robert bristow-johnson | 24 Jul 20:05 2014

Re: Voter strategising ability


Jameson, i am assuming you meant this for the list.

*wow*!  i would have never expected a real-world election where it would 
have mattered (in the outcome) whether it was a Shulze or Ranked-Pairs 
Condorcet method.  not that the Romania 2009 was *any* Condorcet, but 
was it STV and is the ballot data available?  otherwise i would ask, how 
do we know how be the Smith set was?

bestest,

r b-j

On 7/24/14 12:31 PM, Jameson Quinn wrote:
> I believe that cycles in real-life, contentious Condorcet elections 
> would be rare — on the order of 1-2% of elections, or a bit lower if 
> your data include "elections" with only one serious candidate. 
> However, when a Condorcet cycle does happen, it basically implies the 
> existence of at least three separate, more-or-less coherent factions 
> in the electorate. In that case, there's no particular reason that 
> there shouldn't be 2 "quasi-clone" candidates from one of those 
> factions. Thus I'd expect 4-member Smith sets to be almost a third of 
> all Smith sets larger than 1; not "*never*" as Robert suggests. In 
> fact, it is possible that Romania 2009 
> <http://rangevoting.org/Romania2009.html> had a 4-member Smith set.
>
>
> 2014-07-24 0:11 GMT-04:00 robert bristow-johnson 
> <rbj <at> audioimagination.com <mailto:rbj <at> audioimagination.com>>:
>
(Continue reading)

Jameson Quinn | 18 Jul 00:40 2014
Picon

Request: Voting method blurbs for research

I am continuing my research on voting methods on Amazon Mechanical Turk. I'm currently looking at 8 voting methods:
approval, Borda, "Condorcet" (minimax), IRV, MAV (Majority Approval Voting; that is, Bucklin/Medians with ABCDF grades, breaking ties by above-median votes), plurality, score (0-10), and SODA.

The full protocol is outlined below, but one aspect is that, at the end of the experiment, each subject takes a quick survey, including their feelings about the voting system they used. I'd like to test out different system descriptions, to see if how the description impacts those feelings. So, I'd like blurbs to describe how you'd vote, and how votes are counted, in each of these systems. Of course, clarity and brevity are desirable.

So, I have my own blurbs already, but anybody else who can write alternate blurbs for me, I'd appreciate it. You don't have to cover all 8 systems if you don't want, but please do as many as you can; at least 5. You can use html trickery (collapsible sections, popups, tables, images), or not; however you want.

Here's how the experiment works, as described on the landing page:

Please do not take this HIT until you are told to. Press "Next" below when you're ready to.

Voting Experiment

This is an experiment on voting. 18 voters like you, divided into three groups, will decide between three options. Depending on the winning option, participants will earn extra pay of up to $2.40 (paid within hours as a "bonus" in AMT). The average pay for each participant will be at least $2.67, and depending on your luck and skill you may earn up to $4.00 in total. We will be running this experiment several times, using different voting systems, but you may only participate once.

In order to ensure enough simultaneous participants, we will be starting this experiment at a defined time. Until the countdown finishes, you can only view steps 0 (this screen) and 1 (consent form). Press "next" below to see the consent form and countdown. If you leave this window open, when the countdown completes, a sound will play ("voting experiment starting") and a "consent and join" button will appear. At that point, we will accept only 18 subjects per experiment run, on a first-come first-served basis. We ask that you only "accept" the HIT with Amazon after you are allowed into the experiment. (But we have made more than 18 HITs available for idiot-proofing.) Only the 18 workers allowed in will be paid for each run of the experiment.

Process

Step Name Time Payout Explanation

0

Overview

0-0.5 mins See an outline of the experiment (this stage).

1

Consent

0-2.5 mins Understand your rights, wait for the experiment to begin, and informed consent.

2

Scenario

1-15 mins Understand how much you and other voters will earn depending on which of the virtual candidates wins.Also, wait until the experiment fills up before proceeding (a sound will play when ready).

3

Election method practice

1-1.5 mins Learn and practice the election method to be used.

4

Practice results

1-0 mins See results of the practice election: the winner and how much you would have been paid.

5

Voting round 1

0.5-1 mins Vote. You will be paid based on results.

6

Payout round 1

0.5-0.5 mins $0-$1.20 See results of the round 1 election: the winner and how much you will be paid. (Payments will arrive within 1 day)

7

Voting round 2

0.5-1 mins Vote. You will be paid again based on results.

8

Payout round 2

0.5-0.5 mins $0-$1.20 See results of the round 2 election: the winner and how much you will be paid. (Payments will arrive within 1 day)

9

Survey

2-5 mins $1.60 4-5 simple questions each about:
  • you (gender, country, etc)
  • the voting system you used (on a 0-7 scale)
  • your general comments about the experiment

10

Debrief

0-0.5 mins Thanks for participating, and a simple explanation of what we hope to learn from this study. Submit job and receive base pay.

Total

7-16 mins $1.60-$4.00 The total time will mostly depend on how quick the other turkers in the experiment are. (15 minutes are allowed on step 2 for the experiment to fill, but that is usually much quicker.)

Press the button below to see the consent form and wait for the experiment to start.



----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Michael Ossipoff | 14 Jul 15:49 2014
Picon

Retiring from voting systems, quitting EM

I only mention that because I want it to be clear that, when I don't reply to a posting, I'm not being rude--it's just that I haven't received the posting, because I'm no longer subscribed to EM, and have retired from voting-systems.
 
Of course there's  one temporary exception to my voting-system retirement: If there are one or more replies to the messages that posted to EM a few minutes ago, and those replies are posted within a few days, then I'll reply to them (if they're civil). But, when such discussion has concluded, or if 48 hours pass without replies to the messages I posted today, then I'll unsubsubscribe EM, as part of my complete and final retiredmnt from voting-systems.
 
Michael Ossipoff
 
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Gervase Lam | 12 Jul 21:34 2014

Voter strategising ability

I'm a bit concerned about the possible strategic manoeuvres that each
faction of ballots performs in the description below.

I can't see each faction unilaterally carrying such manoeuvres out.
Surely it would require thinking that is beyond the lay voter?

Alternatively, I think a candidate steering voters into the appropriate
strategic voting (as suggested in the past on this list) can be risky.
Other candidates and even the "neutral" media (e.g. editorial
reporters/commentators) would criticise the fact a that this is an abuse
of the democratic vote process (i.e. voters should vote in an entirely
sincere fashion).

Assuming that people are happy with strategic voting, then data would
need to be provided for strategising.  I expect this would be in the
form of polls/voter intention surveys being carried out market research
companies.

The voter intention surveys for the UK European 2014 elections that I
saw were more than just people answering question "who would you vote
for".  They included asking questions like how did you vote in previous
elections, age and even whether they were private or public sector
employed.

With the UK General election in mind for May 2015, the surveys included
questions that were basically on the lines of "would you vote
differently if it were the General Election tomorrow instead of the
European election and if so who would you vote for" [FYI, the answers
were generally yes to this].

I assume the "normal" person (whoever that is) would ignore the 2015
election 'poll' if they were voting in the European 2014 election.  [Why
did the surveys include the 2015 election when the one closest in time
is the 2014 election?  Well, it's because to the UK voters, the 2015 is
by far the more important.]

Also interestingly, as well as asking those surveyed who they would vote
for, most of the surveys also asked how likely they would vote in each
of the 2014 and 2015 elections on a scale from 0 to 10.  With the data
provided in most of those surveys, I would find it easy to use a
spreadsheet and use the scale to weight each vote.  Some of the surveys
did that while others only considered those who would definitely vote in
their count.

In the UK, the European count is done with multi-member districts.
However, of the four or more surveys I looked at, only one reported
their polling against the correct districts.  For the other surveys, I
only found national counts or counts for regions that only vaguely
matched the geographical districts!

Given the above, I really find it hard to see a good proportion of
voters doing the correct strategic calculations.  Also, this is only for
plurality voting!  I don't really know if voters are going to handle
rank voting strategising as per the below.

May be they could download some sort of spreadsheet from online that
could do the strategising?  But I don't think it would be flexible
enough to handle any scenario.  Also, would the voters bother checking
how the spreadsheet worked just in case a rogue spreadsheet was
downloaded?

I suppose to conclude all this, I'm just wondering if a voting method
should handle the situation where voters carry out bad strategy!!?  I
can't see any voting method being able to handle that!

A variation to the above question is, can there be a voting method that
can handle voting where each faction carries out their own strategic
voting AND can handle voting where within each faction voters carry out
their own strategic voting.  The latter may significantly be due to the
fact the voters are floating voters who don't tow the candidate/party
line.  Therefore, they would have different opinions about the other
candidates.

In this current climate, I think most voters would vote sincerely with
practically any 'reasonable' voting method.  But I don't know about the
future.  I think the voting method should be solid for the future as it
can be extremely difficult to change a voting method once one is
instituted.

Ideally, I think voters should always be voting sincerely as
strategising (both for good and badly executed strategies) makes things
complicated.  But Gibbard-Satterthwaite shows this can't happen.

Just my stream of consciousness thoughts on all this...

Thanks,
Gervase.

> [EM] Concerning Chicken Proof Smith compliant methods
> Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu 
> Fri May 9 17:48:53 PDT 2014 

        ________________________________________________________________
> Suppose that max(y, z) < x < y+z,  and that a sincere summary of the voter
> preferences is
> 
> x: A>C
> y: B>C
> z: C>A
> 
> These sincere preferences could not constitute an informed ballot profile.
> Why not?  Because it would not constitute a strategic equilibrium:  The A
> faction could unilaterally truncate C, and thereby win the election.
> 
> How do we know this without knowing what election method i being used?
> Well, we are assuming that the metho is chicken proof, an if so, candidate
> A would be elected wih the following ballot set:
> 
> x: A
> y: B>C
> z: C
> 
> And untruncating A in the C faction could not make A lose in any of the
> methods we have been considering, even the non-mono-raise ones like Benham
> and Woodall.
> 
> x: A
> y: B>C
> z: C>A
> 
> But this position is not a strategic equilibrium either, since th B action
> could benefit y unilaterally raising C to equal top:
> 
> x: A
> y: B=C
> z: C>A
> 
> in which case C would be the winner.
> 
> What's more, this position is a strategic equilibrium, as is the posiiion
> 
> x:A>C
> y:B=C
> z:C>A
> 
> which is just one move from the sincere preferences, and hence the most
> likely equilibrium position.  Under pefect information it is the strongest
> game theoretic solution.
> 
> In summary, if sincere preferences are
> 
> x: A>C
> y: B>C
> z: C>A,
> 
> then rational ballots will be
> 
> x: A>C
> y: B=C
> z: C>B
> 
> So the sincere Condorcet preference is also the strategic ballot CW.
> 
> 
> In general (at least in the case of three candidates) if candidate X is the
> sincere Condorcet preference, candidate X will also be the ballot CW for
> ballot voted by rational voters under complete infomation.
> 
> In particular, the ballot set
> 
> x: A>B
> y: B>C
> z: C>A
> 
> will never be voted by rational voters when there is a sincere Condorcet
> preference.  Nor will
> 
> x: A
> y: B>C
> z: C,
> 
> Why not?  Because they are not strategic equilibria, except possibly in the
> absence of any true Condorcet preference.
> 
> So why do we pay so much attention to these non-equilibrium ballot sets?
> Precisely because we want to make sure that they are not equilibrium
> positions potentially rewarding arm twisting strategy, like the chicken
> strategy.
> 
> Forest

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Ross Hyman | 12 Jul 14:07 2014
Picon
Picon

Re: Random Ballot Condorcet

Sadly, the random ballot Condorcet method I posted about earlier does not in general elect the highest ranked Smith candidate on the random ballot when there are more than three Smith candidates.

The following method will work though.
 Chose a random ballot. If it is not complete, draw others to break ties until there is a complete ranking.  Elect the highest ranked candidate for which there is a beat path from it to every other candidate.

This can be formulated in a way similar to the previous method:  Candidates are either hopeful or discarded.  All candidates are initially hopeful. All candidates, hopeful and discarded are available to be used in beat paths.  Consider the two lowest ranked hopeful candidates.  Discard the lower ranked of the two if there is a beat path from the higher ranked candidate to the lower ranked candidate. (And it doesn't matter what its strength is or if there is a stronger beat path going the other way.)  If there is no beat path from the higher to the lower candidate and there is at least one beat path from the lower to the higher candidate then discard the higher candidate.  If there is no beat path either way, then define a beat path from the higher to the lower candidate and discard the lower candidate. Repeat until one hopeful candidate remains.  Elect that candidate.

The N seat Random Ballot Condorcet STV method is similar.  Construct a ranking of every relevant set of N candidates from random ballots (you will generally need more than one ballot even if all candidates are ranked. I will give a mechanism for doing this in another post.)  Elect the highest ranked candidate set for which there is a beat path from it to every other candidate set.

This method differs from a fully deterministic method because the only elections that must be considered to create the initial set of beat paths are all elections with N+1 candidates for N seats.  For each of these elections, create beat paths from the winning N seat candidate set of that election to each of looser sets of that election that is the winner of at least one N+1 candidate set election. Other beat paths are created as needed as the method proceeds when the lowest ranked hopeful candidate sets have no beat paths between them.    















On Tuesday, May 20, 2014 5:55 PM, Ross Hyman <rahyman <at> sbcglobal.net> wrote:


A better random ballot Condorcet method is: Chose a random ballot (and if it is not complete, draw others to break ties until there is a complete ranking).  Eliminate the pair-wise loser of the two lowest ranked candidates.  Repeat until one candidate remains.  Elect that candidate.

I believe it has the following desired properties: monotonic, clone independent, only Smith candidates get a non-zero probability of being elected, independence of zero probability alternatives, and it requires the fewest number of pair comparisons and chooses the candidate that tends to be higher ranked than the previous version. In the three candidate case, if there is a cycle, it will always choose the top ranked candidate from the random ballot.  

One can form a complete social ranking by starting from the lowest ranked candidate and moving candidates down if they lose to the one below it.  The social ranking from the previous method is equivalent to starting from the highest ranked candidate and moving candidates up if they beat the one above it.



   

 







On Wednesday, May 7, 2014 6:51 PM, Ross Hyman <rahyman <at> sbcglobal.net> wrote:


Random Ballot Condorcet:  Choose a random ballot.  Elect the lowest ranked candidate that pairwise beats all higher ranked candidates.

Has this method been discussed before?  I believe that the following are true:  It will always elect a Condorcet candidate if there is one.  Otherwise it will elect a member of the Smith set with some nonzero probability for each member of the Smith set.  Non-Smith set candidates will have zero probability of being elected.  It is monotonic in that raising a candidate on some ballots cannot decrease its probability of being elected.  It is clone proof in that the probability of electing from the clone set is independent of the number of clones in the set. It is independent of irrelevant alternatives in that deleting a candidate with zero probability of winning cannot effect the probabilities for electing other candidates.  
 

 







----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Peter Zbornik | 1 Jul 19:36 2014
Picon

Software for STV elections - STVBallot

Dear all,

in the Czech Greens we developed this open source vote-entry and
counting program as an App in Chrome called STVBallot.
It allows for vote counting in a network without any dependance on the
internet and without client-server architecture.
Unfortunately the program is in Czech.
The vote-counting algorithm is standard STV, with the possibility to
combine ranked election of some candidates and the incorporation of
gender quotas, without resorting to "guarding" some candidates
(candidates are quoted after those with higher support are elected).

Download STVBallot into Chrome here:
https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/stv-ballot/nckikmpbpcjagehockhckflmmflkifbo

STVBallot was programmed by Vaclav Novak (in copy).
I took part in the analysis, testing and the integration of the
program in our party.

Best regards
Peter Zbornik
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 28 Jun 23:40 2014

¡Mathematics!] ¡TauDay! [/¡Mathematics!]

	⸘Howdy‽

	We are all into ElectionMathematics, so I figured that you all might like this post about TauDay I wrote:

		http://TauDay.Com

	¡Happy TauDay!

	Today is TauDay.  τ (Tau) is the 1 true CircleConstant.  It is TauDay because it is the 28th of June and τ
(Tau) is:

	c/r 	 = 	 τ 	 ≈ 	 6.28318530717959

	In ISO-8601, the 28th of June is:

	YYYY-06-28

	Because the format is:

	YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss

	The first 3 significant figures of τ (Tau) are:

	6.28

	Which looks like:

	YYYY-06-28

	Which is why the 28th of June is TauDay.

	For TauDay, I converted τ (Tau) in to Balanced Ternary:

		1T0 . 10T,T0T,110 , 0T1,10T,T0T , 1TT,000,001

	http://WikiPedia.Org/wiki/balanced_ternary

	http://TauDay.Com

 
	¡Peace!

--

-- 

	“⸘Ŭalabio‽” <Walabio <at> MacOSX.Com>

Skype:
	Walabio

An IntactWiki:
	http://intactwiki.org

	“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.”
	——
	Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Forest Simmons | 28 Jun 22:57 2014

Martin Harper's single vote assignment generalized to range voting

Let V(i) be voter V's rating of alternative i.  Let S(i) be the social rating of alternative i, that is the average rating of alternative i over all ballots. Then voter V's vote is assigned to that alternative i which maximizes the product V(i)*S(i).

[We could min(V(i), S(i)) in place of the product V(i)*S(i) just as well.]


On Fri, Jun 27, 2014 at 2:46 PM, Forest Simmons <fsimmons <at> pcc.edu> wrote:
If most people give sincere ratings, then you wouldn't need conditional approval.  Just list the parties in the order of average ratings, and then use Martini Harper's vote assignment method (adapted to score style ballots) to determine the proportion of the seats for each party.



----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
S Sosnick | 26 Jun 05:10 2014
Picon

2. Re: Methods (Markus Schulze)

Ballot used with Schulze's single-winner system.

Because the Schulze system determines who wins a one-winner election without 
counting how many 1st choices each candidate received, its ranking ballot can differ 
from the ranking ballot used with various other single-winner systems.  Two 
differences are especially noteworthy.

First, a voter can be allowed to assign the same rank to more than one candidate.  That 
voter's ballot will be ignored when comparing the equally-ranked alternatives but 
counted when comparing one of the equally-ranked alternatives with some other 
alternative.  In contrast, with Instant-Runoff, Coombs, Borda, Bucklin, etc., a ballot 
naming more than one 1st choice is invalid.

Second, one of the alternatives offered to voters can be "None of the above" or--as in 
every statewide election in Nevada since 1975--"None of these candidates."  If that is 
done and a named candidate wins, then you can infer that the winner is, not only 
preferred to the other named candidates, but also favored enough to be (say) hired.  
Conversely, if "None" wins the election, then you might conclude that none of the 
named candidates should be hired.

--Stephen H. Sosnick (25-Jun-14)

> Send Election-Methods mailing list submissions to
> 	election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
> 	http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
> 
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
> 	election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
> 	election-methods-owner <at> lists.electorama.com
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of Election-Methods digest..."
> 
> 
> Today's Topics:
> 
>    1. Re: PR for ethnically polarized electorates (Toby Pereira)
>    2. Re: Methods (Markus Schulze)
>    3. Re: Methods (robert bristow-johnson)
>    4. Re: PR for ethnically polarized electorates (Forest Simmons)
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Message: 1
> Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 20:23:49 +0100
> From: Toby Pereira <tdp201b <at> yahoo.co.uk>
> To: Forest Simmons <fsimmons <at> pcc.edu>,	EM
> 	<election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] PR for ethnically polarized electorates
> Message-ID:
> 	<1403724229.46921.YahooMailNeo <at> web133002.mail.ir2.yahoo.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"
> 
> At first glance it seems that 10, 15 and 75 for A, B, M respectively seems
> a little optimistic from a voting system. It's not just that party list PR
> would shut out M - I can't see any system calling itself PR could award the
> seats in those proportions. Something like reweighted range voting or the
> score PR system I detailed a couple of weeks ago would stop M being shut
> out with honest voting, but they would go nowhere near as far as you are
> suggesting.
> 
> Regarding voter honesty, it may be difficult to ensure it anyway with a
> normal score-based PR method, but I can't see how you could get it to work
> given that you would want the middle two factions' support for A and B to
> be effectively ignored. To be clear, 10, 15, 75 are the proportions
> you'd?expect if the 75 people who gave a positive score to M completely
> lost all their support for A/B and raised M to from 80 to 100.
> 
>  From: Forest Simmons <fsimmons <at> pcc.edu>
> >To: EM <election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com> 
> >Sent: Wednesday, 25 June 2014, 1:21
> >Subject: [EM] PR for ethnically polarized electorates
> >  
> >
> >
> >In Rwanda it was the Hutu and the Tutsi tribal division.? In Iraq the
> Sunni, Shia, and Kurds.? In the former Yugoslavia it was the Serbs Croats
> and Bosnians.? There are similar divisions today in the Ukraine, Israel,
> Syria, Bolivia, etc.
> >
> >What do they have in common?? A need for electing a representative body
> that has as many moderates and as much consensus as possible so that
> minorities are not so desperate for separation, i.e. to prevent the scourge
> of Balkanization that seems to be spreading like a plague.
> >
> >Suppose that there are two extreme groups A and B supported by two
> individual ethnicities, as well as a more moderate group M with preferences
> like
> >
> >
> >10 A(100)
> >30 A(100)>M(80)
> >
> 45 B(100)>M(80)
> >
> >15 B(100)
> >
> >
> >
> >(The numbers in parentheses represent voter expectations of relative
> benefits.)
> >
> >
> >In ordinary party list PR methods the parliament would be formed by 40
> representatives from A and 60 representatives from B.? The moderate party
> would be shut out entirely.
> >
> > 
> >Here are my questions:
> >
> >
> >
> >1. What method(s) would take this information and elect a parliament with
> respective party strengths of? 10, 15, and 75? for A, B, and M?
> >
> >
> >2.? What election method could possibly get the two middle factions to
> honestly convey this information via their ballots?? In other words, how to
> keep the two middle factions from defecting from their common interest?
> >
> >
> >Forest
> >
> >
> >
> >----
> >Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/emfor list info
> >
> >
> >    
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:
> <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-
electorama.com/attachments/20140625/5a969127/attachment-0001.htm>
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 2
> Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 21:30:44 +0200
> From: Markus Schulze <markus.schulze <at> alumni.tu-berlin.de>
> To: election-methods <at> electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Methods
> Message-ID: <E1Wzsu9-0001BW-Cq <at> mailbox.alumni.tu-berlin.de>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; format=flowed
> 
> Hallo,
> 
>  > A voting system should never give the impression that candidates that
>  > are universally loathed are ok. If our candidates were Adol Hitler,
>  > Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong and
>  > Leopold II of Belgium then approval would rightly illustrate that none
>  > are good candidates. However a ranked system would merely indicate that
>  > one of them is the "condorcet" winner giving no indication that none
> are
>  > acceptable.
>  >
>  > I think any sane voting system *must* meet this requirement. The
> ability
>  > for the electorate to unambiguously communicate that none of the
>  > candidates are worthy of the post under contest.
> 
> But if one of these candidates has to be chosen, the fact, that you like
> none of them, is quite irrelevant, because the legitimacy of the winner
> does not depend on how overwhelmingly he was chosen.
> 
> Markus Schulze
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 3
> Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 17:04:01 -0400
> From: robert bristow-johnson <rbj <at> audioimagination.com>
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Methods
> Message-ID: <53AB3941.4030702 <at> audioimagination.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
> 
> On 6/25/14 3:30 PM, Markus Schulze wrote:
> >
> > > A voting system should never give the impression that candidates that
> > > are universally loathed are ok. If our candidates were Adolf Hitler,
> > > Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong and
> > > Leopold II of Belgium then approval would rightly illustrate that none
> > > are good candidates. However a ranked system would merely indicate
> that
> > > one of them is the "condorcet" winner giving no indication that none 
> > are
> > > acceptable.
> > >
> > > I think any sane voting system *must* meet this requirement. The 
> > ability
> > > for the electorate to unambiguously communicate that none of the
> > > candidates are worthy of the post under contest.
> >
> > But if one of these candidates has to be chosen, the fact that you like
> > none of them is quite irrelevant, because the legitimacy of the winner
> > does not depend on how overwhelmingly he was chosen.
> >
> 
> i can't tell whom you were responding to, Markus.
> 
> i would ask the OP to suggest how the "sane voting system [that] *must* 
> meet this requirement" does in the event that "None-of-the-above" wins.  
> continue with the existing leadership in government and extend their 
> term?  for how long?
> 
> also, how would Approval avoid this?  would there be a minimum margin 
> that, say, Mao would need to actually win, because certainly *some* 
> voters will approve Mao in an Approval system.  what thresholds of 
> approval margin is needed to declare that Mao isn't so evil after all?
> 
> as always, what do we do about multiple "approvals".  perhaps, in 
> comparison, i am least afraid of Mao and Idi compared to the others.  
> but i fear Idi more than Mao.  so i'm voting for Mao as the least of 
> evils, should i approve Idi or not?  what if Adolf gets elected because 
> not enough of us voted for Idi who came in 2nd?
> 
> i totally reject the notion that Approval voting or Score voting 
> requires no (or the least) tactic from the voter.
> 
> not to say there is no possibility of strategic voting with the ranked 
> ballot decided with a Condorcet-compliant method, but any such strategy 
> is quite sophisticated and likely to backfire (like trying to elect the 
> "Radical Center" over the otherwise "Moderate" that might result in 
> electing one extremist or another).  it's *very* unlikely that an 
> organized campaign to vote insincerely (say, by burying your sincere 
> second choice in a go-for-broke strategy) on the ranked ballot will 
> gather any significant support.
> 
> setting aside a weird and sophisticated (and organized) strategy (which 
> no one will want to risk), the voter has the easiest decision on how to 
> vote with a ranked ballot.  who's your favorite candidate?  mark him or 
> her #1.  imagine if your favorite was not in the race at all, then who 
> would be your favorite?  mark him or her #2.  really tough voting tactic.
> 
> but with either Score or Approval, in a multi-candidate race, it's 
> *always* difficult for the voter to decide how to vote for their second 
> choice.  do you approve your second choice or not?  or how highly do you 
> score your second choice?  what if you help your second choice beat your 
> first choice?
> 
> i wish the Approval and Score advocates would move on from ridiculous 
> scenarios and focus on the real problems we have in real elections.
> 
> -- 
> 
> r b-j                  rbj <at> audioimagination.com
> 
> "Imagination is more important than knowledge."
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Message: 4
> Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2014 15:15:44 -0700
> From: Forest Simmons <fsimmons <at> pcc.edu>
> To: Toby Pereira <tdp201b <at> yahoo.co.uk>
> Cc: EM <election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] PR for ethnically polarized electorates
> Message-ID:
> 	
<CAP29oneWAh9dhh3YoOtcJ=1Qbv2cCM6RLLbeyn8VTYeNGuzW_A <at> mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
> 
> Thanks to Juho and Toby for their insights.
> 
> It is true, as they suggest, that question 2 is the harder one.
> 
> The simplest answer to question one that I know of is based on an idea
> that
> Martin Harper came up with 12 years ago as a way of showing that ordinary
> Approval satisfies "one voter one vote" in the same strict sense that IRV
> does (through vote transfer):
> 
> First list the candidates in order of most approval to least approval.
> Then on each ballot transfer the entire support of the voter to the
> highest
> candidate on the list that is approved on the ballot.  In other words, the
> voter's one and only vote is for the candidate she approves that is most
> approved by other voters.  As Martin pointed out, this assignment of votes
> still elects the ordinary Approval winner in the single winner case. 
> (Half
> a dozen years later Jobst pointed out that this same idea can be used to
> assign probabilities in a single winner lottery method.)
> 
> I am now pointing out that Martin Harper's vote transfer scheme is a
> simple
> way of designing a PR method (based on approval ballots) that solves
> problem one. In the given example let us assume that the truncations are
> reliable indicators of disapproval.  Then the approval ballots are
> 
> 10 A
> 30 A, M
> 45 B, M
> 15 B
> 
> The approval order is M>B>A
> 
> The first faction ballots all count for A.  The last faction ballots all
> count for B, and the other 75 ballots all count for M, yielding the
> desired
> quotas of 10, 15, and 75 respectively.
> 
> Toby asks the question of why this M heavy proportion is so desirable.
> 
> One answer is that in these polarized countries (the ones that inspired
> this thread in the first place) the fewer extremists in power the better.
> But in my next post, the one addressing question two, I will give a more
> dispassionate answer to that question.
> 
> Forest
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jun 25, 2014 at 12:23 PM, Toby Pereira <tdp201b <at> yahoo.co.uk>
> wrote:
> 
> > At first glance it seems that 10, 15 and 75 for A, B, M respectively
> seems
> > a little optimistic from a voting system. It's not just that party list
> PR
> > would shut out M - I can't see any system calling itself PR could award
> the
> > seats in those proportions. Something like reweighted range voting or
> the
> > score PR system I detailed a couple of weeks ago would stop M being shut
> > out with honest voting, but they would go nowhere near as far as you are
> > suggesting.
> >
> > Regarding voter honesty, it may be difficult to ensure it anyway with a
> > normal score-based PR method, but I can't see how you could get it to
> work
> > given that you would want the middle two factions' support for A and B
> to
> > be effectively ignored. To be clear, 10, 15, 75 are the proportions
> > you'd expect if the 75 people who gave a positive score to M completely
> > lost all their support for A/B and raised M to from 80 to 100.
> >
> >    *From:* Forest Simmons <fsimmons <at> pcc.edu>
> > *To:* EM <election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com>
> > *Sent:* Wednesday, 25 June 2014, 1:21
> > *Subject:* [EM] PR for ethnically polarized electorates
> >
> > In Rwanda it was the Hutu and the Tutsi tribal division.  In Iraq the
> > Sunni, Shia, and Kurds.  In the former Yugoslavia it was the Serbs
> Croats
> > and Bosnians.  There are similar divisions today in the Ukraine, Israel,
> > Syria, Bolivia, etc.
> >
> > What do they have in common?  A need for electing a representative body
> > that has as many moderates and as much consensus as possible so that
> > minorities are not so desperate for separation, i.e. to prevent the
> scourge
> > of Balkanization that seems to be spreading like a plague.
> >
> > Suppose that there are two extreme groups A and B supported by two
> > individual ethnicities, as well as a more moderate group M with
> preferences
> > like
> >
> > 10 A(100)
> > 30 A(100)>M(80)
> > 45 B(100)>M(80)
> > 15 B(100)
> >
> > (The numbers in parentheses represent voter expectations of relative
> > benefits.)
> >
> > In ordinary party list PR methods the parliament would be formed by 40
> > representatives from A and 60 representatives from B.  The moderate
> party
> > would be shut out entirely.
> >
> > Here are my questions:
> >
> > 1. What method(s) would take this information and elect a parliament
> with
> > respective party strengths of  10, 15, and 75  for A, B, and M?
> >
> > 2.  What election method could possibly get the two middle factions to
> > honestly convey this information via their ballots?  In other words, how
> to
> > keep the two middle factions from defecting from their common interest?
> >
> > Forest
> >
> >
> > ----
> > Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/emfor list
> info
> >
> >
> >
> -------------- next part --------------
> An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
> URL:
> <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-
electorama.com/attachments/20140625/30c96cbd/attachment.htm>
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> Subject: Digest Footer
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Election-Methods mailing list
> Election-Methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> http://lists.electorama.com/listinfo.cgi/election-methods-electorama.com
> 
> 
> ------------------------------
> 
> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 120, Issue 14
> *************************************************
> 
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Markus Schulze | 25 Jun 21:30 2014
Picon

Re: Methods

Hallo,

 > A voting system should never give the impression that candidates that
 > are universally loathed are ok. If our candidates were Adol Hitler,
 > Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, Benito Mussolini, Mao Zedong and
 > Leopold II of Belgium then approval would rightly illustrate that none
 > are good candidates. However a ranked system would merely indicate that
 > one of them is the "condorcet" winner giving no indication that none are
 > acceptable.
 >
 > I think any sane voting system *must* meet this requirement. The ability
 > for the electorate to unambiguously communicate that none of the
 > candidates are worthy of the post under contest.

But if one of these candidates has to be chosen, the fact, that you like
none of them, is quite irrelevant, because the legitimacy of the winner
does not depend on how overwhelmingly he was chosen.

Markus Schulze

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Forest Simmons | 25 Jun 02:21 2014

PR for ethnically polarized electorates

In Rwanda it was the Hutu and the Tutsi tribal division.  In Iraq the Sunni, Shia, and Kurds.  In the former Yugoslavia it was the Serbs Croats and Bosnians.  There are similar divisions today in the Ukraine, Israel, Syria, Bolivia, etc.

What do they have in common?  A need for electing a representative body that has as many moderates and as much consensus as possible so that minorities are not so desperate for separation, i.e. to prevent the scourge of Balkanization that seems to be spreading like a plague.

Suppose that there are two extreme groups A and B supported by two individual ethnicities, as well as a more moderate group M with preferences like

10 A(100)
30 A(100)>M(80)
45 B(100)>M(80)
15 B(100)

(The numbers in parentheses represent voter expectations of relative benefits.)

In ordinary party list PR methods the parliament would be formed by 40 representatives from A and 60 representatives from B.  The moderate party would be shut out entirely.

Here are my questions:

1. What method(s) would take this information and elect a parliament with respective party strengths of  10, 15, and 75  for A, B, and M?

2.  What election method could possibly get the two middle factions to honestly convey this information via their ballots?  In other words, how to keep the two middle factions from defecting from their common interest?

Forest

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Gmane