" and "left"
> are somehow more and more off the point now, though not so much so as
> "conservative" and "liberal". "Pragmatic" and "ideological" seem to be
> sliding into place for the kind of contrast felt to be most appropriate,
> though "ideological" has negative and not merely oppositional connotation, I
> think. The more partisan Obama devotees seem also to be increasingly making
> use of the term "progressive" -- I've seen Obama referred to a number of
> times as a "pragmatic progressive" in the past couple of weeks -- but
> pursuing these verbal contrasts might get into unprofitable subtleties too
> ephemeral to be worth working with.
>
> Perhaps the best way to go instead would be to focus on the relevant
> difference between Dewey and Peirce, and it occurs to me that the most
> pertinent verbal distinction to be drawn in this connection might be Dewey's
> distinction between the public and the private, i.e. the idea that political
> government is properly concerned with and only with what is a matter of
> genuinely public concern. But I am sure that there are others on the list
> who understand that distinction, as Dewey draws it, better than I do and I
> won't say anything further on that in the present message.
>
> Joe Ransdell
>
>
> Joseph Ransdell
> ransdell <at> cspeirce.com
> ARISBE website: http://www.cspeirce.com/
> PEIRCE-L archives:
> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/?forum=peirce-l
> http://news.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:garyrichmond <at> rcn.com]
> Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2008 3:51 PM
> To: joseph ransdell
> Subject: Joe, this is the article (on the Hayes piece) I meant to send you,
> rather than the Czech attachment.
>
> What Kind of Pragmatism?
>
> December 13th, 2008 http://toojb.com/what-kind-of-pragmatism/
>
> Christopher Hayes has an article in the Nation on Obama's pragmatism
> (h/t Ron Chusid). I like two things about this piece:
>
> 1) It identifies the ambiguous nature of the term, and lists several
> theories meant by the word and
>
> 2) It concludes that the kind of pragmatism compatible with
> progressivism is that espoused by John Dewey, whose work is heavily
> based on Charles Peirce.
>
> I've written before on both of these claims.
>
> The problem with the Hayes piece is that it doesn't come to the "right"
> kind of pragmatism until the end. This leaves Hayes trying to discuss
> pragmatism before defining it coherently, and leaves him opens to
> criticisms like this one from Ron Chusid:
>
> Hayes looks at the view that Barack Obama is a pragmatist as opposed to
> an ideologue. The problem with this evaluation is that the choice is not
> one of pure pragmatism versus pure ideology. Obama does not appear to be
> an ideologue such as George Bush and the Republicans who governed based
> upon their ideology regardless of whether the facts showed that their
> policies were wrong. This does not mean that a pragmatist is, or should
> be, acting without any principles.
>
> If by 'pragmatism' Hayes means one of the first definitions he posits
> that is actually closer to Machiavellianism, then Chusid is right. But
> the definition of pragmatism that Hayes likes isn't "without
> principles," rather, it just determines what those principles are via
> the pragmatic method. I've previously discussed the relationship between
> pragmatism properly defined and ideology:
>
> Ideologies are theories of politics that present certain assumptions as
> answers to empirical questions. In that sense, pragmatism can be
> considered to be opposed to any ideology. On any given topic, however,
> pragmatism admits that it is an open and empirical question as to what
> the 'best' solution is, and therefore might or might not agree with any
> given ideology.
>
> I still think this claim is correct. Moreover, it responds to Chusid's
> claim that pragmatism is opposed to ideology.
>
> The problem for Hayes, myself, or anyone else trying to describe exactly
> what flavor of pragmatism Obama endorses is that there's not much real
> evidence. Basically, people are trying to put a unique interpretation on
> Obama's cabinet appointments and forgiving of Liebermann when these few
> events are equally amenable to interpretations of pragmatism proper and
> Machiavellianism, among other themes. Like I've said, there just isn't
> enough evidence out there to offer a unique interpretation, and we
> really just have to wait until Obama's actually in office making policy.
>
> One thing we writers/pragmatist groupies can do right now to clarify
> this debate when it happens is cease to be equivocal or ambiguous about
> what we mean by 'pragmatism.'
>
> Peirce, later in his life, renamed his philosophy 'pragmaticism' because
> he famously claimed it was a name so ugly that it would not be usurped
> by those who disagree with him. Peirce was prescient: the term
> pragmatism has come to refer, even within philosophy, to ambiguous
> ideas. Richard Rorty, for instance, really did argue that the truth is
> 'what works' in a crude sense, based on 'solidarity' which is basically
> communal agreement rather than understanding the necessity of a
> community to balance out the systematic irrationalities of the
> individual, as Peirce did. And he called his philosophy pragmatism,
> although it is really nothing like that of Peirce, Dewey, or William James.
>
> I can only speak for myself, so I promise that when I discuss pragmatism
> either as a philosophical school of thought or a descriptor for the
> Obama Administration, I will use it following Peirce, James and Dewey.
> By pragmatism, I roughly mean just that the best epistemic method is the
> scientific method. I'll refer to Rorty, or the colloquial
> Machiavellianism as pseudo-pragmatisms.
>
>
> ---
> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber hgcallaway <at> live.com
>

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Jim Willgoose | 19 Jan 2009 18:01
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RE: Is Obama a pragmatist?



List,
 
In one use of the term "pragmatic," Obama is no more or less pragmatic than any  U.S political leader would be in transitioning to power, given the historical context of the economy and the inside briefings that any president-elect receives. I am sure he is adjusting his ends to meet current realities. This would seem to be true for any president-elect regardless of the current issues of the day. On the other hand, every political leader has an ideological bent within which these adjustments are made. I suppose the contrast which the media intends is with the previous administrations bent towards the use of executive power and "political capital" to shape an agenda no matter what.  If the goal is to overcome a dualism of cultural red/blue thinking, and establish greater unanimity of purpose, you might try to integrate the opposition into your cabinet and return greater power to congress.  This is just an example and I do not think this makes either side more or less "pragmatic." So, every administration never has anything but an "end-in view' in the Deweyan sense, and thus, no real distinction is achieved. That is the nature of practical politics. The use of a strong executive versus a congress as matter of emphasis does not demarcate one as more pragmatic than the other and both make adjustments given current historical realities. The Bush admin was just as pragmatic. I guess somebody would have to show me that an apparent broader consensus or "mediation by the social" is a necessary criteria for the application of the term "pragmatic." A further problem is that practical politics shades  into an art like decoy painting, as opposed to a scence, and all bets are off with respect to applying insights gained from the analysis of the concept of "methodeutic."
 
Jim W

> From: joseph.ransdell <at> yahoo.com
> To: peirce-l <at> lyris.ttu.edu
> Subject: [peirce-l] Is Obama a pragmatist?
> Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2009 08:23:14 -0600
>
> Dear list:
>
> I'm picking up here on an earlier thread on the topic of Obama as pragmatist
> -- (True or false? and if true to what extent, in what sense, etc.) -- which
> was initiated by Gary Richmond a month or two ago. It seems worth continuing
> or attempting to resuscitate that thread because of the remarkable extent to
> which Obama's putative pragmatism has come to be taken for granted in
> current mass-media, and because of the likelihood that there are others on
> the list who have yet to weigh in on this topic who might very well have
> some important and interesting comments to make on this. It is not the sort
> of issue which necessarily tends toward degeneration into purely persuasive
> rhetorical (partisan, ideological) discourse since it is certainly possible
> to agree or disagree with this characterization of Obama's views and
> attitudes regardless of whether or not one thinks this is an accurate
> description of them. This is because what is primarily of interest here on
> this particular list is understanding what is, can be, or should be meant by
> talking about pragmatism, the pragmatic, the pragmatist, etc., to begin
> with.
>
> In his later attempts to come to grips with the problem that James' adoption
> of the term for his own view posed for him, Peirce seems finally to have
> come to think that the best bet was simply to accept a much looser or more
> vague use of the term "pragmatism" that could legitimate its application to
> the many somewhat differing forms it was being used to reform to at that
> time, while, of course, limiting the "uglier" term "pragmaticism" to
> reference to Peirce's view in particular. (I am thinking of this in
> contrast with the view that only an authentically Peircean understanding
> should be referred to in speaking of something as being "pragmatic".) How
> to characterize this more vague sense has yet to be specified here, but
> perhaps we can work out a general but vague characterization of it here,
> while at the same time getting clear on what distinguishes Peircean from
> Deweyan, Deweyan from Jamesian, and even, perhaps, what could fairly be
> identified as a Rortyan form of pragmatism. If Peirce enthusiasts can't do
> that, who can? -- and that could be very useful, both for philosophical and
> for practical political purposes.
>
> What I find most remarkable about this is that doing so in connection with
> Obama, the practical politician, actually seems feasible without much real
> danger that the attempt to do so will degenerate into the kind of political
> discourse which would make it not worth discussing here at all. I would
> have thought that quite impossible before now. When I was in graduate
> school back in the early 1960's at Columbia U in New York, I became
> convinced that the word "pragmatism" (and its conjugates and cognates) was
> definitively corrupted in popular usage to the extent that there was simply
> no hope for rehabilitation of its use. What it meant then, in popular
> discourse, was roughly the same as "expedient", where this was construed in
> the narrowest way as roughly the same as "unprincipled". It meant, roughly,
> what is usually meant by "sophistical" in the sense given to that by the
> figure of Thrasymachus (cf. Karl Rove, Roger Ailes), the sophistical
> king-mater in Plato's Republic, or the figure of Kallikles (the prospective
> king-to-made) in the Gorgias dialogue. Richard Nixon was (rightly or
> wrongly) regarded as the paradigm pragmatist in this depraved sense of the
> word -- rightly, in my opinion, but one can disagree with that and still
> agree with my point, I think -- given Nixon's bad reputation among those who
> disapproved of him strongly. Thus Nixon's arch-rival Kennedy might at that
> time also be accused -- and "accused" is the appropriate word for it -- of
> being a pragmatist, for example, but this was understood to mean that he was
> really no different from Nixon or any other pure opportunist, quick to make
> the most politically expedient move regardless of further consequences:
> completely "unprincipled", as we might say. This meaning seemed to me, at
> least, to be so deeply associated with the word "pragmatist" that it would
> be quite unrealistic to expect that it could ever recover from that
> debased usage. But it now seems to me that it has recovered from it and I
> don't get the sense now that people have that in mind at all when they refer
> to Obama as "pragmatic". Thus conservatives and liberals seem to feel
> equally at ease in so characterizing him.
>
> It is also true at present, I think, that the terms "conservative" and
> "liberal" are being increasingly regarded as inappropriate for capturing the
> major political oppositions in the U.S., and even that "right" and "left"
> are somehow more and more off the point now, though not so much so as
> "conservative" and "liberal". "Pragmatic" and "ideological" seem to be
> sliding into place for the kind of contrast felt to be most appropriate,
> though "ideological" has negative and not merely oppositional connotation, I
> think. The more partisan Obama devotees seem also to be increasingly making
> use of the term "progressive" -- I've seen Obama referred to a number of
> times as a "pragmatic progressive" in the past couple of weeks -- but
> pursuing these verbal contrasts might get into unprofitable subtleties too
> ephemeral to be worth working with.
>
> Perhaps the best way to go instead would be to focus on the relevant
> difference between Dewey and Peirce, and it occurs to me that the most
> pertinent verbal distinction to be drawn in this connection might be Dewey's
> distinction between the public and the private, i.e. the idea that political
> government is properly concerned with and only with what is a matter of
> genuinely public concern. But I am sure that there are others on the list
> who understand that distinction, as Dewey draws it, better than I do and I
> won't say anything further on that in the present message.
>
> Joe Ransdell
>
>
> Joseph Ransdell
> ransdell <at> cspeirce.com
> ARISBE website: http://www.cspeirce.com/
> PEIRCE-L archives:
> http://lyris.ttu.edu/read/?forum=peirce-l
> http://news.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Gary Richmond [mailto:garyrichmond <at> rcn.com]
> Sent: Saturday, December 13, 2008 3:51 PM
> To: joseph ransdell
> Subject: Joe, this is the article (on the Hayes piece) I meant to send you,
> rather than the Czech attachment.
>
> What Kind of Pragmatism?
>
> December 13th, 2008 http://toojb.com/what-kind-of-pragmatism/
>
> Christopher Hayes has an article in the Nation on Obama's pragmatism
> (h/t Ron Chusid). I like two things about this piece:
>
> 1) It identifies the ambiguous nature of the term, and lists several
> theories meant by the word and
>
> 2) It concludes that the kind of pragmatism compatible with
> progressivism is that espoused by John Dewey, whose work is heavily
> based on Charles Peirce.
>
> I've written before on both of these claims.
>
> The problem with the Hayes piece is that it doesn't come to the "right"
> kind of pragmatism until the end. This leaves Hayes trying to discuss
> pragmatism before defining it coherently, and leaves him opens to
> criticisms like this one from Ron Chusid:
>
> Hayes looks at the view that Barack Obama is a pragmatist as opposed to
> an ideologue. The problem with this evaluation is that the choice is not
> one of pure pragmatism versus pure ideology. Obama does not appear to be
> an ideologue such as George Bush and the Republicans who governed based
> upon their ideology regardless of whether the facts showed that their
> policies were wrong. This does not mean that a pragmatist is, or should
> be, acting without any principles.
>
> If by 'pragmatism' Hayes means one of the first definitions he posits
> that is actually closer to Machiavellianism, then Chusid is right. But
> the definition of pragmatism that Hayes likes isn't "without
> principles," rather, it just determines what those principles are via
> the pragmatic method. I've previously discussed the relationship between
> pragmatism properly defined and ideology:
>
> Ideologies are theories of politics that present certain assumptions as
> answers to empirical questions. In that sense, pragmatism can be
> considered to be opposed to any ideology. On any given topic, however,
> pragmatism admits that it is an open and empirical question as to what
> the 'best' solution is, and therefore might or might not agree with any
> given ideology.
>
> I still think this claim is correct. Moreover, it responds to Chusid's
> claim that pragmatism is opposed to ideology.
>
> The problem for Hayes, myself, or anyone else trying to describe exactly
> what flavor of pragmatism Obama endorses is that there's not much real
> evidence. Basically, people are trying to put a unique interpretation on
> Obama's cabinet appointments and forgiving of Liebermann when these few
> events are equally amenable to interpretations of pragmatism proper and
> Machiavellianism, among other themes. Like I've said, there just isn't
> enough evidence out there to offer a unique interpretation, and we
> really just have to wait until Obama's actually in office making policy.
>
> One thing we writers/pragmatist groupies can do right now to clarify
> this debate when it happens is cease to be equivocal or ambiguous about
> what we mean by 'pragmatism.'
>
> Peirce, later in his life, renamed his philosophy 'pragmaticism' because
> he famously claimed it was a name so ugly that it would not be usurped
> by those who disagree with him. Peirce was prescient: the term
> pragmatism has come to refer, even within philosophy, to ambiguous
> ideas. Richard Rorty, for instance, really did argue that the truth is
> 'what works' in a crude sense, based on 'solidarity' which is basically
> communal agreement rather than understanding the necessity of a
> community to balance out the systematic irrationalities of the
> individual, as Peirce did. And he called his philosophy pragmatism,
> although it is really nothing like that of Peirce, Dewey, or William James.
>
> I can only speak for myself, so I promise that when I discuss pragmatism
> either as a philosophical school of thought or a descriptor for the
> Obama Administration, I will use it following Peirce, James and Dewey.
> By pragmatism, I roughly mean just that the best epistemic method is the
> scientific method. I'll refer to Rorty, or the colloquial
> Machiavellianism as pseudo-pragmatisms.
>
>
> ---
> Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber jimwillgoose <at> msn.com
>


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