LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

I insert below the abstracts of the papers to be presented at a forthcoming 
conference at the London School of Economics that seems to me to be likely 
to be of spcial interest to Peirceans.  There are a couple of papers about 
Peirce's view in particular -- one by Mats Bergman and one by Josh 
Ellenbogen -- but the reason it seems worthwhile to include all of the 
abstracts is that the program provides a glimpse of the problematics of the 
topic as understood at present that some might find especially helpful or 
suggestive.

Joseph Ransdell

---------------------------------------------


LSE (London School of Economics)
Two-day international conference in London, 22-23 June 2006
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/artAndScience/abstracts.htm


BEYOND MIMESIS AND NOMINALISM:
REPRESENTATION IN ART AND SCIENCE


Abstracts of Presentations


Session 1: Architecture and Space

Abstraction and Planning: The Visuality of Urban Planning at Mid-Century in 
the United States

Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

Joe, Gary R., Mats, list

Joe, thanks for posting these abstracts. Pretty much all of them are interesting! Gary Richmond, who has
just submitted the final version of an interoperability paper to Springer Verlag, might want to take note
of an abstract on a paper "Interoperability and the photograph" by Catherine De Lorenzo and Deborah van
der Plaattalking (appended at this post's end). The paper discusses it in a context of which I hadn't
thought (though for all I know it's as common as weeds) -- a context of the "interoperability" of photos as
interpreted through various disciplines and traditions at various times. I am unsure whether it is even a
legitimate or useful application of the conception of interoperability. But that's just off the top of my
head. It seems like calling "interoperable" a standard computer, because it can be used for various
purposes. Maybe NCOs (non-commissioned officers) should be retitled "IOs" or "interoperable
officers."  "Multi-purpose" or "multi-purposable" seems a better description. Interoperability
seems to pertain more to workability across different media toward some same function or purpose. E.g.,
having an electronic spreadsheet which is easily read & edited by whatever program and whatever kind of
computer (PC, Mac, and whatever else).

On Mats Bergmann's abstract, I have interspersed a few comments below.

> [Joe Ransdell] I insert below the abstracts of the papers to be presented at a forthcoming conference at
the London School of Economics that seems to me to be likely to be of spcial interest to Peirceans.  There are
a couple of papers about Peirce's view in particular -- one by Mats Bergman and one by Josh Ellenbogen -- but
the reason it seems worthwhile to include all of the abstracts is that the program provides a glimpse of the
problematics of the topic as understood at present that some might find especially helpful or suggestive.
>Joseph Ransdell

>---------------------------------------------

>LSE (London School of Economics)Two-day international conference in London, 22-23 June 2006 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/artAndScience/abstracts.htm

>BEYOND MIMESIS AND NOMINALISM:REPRESENTATION IN ART AND SCIENCE

Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

Joe, Gary R., Mats, list

Once again I've tripped up over the difference between "signification" & "significance." In addition to
tripping up often simply because of trying to think through ideas of comprehension, denotation, etc., in
regard to qualities, representational relations, etc., I have located one case in "The New Elements"
where Peirce used the word "signification" to mean "meaning" (what's formed into the interpretant)
instead of "comprehension" (a ground as referenced), and it probably worked its way into my mind in past readings.
". every sign is intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or meaning. Any
sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without violation of its, A's, purpose, that is, in
accordance with the 'Truth,' even though it, B, denotes but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and
signifies but a part of its, A's, characters, I call an _interpretant_ of A." ('New Elements', EP 2:304,
1904?) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html

Anyway, if one can, unlike me, keep straight the more usual terminology (ground, comprehension,
connotation, signification versus interpretant, meaning, significance), Mats' assertion that
mental icons are _the_ carriers of connotative meaning in communication makes a lot more sense.

As an icon refers to a ground  (the ground of the quality which the icon presents), it could be said to have
comprehension a.k.a. connotation, at least by some of Peirce's characterizations (unless those
characterizations involved implicit and unstated qualifications limiting comprehension to being a
property of symbols). And as the function of an asserted icon is to evoke a mental icon, the mental icons can
be said to be -- well, here, I still part with Mats -- not the "carriers" but the decodings, or just say it
plain, the interpretants, of connotative meaning in communication. As decodings, interpretants, they
are also encodings, signs, carriers; it's a difference of emphasis, yet an important one, I think,
relating to the fact, in which Joe Ransdell has been particularly interested in the past, that a symbol is
supposed to lead to a mental icon, and that a particular semiosis or inquiry process finds an ending (but
not a resting -- there I part with Peirce) in an icon, not a symbol. A symbol is also a carrier of
comprehensional meaning such that it doensn't seem clear or obvious that mental icons are _the_
principal carriers of comprehensional meaning in communication.

Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

Ben:

I don't know that it helps much in clarification of the 
"significance"/"signification" distinction, but you'll find below the 
definitions of "sign", "significance", and "signification" in the Century 
Dictionary.  I've included only the statements of definition in the entries 
since it is simply too time-consuming to present the entire entries here, 
given all of the problems of transliteration, etc.; but I've made a few 
comments in brackets that might help.

What I find remarkable is that Peirce amde no attempt whatever to convey 
even so much as a hint as to how he would define any of these terms for 
technical philosophical purposes.  One could not possibly infer his own view 
even hypothetically from the definitions he provides.

Do the definitions he provides correspond to his own colloquail rather than 
technical understanding of these terms?  Presumably yes, so we can perhaps 
learn something from them if we bear in mind that they do not purport to be 
anything more than a report of what orinary or common usage is.   And even 
there we should also bear in mind that the entries in the Century are often 
based largely upon the entries in a still older dictionary, the Imperial, as 
I believe it is called.  So what we find here is apparently provided by 
Peirce but perhaps -- to some extent at least -- only approved of by him 
rather than created by him.  I am not well acquainted with the Century as a 
whole.  I had simply neglected its importance until quite recently.  But my 
understanding is that he does in some cases do some fairly extensive 
creative work, going beyond mere approval of pre-existing accounts of 
popular usage; yet there is no trace of that sort of thing in his 
definitions of "sign".  I assume his refusal to take advantage of the 
opportunity to grind his own axe in these definitions is due to and 

Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

Dear Joe,

In my Websters the meaning of D.C.L. is given as "doctor of civil law", but 
I don't find it in Black's Law dictionary.

Jim Piat

----- Original Message ----- 
From: "Joseph Ransdell" <ransdell4 <at> cox.net>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l <at> edsel.tosm.ttu.edu>
Sent: Sunday, June 04, 2006 9:33 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art 
and science

> Ben:
>
> I don't know that it helps much in clarification of the
> "significance"/"signification" distinction, but you'll find below the
> definitions of "sign", "significance", and "signification" in the Century
> Dictionary.  I've included only the statements of definition in the 
> entries
> since it is simply too time-consuming to present the entire entries here,
> given all of the problems of transliteration, etc.; but I've made a few
> comments in brackets that might help.
>
> What I find remarkable is that Peirce amde no attempt whatever to convey
> even so much as a hint as to how he would define any of these terms for
> technical philosophical purposes.  One could not possibly infer his own 
> view
> even hypothetically from the definitions he provides.

Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

Jim, Joe,

D.C.L could also be "doctor of canon law."

Gary

PS A gentle reminder not to include whole message, especially long 
quotations, in responses 

Jim Piat wrote:

> Dear Joe,
>
> In my Websters the meaning of D.C.L. is given as "doctor of civil 
> law", but I don't find it in Black's Law dictionary.
>
> Jim Piat
>
>

---
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Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

> D.C.L could also be "doctor of canon law."
>
> Gary

Dear Gary,

My Websters gives D. Cn. L. as doctor of cannon law.  I notice Peirce 
mentions Canadian law in these entries as well.  Elswhere I believe he uses 
the lawyer/client relationship as an illustration of "standing for" or 
representation.  I think Peirce's legal friends had an important influence 
on his thinking -- no doubt mutual.  Especially the notion that the meaning 
of  something lies in its consequences.  I believe that he specifically 
makes this acknowledgment somewhere.

Sorry about including the whole message, and thanks for the reminder.

Best,
Jim Piat 

---
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Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science

Jim & List,

Jim Piat wrote:

My Websters gives D. Cn. L. as doctor of cannon law.

Well, I know Peirce used a few military metaphors, but "cannon law"? All kidding aside, the American Heritage Dictionary offers this:

DCL
abbr.

1. Doctor of Canon Law
2. Doctor of Civil Law
   

The Berkeley review includes this interesting observation on the development of law in the West including a mention of both Canon and Civil Law.

[A]bout the end of the twelfth century a great revolution of thought took place in Europe. What the influences were which produced it requires new historical researches to say. No doubt, it was partly due to the Crusades. But a great awakening of intelligence did take place at that time. It requires, it is true, some examination to distinguish this particular movement from a general awakening which had begun a century earlier, and had been growing ever since. But now there was an accelerated impulse. Commerce was attaining new importance, and was inventing some of her chief conveniences and safeguards. Law, which had hitherto been utterly barbaric, began to be a profession. The civil law was adopted in Europe, the canon law was digested; the common law took some form. [emphasis added]

[JP] I notice Peirce mentions Canadian law in these entries as well.  Elswhere I believe he uses the lawyer/client relationship as an illustration of "standing for" or representation.

In this connection (where the "standing for" are letters used by lawyers as relative pronouns), I found this interesting excerpt [from CP 2.287]

. . . Lawyers use A, B, C, practically as very effective relative pronouns. To show how effective they are, we may note that Messrs. Allen and Greenough, in their admirable (though in the edition of 1877 [?], too small) Latin Grammar, declare that no conceivable syntax could wholly remove the ambiguity of the following sentence, "A replied to B that he thought C (his brother) more unjust to himself than to his own friend." Now, any lawyer would state that with perfect clearness, by using A, B, C, as relatives, thus:

                              (A)    
       A replied to B that he (B), thought C

     (A's)                                   (A)
(his (B's), brother) more unjust to himself, (B) than to his
                                             (C)

(A's)
(B's) own friend.The terminations which in any inflected
(C's)
language are attached to words "governed" by other words, and which serve to show which the governing word is, by repeating what is elsewhere expressed in the same form, are likewise indices of the same relative pronoun character.

Jim, you also commented:

I think Peirce's legal friends had an important influence on his thinking -- no doubt mutual.  Especially the notion that the meaning of  something lies in its consequences.  I believe that he specifically makes this acknowledgment somewhere.

I have not yet been able to find the source of this notion  "that the meaning of  something lies in its consequences" was explicitly connected to legal thinking in Peirce, but would be very interested if any lister has located it.

Best,

Gary

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Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science