Diego Renato | 19 Nov 2007 19:50
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[Election-Methods] Best electoral system under real circumstances

I've read in this list that possibly the worst electoral system used is Brazilian open list PR. In this year, Brazilian Congress discuted the change of electoral law to closed lists, single member plurality or MMP.

Presidents, Governors and Mayors are elected by top-two runoff. I think this method is sufficiently good. Maybe ranked methods are not suitable for Brazilian voters' degree of skill, and for voting machines.

Federal, State and Muncipal representatives are elected according open lists. The main problem of this method is the excessive district magnitude (8 in least populated states up to 70 in São Paulo) and resulting high number of candidates. Transfers of surpluses are unpredictable. My suggestions for improvements of this system are:

- reduce district size to 3, 4 or 5;
- limit number of candidates by party. Candidates should be nominated by primary elections.
- prohibit surplus transfers among different parties.
- adoption of STV in the future.

Do you agree with these measures?

_______________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos

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Kevin Venzke | 19 Nov 2007 22:56
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[Election-Methods] RE : Best electoral system under real circumstances

Hi,

--- Diego Renato <diego.renato <at> gmail.com> a écrit :
> I've read in this list that possibly the worst electoral system used is
> Brazilian open list PR. In this year, Brazilian Congress discuted the
> change
> of electoral law to closed lists, single member plurality or MMP.
> 
> Presidents, Governors and Mayors are elected by top-two runoff. I think
> this
> method is sufficiently good. Maybe ranked methods are not suitable for
> Brazilian voters' degree of skill, and for voting machines.
> 
> Federal, State and Muncipal representatives are elected according open
> lists. The main problem of this method is the excessive district
> magnitude
> (8 in least populated states up to 70 in São Paulo) and resulting high
> number of candidates. Transfers of surpluses are unpredictable. My
> suggestions for improvements of this system are:
> 
> - reduce district size to 3, 4 or 5;
> - limit number of candidates by party. Candidates should be nominated by
> primary elections.
> - prohibit surplus transfers among different parties.
> - adoption of STV in the future.
> 
> Do you agree with these measures?

I don't remember that it is possible for surplus transfers to go to
different parties. The problem is that even within the same party list,
you don't know what you're getting. Voters don't necessarily vote by
party, and party lists don't necessarily form by party.

It was brought up in that discussion that the same electoral method works
well in Finland. I would guess the major difference is that Finland is more
parliamentary, so it's more important to vote based on party and not just
individual.

I think it makes sense in theory to limit the number of candidates a party
can nominate, to the number of seats that are being contested. Naturally
parties do not want to stick to this limit, since the more votes they can
get, the better.

STV would probably help. I don't think STV has ever been used to elect the
congress in a presidential system though.

Reducing district magnitude would probably help also, since it would have
the effect of increasing the proportion of elected candidates who actually
received a share of votes that is large enough to justify being elected.
(If it will continue to be the case that candidates on a party list have
little in common politically, then at least the individuals who are elected
should be justifiable.)

Some links on the subject:
http://aceproject.org/regions-en/jne/BR/case-studies/esy_br
http://countrystudies.us/brazil/100.htm
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/desposato.pdf

Kevin Venzke

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Juho | 19 Nov 2007 22:56
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Re: [Election-Methods] Best electoral system under real circumstances

I'll compare the Brazilian open list method to a somewhat  
corresponding case, open list based parliamentary election in Finland  
and the plans to improve it.

In Finland the smallest districts have now 6 seats. That is  
considered a problem since having both districts with lots of seats  
(max 32) and small ones means that it does not make sense to vote for  
the smallest parties in the small districts (they may get some seats  
in the 32 seat district but in districts of 6 all seats go to big  
parties (and votes to small parties are in a way lost)).

One of your possible solutions is to reduce the district size.  
Reducing district size would make the system less proportional. Maybe  
the intention is to eliminate some of the smallest parties this way.  
That would work (there are also other ways to go in that direction)  
but I don't know if that is the intention (and if reducing  
proportionality is a target). In Finland the discussion has been  
rather to make all the districts close to same size. The aim is to  
achieve this by combining small districts to bigger ones rather than  
to split big ones to smaller districts (bit more complex than this  
but that's the overall direction).

You mentioned excessive district magnitude and that leading to high  
number of candidates. You mention also the possibility of limiting  
the number of candidates by party. Why is it a problem to have a high  
number of candidates? I assume the method gives each party a  
proportional part of the seats (based on the sum of votes of the  
candidates of the party). In Finland people roughly (in theory) first  
pick their party and then vote someone on that party's list. No  
problem if other parties have an excessive number of candidates. (Do  
you maybe have lots of work and large ballot papers because of the  
numerous candidates. In Finland the ballot is very simple, just a  
small white paper with a circle where you can write the number of  
your candidate.)

Can you explain how the surpluses are transferred. Why unpredictable?  
Is the transfer algorithm somehow not working?

You mentioned STV. That is an option (quite ok) but this method leads  
to a considerably different political system. Is such a system what  
people want in Brazil? The parties may not like this idea since the  
end result may be a "less party based" system, so the battle may be  
an uphill battle (good luck to you though if you want this change).

Closed lists:  Typically gives the power of deciding which  
individuals will be elected from voters to the parties. Is that what  
Brazil wants? (I don't yet.)

Single member:  Does this mean a dual party system based on single  
seat districts? Is that what Brazil wants? (I don't yet.)

MMP:  More complex than open list. What is the rationale? Maybe  
interest to have local single seat districts to elect very local  
(small district) representatives? Is this what Brazil wants? Isn't  
basic (open list based) proportional representation in bigger  
districts enough?

Top-two runoff (for single winner elections):  Yes, in many cases  
good enough but has also some clear problems and can be improved. I  
don't think ranked methods (e.g. Condorcet that is a more "compromise  
candidate oriented" (good or bad) and that is better from strategic  
voting point of view) would be too difficult. At least if the number  
of candidates is not large (7 candidates in the last presidential  
elections according to wiki) then also the ballots can be e.g. some  
simple ticking exercises. (The method should tolerate/allow some  
ticking errors to avoid losing the votes of people who are not that  
familiar with using the method.)

Juho Laatu

On Nov 19, 2007, at 20:50 , Diego Renato wrote:

> I've read in this list that possibly the worst electoral system  
> used is Brazilian open list PR. In this year, Brazilian Congress  
> discuted the change of electoral law to closed lists, single member  
> plurality or MMP.
>
> Presidents, Governors and Mayors are elected by top-two runoff. I  
> think this method is sufficiently good. Maybe ranked methods are  
> not suitable for Brazilian voters' degree of skill, and for voting  
> machines.
>
> Federal, State and Muncipal representatives are elected according  
> open lists. The main problem of this method is the excessive  
> district magnitude (8 in least populated states up to 70 in São  
> Paulo) and resulting high number of candidates. Transfers of  
> surpluses are unpredictable. My suggestions for improvements of  
> this system are:
>
> - reduce district size to 3, 4 or 5;
> - limit number of candidates by party. Candidates should be  
> nominated by primary elections.
> - prohibit surplus transfers among different parties.
> - adoption of STV in the future.
>
> Do you agree with these measures?
>
> _______________________________
> Diego Renato dos Santos
>
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Diego Santos | 20 Nov 2007 01:30
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Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Best electoral system under real circumstances

2007/11/19, Kevin Venzke <stepjak <at> yahoo.fr>:


I don't remember that it is possible for surplus transfers to go to
different parties.

According Brazilian law, parties of same coalition are counted as a single party. After elections, is not rare these parties to separate to opposite political sides.

It was brought up in that discussion that the same electoral method works
well in Finland. I would guess the major difference is that Finland is more
parliamentary, so it's more important to vote based on party and not just
individual.

Some congressmen want a constitutional reform to restore a parliamentary system, but in two referenda, people voted for presidential one.

Reducing district magnitude would probably help also, since it would have
the effect of increasing the proportion of elected candidates who actually
received a share of votes that is large enough to justify being elected.
(If it will continue to be the case that candidates on a party list have
little in common politically, then at least the individuals who are elected
should be justifiable.)

Some links on the subject:
http://aceproject.org/regions-en/jne/BR/case-studies/esy_br
http://countrystudies.us/brazil/100.htm
http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA97/desposato.pdf

Thanks. In this year, the Supreme Court resolved that party-switching can be punished by removal from office.
_____________________________
Diego Renato dos Santos
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Dave Ketchum | 20 Nov 2007 05:15

Re: [Election-Methods] Best electoral system under real circumstances

I restrict my commenting to Condorcet.

On Mon, 19 Nov 2007 23:56:32 +0200 Juho wrote:
...
> 
> Single member:  Does this mean a dual party system based on single  
> seat districts? Is that what Brazil wants? (I don't yet.)
> 
> MMP:  More complex than open list. What is the rationale? Maybe  
> interest to have local single seat districts to elect very local  
> (small district) representatives? Is this what Brazil wants? Isn't  
> basic (open list based) proportional representation in bigger  
> districts enough?
> 
> Top-two runoff (for single winner elections):  Yes, in many cases  
> good enough but has also some clear problems and can be improved. I  
> don't think ranked methods (e.g. Condorcet that is a more "compromise  
> candidate oriented" (good or bad) and that is better from strategic  
> voting point of view) would be too difficult. At least if the number  
> of candidates is not large (7 candidates in the last presidential  
> elections according to wiki) then also the ballots can be e.g. some  
> simple ticking exercises. (The method should tolerate/allow some  
> ticking errors to avoid losing the votes of people who are not that  
> familiar with using the method.)

As a Condorcet backer, let me talk to voters a bit:
      If you would be happy with Plurality, voting for one candidate and 
indicating no preference among the rest of the field - do EXACTLY that 
vote.  Since you choose to ask nothing beyond showing preference for one 
and treating all others as equal bottom rank, your vote is simple.
      If you would like to vote a first choice above a second choice, with 
the rest of the field sharing bottom rank, vote F>S.
      If you would like to vote for two as equally liked first choice, 
with the rest of the field sharing bottom rank, vote P=P.
      For a more complex vote you can vote such as FA=FB>SA=SB=SC>TA=TB - 
where "=" connects those you like equally and ">" separates those to the 
left (liked better) from those to the right (liked less).
      You do not have to rank all candidates - those not ranked are 
treated as liked less.

How the voters mark ballots needs thought.  For example:
      Assigning the same number to multiple candidates indicates equality.
      Assigning different numbers to two candidates indicates difference 
in liking.  Matters not whether the numbers are numerically adjacent.
      Whether 5 is more or less than 6 has to be agreed on, but I am not sure.

There is less reason to do runoffs than with Plurality - voters can vote 
their thoughts as to preference in more detail with Condorcet than with 
such as Plurality.

Condorcet classifies some vote counts as cycles.  All members of a cycle 
are better-liked than the field, and runoffs MIGHT be useful among them - 
certainly deciphering which cycle member should win is a source of
arguments.

There is no value in demanding that all candidates be ranked - voters can 
rank all they see as better than scum, and demanding that they rank what 
they see as scum introduces noise with no positive value.
> 
> Juho Laatu
> 
> 
> 
> On Nov 19, 2007, at 20:50 , Diego Renato wrote:
> 
> 
>>I've read in this list that possibly the worst electoral system  
>>used is Brazilian open list PR. In this year, Brazilian Congress  
>>discuted the change of electoral law to closed lists, single member  
>>plurality or MMP.
>>
>>Presidents, Governors and Mayors are elected by top-two runoff. I  
>>think this method is sufficiently good. Maybe ranked methods are  
>>not suitable for Brazilian voters' degree of skill, and for voting  
>>machines.
>>
I write above about required voter skill.

There has been plenty written about the stupidity demonstrated in US 
installation and misuse of voting machines.  I feel strongly that 
reasonable application of brain power and honest intentions should be able 
to get past these catastrophes.
...
>>_______________________________
>>Diego Renato dos Santos
--

-- 
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  Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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Juho | 20 Nov 2007 07:32
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Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Best electoral system under real circumstances

On Nov 20, 2007, at 2:30 , Diego Santos wrote:

2007/11/19, Kevin Venzke <stepjak <at> yahoo.fr>:

I don't remember that it is possible for surplus transfers to go to
different parties.

According Brazilian law, parties of same coalition are counted as a single party. After elections, is not rare these parties to separate to opposite political sides.

This problem exists in the Finnish system too. The system slightly favours large parties. Especially in the smallest districts the only way for small parties to get seats is to form coalitions. The election method allows coalitions and sees these coalitions as single parties. The allocation of the seats within the coalition is based on which individuals get the highest number of votes. This breaks the proportionality by allocating the seats in a rather random fashion. Small parties try to guarantee the seat(s) to themselves by naming only a small number of candidates (e.g. 1) and thereby focusing all their votes to this individual.

One solution to solve this problem would be simply to count the votes hierarchically per party also within the coalition. The seats would thus be given proportionally to different parties within the coalition. This could work slightly against the smallest parties since if the coalition would get one seat it would more typically go to the largest member of the coalition.

In order to increase the level of proportionality from this the number of seats per party could be counted proportionally based on the votes that the party gets within the whole country. Seat allocation within the districts would be counted only after this. This kind of methods would lead to some "rounding errors" at the district level seat allocation. But it seems that people often (typically?) value absolute proportionality between parties highly. It is thus possible to guarantee very exact country wide proportionality between parties and between districts, and push the "rounding errors" to district level seat allocations. (I'll skip the algorithms here.)

One more rather simple technique to solve this problem is simply to ban the coalitions (this is under discussion in Finland). This change could be accompanied by increasing the size of the (smallest) districts in order to keep also the current smallest parties alive in those areas.

Juho


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Kevin Venzke | 20 Nov 2007 10:21
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[Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Best electoral system under real circumstances

Diego,

--- Diego Santos <diego.renato <at> gmail.com> a écrit :
> 2007/11/19, Kevin Venzke <stepjak <at> yahoo.fr>:
> > I don't remember that it is possible for surplus transfers to go to
> > different parties.
> 
> According Brazilian law, parties of same coalition are counted as a
> single
> party. After elections, is not rare these parties to separate to opposite
> political sides.

Well, if the parties find it advantageous to stand together on the same
party list, I guess they will just form bigger (and more meaningless)
"parties" if you make a law that says multiple parties can't run on the
same party list.

It seems mistaken to me to try to use laws to enforce ideological cohesion
in party lists. It would be better to fix whatever it is that gives
parties incentives to form party lists without respect to ideology.

Using the law to punish party switching also seems like a "band-aid"
solution to me. Find out why deputies switch parties, and then fix the
system to get rid of those incentives.

I would say the obvious issue with Brazil is that it doesn't make sense to
have proportional representation by party if candidates and voters behave
as though party doesn't mean anything. And this seems to be caused by
intraparty competition, and the fact that elected candidates don't form a
government once elected (so that voters don't need to consider which
government a candidate supports).

If you get rid of the proportional representation, you just have SNTV.
That's arguably a lot worse, but it would probably stop some of the party
switching. (It would no longer be possible to gain an advantage under the
election rules by belonging to one party list vs. another.)

Kevin Venzke

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Juho Laatu | 21 Nov 2007 07:12
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Re: [Election-Methods] RE : Re: RE : Best electoral system under real circumstances

One more comparison to the Finnish system.

On Nov 20, 2007, at 11:21 , Kevin Venzke wrote:
> --- Diego Santos <diego.renato <at> gmail.com> a écrit :
>> According Brazilian law, parties of same coalition are counted as a
>> single
>> party. After elections, is not rare these parties to separate to  
>> opposite
>> political sides.
>
> Well, if the parties find it advantageous to stand together on the  
> same
> party list, I guess they will just form bigger (and more meaningless)
> "parties" if you make a law that says multiple parties can't run on  
> the
> same party list.

Also in Finland the parties may form "unholy alliances" between  
parties that have quite different ideological standpoints just for  
tactical reasons to grab the last seats to this coalition. The  
candidates are clearly listed as candidates of the parties of the  
coalition (no confusion here to the voters), just the calculation  
formula now counts these parties as if they were one.

Forming any kind of parties is not easy. Parties can take part in the  
elections (roughly) if they have managed to get their candidates  
elected in the last or the previous election. Otherwise they need to  
collect a long list of names of supporters to get the permission to  
take part. The party structure is quite stable. The method sets in  
various ways limits to how small a party can be and still survive in  
the process (no artificial limits though on the number of votes a  
party must get, just the problems that I already mentioned on small  
parties having much harder time in the small districts than in the  
big ones, and thereby being forced to try the coalitions which then  
give a bit random results for the last seats).

It is possible for parties to split, form new groupings and  
individual candidates to change affiliation of to form single member  
groupings during the term of the parliament in Finland. This is not  
very common and typically leads to problems in the next elections,  
although some candidates (typically quite visible) have managed to  
establish "new life" in a new party.

I didn't yet understand what exactly the problems in Brazil were and  
how they are perceived. Small differences in the rules and practices  
may sometimes have a big impact. I think voters often are also quite  
different in different countries and at different times - they may  
e.g. be very quick in moving from one party to another or they may be  
loyal to one party no matter what the party does (Finland is on this  
side, sometimes maybe even too much).

Juho

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Diego Santos | 30 Nov 2007 14:06
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[Election-Methods] Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

There were many discussions in this mailing list about advantages of winning votes as counterstrategy against order reversal. But sometimes truncation is risky. Consider this example:

46: A > B > C
44: C > B > A
10: B > A > C

B is CW.

Offensive strategy by A voters:

46: A > C > B
44: C > B > A
10: B > A > C

A wins under RP(wv) or margins.

If truncation would be used:

46: A > C > B
44: C > B > A
10: B

C, the sincere Condorcet loser, wins.

Winning votes induces truncation. Voters should feel free to express complete preferences.

I was thinking in something similiar to "automatic truncation", i. e., pairwise stregth in ranked pairs should be measured by plurality. If approval is used, the method becames DMC. Maybe approval cutoffs are not needed, then RP(plurality) is sufficient.

RP (plurality)  or pairwise sorted plurality offers weak burial resistance and is summable, opposite to Smith,IRV.

Diego Santos

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Kevin Venzke | 30 Nov 2007 15:30
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[Election-Methods] RE : Is this Condorcet method reasonable?

Hi Diego,

--- Diego Santos <diego.renato <at> gmail.com> a écrit :
> There were many discussions in this mailing list about advantages of
> winning
> votes as counterstrategy against order reversal. But sometimes truncation
> is
> risky.
>
>  Consider this example:
> 
> 46: A > B > C
> 44: C > B > A
> 10: B > A > C
> 
> B is CW.
> 
> Offensive strategy by A voters:
> 
> 46: A > C > B
> 44: C > B > A
> 10: B > A > C
> 
> A wins under RP(wv) or margins.
> 
> If truncation would be used:
> 
> 46: A > C > B
> 44: C > B > A
> 10: B
> 
> C, the sincere Condorcet loser, wins.
> 
> Winning votes induces truncation. Voters should feel free to express
> complete preferences.

I agree, they should. But how can you promise it?

> I was thinking in something similiar to "automatic truncation", i. e.,
> pairwise stregth in ranked pairs should be measured by plurality. If
> approval is used, the method becames DMC. Maybe approval cutoffs are not
> needed, then RP(plurality) is sufficient.
> 
> RP (plurality)  or pairwise sorted plurality offers weak burial
> resistance
> and is summable, opposite to Smith,IRV.

However, using the plurality vote as the strength of a defeat would cause
clone independence to be violated. More importantly, it's likely that this
measure would mean that you need to rank a viable candidate in the top
position on your ballot, or risk causing him to lose.

In my opinion it's better for it to be safer to be sincere about your first
preference, than for it to be safe to rank less preferred candidates whose
supporters you fear will use strategy against you.

Kevin Venzke

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Gmane