Steve's 2nd Real Democracy, APR and SPPA dialogue with Stephane
2015-07-26 01:14:00 GMT
Real Democracy, APR and SPPA dialogue with Stephane
election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 20
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 19:56:12 -0700
> 2. Re: Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane
> Rouillon (St?phane Rouillon)
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 22:55:59 -0400
> From: St?phane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon <at> sympatico.ca>
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane
> Message-ID: <BLU436-SMTP140D793C8BDDBFDF1386B538F830 <at> phx.gbl>
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> Stephane Rouillon (R) wrote:
> R: 1) The whole document is available from http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-1.php tohttp://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-10.php
> You can copy (Ctrl-C) any of the 10 pages in a text document...
> 2) I will read your APR document as soon I find which software opens
> .odt document...
>>S: I have re-sent it using Rich Text (.rtf) format. I hope this will make it easier to read.
>Rouillon (R): For the moment I can only give some comments on your APR comparison. I
> am sorry if it sounds negative but it is not. I just want more details
> about the few differences between APR and SPPA:
> 3) Does APR "geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary
> organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups)" /that/ "will be
> officially recognized as electoral 'associations" prevent
> outsiders to infiltrate artificially an electoral 'associations? Like
> partisan of a mainstream idea that would decide to sink another debate
> using their strong majority...? Lets suppose that massive
> supporters of gay weddings want to dilute a more 50%-50% debate about
> adoption from homosexual parents (just an example). Would APR detect
> organized infiltration movements?
>>S: Firstly, for the primary, any voluntarily organization applying to become an 'association' could decide officially to exclude all citizens from becoming a part of its registered voters for general election purposes other than those conforming to any criteria it might publicly specify. These criteria would have to be specified within its application to the FEC and widely published before the relevant APR primary. Any citizens not conforming to these criteria could know in advance that they would not be accepted as registered voters in that 'association'.
If any such citizen ignored this bar to them and initially seemed to become a registered voter in the relevant association as a result of the way she ranked the organizations during the primary, she would later be excluded from this membership immediately upon the association discovering that she did not satisfy the criteria. At that point, she would, by default, become a registered voter within the geographically defined association within which she resides.
At the same time, each applicant organization would want to think very carefully before excluding anyone because it expects to have more voting power in the assembly in proportion to the number of citizen who help to elect its rep(s). Also, the more registered votes it gains, the more MPs it would be allowed to send to the assembly.
Finally, it seems to me that no rational citizen would choose to join an association she opposes when this means, as a result, she will not be able to join and support her most favored association during the primary an thus not be able to help it send more MPs to the assembly in this way.
>R: 4) What happens
if a very low number of APR representatives controls a
> majority (more than 50%) of the parliament voices? Oligarchy?
> >S: My article stipulates that no MP would be allowed to retain more that 10% of the weighted votes in the assembly. Any extra votes received by a very popular MP would have to be non-returnably transferred to her trust colleagues.
> 5) SPPA garantees a stable bipartite coalition around the main political
> parties, despite balanced national split supports like 30%, 18%, 17%,
> 14%, 11% and 10%.
> In such a case, it would boost the main party to 50% and reduce the
> mandate to 3/7 of tis original length to ensure fairness. How does APR
> handle unstable splits?
>>S: Firstly, I have to admit that at least the 1st APR elected assembly could be even more 'split' than your above numbers suggest. However, because the ideology and policy agenda of each APR MP is likely to be much closer to her electorate, I think this also makes it more likely that each will be trusted, able, and motivated to negotiate any necessary compromises (even with her opposing MPs) to form and be an essential part of a working majority coalition. Separately, I will email to you (or anyone else) my reason for this expectation (see the attachment: 'Common Ground').
explains especially why an APR MP would have a strong incentive to
negotiate to become an essential part of a working majority
coalition so she can have at least some of her own policy aims passed
into law. However, even these incentives by themselves do not
guarantee that such a majority will always be formed. This is why I
will also separately email to you a second attachment
outlining some constitutional arrangements that some states already
have and which rationally address the potential danger that a state
might otherwise become paralyzed if its legislative assembly fails
to form a working majority. The contingency plans contained in these
constitutional arrangements also make it even more likely that such
a majority will be formed. This is because they remove the option for
any MP or group of MPs to hold the assembly or the state to ransom
simply by refusing to cooperate with all other minorities of MPs (see
attachment: 15-secure-executive. I will also email anyone
else these attachments upon requests).
> 6) How do you organize fair debates when a voter can choose between a
> huge amount of candidates?
>>S: Firstly, ideally all candidates' campaigns should be basically facilitated by a public media provider like the BBC. Also, each campaign should be basically financed by the state in proportion to the numbers of registered voters each association has received as a result of APR's primary. Also, the amount of additional private funds each association and candidate can spend should be carefully limited by law.
Secondly, it must be recalled that the very basic information about every association would be made widely available to the public before APR's primary, as guaranteed by the central electoral commission. The basic information about each candidate in the country would be similarly published well before the general election.
Thirdly, each association would want to organize debates between all the candidates seeking to represent it. For example, the publicly controlled internet would be able to facilitate such debates between the candidates seeking to represent even a small and non-geographically defined association.
Also, coalitions of associations would coordinate their campaigns, both to present their common policies and to attack opposing coalitions or parties. Parties (together with any 'associations' that might be affiliated to them) would presumably campaign in a similar way.
>>S: I look forward to receiving your feedback.
> R: It might take some time before I comment: plenty of work...
> S. Rouillon
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