Benjamin Udell | 1 Feb 2006 01:32
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)

Joe, list,

I think you've got it right -- the cognitive content rather than either the act of interpretation or the
activity of interpretation. This distinction may get slippery, though, insofar as obect - sign -
interpretant are agent - patient - act! Well, let's burn that bridge when we come to it. You may also be right
that, whatever the optimal distinction, Peirce wanted to put a reminder that distinctions of possibly
somewhat various kinds will be waiting to be made.

The cognitive content rather than either the act or the activity of interpretation -- The final
interpretant is not approached at some universal rate or class of rates that invariably puts it off
indefinitely into the future -- but may instead be reached (though the interpreter won't know for sure)
already. What stretches invariably into the indefinite future is the _maximum_ time that it would take to
reach the final interpretant -- that's an extremum, such that inquiry prolonged long enough is destined
to reach the final interpretant "no later than indefinitely far into the future." It sounds
unencouraging until we remember that the point of this is to bring research and truth into mutual
definitional relation and that, as a brief about research prospects, it is considerably less
pessimistic than the view which flatly forbids access to things "in themselves." An infinitely precise
truth could be approached, as a limit, only over infinite time but, as Peirce said, we can confess
inaccuracy and one-sidedness and call it a night. Eventually Peirce did refer to an "infinite community"
of investigators rather than merely an "indefinitely" prolonged investigation. And it might actually
mean something, too, to say that a given truth would take a higher order than lower-case omega successive
finite non-infinitesimal periods of time -- that would be to say that the chances of our reaching it sooner
were vanishingly small. This seems actually the case with undecidable mathematical questions, though
Peirce somewhere talks about resorting to non-deductive inference in such cases. That may seem a stretch
with some mathematical questions, but with questions like the consistency of sufficiently rich
mathematical systems, it seems that some sort of inductive generalization is in fact how mathematicians
come to such a strong belief in many of those systems' consistency, especially the ones proven to be
consistent-if-arithmetic-is-consistent. I've argued on another list that such beliefs are probably
best not regarded as "faith" unless we want to talk about statistics-based "faith" as well. Seems to me to
water down the word "faith." But then what do I know, I'm not a mathematician.
(Continue reading)

Benjamin Udell | 1 Feb 2006 02:15
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)

Matts,

Yes, it seems possible, "interpretant" _a la_ "resultant." It doesn't seem a bad idea! Of course it would
help, if one could find a clear statement by Peirce himself about this sort of thing, or a clear pattern of
word-echoes among his coinages (e.g., "representamen" and what?). I wonder how many of those
mathematical terms ending in -ant & -ent had already been coined up till Peirce's time. There's something
about those words that suggests precision, clean lines, sharp corners, etc.

Math, chemistry, logic, navigation, etc. --

When I looked at the encyclopedia entry about "interpretamentum," after a while I thought, it would be
surprising if Peirce _didn't_ know about the word.

I cleaned up the OCR'd passage from the Century Dict.

Best, Ben

----- Original Message [OCR'd passage from Century Dict. cleaned up] ----- 
From: "Mats Bergman" <mats.bergman <at> helsinki.fi>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l <at> lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 2:55 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)

Ben,

Just wanted to thank you for this plausible hypothesis concerning the possible background of Peirce's
"interpretant". A useful bit of terminological information for me.

Just a wild guess: As a scientist, Peirce might also have wanted to create an association to "resultant" -
could explain the abbreviation of "interpretament". One standard dictionary gives this for "resultant":
(Continue reading)

Benjamin Udell | 1 Feb 2006 03:44
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)

Gary F., list,
 
>>[Ben] I argued also that calling it an "interpretant" tended to minimize the idea that it had to be a _human_ interpretation.
>[Gary] That's a good place to start, i think.
 
I was thinking in general of the quasimind http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/quasimind.html (and also specifically of the question whether interpretants are "embodied" in vegetable organismic processes, and in biological evolution. There seem to be interpretant-like things embodied there, but as to embodied genuine interpretants, I haven't dispelled my doubts.)
 
>[Gary] If any term is the key to his whole system, this [the interpretant] might be it.
 
For one person or another, following up on the conception of the interpretant might indeed by the key to opening the doors to Peirce's whole system. Most Peirceans will agree that one doesn't really conceive of the interpretant apart from the sign and the semiotic object. Irreducible triad. The sign stands FOR an object TO an interpretant. Sometimes I find it convenient to think of the sign as being "about" the object. A discoloration of a fruit represents the fruit, it's a sign about the fruit. My interpretant may be: "rot!"
 

There's been some argument at peirce-l in the past about whether the three categories correlate successfully with the three semiotic elements & whether they're even supposed to do so. Above is how I've looked at it.
I'll recycle (= quote) myself: A sign is "almost" its (the sign's) object and conveys information about the object, but is not the object, so familiarity with the sign is not familiarity with the object. The interpretant is the sign's meaning clarified, such that the interpretant itself is a sign (a) of the object and also (b) of interpretant's "predecessor" as a sign of the object. Peirce, unlike so many before and since, saw that there's much more to signs as a general phenomenon (general like statisticality and information) than "signifier" and "signified." Not only does a sign require and address itself to interpretation, but the interpretant itself is a sign, a night's womb to a further interpretant dawn, just as a translation is into something itself further translatable, a ramification has ramifications, and meaning means, means ceaselessly and sometimes to our chagrin (Merleau-Ponty said 'we are condemned to meaning') -- and so the interpretant is a sign, promoting and provoking further interpretation. But the interpretant, though it's a sign, is not an object's "mere" sign which one would never guess is also a sign about a previous thing-as-sign about the same object. Instead the interpretant is a sign having reference to an interpreted sign as well as to the object, and in fact practically all signs are like this in the interpreter's perspective, links in chains stretching both fore and aft, just not always with clarity (so usually it's a relative question, a role question -- "is it the sign or the interpretant?" -- just like the question of which codings are encodings and which are decodings), and Peirce conceived the interpretive chain as operative all the way down to the level of the infinitesimal and the truly continuous. _Actually_ so infinitely-finely continuous or not, perpetual interpretation is sometimes to our chagrin, yet also lets us infer around a lot of bends (of hearts, planets, etc.)
 
I didn't know about David Lodge's remark on encoding & decoding, I swear it!
 
Peirce's classifications of the sciences were, among other things, ways of organizing his philosophy. Roughly, it's like this, with the earlier furnishing principles to the later but not vice versa (That's why I put "THEN" in there, as a reminder):
 
1. Mathematics -- study of hypotheticals, and drawing necessary conclusions
THEN
2. Cenoscopy (philosophy) study of positive phenomena in general & without need of special experiences/experiments, phenomena such as anybody at any moment will find before his/her notice http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/cenoscopy.html 
THEN
3. Special sciences -- study of positive phenomena in their various classes and resorting to special experiences/experiments.
 
Back within philososphy:
 
1. Phenomenology/phaneroscopy -- THE THREE CATEGORIES (FIRSTNESS, SECONDNESS, THIRDNESS). THE REDUCTION THESIS.
THEN
2. Normative sciences -- esthetics (ideals, the admirable), ethics (right & wrong), logic (semeiotics)
THEN
3. Metaphysics -- general metaphysics aka ontology, psychical / religious metaphysics (God, freedom, immortality), physical metaphysics (real nature of time, space, laws of nature, matter)
 
And, back within logic or semeiotics:
 
1. SPECULATIVE GRAMMAR: THE SEMEIOTIC TRIAD: (SIGN, OBJECT, INTERPRETANT) & KINDS OF SIGNS (ICON, INDEX, SYMBOL; QUALISIGN, SINSIGN, LEGISIGN; etc.).
THEN
2. CRITIC: THE MODES OF INFERENCE (ABDUCTION, INDUCTION, DEDUCTION), their various validities & degrees of force.
THEN
3. METHODEUTIC (methods for truth's investigation, exposition, application).
 
He also divided sciences into Theoretical & Practical; eventually he divided them into Sciences of Discovery (all of the above listed ones), Sciences of Review (compendious, synthesizing results from across the sciences, etc.),. & the Practical Sciences. He also put a philosophical area into the Sciences of Review, and called it Synthetic Philosophy, whose tasks included classifications like the one above.
 
Here's one of his later classifications, 1903
 
Here's another:
 
Best, Ben Udell
 
----- Original Message -----
From: "gnusystems" <gnox <at> vianet.ca>
To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l <at> lyris.ttu.edu>
Sent: Tuesday, January 31, 2006 6:40 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)

Ben, and (especially) my fellow "beginners" in Peirce studies,

[[ Commens Dictionary of Peirce's Terms, Peirce's Terminology in His Own
Words, Edited by Mats Bergman & Sami Paavola
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html ]]

Yes, a superb resource. (And note that the other entries defining various kinds of interpretants -- dynamical, logical, emotional etc. -- are conveniently grouped at the head of the main entry.)

I think it's significant that Peirce introduced and (sort of) defined this term in his first major work (the "New List of Categories"). If any term is the key to his whole system, this might be it.

[[ I argued also that calling it an "interpretant" tended to minimize the idea that it had to be a _human_ interpretation. ]]

That's a good place to start, i think.

Getting back to Kaina Soicheia: i can see why Peirce's relationship with Royce might be significant as context for this piece, but for me (as a relative newcomer) the more immediate connections are with Peirce's other essays -- notably the "New List", which i've just been re-reading because Joe mentioned it awhile back in this connection.

        gary F.

}Throughout the universe nothing has ever been concealed. [Dogen]{

gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
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Jon Awbrey | 1 Feb 2006 14:50
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Re: Kaina Stoicheia -- Commentary

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

KS.  Commentary Note 13

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o

Rummaging about our Polis with Perseus, I find these glosses:

| arithmos, as etym. of Stoichadeus, Sch.D.T.p.192 H.
| Stoicha^deus , eôs, ho, title of Zeus at Sicyon, Sch.D.T. p.192 H.
| Stoicheia , hê, epith. of Athena at Epidaurus, IG42(1).487.
|
| Perseus at Tufts:
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0057:entry=%2396930

Jon Awbrey

o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
inquiry e-lab: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/
o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o~~~~~~~~~o
Bernard Morand | 1 Feb 2006 16:06
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

A 13:51 31/01/2006 -0500, Skagestad, Peter a écrit :
>Bernard, Gary, and list,
>
>The English wording is "Every decoding is another encoding". It is uttered 
>repeatedly in "Small World" by the fictional Professor Zapf, who 
>references Peirce as the father of semiotics, so David Lodge had at least 
>heard of Peirce. He later heard even more. After quoting this saying in 
>one of my papers (I think it was in "Peirce and Contemporary Thought"), I 
>sent Lodge a copy, for which he professed himself most grateful.
>
>Peter
>

Thanks for the details Peter. I had forgotten them. It's nice to see that 
D. Lodge had heard of Peirce and may be read about him. I suppose that you 
have read the novel Thinks... the subject of which turns around Artificial 
Intelligence. I don't remember if he is referring to Intelligence 
Augmentation as such. I was a little bit disappointed when reading this one 
because I felt that the author had got second hand documentation without 
being directly involved with the milieu he was reporting (evidently Small 
World was exactly the other way). But this was just an impression.

Bernard

>________________________________
>
>From: Bernard Morand [mailto:morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr]
>Sent: Tue 1/31/2006 1:13 PM
>To: Peirce Discussion Forum
>Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
>
>
>
>A 20:19 30/01/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :
> >Bernard, list,
> >
> >You concluded your post by quoting (or paraphrasing?) David Lodge to the
> >effect that "Every decoding is a new encoding."  Of course this can be
> >interpreted as exactly the point of the New Elements approach. As Peirce
> >puts it:
> >>In so far as the interpretant is the symbol. . . the determination agrees
> >>with that of the symbol. . . It's purpose. . .is to represent the symbol
> >>in its representation of its object; and therefore, the determination is
> >>followed by a further development in which it becomes corrected. EP2: 
> 323-324
> >This, then, is exactly the entelechy of the symbol: "symbols grow" as
> >Peirce elsewhere expresses it. He continues:
> >>By virtue of of this [that "it is of the nature of a sign to be. .a
> >>living general"] the interpretant is animaaed by the original replica. .
> >>. with the power of representing the true character of the object. . . In
> >>these two steps, of determination and of correction, the interpretant
> >>aims at the object more than at the original replica and may be truer and
> >>fuller than the later.
> >Of course the implications of this are profound, for as Peirce comments:
> >>The every entelechy of being lies in being representable. . .[so that]
> >>there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol. EP2: 324
> >Gary
> >
>
>Gary and list,
>
>My reference to D. Lodge was somehow interrogative because I know it only
>through the French edition : "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage". I was
>not sure that the phrasing in the original English edition was what I was
>writing. (As a matter of fact I suppose that D. Lodge did not read Peirce
>but some ideas in his novels sound peircian)
>
>To continue the discussion, we find "pure icons" in the following passage
>of New Elements and "pure indices" will appear later. I mention this with
>regard to a precedent discussion between Joe and Jon relative to "pure
>symbols". I think that "pure" as to be taken here in the same sense as we
>could consider "pure symbols". But in fact my question is elsewhere: at the
>end of the quote Peirce makes the point that "an icon can only be a
>fragment of a completer sign". I am not sure of what he is saying here.
>Answers are welcome !
>
>Bernard
>
>-----------------------Quote New Elements------------------------
>The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon. This
>is defined as a sign of which the character that fits it to become a sign
>of the sort that it is, is simply inherent in it as a quality of it. For
>example, a geometrical figure drawn on paper may be an icon of a triangle
>or other geometrical form. If one meets a man whose language one does not
>know and resorts to imitative sounds and gestures, these approach the
>character of an icon. The reason they are not pure icons is that the
>purpose of them is emphasized. A pure icon is independent of any purpose.
>It serves as a sign solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves
>to signify. The relation to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts
>nothing. If it conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the
>object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information. An
>icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign.
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>__________________________________________
>
>Bernard Morand
>Département Informatique
>Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
>TEL (33) 02 31 52 55 34             FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
>e-mail: morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr
>http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/
>__________________________________________________________________
>
>
>---
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>
>
>
>
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__________________________________________________________________
Bernard Morand
Département Informatique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
TEL (33) 02 31 52 55 34             FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
e-mail: morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr
http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/
__________________________________________________________________

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Skagestad, Peter | 1 Feb 2006 17:51
Favicon

Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

Bernard,

I have read Thinks, and I thought Lodge goes much easier on AI professors than on English professors. Maybe
he has mellowed with age or maybe, as you suggest, he is simply much more familiar with English professors.
No offense to either AI professors or Enlish professors on the list, but we are talking satire here:-)

Cheers,
Peter

________________________________

From: Bernard Morand [mailto:morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr]
Sent: Wed 2/1/2006 10:06 AM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

A 13:51 31/01/2006 -0500, Skagestad, Peter a écrit :
>Bernard, Gary, and list,
>
>The English wording is "Every decoding is another encoding". It is uttered
>repeatedly in "Small World" by the fictional Professor Zapf, who
>references Peirce as the father of semiotics, so David Lodge had at least
>heard of Peirce. He later heard even more. After quoting this saying in
>one of my papers (I think it was in "Peirce and Contemporary Thought"), I
>sent Lodge a copy, for which he professed himself most grateful.
>
>Peter
>

Thanks for the details Peter. I had forgotten them. It's nice to see that
D. Lodge had heard of Peirce and may be read about him. I suppose that you
have read the novel Thinks... the subject of which turns around Artificial
Intelligence. I don't remember if he is referring to Intelligence
Augmentation as such. I was a little bit disappointed when reading this one
because I felt that the author had got second hand documentation without
being directly involved with the milieu he was reporting (evidently Small
World was exactly the other way). But this was just an impression.

Bernard

>________________________________
>
>From: Bernard Morand [mailto:morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr]
>Sent: Tue 1/31/2006 1:13 PM
>To: Peirce Discussion Forum
>Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
>
>
>
>A 20:19 30/01/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :
> >Bernard, list,
> >
> >You concluded your post by quoting (or paraphrasing?) David Lodge to the
> >effect that "Every decoding is a new encoding."  Of course this can be
> >interpreted as exactly the point of the New Elements approach. As Peirce
> >puts it:
> >>In so far as the interpretant is the symbol. . . the determination agrees
> >>with that of the symbol. . . It's purpose. . .is to represent the symbol
> >>in its representation of its object; and therefore, the determination is
> >>followed by a further development in which it becomes corrected. EP2:
> 323-324
> >This, then, is exactly the entelechy of the symbol: "symbols grow" as
> >Peirce elsewhere expresses it. He continues:
> >>By virtue of of this [that "it is of the nature of a sign to be. .a
> >>living general"] the interpretant is animaaed by the original replica. .
> >>. with the power of representing the true character of the object. . . In
> >>these two steps, of determination and of correction, the interpretant
> >>aims at the object more than at the original replica and may be truer and
> >>fuller than the later.
> >Of course the implications of this are profound, for as Peirce comments:
> >>The every entelechy of being lies in being representable. . .[so that]
> >>there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol. EP2: 324
> >Gary
> >
>
>Gary and list,
>
>My reference to D. Lodge was somehow interrogative because I know it only
>through the French edition : "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage". I was
>not sure that the phrasing in the original English edition was what I was
>writing. (As a matter of fact I suppose that D. Lodge did not read Peirce
>but some ideas in his novels sound peircian)
>
>To continue the discussion, we find "pure icons" in the following passage
>of New Elements and "pure indices" will appear later. I mention this with
>regard to a precedent discussion between Joe and Jon relative to "pure
>symbols". I think that "pure" as to be taken here in the same sense as we
>could consider "pure symbols". But in fact my question is elsewhere: at the
>end of the quote Peirce makes the point that "an icon can only be a
>fragment of a completer sign". I am not sure of what he is saying here.
>Answers are welcome !
>
>Bernard
>
>-----------------------Quote New Elements------------------------
>The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon. This
>is defined as a sign of which the character that fits it to become a sign
>of the sort that it is, is simply inherent in it as a quality of it. For
>example, a geometrical figure drawn on paper may be an icon of a triangle
>or other geometrical form. If one meets a man whose language one does not
>know and resorts to imitative sounds and gestures, these approach the
>character of an icon. The reason they are not pure icons is that the
>purpose of them is emphasized. A pure icon is independent of any purpose.
>It serves as a sign solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves
>to signify. The relation to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts
>nothing. If it conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the
>object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information. An
>icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign.
>---------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>__________________________________________
>
>Bernard Morand
>Département Informatique
>Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
>TEL (33) 02 31 52 55 34             FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
>e-mail: morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr
>http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/
>__________________________________________________________________
>
>
>---
>Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber Peter_Skagestad <at> uml.edu
>
>
>
>
>---
>Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber MORAND <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr

__________________________________________________________________
Bernard Morand
Département Informatique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
TEL (33) 02 31 52 55 34             FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
e-mail: morand <at> iutc3.unicaen.fr
http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/
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Joseph Ransdell | 1 Feb 2006 17:56
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

Kirsti and list:
 
Kirsti says (full message appended below):
 
First: Thank you, Joe very much for the NEW ELEMENTS & the incentive for a detailed discussion. I've just read the first part of the mails on the thread & the text, with keen interest, though only once.

What I wish to do, is to stick with the question "What is it all about?" for a while. I have a special interest in this particular question, related to a method I originally developed for a Peircean course on text and argument analysis for students working on their PhD or Master's theses. I've described some aspects of it in discussions with Gary, first ON, then OFF Peirce-list, soon after joining the list a couple of years ago. Since then, I've had reason to reconsider what would be the best way to convey the most basic idea in it. As one result I decided to name it Dialogical Argument Analysis. Now I'm planning to write a paper of the method next summer, based on my notes for the lectures and tasks for the students. First in Finnish, perhaps later in English. So my motive in this comes partly from furthering that plan.

I hope this does not interfere with the plans Joe has in mind. If it does, please just tell me so, Joe!
 
REPLY:
 
I have no objection myself, Kirsti, if you understand that it is entirely up to you, i.e. I won't be altering anything I do in order to make your study work and you shouldn't expect anyone else to be doing that either.  You can of course make methodological suggestions or otherwise try to shape what happens yourself -- as can anyone else -- but no one should feel required to cooperate with you, as distinct from taking your advice because it sounds like it might really improve the discussion in some way.  Bear in mind, though, that PEIRCE-L remains a forum without any special agenda and the conversation concerning the New Elements is likely to be far less structured overall than it might be if this were a discussion list set up for the special purpose of a controlled discussion of that paper.  
 
This might be a good place to quote a relevant passage from Plato's Theaetetus.  The context is a little different than is appropriate here -- he has in mind people in politics and public affairs -- but suitable changes being made, the point to quoting it would be clear enough:
 

SOCRATES: . . . Those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such places [i.e. places of public discussion generally] as a freeman is in breeding unlike a slave.

THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen?

SOCRATES: In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always command: he has his talk in peace and, like ourselves, he wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third, -- if the fancy takes him he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra [i.e. the clock] driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the affidavit is recited at the time: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is continually disputing about a fellow servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

 
Joe Ransdell
 
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2006 7:14 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?


List,

First: Thank you, Joe very much for the NEW ELEMENTS & the incentive for a detailed discussion. I've just read the first part of the mails on the thread & the text, with keen interest, though only once.

What I wish to do, is to stick with the question "What is it all about?" for a while. I have a special interest in this particular question, related to a method I originally developed for a Peircean course on text and argument analysis for students working on their PhD or Master's theses. I've described some aspects of it in discussions with Gary, first ON, then OFF Peirce-list, soon after joining the list a couple of years ago. Since then, I've had reason to reconsider what would be the best way to convey the most basic idea in it. As one result I decided to name it Dialogical Argument Analysis. Now I'm planning to write a paper of the method next summer, based on my notes for the lectures and tasks for the students. First in Finnish, perhaps later in English. So my motive in this comes partly from furthering that plan.

I hope this does not interfere with the plans Joe has in mind. If it does, please just tell me so, Joe!

There may well be a host of more or less similar methods, which I do not know of. But, as I've always found it best, for me that is, to let my own experiences lead the way, I'll stick to that also now. Also, I may add, my aim with the method is not particularly to present something new, but to explicate (in Peircean terms) and make more systematic (in a Peircean way) what we all ordinarily do when we try to find out what various writings are all about - or when we, deliberately and consciously or spontaneously, have other questions in mind, with which we hope the text in question may be helpful in finding an answer.

Well, hope you haven't got all bored with the lengthy introductory part - if so, I apologize & trust those of you have, have already resorted to delete button. And to those, who haven't, a word of warning: What follows is very boring!

Now I'll try and apply some of the basic rules of the method to NEW ELEMENTS, just to see where it leads, for a start.

First, I agree with Bernard, who wrote that he finds it best
BM:... to go directly to the text of New Elements because I think it to be the most immediate way of dealing with the question "So what is it all about?" (as well as answering it).

As Peirce quite frequently notes, we must start with what we have. So, what do we have here?
In simplest terms, we have a text, a question, and an interest to find a reasonably well grounded answer, as economically as possible.

What is needed is a method, preferably as Peircean as possible, suitable for present purposes.

In simplest terms, a method consists of a guiding principle and a reasonably systematic way of proceeding from a question to an array of answers, which may then be critically examined, in order to proceed from (some of) them to new questions, etc.

With a question like: What is this all about? the first step I've found the best is to see if, and what the author explicitly states. That is: stick to quotes from the text. As few as possible and as short as possible, but not too few or too short for the purpose of getting on with the task & without losing anything essential from the text as a whole.

Bernard already took up one citation:
1) "A scholium is a comment upon the logical structure of the doctrine. This preface is a scholium." (EP2, p. 303).

So, in most general terms, it is all about logical structure. And, less generally, about the logical structure of a doctrine.

I'd provisionally add three more:

2) CP: "Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as such."

3) CP: "It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium; (...)"
/fontfamily>
4) CP: "We can now see what judgment and assertion are. (...)" [n the last paragraph, just before final conclusions. So, it must be an integral part of what the whole, as a whole, is all about.]

/fontfamily>Let's see, then, what we can make up of these four short citations (There most probably are more to be found in the text, but they may be added later, if necessary).

So, NE is a comment upon the logical structure of a doctrine, the general nature of which is explicated in citation 2). Citation 3) is about the main subject of this scholium, the proposition. - So far, so good.

But 4) presents a small, but not perhaps insignificant, problem. It is nor clear enough from these short citations only, taken out of their respective contexts, how judgement and assertion relate to 1)-3). So, lets see if it's helpful to take a somewhat longer citation of one or more. My first candidate for this is 3):

3) CP: "It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium; for the distinctions of vague and distinct, general and individual are propositional distinctions. I have endeavored to restrain myself from long discussions of terminology. But here we reach a point where a very common terminology overlaps an erroneous conception. Namely those logicians who follow the lead of Germans, instead of treating of propositions, speak of “judgments” (Urtheile). They regard a proposition as merely an expression in speech or writing of a judgment. More than one error is involved in this practice."/fontfamily>

Well, this is clearly too long for the present purpose, so I'll make a tentative shortened version of it:
3) CP: "It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium; [...] those logicians who follow the lead of Germans, instead of treating of propositions, speak of “judgments” (Urtheile). They regard a proposition as merely an expression in speech or writing of a judgment. More than one error is involved in this practice."/fontfamily>

- From this one can infer that it is about critical comments on how the relation between proposition and judgement are to be understood, especially in relation to what it is that is expressed in speech or writing. - If the rule of sticking to quotes were followed in strictest terms, then one ore more quotes with the term "assertion" should be added. But let's loosen the rule, and take the "what is expressed in speech or writing" to be an assertion.

Let's also skip the next step, which would be to explicate, write down, the first provisional answer to the question, inferred from quotes only.

Then it would be time to choose the most general of the ideas in the provisional answer, and read the first, introductory part of the paper, from the angle given by the idea. To me it clearly seems to be: "This is all about logical structure." - I already tried it, and to me it worked just fine. But I'll leave it to the next mail, if there is to be one.

Just one more comment:

Bernard also wrote:
BM: I think more and more that the only topic on which this text is all about is nothing but METAPHYSICS.
This I find very intriguing. Metaphysics is what Peirce explicitly says he wishes to avoid here. So, in terms of quotes, the answer would be negative. Still, it may not be the case. In fact, I'd tend to affirm the idea. Provisionally, of course.

Best,

Kirsti

Finally, I have a basic reservation in dealing with Peirce's work from the point of view of its expected audience. I think that Peirce never elaborated his contributions for any audience except for this audience that he used to call the Truth. When he tried to make something like that, for example an elementary book in mathematics, the manuscript was judged too much original to be published by the editors. May be that in some circumstances the case could be made that he was making a specific discourse but it would have to be strongly justified by the defender of such a view, I think.



Bernard took up:
BM: The first thing that always appeared strange to me is that Peirce is beginning with a long development about Euclid's exposition. But we know that precisely a great revolution had already taken place in mathematics under the auspice of non euclidian geometries. I think Peirce is here just saving what had made the value of euclidian geometry in his view, the deductive method as well as the associated style of exposition.

This style amounts to some general and abstract statements, which are just set down in order to show their necessary consequences. The logical structure of the exposition has not to be made explicit because it is to the reader's activity to realize it for himself.
In brief I think Peirce is revisiting the basic points of his semiotic doctrine of the time, in order to see what he could further make of it, but without ordering nor explaining it, that is to say without making any kind of argument in the proper sense.

/fontfamily>



Kirsti Määttänen
<kirstima <at> saunalahti.fi>/fontfamily>

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Gary Richmond | 1 Feb 2006 20:05
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

Kirsti, Bernard, list

Caught up in a million and one pressing personal and profession matters, I won't for now be able to engage much in your mode of  inquiry, Kirsti (while I would like to experiment with it on-list soon when some deadlines for conference papers being reviewed, etc. are behind me). But let me for now just agree with you regarding a  tentative conclusion you've arrived at, or rather, a question you have about another's interpretation following your own textual analysis. First, quoting Bernard Morand, you wrote:
BM: I think more and more that the only topic on which this text is all about is nothing but METAPHYSICS.
KM: This I find very intriguing. Metaphysics is what Peirce explicitly says he wishes to avoid here. So, in terms of quotes, the answer would be negative. Still, it may not be the case. In fact, I'd tend to affirm the idea. Provisionally, of course.
As you no doubt know, I have tended to be of the same mind (commind?) as Bernard  and Martin Lefebvre in the discussion of the New Elements so far. However, I would tend to agree with your questioning Bernard's remark for I too see the New Elements fragment as NOT concerning itself with metaphysics. Perhaps Bernard will clarify his comment since he too has otherwise suggested that the New Elements is "all about logical structure."

Gary

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Joseph Ransdell | 1 Feb 2006 21:59
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

That quotation from Socrates was not intended as an attack on lawyers, by the way!  I just noticed that it might be construed that way.  They didn't have lawyers then and that is just Jowett's mistaken translation.  The basic contrast in that passage is rather of the philosopher as the person who lives in leisure time, which is time overcome by not being timed and not being done for a purpose external to the doing itself: one does philosophy in order to keep on doing philosophy. So what's the hurry?   It is the human approximation to the life of the gods, who do nothing but play.   It is not inactivity but rather activity which is not measured by external criteria of productivity.   Its religious expression is Hinduism: Do not work for the fruits of your action.  This does not imply inactivity but rather activity upon the performance of which one is totally focused by the aim of perfection: it translates into the idea of craftsmanship.   This may have something to do with the conception of entelechy, by the way. 
 
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Wednesday, February 01, 2006 10:56 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

Kirsti and list:
 
Kirsti says (full message appended below):
 
First: Thank you, Joe very much for the NEW ELEMENTS & the incentive for a detailed discussion. I've just read the first part of the mails on the thread & the text, with keen interest, though only once.

What I wish to do, is to stick with the question "What is it all about?" for a while. I have a special interest in this particular question, related to a method I originally developed for a Peircean course on text and argument analysis for students working on their PhD or Master's theses. I've described some aspects of it in discussions with Gary, first ON, then OFF Peirce-list, soon after joining the list a couple of years ago. Since then, I've had reason to reconsider what would be the best way to convey the most basic idea in it. As one result I decided to name it Dialogical Argument Analysis. Now I'm planning to write a paper of the method next summer, based on my notes for the lectures and tasks for the students. First in Finnish, perhaps later in English. So my motive in this comes partly from furthering that plan.

I hope this does not interfere with the plans Joe has in mind. If it does, please just tell me so, Joe!
 
REPLY:
 
I have no objection myself, Kirsti, if you understand that it is entirely up to you, i.e. I won't be altering anything I do in order to make your study work and you shouldn't expect anyone else to be doing that either.  You can of course make methodological suggestions or otherwise try to shape what happens yourself -- as can anyone else -- but no one should feel required to cooperate with you, as distinct from taking your advice because it sounds like it might really improve the discussion in some way.  Bear in mind, though, that PEIRCE-L remains a forum without any special agenda and the conversation concerning the New Elements is likely to be far less structured overall than it might be if this were a discussion list set up for the special purpose of a controlled discussion of that paper.  
 
This might be a good place to quote a relevant passage from Plato's Theaetetus.  The context is a little different than is appropriate here -- he has in mind people in politics and public affairs -- but suitable changes being made, the point to quoting it would be clear enough:
 

SOCRATES: . . . Those who have been trained in philosophy and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such places [i.e. places of public discussion generally] as a freeman is in breeding unlike a slave.

THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen?

SOCRATES: In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always command: he has his talk in peace and, like ourselves, he wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third, -- if the fancy takes him he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra [i.e. the clock] driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the affidavit is recited at the time: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is continually disputing about a fellow servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a slave from his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

 
Joe Ransdell
 
 
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Monday, January 30, 2006 7:14 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?


List,

First: Thank you, Joe very much for the NEW ELEMENTS & the incentive for a detailed discussion. I've just read the first part of the mails on the thread & the text, with keen interest, though only once.

What I wish to do, is to stick with the question "What is it all about?" for a while. I have a special interest in this particular question, related to a method I originally developed for a Peircean course on text and argument analysis for students working on their PhD or Master's theses. I've described some aspects of it in discussions with Gary, first ON, then OFF Peirce-list, soon after joining the list a couple of years ago. Since then, I've had reason to reconsider what would be the best way to convey the most basic idea in it. As one result I decided to name it Dialogical Argument Analysis. Now I'm planning to write a paper of the method next summer, based on my notes for the lectures and tasks for the students. First in Finnish, perhaps later in English. So my motive in this comes partly from furthering that plan.

I hope this does not interfere with the plans Joe has in mind. If it does, please just tell me so, Joe!

There may well be a host of more or less similar methods, which I do not know of. But, as I've always found it best, for me that is, to let my own experiences lead the way, I'll stick to that also now. Also, I may add, my aim with the method is not particularly to present something new, but to explicate (in Peircean terms) and make more systematic (in a Peircean way) what we all ordinarily do when we try to find out what various writings are all about - or when we, deliberately and consciously or spontaneously, have other questions in mind, with which we hope the text in question may be helpful in finding an answer.

Well, hope you haven't got all bored with the lengthy introductory part - if so, I apologize & trust those of you have, have already resorted to delete button. And to those, who haven't, a word of warning: What follows is very boring!

Now I'll try and apply some of the basic rules of the method to NEW ELEMENTS, just to see where it leads, for a start.

First, I agree with Bernard, who wrote that he finds it best
BM:... to go directly to the text of New Elements because I think it to be the most immediate way of dealing with the question "So what is it all about?" (as well as answering it).

As Peirce quite frequently notes, we must start with what we have. So, what do we have here?
In simplest terms, we have a text, a question, and an interest to find a reasonably well grounded answer, as economically as possible.

What is needed is a method, preferably as Peircean as possible, suitable for present purposes.

In simplest terms, a method consists of a guiding principle and a reasonably systematic way of proceeding from a question to an array of answers, which may then be critically examined, in order to proceed from (some of) them to new questions, etc.

With a question like: What is this all about? the first step I've found the best is to see if, and what the author explicitly states. That is: stick to quotes from the text. As few as possible and as short as possible, but not too few or too short for the purpose of getting on with the task & without losing anything essential from the text as a whole.

Bernard already took up one citation:
1) "A scholium is a comment upon the logical structure of the doctrine. This preface is a scholium." (EP2, p. 303).

So, in most general terms, it is all about logical structure. And, less generally, about the logical structure of a doctrine.

I'd provisionally add three more:

2) CP: "Logic, for me, is the study of the essential conditions to which signs must conform in order to function as such."

3) CP: "It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium; (...)"
/fontfamily>
4) CP: "We can now see what judgment and assertion are. (...)" [n the last paragraph, just before final conclusions. So, it must be an integral part of what the whole, as a whole, is all about.]

/fontfamily>Let's see, then, what we can make up of these four short citations (There most probably are more to be found in the text, but they may be added later, if necessary).

So, NE is a comment upon the logical structure of a doctrine, the general nature of which is explicated in citation 2). Citation 3) is about the main subject of this scholium, the proposition. - So far, so good.

But 4) presents a small, but not perhaps insignificant, problem. It is nor clear enough from these short citations only, taken out of their respective contexts, how judgement and assertion relate to 1)-3). So, lets see if it's helpful to take a somewhat longer citation of one or more. My first candidate for this is 3):

3) CP: "It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium; for the distinctions of vague and distinct, general and individual are propositional distinctions. I have endeavored to restrain myself from long discussions of terminology. But here we reach a point where a very common terminology overlaps an erroneous conception. Namely those logicians who follow the lead of Germans, instead of treating of propositions, speak of “judgments” (Urtheile). They regard a proposition as merely an expression in speech or writing of a judgment. More than one error is involved in this practice."/fontfamily>

Well, this is clearly too long for the present purpose, so I'll make a tentative shortened version of it:
3) CP: "It is the Proposition which forms the main subject of this whole scholium; [...] those logicians who follow the lead of Germans, instead of treating of propositions, speak of “judgments” (Urtheile). They regard a proposition as merely an expression in speech or writing of a judgment. More than one error is involved in this practice."/fontfamily>

- From this one can infer that it is about critical comments on how the relation between proposition and judgement are to be understood, especially in relation to what it is that is expressed in speech or writing. - If the rule of sticking to quotes were followed in strictest terms, then one ore more quotes with the term "assertion" should be added. But let's loosen the rule, and take the "what is expressed in speech or writing" to be an assertion.

Let's also skip the next step, which would be to explicate, write down, the first provisional answer to the question, inferred from quotes only.

Then it would be time to choose the most general of the ideas in the provisional answer, and read the first, introductory part of the paper, from the angle given by the idea. To me it clearly seems to be: "This is all about logical structure." - I already tried it, and to me it worked just fine. But I'll leave it to the next mail, if there is to be one.

Just one more comment:

Bernard also wrote:
BM: I think more and more that the only topic on which this text is all about is nothing but METAPHYSICS.
This I find very intriguing. Metaphysics is what Peirce explicitly says he wishes to avoid here. So, in terms of quotes, the answer would be negative. Still, it may not be the case. In fact, I'd tend to affirm the idea. Provisionally, of course.

Best,

Kirsti

Finally, I have a basic reservation in dealing with Peirce's work from the point of view of its expected audience. I think that Peirce never elaborated his contributions for any audience except for this audience that he used to call the Truth. When he tried to make something like that, for example an elementary book in mathematics, the manuscript was judged too much original to be published by the editors. May be that in some circumstances the case could be made that he was making a specific discourse but it would have to be strongly justified by the defender of such a view, I think.



Bernard took up:
BM: The first thing that always appeared strange to me is that Peirce is beginning with a long development about Euclid's exposition. But we know that precisely a great revolution had already taken place in mathematics under the auspice of non euclidian geometries. I think Peirce is here just saving what had made the value of euclidian geometry in his view, the deductive method as well as the associated style of exposition.

This style amounts to some general and abstract statements, which are just set down in order to show their necessary consequences. The logical structure of the exposition has not to be made explicit because it is to the reader's activity to realize it for himself.
In brief I think Peirce is revisiting the basic points of his semiotic doctrine of the time, in order to see what he could further make of it, but without ordering nor explaining it, that is to say without making any kind of argument in the proper sense.

/fontfamily>



Kirsti Määttänen
<kirstima <at> saunalahti.fi>/fontfamily>

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Kirsti Määttänen | 2 Feb 2006 02:43
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Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

Bernard, list

31.1.2006 kello 20:13, Bernard Morand kirjoitti

>  BM: To continue the discussion, we find "pure icons" in the following  
> passage of New Elements and "pure indices" will appear later. I  
> mention this with regard to a precedent discussion between Joe and Jon  
> relative to "pure symbols". I think that "pure" as to be taken here in  
> the same sense as we could consider "pure symbols". But in fact my  
> question is elsewhere: at the end of the quote Peirce makes the point  
> that "An icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign". I am not  
> sure of what he is saying here. Answers are welcome!

Interesting question. What catches my attention is that Peirce does NOT  
say "A PURE icon can only..." , but "AN icon", so it's a question of  
ANY one icon. Nor does Peirce say: "THE icon".

I think the question is best approached through the categories. An  
icon, as firstness, is
a mere possibility. But we cannot e.g. point out to someone else (or to  
oneself, for that matter) a mere possibility without realizing (in both  
senses) the possibility. (So, a mere possibility is akin to Kantian  
Ding an sich in this respect.)

 From this it seems to follow that when Peirce speaks of pure icons, he  
is emphasizing that he is speaking of mere possibilities, something we  
can understand, but only as something virtual. As soon as a mere  
possibility is brought into relation with anything, secondness is  
brought in, and it no longer is about mere firstness, but firstness IN  
RELATION, any relation. Then firsness (a pure icon) is no longer pure,  
but necessarily "mixed" with secondness (some object). And if the  
relation is interpreted, e.g. by understanding the relation AS some  
kind of a relations, then thirdness is brought in. The relation is then  
mediated by a certain kind of understanding.

If Peirce had written "THE icon", he would have been speaking of  
something general (thirdness), the being of which can only be virtual.  
But here he is not. I don't think THE icon, being general, can be a  
fragment (of a completer sign).

  All this brings me to the conclusion that the precedent discussion on  
pure symbols became so complicated partly because the question: Are  
there pure icons? may not have been a good first question. It  
presupposes that participants share an understanding of what "pure  
icon" means. Which did not seem to be the case.

Anyway, now it seems to me that Peirce used "pure" in two senses given  
in The Concise Oxford Dictionary (5th ed.): 1) Unmixed, and 3) Mere,  
simple, nothing but, sheer.

So, a pure icon means something not mixed with anything, as a fragment  
necessarily is. Consequently, "An icon can only be a fragment of a  
completer sign" does not deal with a pure icon, but an icon mixed with  
at least secondness, its object, possibly also with thirdness, an  
interpretant. An icon as a fragment being necessarily mixed.

Sometimes Peirce used "mere icon", if I remember correctly (which I may  
not?). Sometimes "pure icon". It seems to me that respective meanings  
overlap, "pure" giving more emphasis to "unmixed" than "mere". - But  
who am I to say? Not being a native speaker.

Does this have any relevance to what you had in mind, Bernard?

I apologize for lagging behind in the discussion. There are several  
mails I have not read yet, But if I don't respond right away, leaving  
subsequent ones to wait, I won't have time to respond at all.

Best regards

Kirsti Määttänen

> -----------------------Quote New Elements------------------------
> The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon.  
> This is defined as a sign of which the character that fits it to  
> become a sign of the sort that it is, is simply inherent in it as a  
> quality of it. For example, a geometrical figure drawn on paper may be  
> an icon of a triangle or other geometrical form. If one meets a man  
> whose language one does not know and resorts to imitative sounds and  
> gestures, these approach the character of an icon. The reason they are  
> not pure icons is that the purpose of them is emphasized. A pure icon  
> is independent of any purpose. It serves as a sign solely and simply  
> by exhibiting the quality it serves to signify. The relation to its  
> object is a degenerate relation. It asserts nothing. If it conveys  
> information, it is only in the sense in which the object that it is  
> used to represent may be said to convey information. An icon can only  
> be a fragment of a completer sign.
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
> ----

kirstima <at> saunalahti.fi

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Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber gspp-peirce-l <at> m.gmane.org


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