Chris Benham | 1 Mar 2008 18:13
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[Election-Methods] MCA's IIB problem fixed


Hello,
I've been thinking about 3-slot methods that combine
Top Ratings, Approval and Pairwise Opposition
information (all concepts that are compatible with FBC
and Independence from Irrelevant Ballots) to produce a
method that meets those criteria and also 3-slot
Majority for Solid Coalitions and mono-raise and also
which has its LNHarm and LNHelp problems in
approximate balance.

In my last message in this thread I suggested "one
possibility" to be:

"If  any candidates have a top-ratings score not
smaller than their  MPO score, disqualify the other
candidates.  Elect the undisqualified candidate with
the highest Approval-minus-MPO score".

This has now firmed as my preferred 3-slot (FBC
complying) method.

Any comments?  I have no idea what it should be
called.

Chris Benham

      Get the name you always wanted with the new y7mail email address.
www.yahoo7.com.au/y7mail

(Continue reading)

mrouse1 | 1 Mar 2008 20:16

[Election-Methods] Minimum Distance Condorcet Completion

I was doing some mathematical doodling at work one day, and I came up with something I jokingly call the 1700 voting method (I actually wrote down "Minimum Distance Condorcet Completion," but the acronym reminded me of the copyright dates in old books and movies).

I make no claims of originality, just simplicity and verbosity (grin). I actually did a brief check to make sure I wasn't reinventing the wheel, and I didn't find another example of it, but it was more fun to play with the system than to try to hunt down prior art. If someone has already suggested it, just let me know.

Anyway, here it is:

Minimum Distance Condorcet Completion (MDCC)

1. Use Range ballots.
2. Treat the relative positions of the candidates as in a rank-order ballot, and see if there is a Condorcet winner.
3. If there is no Condorcet winner, find the shortest distance (sum of individual ranges) necessary to produce a Condorcet winner.

If there is more than one possibility, use one of the of the following tiebreakers:

4a. Find the lowest order of ranges that need to be counted, e.g., ranges from 0 to 1 are considered before ranges from 9 to 10. Continue to step 4b, if needed.
or
4b. Find the fewest number of ranges that need to be counted. Continue to step 4a if necessary.

(I'm also working on a spinoff method based on step 4a)

****************************

That's all it is. Of course, it wouldn't be much of a post if I left it there, so I might as well provide some examples that I scribbled out.

Here is a circular tie sometimes used to illustrate Condorcet completion methods.

40 A>B>C
35 B>C>A
25 C>A>B

A over B, 65-35
B over C, 75-25
C over A, 60-40

Let's assume people *really* like their favorite, but don't really care for their second and third choices (or they may be attempting to vote strategically).
We might end up with the following set of Range ballots:

40 A(10)>B(1)>C(0)
35 B(10)>C(1)>A(0)
25 C(10)>A(1)>B(0)

If you count the ranges of 20 of the C(1)>A(0) votes) the total score is 20.
If you count the ranges of 30 of the A>B votes (25+45 -- 25 A(1)>B(0) plus 5 A(10)>B(1)), the total score is 70.
If you count the ranges of 50 of the B>C votes (40+90 -- 40 B(1)>C(0) plus 10 B(10)>C(1)), the total score is 130.

With this example, it takes a distance of 20 to make A the Condorcet winner, 70 to make B the Condorcet winner, and 130 to make C the Condorcet winner. A should be the overall winner, and the complete order is A>B>C.

Let's take the opposite possibility -- people really like their top two candidates, but don't like the third at all.

40 A(10)>B(9)>C(0)
35 B(10)>C(9)>A(0)
25 C(10)>A(9)>B(0)

If you count the ranges of 20 of the C(10)>A(9) votes, the total score is 20.
If you count the ranges of 30 of the A(10)>B(9) votes, the total score is 30.
If you count the ranges of 50 of the B>C votes (35+135 -- 35 B(10)>C(9) plus 15 B(9)>C(0)), the total score is 170.

In this case as well, A is the overall winner (A=20, B=30, C=170), and the order is A>B>C.

Now let's see if it's possible to make each candidate the winner by adjusting their scores, without changing their ranking. Since A was the winner in the first two examples, let's try B and C:

An example of B being the winner:

40 A(10)>B(9)>C(0)
35 B(10)>C(9)>A(0)
25 C(10)>A(1)>B(0)

Total distance for A equals 180 (either 20 C(9)>A(0) or 20 C(10)>A(1))
Total distance for B equals 30 (30 A(10)>B(9))
Total distance for C equals 170 (35+135 -- 35 B(10)>C(9) plus 15 B(9)>C(0))

B is the winner (B=30, C=170, A=180), and the order is B>C>A.

An example of C being the winner:

40 A(10)>B(1)>C(0)
35 B(10)>C(9)>A(0)
25 C(10)>A(1)>B(0)

Total distance for A equals 180 (20 C(9)>A(0))
Total distance for B equals 70 (25+45 -- 25 A(1)>B(0) plus 5 A(10)>B(1))
Total distance for C equals 50 (40+10 -- 40 B(1)>C(0) plus 10 B(10)>C(9))

C is the winner (C=50, B=70, A=180), and the order is C>B>A -- a different result from merely cutting the circular tie.

Now, a question arises on whether or not we are simply using Range voting as a Condorcet completion method. Here is a counterexample:

40 A(10)>B(1)>C(0)
35 B(10)>C(9)>A(0)
25 C(10)>A(7)>B(0)

Total distance for A equals 60 (20 C(10)>A(7))
Total distance for B equals 220 (175+45 -- 25 A(7)>B(0) plus 5 A(10)>B(1))
Total distance for C equals 50 (40+10 -- 40 B(1)>C(0) plus 10 B(10)>C(9))

C is the winner with this method (C=50, A=60, B=220), and the order is C>A>B. Using Range voting, the winner is A (A=575, B=390, and C=565), and the order is A>C>B.

Finally, as a test to see if it was potentially original (still not 100% sure it is, but hey), I tested the following two possibilities against the 68 methods and variations on the range voting calculator at http://rangevoting.org/VoteCalc.html

Example 1:
40: A=10 B=1 C=0
35: A=0 B=10 C=9
16: A=7 B=0 C=10
9: A=8 B=0 C=10

Total distance for A equals 51 (18+33 -- 9 C(10)>A(8) plus 11 C(10)>A(7))
Total distance for B equals 234 (112 + 72 + 50 -- 16 A(7)>B(0) plus 9 A(8)>B(0) plus 5 A(10)>C(0))
Total distance for C equals 50 (40+10 -- 40 B(1)>C(0) plus 10 B(10)>C(9))

C is the winner (C=50, A=51, B= 234, or C>A>B)

Example 2:
40: A=10 B=1 C=0
35: A=0 B=10 C=9
14: A=7 B=0 C=10
11: A=8 B=0 C=10

Total distance for A equals 49 (22+27 -- 11 C(10)>A(8) plus 9 C(10)>A(7))
Total distance for B equals 236 (98 + 88 + 50 -- 14 A(7)>B(0) plus 11 A(8)>B(0) plus 5 A(10)>C(0))
Total distance for C equals 50 (40+10 -- 40 B(1)>C(0) plus 10 B(10)>C(9))

A is the winner (A=49, B=236, C=50, or A>C>B)

MDCC was the only one that gave C as the consistent winner for Example 1, and A as the consistent winner for example 2. The dividing line between the A-winner/C-winner domains is:

40: A=10 B=1 C=0
35: A=0 B=10 C=9
15: A=7 B=0 C=10
10: A=8 B=0 C=10

Using the tie-breaker in step 4a at the top of the post, C is the winner. If we use the tiebreaker in 4b, A is the winner.

*******************

Finally, as I mentioned at the very top of this post, I am also looking at a spinoff method based on step 4a above. Basically, it considers the distance between 0 and 1 to be shorter than the distance from 9 to 10. The reason I'm looking at it that way is because of how the margin of error tends to grow in voting as you get further away from your top picks, either because you don't know as much about everyone ranked really low (people tend to rank those they don't know as lower than the average candidate they know), or because they are strategically burying them. Anyway, I'll probably have a stretch or doodling again at some point, so I may inflict it on an unsuspecting election methods group (hehe).

Michael Rouse

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Fred Gohlke | 2 Mar 2008 16:45
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[Election-Methods] Partisan Politics

This site focuses on methods of conducting elections, but most posts 
address only a single aspect of that topic; the way votes are counted. 
Is not the object for which votes are cast a matter of even greater 
concern?  When our public officials are not representative of the people 
who elect them and are masters of misdirection, obfuscation and deceit, 
ought we not ask ourselves whether there is a taint in the method by 
which they are selected?  Ought we not consider the role of political 
parties in the political process?

OVERVIEW
Political parties are quasi-official institutions designed to acquire 
the reins of government.  They sponsor candidates for public office by 
providing the resources needed to conduct a campaign for election.  As a 
condition of their sponsorship, they require that the candidates support 
the party, thus giving the party ultimate control of the elected officials.

In the United States, our governmental system is defined by our 
Constitution, and nothing in our Constitution expresses or implies the 
need for political parties.  They are an extra-Constitutional invention, 
devised to advance partisan interest.  The problem of partisanship was 
well understood by the framers of our Constitution:

"When the Founders of the American Republic wrote the U.S. Constitution 
in 1787, they did not envision a role for political parties in the 
governmental order.  Indeed, they sought through various constitutional 
arrangements such as separation of powers, checks and balances, 
federalism, and indirect election of the president by an electoral 
college to insulate the new republic from political parties and 
factions." Professor John F. Bibby
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/election04/parties.htm

A "party system" developed in our nation because our early leaders used 
their standing to consolidate their power.  Politicians in a position to 
do so institutionalized their advantage by forming political parties and 
creating rules to preserve them and aid their operation:

"The Democratic-Republicans and Federalists invented the modern 
political party -- with party names, voter loyalty, newspapers, state 
and local organizations, campaign managers, candidates, tickets, 
slogans, platforms, linkages across state lines, and patronage."
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Early_Republican_Party_(United_States)

These features advance party interest at the expense of the public 
interest.  They show how political parties are an embodiment of human 
nature; they put self-interest above all other considerations.  They 
function precisely as a thoughtful person would expect them to function.

PARTISANSHIP
Political parties are grounded in partisanship.  Partisanship is natural 
for humans.  We seek out and align ourselves with others who share our 
views.  Through them, we hone our ideas and gain courage from the 
knowledge that we are not alone in our beliefs.  Partisanship gives 
breadth, depth and volume to our voice.  In and of itself, partisanship 
is not only inevitable, it is healthy.

On the other hand, partisans have a penchant for denigrating those who 
think differently, often without considering the salient parts of 
opposing points of view.  They seek the power to impose their views on 
those who don't share them, while overlooking their own shortcomings. 
Communism and National Socialism showed these tendencies.  Both had 
features that attracted broad public support throughout a national 
expanse and both degenerated into destructive forces because their 
partisans gained control of their governments.

The danger in Communism and National Socialism was not that they 
attracted partisan support; it was that the partisans gained control of 
government.  In general, partisanship is healthy when it helps us give 
voice to our views. It is destructive when it achieves power.  All 
ideologies, whether of the right or the left, differ from Communism and 
National Socialism only in the extent to which their partisans are able 
to impose their biases on the public.

Partisanship is a vital part of society ... provided it is always a 
voice and never a power.  The danger is not in partisanship, it is in 
allowing partisans to control government.

OLIGARCHIC PARTY STRUCTURE
The political parties that control all political activity in the United 
States are in no sense democratic.  The American people do not elect 
those who control the parties.  In fact, most Americans don't even know 
who they are.  They are appointed by their party and serve at the 
party's pleasure.  We, the people the parties are supposed to represent, 
have no control over who these people are, how long they serve, or the 
deals they make to raise the immense amounts of money they use to keep 
their party in power.  They constitute a ruling elite above and beyond 
the reach of the American people.

When we allow those who control our political parties to usurp the power 
of governing our nation, it is foolish to imagine that we retain the 
power bestowed on us by our Constitution.  It is a tragedy that so few 
of us recognize (or are willing to acknowledge) that we have 
relinquished our right to govern ourselves to unknown people who 
proclaim themselves our agents.

CORRUPTION
Corruption pervades our political system because the parties control the 
selection of candidates for public office. Candidates are not chosen for 
their integrity.  Quite the contrary, they are chosen after they 
demonstrate their willingness and ability to dissemble, to obfuscate and 
to mislead the electorate. They are chosen when they prove they will 
renounce principle and sacrifice honor for the benefit of their party.

The result is a circular process that renounces virtue and is ruled by 
cynicism:

* Candidates for public office cannot mount a viable campaign without 
party sponsorship, so they obtain sponsorship by agreeing to the party's 
terms.

* The party, assured of the loyalty of its candidates, attracts donors 
because it can promise that its candidates will support the objectives 
set by the party, i.e., the goals of the donors.

* From the donors, the party obtains the resources it needs to attract 
appealing candidates and bind them to the party's will.

This cycle makes political parties conduits for corruption.  Businesses, 
labor unions and other vested interests give immense amounts of money 
and logistical support to political parties to push their agenda and to 
secure the passage of laws that benefit the donors.  The political 
parties meet their commitment to the donors by picking politicians who 
can be relied upon to enact the laws and implement the policies the 
donors' desire.  The politicians so selected are the least principled of 
our citizens, but are the only choices available to the American people 
in our "free" elections.

None of this is a secret.  The parties conduct their business with our 
knowledge and tacit approval.  We know, full well, how they operate.  We 
know about the "party bosses", "pork barrels", "party loyalty", "slush 
funds", "party whips", and the whole lexicon of political manipulation. 
  Since we know these things exist and do not prevent them, we are party 
to the very corruption we decry.

THE MYTH OF CORRUPTIBILITY
Some believe we cannot remove corruption from our political systems 
because humans are corruptible.  Why should we believe such a canard?

We are misled by the high visibility of deceit and corruption in our 
culture.  The idea that it is inescapable leads to the self-defeating 
notion that trying to correct it is futile.

The reality is that the vast majority of humans are honorable, 
law-abiding people.  They have to be, for society could not exist 
otherwise.  By far, the greater percentage of our friends, our 
relatives, our co-workers and our neighbors are trustworthy people.

The reason our political leaders are corrupt is that party politics 
elevates unscrupulous people by design.  It does so by heeding the 
notion attributed to B. F. Skinner:  "The bad do bad because the bad is 
rewarded".  Since the goal of a party is to advance its own interest, it 
rewards those who do so, unfettered by the restraints of honor.  Once 
these unprincipled people achieve leadership they infect our society 
because morality is a top-down phenomenon.

The idea that we can't remove corruption from our political systems 
because we are corruptible is nonsense.  It is a myth.  The problem is 
not the people; it is a political system that demands subservient 
politicians at the expense of integrity.  The vast majority of our peers 
are honest, principled people.  When we make probity a primary concern 
in our electoral process, the pervasiveness of dishonesty in our society 
will diminish.

PASSION VERSUS INTELLECT
Political parties appeal to emotion by applying the principles of 
behavioral science to manipulate the public.  They mount, finance and 
staff campaigns designed to inflame the passions of the electorate.

Communication during election campaigns is one-way.  There is no genuine 
attempt to consult the public interest and the serious issues are seldom 
those raised during a campaign.  Surveys are conducted to find "hot 
buttons" which generate a desired response and professionals use the 
information to mold "messages" which the candidates and the parties feed 
the public in a flood of misinformation.  It is a rabble-rousing technique.

Intelligent decisions require dialogue; assertions must be examined, not 
in the sterile environment of a televised debate, but in depth.  The 
electorate must be able to examine candidates and discuss matters of 
public concern, and, with the knowledge so gained, make decisions.  They 
have no opportunity to do so.

SEPARATION OF POWERS
The U. S. Constitution separated the powers of government in such a way 
as to operate as checks upon each other.  Separation of Powers is lauded 
as a cornerstone of our Constitution.  I'm unaware of any substantive 
disagreement with this view of the intent of our Founders.

Political parties persistently attack the Separation of Powers.  They 
use their immense resources to maximize their power by forcing our 
public officials to vote en bloc on crucial issues, making a mockery of 
the safeguards we rely on to protect our freedoms.  When a single group 
of people with a common interest succeeds in controlling multiple 
branches of our government, it is ludicrous to imagine we have a system 
of checks and balances (as was vividly demonstrated by our recent 
experience with the baneful effects of single party dominance.)

SEEKING IMPROVEMENT
Political parties, in their omnivorous quest for power have, during my 
lifetime, gone a long way toward destroying the greatness of my 
homeland.  Unrestrained, they will succeed.

It need not be so.

Those who seek good government need not tolerate the corruption of party 
politics.  We do not need partisanship, which sets one person against 
another; we need independent representatives who will think for 
themselves and reach intelligent decisions on matters of public concern. 
  In other words, to improve our government, we must change the way we 
select our representatives.

We have the technological ability to support a more democratic method; 
the big hurdle is to get people to acknowledge the problem.  Many fall 
victim to the common malady of believing our press clippings.  We've 
been told so many times through so many years that our political system 
is the best in the world, some of us can't admit it is a cesspool of 
corruption, funded by special interests that buy the laws we endure.

Most Americans assume political parties are legitimate centers of power 
under our Constitution.  That is untrue.  Nothing in our Constitution 
authorizes, institutes or enables political parties.  The laws that do 
so are enacted in the various states.

Breaking the stranglehold the parties have on our political process is 
non-trivial.  It depends, not on our Constitution, but on our will.  We 
must want to build a political system that puts public interest above 
partisanship, a method that responds to vested interests but is not 
controlled by them.

Political systems are always an embodiment of human nature.  Until we 
learn to harness our own nature, we can improve neither our politics nor 
our society.  There is no Constitutional bar to devising a more 
democratic process; the only impediment is ourselves.  Since we can not 
divorce our political institutions from our own nature, we must make 
virtue a desirable attribute in those who seek political advancement. 
That may be difficult ... but it is not impossible.

Such changes occur slowly.  Ought we not start to consider the methods 
by which they can be accomplished?

Fred
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Steve Eppley | 2 Mar 2008 19:46
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Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics

Hi,

Fred Gohlke wrote:
> This site focuses on methods of conducting elections, but most posts 
> address only a single aspect of that topic; the way votes are counted. 
> Is not the object for which votes are cast a matter of even greater 
> concern?  When our public officials are not representative of the people 
> who elect them and are masters of misdirection, obfuscation and deceit, 
> ought we not ask ourselves whether there is a taint in the method by 
> which they are selected?  Ought we not consider the role of political 
> parties in the political process?
>   
-snip-

My view is that the reason we have two large parties that each nominate 
one candidate per office is the bad voting method, which punishes people 
who fail to form the largest coalition. It also punishes those who seek 
the best compromise, by reducing the "votes" cast for them (if they 
bothered to compete) by squeezing them between other candidates.  Fix 
the voting method to change the parties and promote cooperation.

Regards,
Steve
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mrouse1 | 2 Mar 2008 21:20

[Election-Methods] Using range ballots as an extension of ranked ballot voting

Just an addendum from previous post (Minimum Distance Condorcet Completion). I'm curious about voting methods that take ranked ballot methods and adapt them to range ballots. For example, with Baldwin's method, you take drop the candidate with the lowest Borda score, recalculate, and so on. A range variant might drop the candidate with the lowest range score, normalize the remaining scores, and repeat. It should still give the Condorcet winner (if any) but it might fit different election criteria than standard Baldwin. Likewise, a range generalization of the Kemeny-Young order might be interesting.

I figure Warren Smith would know the names of range variants, but I'm sure others would as well. Anything with pretty graphs involved is also cool. (grin)

And as always, I probably saw something like this a year ago and just forgot. A lot of time these things sit in my mind, and then something triggers the interest.

Michael Rouse

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Juho | 2 Mar 2008 21:58
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Re: [Election-Methods] Using range ballots as an extension of ranked ballot voting

Check also James Green-Armytage's cardinal-weighted pairwise comparison method if you haven't don that yet. => http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm

Can you also clarify a bit how step 3 is counted when some candidate X is beaten by two other candidates (Y and Z).

I find the proposed method interesting since it seems to aim at electing good winners (using a function minimizes the problems caused to the voters, from one point of view).

Juho



On Mar 2, 2008, at 22:20 , <mrouse1 <at> mrouse.com> wrote:

Just an addendum from previous post (Minimum Distance Condorcet Completion). I'm curious about voting methods that take ranked ballot methods and adapt them to range ballots. For example, with Baldwin's method, you take drop the candidate with the lowest Borda score, recalculate, and so on. A range variant might drop the candidate with the lowest range score, normalize the remaining scores, and repeat. It should still give the Condorcet winner (if any) but it might fit different election criteria than standard Baldwin. Likewise, a range generalization of the Kemeny-Young order might be interesting.


I figure Warren Smith would know the names of range variants, but I'm sure others would as well. Anything with pretty graphs involved is also cool. (grin)


And as always, I probably saw something like this a year ago and just forgot. A lot of time these things sit in my mind, and then something triggers the interest.


Michael Rouse

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mrouse1 | 3 Mar 2008 00:45

Re: [Election-Methods] Using range ballots as an extension of ranked ballot voting

juho4880 <at> yahoo.co.uk:

>>Check also James Green-Armytage's cardinal-weighted pairwise comparison method if you haven't don that yet. => http://fc.antioch.edu/~james_green-armytage/cwp13.htm

Thanks, I'll do that!


>>Can you also clarify a bit how step 3 is counted when some candidate X is beaten by two other candidates (Y and Z).
>>I find the proposed method interesting since it seems to aim at electing good winners (using a function minimizes the problems caused to the voters, from one point of view).

I'd be happy to try. Do you have an example election for me to play with? I'm assuming you mean where I said

3. If there is no Condorcet winner, find the shortest distance (sum of individual ranges) necessary to produce a Condorcet winner.

An example in the form of

A: X>Y>Z (Value for X=100, Z=0, Y=somewhere in between)

B: Y>Z>X (Value for Y=100, X=0, Z=somewhere in between)

C: Z>X>Y (Value for Z=100, Y=0, X=somewhere in between)

would be great. If it's more than three candidates or ballot profiles, just make the range from 0 to 100 (0-10, A-F, or whatever you want). An example also helps make certain I'm answering the right question. (heh)

Thanks!

Michael Rouse

BTW, if anyone thinks of a more interesting variation -- or better yet, a webpage for one -- I'd love to see it, especially since there are several on the mailing list that are much better at the math than I! (grin)

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Juho | 2 Mar 2008 23:45
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Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics

On Mar 2, 2008, at 17:45 , Fred Gohlke wrote:

> SEEKING IMPROVEMENT

> We do not need partisanship, which sets one person against
> another; we need independent representatives who will think for
> themselves and reach intelligent decisions on matters of public  
> concern.
>   In other words, to improve our government, we must change the way we
> select our representatives.

This sounds like you would be happy with something like STV. Parties  
do cause problems but also the other extreme where the  
representatives are all totally independent has some problems. I'd  
expect the totally independent representatives to associate  
themselves with some known groupings or ideologies to clarify their  
position. And this is not that far from having a new party structure.

Another approach to expressing how the political system (of USA and  
many other countries too) should change is to say that the party  
behaviour and rules of behaviour should be improved. (Parties need  
not be tyrants and nests of evil but just free groupings of people  
with similar opinions.) Typical problems are having individual  
representatives that have no own power but that need to follow the  
policies set by the party leaders. Another might be too strong  
connections to some interest groups. Third one might be lack of  
contact to the voters and their true needs/interests. And fourth one  
use of cheap propaganda instead of open discussion.

Any system has some tendency to corrupt in time. Political parties  
and the political system are no exceptions. One needs to stay awake  
and not let the system slide into something less good than what it  
was or what people expect it to be or become.

One could also start by seeking the problems from the voters. There  
is a saying that citizens will get as good government as they  
deserve. I mean the voters that are well educated and that are  
offered good information on the state and plans and actions of the  
society throughout the election period may be capable of making wiser  
decisions in the elections than those who are just briefly targets of  
the marketing campaigns before the elections.

> Political systems are always an embodiment of human nature.  Until we
> learn to harness our own nature, we can improve neither our  
> politics nor
> our society.

Yes. One viewpoint to the evolution of our societies is that we are  
on a journey from the laws of jungle towards societies that take the  
human needs better into account. There is no reason to believe that  
the current systems would be perfect. We have taken many steps from  
the pure "laws of jungle" model but certainly also further improving  
steps are possible.

> Such changes occur slowly.  Ought we not start to consider the methods
> by which they can be accomplished?

Yes.

I do believe that many of the shortcomings of politics do have strong  
links and may be traced back to the incumbent political parties and  
the way they operate. But that doesn't necessarily mean that parties  
would be evil as such, or that political systems without parties  
would automatically perform better. Thorough understanding of the  
dynamics of the political system is needed to make its operation  
better (in small or large steps).

Juho

		
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Dave Ketchum | 3 Mar 2008 05:08

Re: [Election-Methods] Partisan Politics

On Sun, 02 Mar 2008 10:45:42 -0500 Fred Gohlke wrote:
> This site focuses on methods of conducting elections, but most posts 
> address only a single aspect of that topic; the way votes are counted. 
> Is not the object for which votes are cast a matter of even greater 
> concern?  When our public officials are not representative of the people 
> who elect them and are masters of misdirection, obfuscation and deceit, 
> ought we not ask ourselves whether there is a taint in the method by 
> which they are selected?  Ought we not consider the role of political 
> parties in the political process?
> 
Reading this I think of:
      A direct attack on the party system, demanding that it release control.
      The party system, having the power to do so, retaliates - nets much 
pain and no gain.

I have two thoughts:
      Let Fred establish a group for his goal.
      Let Election Methods stick with its current efforts.

EM can and should think more of our environment, toward making our 
proposals more salable.  Burying Plurality voting deserves to be an easy 
sale   Think of three Presidential elections (though I am NOT ready to 
touch the Electoral College - that would need careful separate thought):
      2000 and 2004 - with main race in a near tie, interaction as to how 
Plurality handles third parties caused much pain.  NOTE that we are not 
against third parties; just against Plurality's handling.
      2008 - Hillary and Barack are in a desperate struggle grasping for 
the single slot the Democrat party can offer due to Plurality's weakness. 
  Letting both get to the general election and be handled reasonably would 
be better.

Note that eliminating Plurality makes for healthier elections and more 
power to third parties.  However, it does not prevent major parties from 
adapting and continuing - assuming they earn this.
...
--

-- 
  davek <at> clarityconnect.com    people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
            Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
                  If you want peace, work for justice.

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Abd ul-Rahman Lomax | 3 Mar 2008 14:46

Re: [Election-Methods] Strategy/polling simulation for simple methods

At 11:40 PM 1/21/2008, Kevin Venzke wrote:
>For each round of polls I can also note the rate of agreement between the
>poll winner and the sincere CW (if there is one), sincere MF (if there is
>one), and social utility maximizer given the voters who show up.

Other writers have long noted this, and I've, in particular, pointed 
out that participation bias favors the SU maximizer (which I 
generally call the "range" winner). Thus top-two runoff is a much 
better method than often thought. The only problem is it's 
vulnerability to center squeeze in the first round. Approval with 
top-two runoff should do much better, likewise Range with pairwise 
analysis and a runoff if there is conflict between the range winner 
and a pairwise winner (beating the range winner0 and when there are 
cycles, consideration of all of the cycle members, though that's not 
a possibility I've explored much, it would be extraordinarily rare, I 
suspect. Probably Range winner vs. any candidate beating the Range 
winner pairwise would be quite enough.

Besides, there is a much better method: parliamentary elections 
through deliberative process, with an Asset elected parliament, with 
direct voting allowed by all electors (all those who hold votes from 
the original secret ballot.) Deliberative process is, of course, 
Condorcet compliant, and it allows the repeated balloting (v. 
Robert's Rules of Order) which has the settling effect Venzke 
describes. Fully democratic (direct participation or participation by 
chosen "proxy," which is what it amounts to), creates peer assembly 
as part of the same electoral process, efficient, fair, and 
intelligent. Down side?

Let's see -- there will be logrolling (horrors!). Candidates will say 
one thing and do another (double horrors! -- rule one: don't vote for 
someone you don't trust, period. Under present systems you have to do 
that, or you vote for someone you think you trust from media 
impressions, but very few can vote for someone they would actually 
hand their baby to for care without further exploration of who they 
are in person. Only with Asset (or delegable proxy) can you actually 
vote for the person you most trust, without any consideration 
necessary of whether or not that person is "electable," because, by 
voting for him or her, you *are* electing.

Turns out Lewis Carroll got the Asset part right, in the 1880's. What 
more lurks behind the looking glass?

>The strategy used varies by the method. Approval is the easiest:
>Expectation can be perfectly calculated from the previous round of polls.
>Approve above expectation.

Right. This work has been done before (by Lanphier?). Though maybe 
not with this kind of simulation. It is easily predictable on pure 
theoretical grounds.

>FPP, antiplurality, and combinations involve estimating the value and
>likelihood of all ties that could be broken from a given vote.

I did analysis of Range Voting vs Approval strategy (expected outcome 
for various votes), by looking only at the outcomes for votes which 
actually affect the outcome (create or break tie). All other votes 
affect the voters' overall expected utility for voting, but not the 
expected utility between vote options. This allows an almost-exact 
study of expected outcomes; this is published on the Range Voting 
site. There was further work to be done, but, hey, I've got 
Attention-deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and one thing that means is 
that I can do some serious work, with interesting results, at the 
beginning, but finishing it, nailing it shut, and sending it off to 
the publisher, almost never happens. Story of my life. Anyway, I've 
got lots of nice nearly-woven scarves lying about. Trying to figure 
out how to finish them. It will take help, that's clear. If I could 
do it on my own, it would mean that my ADHD diagnosis wasn't 
accurate, and that the doctors who prescribe me controlled substances 
to treat it are misguided.

>Hopefully this is a somewhat interesting read. Any thoughts?

It *is* interesting, but I didn't read beyond what I commented on. 
Someday I should. Kevin, would you like to work on a paper formally 
publishing all this? We *can* get it published, and if it's 
published, there will actually be some serious attention paid to it, 
and, hey, if it's published, you can put it on Wikipedia. This list 
is a form of peer-review, better, in fact, than the peer review 
boards of most peer-reviewed publications, but, because there is no 
decision made, it's all informal, it's wasted and without serious 
consequence (except that all of us who are paying attention now know 
something or know it better, but ... as far as informing a broader 
audience, useless and mere navel-gazing among election method 
aficionados. To move beyond this, as one suggestion, join and 
*participate* (don't just wait for me to do something and then react) 
in the Election Methods Interest Group, 
electionmethods <at> yahoogroups.com). It's an FA/DP organization, which 
has lots of consequences, among them that you can join, pick a proxy, 
then go on no-mail or special notices status, and wait for your proxy 
to ping you if your proxy thinks it needed. If you are interested in 
election methods, there is *no* good reason not to join. You can even 
be a supporter of -- horrors! -- IRV and join, and a fair number have.

Thanks for your work, Kevin.

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Gmane