FW: SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
Catherine Legg <clegg <at> WAIKATO.AC.NZ>
2012-02-07 05:15:10 GMT
Dear Peirceans,
Just a short note to say that after a long absence from this list, I'm
back, and *how* nice it is to read such thoughtful and wide-ranging posts
as the below. I'm remembering the old magic that drew me to the list and
to Peirce studies back in the mid-90s, and the 'intellectual hope' that
Gary speaks eloquently of below, of creating (by 'bodying forth', rather
than arguing about it) a new paradigm in semiotics and philosophy, is one
that moves me too.
On the topic of which, I am about to post a Call For Papers for a very
specific project which hopefully will be of interest to this list.
Stand by...
Yours,
Cathy
Catherine Legg
Senior Lecturer, Philosophy Programme
University of Waikato
Private Bag 3105
3240, Hamilton, New Zealand
http://waikato.academia.edu/CathyLegg
-----Original Message-----
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On
Behalf Of Gary Richmond
Sent: Friday, 3 February 2012 9:51 a.m.
To: PEIRCE-L <at> LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: Re: SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
Peter, Stephen, list,
Peter, you wrote:
PS: I am a little surprised at the lack of follow-up from the list to
Steve's suggestions, below. I do not personally have any opinion
regarding the prospect of Peirceans forming a new generation of public
intellectuals, but this is a theme that I recall being raised on the
list in the past, and generating lively discussion.
Stephen had written:
SR: Did Peirce ever say anything relevant to the issue of peer review?
As for example implying a division between disciplines, in which
ordinary persons would have no relevant contribution to make, and areas
where anyone of ordinary capacities might be seen to have a valuable
contribution to make? The impression I have is that Peirce might be
quite iconoclastic regarding the vetting all of claims to truth, not to
mention the proliferation of specialization and its sequestration under
the umbrellas of academia and professions.
GR: For my own part, I would hope--and that's all that it is and can be
for now: a hope--that a more Peircean approach to "forming a new
generation of public intellectuals" might come to be. By "a Peircean
approach" I mean to include such thing as Socratic dialogue (that is, as
Peirce understood it, not as Plato misinterpreted it); critical
commonsensism (== pragmatism); a tripartite method of scientific inquiry
involving the individual abductive generation of hypotheses, the
deduction of the implications of certain hypotheses for testing, and the
actual inductive test occur, the results to be reviewed and reflected
upon by the relevant scientific communities of interest; the notion of
the significant differences (including methodological) between
Cenoscopic (philosophy) and Idioscopic (the 'special' sciences); the
assumption of an extreme realist metaphysic--countering nominalistic and
reductivistic tendencies--upon essentially pan-semiotic analyses
(following the findings of a tricategorial phenomenology); his ethics of
inquiry, etc.
Still, all of this--and much more--has been 'out there' for well over a
century, almost two (we are approaching the centenary of Peirce's death
in 2014), and, while there has been some progress especially in the
theory related to much that has been outlined above, for a philosophy
which has as its name, "pragmatism," there has been scant little
application of it to communities of inquiry it seems to me.
Nevertheless, after decades of specialization, one can imagine that
we're beginning to see a new, growing ideal of interdisciplinary
semiotic thinking, this being one of the great possibilities of
biosemiotics as some are conceiving it,and certainly one of the
principal reasons why I'm drawn to it. Not only Deacon's work, but also
Eliseo Fernandez's and Soren Brier's (both of these scholars are on this
list, btw) tend towards this new interdisciplinary thinking. But the
terrain is vast and extraordinarily complex such that both Brier and
Deacon, for example, have had to write very long, very dense, very
complex books. On the other hand, I've recommended Fernandez's work here
since his short articles gives one--at least gave me--enough of a sense
of the value and importance of the possibilities inherent in this
relatively newly budding semiotic approach as to afford me the patience
and fortitude to tackle a tome like Deacon's *Incomplete Science*. So,
in a word, this is difficult material to take up as a individual or, a
fortiori, as a community because of its complexity. I've been talking
about beginning a discussion of Deacon's book here for some time, and
Gary Fuhrman made a good faith attempt at getting it going. But now I
think it'll take a great deal more preparation for us to get such a
discussion off the ground (at the moment we are both rereading the book,
btw).
Peirce clearly distinguishes kinds of sciences (theoretical and
practical, censocopic and specific, research/review/applied, etc.) and
kinds of scientists; there have been many discussions concerning these
distinctions on the list over the years. As for research in these
individual disciplines, to offer a personal example, I have a special
interest in a tiny little practical science which I call 'trikonic'. All
it means to do is tricategorially analyze the findings of certain other
sciences (viz., the theoretical and review sciences, especially the
former as they are reflected on and organized by the later). Now, it is
true that I am sometimes drawn to make--in order to undertake, or more
frequently, to complete a particular trichotomic analysis--an abduction
of my own which goes beyond trikonic. For example, I have hypothesized
that Peirce's phenomenology is a trichotomic science (much as logic as
semeiotic is). Still, and this is my main point here, I was informed by
the work of others, in this case, Andre de Tienne in phenomenology, for
ideas leading to the hypothesis that Peirce's phenomenology has these
branches (Phaneroscopy, 1ns; Iconoscopy, 2ns; Category theory, or
trichotomic, 3ns). Were it not for the list and, in particular, Joe's
pointing to de Tienne's work, I might never have come upon it, have
never read and reflected on it.
Continuing, Stephen also wrote:
SR: [. . . ] I feel it is the job of Peirceans to define a way ahead
beyond the current straitjacket [. . . ] theologically and generally, I
think Peirce is absolutely essential to explaining a way beyond
nominalism and to opening the door to the appropriation of religion as
post-institutional spirituality. Also to the introduction of a general
appropriation of ethical values [. . .] in a world where [these have
(GR] proved seriously wanting. Maybe academic Peirce folk could fill the
void in the ranks of our public intellectuals.
GR: Now that's some challenge! I won't remark on the 'theological'
aspect of the question, since it has historically 'gotten me into
trouble' here, not to mention that even a brief reflection on it (or the
problem of nominalism, or the ethical question) would make an already
long post even longer. I will only suggest, again, that much as did the
late Arnold Shepperson, and as many have expressed here and in print, I
too have benefited immensely now for well over a decade from seeing this
Peirce forum and Arisbe as essential intellectual resources. I will
always be grateful to Joe Ransdell for creating both on the Peircean and
democratic principles that he did. For me the list offers a kind of
intellectual 'hope' that we can discuss matters philosophical here as
peers. Because Peirce posited cenoscopic--that is, philosophy--as a
science anyone of sound mind might enter into, I personally consider
everyone on this list my peer in philosophy. Still, when one considers
its several branches, I know that there are some here far more competent
than I in some of these branches, and I look to them for enlightenment.
Meanwhile, challenges to my own thinking only help to sharpen it.
I would like to conclude by quoting a passage from Deacon's chapter in
*Incomplete Nature* titled "Work," a passage which, I think, suggests
just how great the challenge is to especially creative intellectuals
today in even conveying their thinking to others.
TD: "[T]hat which is involved in discovering how best to communicate
ideas that are counterintuitive or alien or otherwise go against
received wisdom, is particularly difficult work [. . .] This suggest
that the sources or resistance that are the focus of the work to be done
also include many tendencies not generally considered by physicists and
engineers; for example, tendencies of thought that contribute to the
difficulty of changing opinions or beliefs" (Deacon, 331).
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
>>> "Skagestad, Peter" 01/29/12 3:35 PM >>>
List,
I am a little surprised at the lack of follow-up from the list to
Steve's suggestions, below. I do not personally have any opinion
regarding the prospect of Peirceans forming a new generation of public
intellectuals, but this is a theme that I recall being raised on the
list in the past, and generating lively discussion.
Anyhow, this slow read has gone on somewhat longer than intended or
expected, and it is clear that the focus of discussion on the list has
moved beyond it, which is fine. I shall attempt to wrap it up with a
fairly quick overview of the last few pages of Joe's paper. A peer is
someone who is to be treated as an equal, and who is to be respected
both because s/he is an equal and because s/he has a perspective that is
different from mine and therefore of value to me as an inquirer. Joe
specifically grounds this conception in Peirce's work, as follows:
JR: "Peirce describes the coordination of the perspectives of the
individual inquirers, which assumes an equal respect for each such
perspective as having its own role to play in providing the composite
substance of the date being reconciled in the coordination in a striking
passage in "How to Make Our Ideas Clear":
[Quoting Peirce] One man may investigate the velocity of light by
studying the transit of Venus and the aberration of the stars; another
by the oppositions of Mars and the eclipses of Jupiter's satellites; a
third by the method of Fizeau; a fourth by that of Foucault; a fifth by
the motions of the curves of Lissajoux; a sixth, a seventh, an eighth,
and a ninth, may follow the different method of comparing the measures
of statical and dynamical electricity. They may at first obtain
different results, but, as each perfects his method and his processes,
the results are found to move steadily together toward a destined
center. So with all scientific research. Different minds may set out
with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation
carries them by a force outside themselves to one and the same
conclusion. (Collected Papers, 5.407)"
PS: I take Joe here to be * correctly * inferring from Peirce that the
larger and, more importantly, the more diverse the pool of inquirers is,
the greater confidence we can have that any consensus they reach is one
to which they have been carried "by a force outside themselves". What
is of the very essence of scientific research, then, is undermined by
the formation of scientific elites which decide who does or does not
qualify as a peer and allowed to participate in peer review of
scientific communications:
JR: "When only some members of a research community are actually treated
as having a right to provide input into the theoretical reconciliation
that is constantly being constructed in the ongoing course of inquiry,
the community of inquirers shrinks, in effect, to the size of those so
privileged, and the properties of the subject-matter that are
effectively being accessed and taken duly into account for purposes of
arriving at an understanding of the subject-matter are correspondingly
diminished *"
PS: Peer review through editorial selection of reviewers, then, is
really pseudo-peer review, in contrast to Ginsparg's system, which comes
closer to realizing peer review in the proper sense of the term. Joe
goes on to emphasize that what he is criticizing is the existing system;
he does not mean to impugn editors functioning within the system, who
need have no elitist intent and who may in fact exercise excellent
judgment in their selection of reviewers. But what is elitist,
authoritarian, and limiting is the very system whereby reviewers are
selected by editors, who are of course themselves selected by people in
positions of authority:
JR: "There is no doubt but what many editors do in fact have good
judgment, and that their selection of reviewers can be counted on to be
reasonably just. But inasmuch as the opinion of the reviewers is
actually operative in publication process only via the confidence the
editor places in them, and it is the editor who selects them to begin
with, there is no getting around the fact that this is an elitist system
in which the editors, who must themselves be peers of the readers of
their journals, are functioning as Orwellian peers, peers more perish
than the peers whom they nominally serve."
PS: The adjective "Orwellian" here is of course a reference to Animal
Farm, George Orwell's satire of Soviet communism, where "all animals are
equal, but some animals are more equal than others". Joe goes on for
three more pages enlarging on the themes covered above, but I think all
the main points have been covered, so I shall stop here. Again, I wish
had some probing, provocative questions to put out there, but I don't.
The floor is open to questions, comments, objections, amplifications,
etc.
Cheers,
Peter
________________________________
From: Stephen C. Rose [steverose <at> gmail.com]
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2012 11:57 AM
To: Skagestad, Peter
Cc: PEIRCE-L <at> listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
Thanks Peter. You have answered the question I think. But I feel
comments on this ending part might be useful:
> The impression I have is that Peirce might be quite iconoclastic
regarding the vetting all of claims to truth, not to mention the
proliferation of specialization and its sequestration under the
umbrellas of academia and professions.
If the answer to this is yes, I feel it is the job of Peirceans to
define a way ahead beyond the current straitjacket. My efforts are
entirely beyond it. because I claim no expertise and only (perhaps) an
intuitive and imperfect understanding. But theologically and generally,
I think Peirce is absolutely essential to explaining a way beyond
nominalism and to opening the door to the appropriation of religion as
post-institutional spirituality. Also to the introduction of a general
appropriation of ethical values generally in a world where the
Aristotelian framework of values (which Aristotle actually did not
possess, opting instead for characteristics such as "honor") has proved
seriously wanting. Maybe academic Peirce folk could fill the void in the
ranks of our public intellectuals.
ShortFormContent at Blogger
On Wed, Jan 25, 2012 at 10:55 AM, Skagestad, Peter > wrote:
Steve, list,
I am not aware that Peirce said anything explicitly about peer review,
although he certainly said things that are relevant to it - more of that
when we move on to the next segment of Joe's paper. But of course
academic disdciplines barely existed in Peirce's day, and they certainly
were not institutionalized the way they are today. Thus Perirce could
hold a degree in chemistry, spernd most of his professional life as
astronomer, while taking time out to teach logic at Johns Hopkins, a
combination that is hardly imaginable today.
Does anyone else have any light to shed on Steve's question?
Cheers,
Peter
________________________________________
From: Stephen C. Rose [steverose <at> gmail.com]
Sent: Saturday, January 21, 2012 5:19 PM
To: Skagestad, Peter
Cc: PEIRCE-L <at> listserv.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO
COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION
Did Peirce ever say anything relevant to the issue of peer review? As
for example implying a division between disciplines, in which ordinary
persons would have no relevant contribution to make, and areas where
anyone of ordinary capacities might be seen to have a valuable
contribution to make? The impression I have is that Peirce might be
quite iconoclastic regarding the vetting all of claims to truth, not to
mention the proliferation of specialization and its sequestration under
the umbrellas of academia and professions.
ShortFormContent at Blogger
On Sat, Jan 21, 2012 at 4:53 PM, Skagestad, Peter >> wrote:
List,
After a bit of a hiatus I am returning to the slow read of Joe's paper.
I said earlier that, while I count myself quite knowledgeable about the
topics covered in the first part of the paper, I know next to nothing
about contemporary scientific communication, which is the focus at least
of the second half. It has occurred to me, however, that in the interest
of full disclosure I should mention that I am currently in my third
career as a textbook editor, meaning that I routinely commission and
interpret reviews of manuscripts. These reviews are no doubt very
different from prepublication reviews of scientific papers * my
manuscripts are reviewed less for truth claims than for coverage,
organization, accessibility, and the like * but the listers should be
aware that this is what I do for a living.
We resume on page 19 of the version posted at Arisbe. Having described
Ginsparg's publication system (arXiv), Joe counters the criticism that
the system lacks peer review, not by questioning the fundamental
importance of peer review to scientific communication, but by
challenging the concept of peer review as currently understood, i.e.
prepublication review by editorially selected reviewers:
JR: [my] view is * that what has come to be called "peer review" is not
peer review proper but rather a crippled form of it which is not only of
limited value at best as a critical control principle but is also a
subversion of the peer principle that underlies the practice of
authentic peer review. Why? Because it treats peer review as a system of
elite control, which is directly contrary to the conception of a peer."
PS: Initially, Joe notes, he thought this use of the term "peer review"
to refer to review by editorially selected reviewers was a purely verbal
matter, which was best left undisturbed, especially as both defenders
and opponents of the practice shared the same usage. But this, he had
later come to see, was a mistake. By accepting the conventional usage of
"peer review" and by rejecting peer review so understood, the advocates
of the Ginsparg system were in effect undermining the radical potential
of the system and contributing go rendering it innocuous:
JR: "[Since] it is respect for the peer principle that lies at the basis
of the critical control of research communication generally, [the
rejection of peer review] was a rhetorical mistake that has enable the
success of those who deny the significance of the success of the
Ginsparg system by denying that it has the status which it actually does
have as a venue for primary publication. With this status denied, what
actually takes place in the Ginsparg system can be and now commonly is
in fact dismissed as being no different in kind from what happens on any
bulletin board, listserver based forum or discussion group, chat line,
or any other informal medium not regarded as important enough to the
hegemony of legitimacy claimed by the editorially controlled journal to
be a challenge to it."
PS: So, Ginsparg's system, in Joe's view, differs substantially from
informal online discussion groups by incorporating its form of peer
review, facilitated by the use of abstracts, which enables it to play
the role previously played by scientific journals, while at the same
time its egalitarianism poses a serious challenge to the elitism of the
scientific establishment. This challenge, however, has been blunted by
the failure of both the system's advocates and the defenders of the
status quo to recognize the role of peer review in the system and the
consequent failure of both sides to distinguish the Ginsparg system from
informal forums which pose no threat to the status quo. What is needed,
in Joe's view, is a new understanding of "peer review", starting with a
new understanding of the term "peer":
JR: "A research peer * is a presumptive equal, not someone who has been
demonstrated to be de facto equal in this or that respect but rather
someone who is regarded, presumptively, as someone whose informed
opinion about the subject-matter of research is to be taken as seriously
as one's own opinion is insofar as that depends on the status of the
researcher, as distinct from its dependence on the justification
provided by the researcher for the claim. A peer is someone whose
disagreement with one's own view requires to be explained * a non-peer
is someone whose opinion about the matter in question makes no
difference to you*"
PS: I pause here to note that Joe is here defining "peer" in terms of
how a person is to be treated; your peer is a person you regard in a
particular way and treat in a particular way. Joe not going to go into
the question of how a person comes to qualify as your peer, not because
the question is not important, but because it is too big a question to
do it justice in this context. Joe goes on to define "peer review" as
follows:
JR: "Peer review proper, then, is what occurs in the inquiry process
when one makes * a research claim and the research community addressed
responds according to the communicational norms that then obtain. All
communication that occurs within this normatively constituted dialogical
space hat pertains to the claim at issue is peer review."
PS: There is much more to come, but I shall stop here, both to catch my
breath and to give listers the opportunity to chime in with any comments
or questions that occur to you. As there has been very limited list
participation so far, I want to emphasize that of course a slow read is
a recreational activity rather than a professional duty. No one should
feel any obligation to contribute; I am simply offering the opportunity
to do so. I plan to resume in a few days.
Cheers,
Peter
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>>
>> What do others think of Moore's book?
>> This question has long concerned me.
>> The introductions to each of the segments are quite remarkable in efforts to clarify CSP narratives.
Yet, by the same token, I wonder how representative of CSP's philosophy are these segments? In
particular, CSP often used the logic and mathematics of chemistry as motivations for his mathematical
thinking, especially in graph theory.
>>
>> Can one give a balanced account of CSP philosophy of mathematics without relating it to the mathematics
of chemistry? Or, is motivation not that important to the history of philosophy?
>>
>>
>> On a different topic...
>>
>> Irving, thanks for posting your recent paper on CSP's role in the history of modern logic. I learned a
great deal from it - the history of logic is so entangled with personality and individual values that it is
almost impossible to decrypt. Your extensive quotes and careful dating were particularly appreciated.
It is a long paper. It required every bit of diligence that I could muster to read and re-read it until I was
able to capture portions of it.
>>
>> Which leads me to the following question:
>>
>> Modern textbooks in set theory and computer science read as if mechanics and electro-mechanics are
sufficient for all of logic. But these theories of logic exclude chemical logic. The chemical symbols, as
indexes to the existential identities of nature and as iconic representations of natural signs, are
excluded from the mechanical and electro-mechanical narratives.
>>
>> So, I remain with the question that has haunted me for more than ten years: What is logic?
>>
>> Thus, from my perspective, Moore's book shortens a few mathematical shadows but lengthens the shadows
on the origins of logic.
>>
>> Cheers
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>>
>> On Jan 26, 2012, at 9:30 AM, Irving wrote:
>>
>>> In the alert I received this morning from the journal Philosophia
>>> Mathematica, I could not help but notice the review by Thomas
>>> McLaughlin of Matthew Moore (ed.), Philosophy of Mathematics: Selected
>>> Writings of Charles S. Peirce.
>>>
>>> The review starts off:
>>>
>>> "The importance of C.S. Peirce as a philosopher of mathematics has long
>>> been less than a matter of consensus. For a goodly portion of the
>>> twentieth century, those who championed his stature in this regard were
>>> rather few, and his significant — if admittedly not numerous —
>>> contributions to mathematics per se (e.g., his independent proof of the
>>> Frobenius theorem on associative division algebras with real scalars)
>>> went largely overlooked. Gradually, however, the work of scholars such
>>> as Brady, Herron, Herzberger, Levy, Putnam, and Roberts (the list is by
>>> no means exhaustive) brought Peirce's writings in the area to the more
>>> respectful, if not always concurring, attention of a wider audience."
>>>
>>> The link is
>>>
>>> 
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