⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 27 Jun 08:23 2015

[non-electoral mathematics] TauDay [/non-electoral mathematics]

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	**	State of the Tau 2015

	------------------------------------------------------------

	Note: This message can also be read online at the State of the Tau
(http://tauday.com/state-of-the-tau?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) .

	Happy Tau Day (http://tauday.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) 2015! Interest in the true
circle constant (τ = C/r = 6.283185…) and The Tau Manifesto
(http://tauday.com/tau-manifesto?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) continued unabated this
year, highlighted by a surge of attention on the “Pi [Half Tau] Day of the Century” (3/14/15). (Tau
will have its revenge on 6/28/31—party at my place!) As one of the leaders of the “opposition”, I was
invited to the Pi Day festivities at the Exploratorium
(http://www.exploratorium.edu/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) in San Francisco—the
organization that originally created Pi Day—but I was on vacation in Barcelona at the time and was
unable to attend. (I know, rough life!) That the invitation was proffered in the first place is an
excellent sign, though, as it serves as proof that even the Paladins of Pi recognize tau as a legitimate rival.

	Before getting to the full update, here are three quick announcements:

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June 29).
(Continue reading)

steve bosworth | 26 Jun 22:42 2015
Picon

: UK 'post mortem', Steve's 1st dialogue with Alexander Praetorius


 
> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 132, Issue 19
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 12:01:41 -0700
> 1. Re: (2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and
> Fred Gohlke (Alexander Praetorius)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Alexander Praetorius citizen <at> serapath.de,
 
As requested, attached is my article,
 
Please feel free to ask questions, criticize, offer suggestions, etc.  Also, feel free also to ask me to also send you the illustrative missing items in the Appendix:  2 flow charts and 3 tables.
Steve
Re: > Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 17:43:57 +0200
> From: Alexander Praetorius <citizen <at> serapath.de>
> To: Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>
> Cc: Election Methods <election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] (2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve Alexander Praetorius
> and Fred Gohlke
> Message-ID:
> <CADPDqjE=BVtoyXm6WJqoJGeUcz_niFPZk85VYTBjFc6G9XG5EQ <at> mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Help people to become self employed (sole proprietors or owners of 1-person
> limited liability company)
> Thats where democracy starts.
>
> What are we mumbeling about democracy when 40+ hours every week - people go
> to work and do what they are told to do.
> They have to start co-deciding with the people they meet every day and
> about the way they want to do business.
>
> A "Ltd." can be founded and maintained these days for as cheap as 30 GBP a
> month flat price... this is something everyone can afford and it can be
> managed online.
> At the click of a button, people could "invite" others to collaborate (thus
> join their business) ... Everyone can have a personal "HOLDING Ltd." which
> ones 0+ other Ltd. for all the entrepreneurial projects they are engaging
> in. This kind of culture has to happen and.... THE TIME IS NOW :-) The
> "self employed sector" is growing like never before - and if you already
> have to create:
> "Model Article Of Association" (which can be enforced by an APP), then this
> is how people can start to practice democracy in every day life.
>
> Only if they do that, they will discover and want more influence in all
> kinds of aspects of their lives.... if they do not make that step, they
> will stay wage slaves forever...
> >
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > Good Morning, Steve
> >
> > This will be a slow process. Empowering the people is not a trivial
> > issue. It has many facets.
> >
> >
> > re: I see each person's somewhat different 'internal
> > proportionality' as what would guide each citizen
> > as how to participate or not ...
> >
> > I agree, particularly with regard to "each citizen". A democratic process
> > is (or, rather, should be) bottom-up. It must be inclusive but it cannot
> > be coercive. Each of us must be allowed to participate in the political
> > process to the full extent of our desire and ability. In the U. S., the
> > people have been excluded from the political process for so long that many
> > of them have been schooled in the art of disinterest. Such people will not
> > trust an inclusive process until they have seen it work.
> >
> > When we devise an inclusive democratic process, some people will
> > participate, others will learn to participate, and some will never
> > participate. From the point of view of the community, those who will not
> > participate in its government add no value to the political process.
> > However, all the rest do, so the first step in devising an inclusive
> > process must be to distinguish between the two types of citizens. It has
> > been shown, by Archon Fung of Harvard and many others, that, when people
> > who want to participate in the political process, deliberate on the issues
> > that concern the community, their efforts can be productive.
> >
> >
> > re: ... in electing a rep, e.g. to choose which candidate(s)
> > to rank.
> >
> > This raises the most important question in politics: Who names the
> > candidates? I see you mentioned this issue, as follows:
> >
> >
> > re: During APR's primary election you would rank (1,2,3, etc.)
> > all the voluntary, social organizations that had applied
> > directly to elect their own rep(s) during the next general
> > election, i.e applied to the central electoral commission to
> > become and official electoral 'association' ... You would
> > rank these according to the degree to which each organization
> > seemed to mirror your own.
> >
> > How would I know, with any degree of certainty, the aims of the
> > organizations? Is AARP an organization to help retired people or a
> > marketing enterprise? Is it reasonable to think the lay citizen will do
> > the exhaustive research necessary to rank the multitude of organizations
> > seeking to increase their power and influence by placing an advocate in the
> > government?
>>>S:   I do not think 'certainty' on such matters can be expected.  Each person can only do all they can to find out and judge which organizations and candidates are most likely to represent him or her for each primary election and general election.
> >
> > You mentioned sending me a more complete explanation of APR. I'd like to
> > see the explanation of the groundwork.
 
>>>S:  Yes find my article attached, Alexander Praetorius.
 
>  I don't think it's difficult to
> > arrange for the people to decide who they want to represent them in their
> > government and I'm anxious to see your approach. I may offer a
> > counter-suggestion
>>>S:  Yes, pleas do.
>as a step in the slow process of re-thinking our
> > political infrastructure.
 
> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 132, Issue 19
> *************************************************
Attachment (15-June-EqualVotingSustained.odt): application/octet-stream, 55 KiB
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Kristofer Munsterhjelm | 24 Jun 15:52 2015
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SNTV-like reduction for weighted majoritarian voting

While writing my reply to Steve Bosworth, I think I found a problem with 
some types of weighted voting.

Let's consider a very general setup for weighted voting, consisting of 
two stages. In the first stage, one uses some kind of election method to 
reduce the field of C candidates into one of W winners, W <= C. In the 
second stage, one assigns voters to the winners to give the winners 
different weight (proportional to the number of voters assigned to them).

When we split the weighted voting process in two like this, it's 
possible to use a whole bunch of different election methods for the 
first stage. The APR proposal uses IRV, for instance. Similarly, it's 
possible to use a bunch of different assignment methods for the second 
stage: the simplest and most obvious one is to assign each voter to the 
winner he voted first (or gave highest rating, if it's a rated method).

But if the first stage is to use a majoritarian method (i.e. a method 
ordinarily used to find a single winner or social ordering), and that 
method is cloneproof, then we might get a strategy that (unless I'm 
wrong) severely compromises the weighted aspect.

If there are W winners and W is fixed, then any majority party has an 
incentive to field a certain number of clones to crowd out the others. 
For instance, say the initial election is something like:

52: A > B > C
25: B > C > A
-----
10: C > B > A

with two winners. A and B win, so A gets a weight of 52/87 and B gets a 
weight of 35/87.

Then A has an incentive to clone itself into A1 and A2 and tell its 
supporters to split, voting for these evenly:

26: A1 > A2 > B > C
26: A2 > A1 > B > C
------
25: B > C > A2 > A1
10: C > B > A2 > A1

Now B has been pushed off, and A has gone from controlling 60% to 
controlling 100%. In a council with a majority vote, that makes no 
difference since 60% is enough, but hopefully it should be clear how the 
strategy can be generalized.

Each party faces pressure in two directions. If there was a three-seat 
election like

52: A > B > C > D
25: B > C > D > A
10: C > B > A > D
  5: D > A > B > C

Then B would face pressure from C and D which it could alleviate by 
cloning; but doing so would permit A to clone even more widely in turn 
and perhaps push many of B's clones off. If I am correct, the 
equilibrium turns out to be an SNTV-like strategy, which in essence 
reduces the system to party list proportional representation.

An intuitive way of considering this is: if a party can split itself 
into k parts without any part having less support than the winner with 
the least support, then it is to that party's benefit to do so; doing so 
will push someone who's not of that party out of the winning group. A 
party's weight can be used no matter whether it's distributed or 
concentrated as long as the party leadership controls all the 
candidates. Furthermore, this could be used to avoid upper thresholds 
like the Asset limit in APR: a party simply fields enough candidates 
that no single candidate exceeds the upper threshold.

So, again unless I'm wrong, majoritarian systems do not seem to be 
suitable as the first stage of a weighted voting process, because they 
would give unfair benefit to organized groups of candidates who could 
coordinate and clone as shown above.

-

This problem doesn't occur in party list PR itself because the number of 
parties is not fixed beforehand. So if you start with (Plurality for the 
sake of simplicity)

52: A
25: B
10: C

with 10 seats using Webster/Sainte-Lague, the share is

A: 6, B: 3, C: 1

If A tries to clone:

26: A1
26: A2
25: B
10: C

A1: 3, A2: 3, B: 3, C: 1

to no benefit.

However, trying to run party list PR with majoritarian systems like 
Condorcet doesn't work very well, at least not with the allocation 
mechanism given above[1]. Since the majoritarian systems can put 
candidates with no FPP votes first in their social ranking, you end up 
with the weird result that the candidate that the election method 
unambiguously considers the best corresponds to a party that, according 
to the allocation method, has no voters associated with it and should 
thus have no seats.

I think I have found some Condorcet-like methods that handle weighted 
voting and party list PR, and I may write about them later. The 
exhaustive versions of the methods have exponential runtime in the 
number of parties, but (thankfully) not in the number of seats.

-

[1] I suspect that the reason Plurality works for party list is closely 
related to the reason that it's not a good single-winner method. A 
single-winner method gives a social ordering that places the candidate 
that would be best when you *have* to pick only one (according to its 
logic), then the one that would be second best, and so on. That's why 
cloning the winner (if the method is cloneproof) has all the clones of 
the original winner appearing after the winner: if the original winner 
would not be able to stand, the clone is the next best. But for party 
list PR, you'd want a group representing many opinions, not just copies 
of the best compromise. If that reasoning is right, then a proportional 
ranking method would fit much better, and that's sort of what one of the 
Condorcet-like methods become.
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steve bosworth | 24 Jun 06:54 2015
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(2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and Fred Gohlke

 


(2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and Fred Gohlke



> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 132, Issue 14
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 12:01:57 -0700
>
…......................................


Hi Fred,


Thank you for your reply. I'll tag my responses with S:


F: re: "I would like to understand exactly what you mean by the difference
> between 'internal and external proportionality'."
>
> External proportionality is the relatively static division of political
> interests, as reflected by party representation in a legislature.
>
> Internal proportionality is the relatively dynamic division of political
> interests as reflected by the range of thoughts and feelings about the
> world around us that each of us carry within ourselves.

S: Using your definitions, I see each person's somewhat different 'internal proportionality' as what would guide each citizen as how to participate or not in electing a rep, e.g. to choose which candidate(s) to rank. This 'proportionality' is what I sometimes refer to as a person's 'scale of values'.
>
F: re: "I see the proportionality that could be guaranteed by APR (as
> mentioned) above my comments to James Gilmour) would offer what you seem
> to want: 'to choose representatives that represent the entire community'."
>
> Although I've seen your comments about APR, I have no deep understanding
> of the method. As far as I've been able to tell, it is a way to weigh
> votes for party candidates. However, that is not what I'm concerned
> about. I'm concerned about the way influence on the political process
> is distributed throughout the community. I, and many others like me,
> are not members of, and do not subscribe to the positions proclaimed by,
> any party. Can you tell me how much influence APR will give us on the
> choice of candidates for public office?

…............ how does APR let non-partisans seek out the members of the community best suited to lead it?


S: If APR already existed in your country, and you only wanted to rank (vote for) attractive candidates whose scale of values are closely matched with your own 'internal proportionality', you could do this without 'joining' any organization, face to face. You would do this as follows:

During APR's primary election you would rank (1,2,3, etc.) all the voluntary, social organizations that had applied directly to elect their own rep(s) during the next general election, i.e applied to the central electoral commission to become and official electoral 'association'. These organization would presumably not only include all the existing geographically defined associations (electoral districts) and political parties, but also a number of nongeographically defined organizations (e.g. interest groups: economic, religious, social, environmental, etc.)You would rank these according to the degree to which each organization seemed to mirror your own. In any case, you would, as a result, become a registered vote for general election purposes through the surviving organization (i.e. association) that you had ranked most highly. You would expect that the candidates who later would run to represent this organization would also have similar aims and concerns to your own, and that at least one of them would represent you very well in the legislative assembly.


For the general election itself, the central electoral commission would ensure that you would receive your official ballot at your most local polling station, i.e. even if your official association and ballot is different from the list of candidates for that local district. Each ballot paper originating from each association would also contain a Section B which would also allow a voter to rank as few or as many candidates seeking to represent associations other than the one in which she is registered. Consequently, you would rank as few or as many of the hundreds of candidate in the whole country during the general election as you might wish. As a result, you would be represented by the one elected candidate in the whole assembly you had ranked most highly. She would have a weighted vote in the assembly exactly equal to the number of citizens who had elected her. If none of the candidates you ranked received enough votes to be elected, APR's ballot allows you to require your first choice but eliminated candidate to transfer your vote to the weighted vote of the elected candidate she favors most, e.g. the elected candidate highest on her pre-declared list.


In this way, I see APR as offering you 'the means to seek out and elect
> those who have the particular blend of qualities needed to address and
> resolve the issues that are of current concern'.
>

What do you think?

I look forward to your feedback.

P.S. If you wish, ask Steve to email you a copy of his more systematic explanation of APR.


Steve

stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com

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steve bosworth | 22 Jun 20:59 2015
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Re: UK "post mortem" with an 'initiative' requiring a 'referendum'

> Date: Sun, 21 Jun 2015 13:17:40 +0300
> From: Juho Laatu juho.laatu <at> gmail.com
> To: EM <election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] UK electoral systems "post mortem" discussion on
> radio
> Message-ID: D457C12F-FBE7-4FA1-BC8E-ECEE1BCAE55E <at> gmail.com

 
Let me thank both Kristofer and Juho for their helpful realism concerning the practical possibilities of achieving electoral reforms.  I would only want to add  the reminder that some 20 states in the USA (like California) legally would allow their citizens to change their existing electoral system as a result of a majority vote in a referendum that had been required by enough of their citizens earlier signing the relevant 'initiative'.  In these states, citizens could vote for Thanksgiving even when the current politicians (i.e.the turkeys) are refusing to do so.

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steve bosworth | 22 Jun 03:03 2015
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(2) UK 'most mortem': Steve's 2nd dialogue with Kristofer

 

> Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 22:17:11 +0200
> From: km_elmet <at> t-online.de
> To: stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com; election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com; jgilmour <at> globalnet.co.uk; fredgohlke <at> verizon.net
> Subject: Re: [EM] The 'post mortem' discussions on UK radio (from Steve)
> On 06/18/2015 05:49 PM, steve bosworth wrote:

Hi Kristofer,

 

Perhaps to continue our dialogue most efficiently, please tell me if I have properly understood

your use of 'asymptotically' below.


S: Because you want both a 'simple' and 'fair' electoral system, perhaps
> > you would like to consider APR. It is referred to in my next comment to
> > James Gilmour. APR's countrywide count with its modified STV would be
> > administured through all the single member constituencies that remained
> > after APR's primary election. Consequently, rather than having to rank
> > more than one candidate, each citizen would still have the option of
> > voting only for one candidate, much as they do now using FPTP. At the
> > same time, each such vote would still be guaranteed to continue
> > mathematically to count in the legislative assembly. APR seems to offer
> > your 'fairness throughout'. APR is almost as simple as party-list
> > systems but puts each citizen in control of to which representative's
> > 'weighted vote' her vote will be added.
> >
> > What do you think?
>
K: Unfortunately, because APR reduces to IRV, I can only consider it
> asymptotically fair (that is, when you have enough seats compared to the
> number of candidates).


S: Please correct me if I have misunderstood you to mean the following: The more reps to be elected from a multi-winner district (from many more candidates) by an electorate of many millions of citizens, the probability of monotonicity failures (and thus 'unfairness') would becomes almost fanishingly small.


If so, this would be the case with APR because its general election, in effect, elects all reps from one district (i.e. the whole country, even though it is initially administer through all the single-member district in the country). Moreover, the probability of monotonicty failures occurring with APR is made even smaller by its giving 'weighted votes' to each rep in the assembly, i.e. the transferring of so-called 'surplus votes' is not a part of APR's modified use of STV.


What do you think?


Steve


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steve bosworth | 18 Jun 17:49 2015
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Re: The 'post mortem' discussions on UK radio (from Steve)

Re: [EM] The 'post mortem' discussions on UK radio (from Steve)


To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm <km_elmet <at> t-online.de>

James Gilmour" <jgilmour <at> globalnet.co.uk>

Fred Gohlke<fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>


> Date: Thu, 11 Jun 2015 15:55:34 +0100

….........................

To: Kristofer Munsterhjelm

 

Because you want both a 'simple' and 'fair' electoral system, perhaps you would like to consider APR. It is referred to in my next comment to James Gilmour. APR's countrywide count with its modified STV would be administured through all the single member constituencies that remained after APR's primary election. Consequently, rather than having to rank more than one candidate, each citizen would still have the option of voting only for one candidate, much as they do now using FPTP. At the same time, each such vote would still be guaranteed to continue mathematically to count in the legislative assembly. APR seems to offer your 'fairness throughout'. APR is almost as simple as party-list systems but puts each citizen in control of to which representative's 'weighted vote' her vote will be added.

What do you think?

Steve

To: James Gilmour

Because of the valid points you make to Fred Cohlke about the Frome result, I wonder if you or others have any better suggestions or criticisms of the electoral system that Sol Erdman proposes, also for nationwide electoral purposes: Personal Accountability Representation (PAR, see ERDMAN, SOL . 2010 ‘To Reverse America’s Decline, We Have to Fix Congress’s Dysfunctional Incentives’, Center for Collaborative Democracy, pp. 7—17, Appendices III-V: https://www.olssons.us/thelibrary/Center%20for%20Collaborative%20De mocracy_%20Case%20for%20PAR.pdf. ).

Erdman's PAR paper ballot system is disarmingly introduced by describing the simple face to face way the following imaginary village elects the 7 Members of its Village Council:

Imagine that you are a citizen of this village and 15 of your fellow citizens want to be elected. To discover which 7 of the 15 are to be elected, each candidate initially stands at a different place in the Village Hall surrounded by the citizens who most favour him or her. If more than 7 candidates have such supporters, the one with the fewest is eliminated. Each of his or her supporters now moves to stand by their 2nd choice candidates. This process continues until only 7 candidates remain. These 7 are elected.

Each of these 7 Members will have a ‘weighted vote’ in the Council equal to the number of citizens standing by them at the end of the count. No citizen’s vote is wasted. Each citizen’s vote will continue to count in every decision made by the Council. Each citizen has voted most positively. If you participated in this election, your concerns would be represented by the Member you trust most.

If you like Erdman's proposal, perhaps you would also like to receive an emailed copy of my article that describes an improvement on development on PAR called APR: Associational Proportional Representation ('Equal Voting Sustained' from stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com). In addition to PAR's allowing each citizen's vote equally to continue mathematically to count in the relevant legislative assembly through the 'weighted vote' earned by each rep, APR also includes a primary election which discovers the most popular geographically and non-geographically defined electoral 'associations' through which each citizen will later rank as few or as many candidates in the country during the general election. This additon makes it also more likely that each citizen will continue to be represented qualitatively— by the one representative in the assembly whose scale of values is as close as possible to his or her own.

What doe you think?

 

Steve

To: Fred Gohlke,

 

I would like to understand exactly what you mean by the difference between 'internal and external proportionality'. In any case, I see the proportionality that could be guaranteed by APR (as mentioned) above my comments to James Gilmour) would offer what you seem to want: ' to choose representatives that represent the entire community'. In this regard, perhaps you would also like to receive an emailed copy of 'Equal Voting Sustained' as well as to consider Erdman's PAR. I see both as offering a much better means by which the candidates could have been selected (and voted for) by the citizens of Frome.

I see APR as especially offering 'the means to seek out and elect those who have the particular blend of qualities needed to address and resolve the issues that are of current concern'. APR seems to offer what your Dr. Mansbridge wants: 'the objectives of principal and agent … to be aligned'. Similarly, I see that because APR is more likely to produce, on average, a closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson (MP), APR is more likely to help solve the real problems facing the country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the ideologically different electorates who elected them. To do this, compromises must be made and a working majority coalition formed. The likelihood of this happening with APR contrasts with the gridlock that is frequently produced by the more defuse, vague, and often conflicting agendas held by the congresspersons and their electors using existing electoral systems.

A trusting voter is more likely to believe her own congressperson’s claim that a given compromise is necessary. This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also seem to make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and known to be backed by his 'association' and his electors. This greater clarity and focus would seem to help each APR congressperson to present the strongest possible case for his legislative proposals to the other members of the House. Consequently, an assembly composed of such able, different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the production of creative and evidence based solutions to the country's problems. The wisdom of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an assembly whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and intensity of the concerns of all citizens.

What do you think?

Steve


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steve bosworth | 15 Jun 22:56 2015
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(18) APR: Steve's 18th dialogue with Richard Fobes

 

(18) APR: Steve's 18th dialogue with Richard Fobes

 

To Richard (and everyone),

 

Sorry, my travels have prevented me from responding earlier.

 

Again thank you for your answers. In addition to initiating this 18th dialogue between us, I have also added a copy of our 17th dialogue to refresh my memory. I look forward to your response this this 18th. 

 

(Also, I would be happy to email my most recent description of how APR works to anyone who requests it,)

 

To Richard:

Yes, as a result of reading your book ("Ending The Hidden Unfairness…”), I think I do understand how both VoteFair popularity and representation rankings could work. Again, I agree that VoteFair popularity ranking offers the best way to elect the president, a governor, or a major. However, I still see it as offering less proportionality and representativeness than APR for electing a legislative assembly. In fact, you seem to acknowledge this APR advantage below:

You explicitly say that you do not “dispute” the fact that “these VoteFair-based linkages between a specific ballot and a specific representative are not as obvious as … in your APR method”.

“I do not dispute your claim that your APR method has the advantage that a voter can directly associate their vote with a particular elected representative's voting influence. …

Aside from these important relative weaknesses of VoteFair when compared to APR for electing an assembly, I see VoteFair's greater mathematical complexity, its remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral districts, and its still wasting some votes (for example by its offering a more limited choice of candidates for electors) as seeming to make it less likely (and less worthy than APR) to replace the existing system in California. More Californians would understand APR.

However, against this APR advantage you again claim that it is more vulnerable to money corruption. Several times before you have suggested that APR would be more vulnerable in this regard but I still have not seen your exact reasons for believing this. Please try again to specify the nature of the exta volnurability you see APR having in this regard.

Also, why do you seem to reject the case for believing that APR would be less vulnerable in this regard as recalled by the last paragraph in the following case for APR’s primary and associations:
APR: Finding Common Ground and Forming a Working Majority Coalition

With regard to finding common ground and forming a working majority in the assembly with ideologically different congresspersons, paradoxically, the advantage that each APR member of the House is likely to have is that he knows that he has been elected by citizens who expect and trust him to work and vote to promote their common scale of values. As elaborated below, this ideological bond between each citizen and her rep would seem more likely to provide the kind congresspersons to engage in the kind of productive debates and negotiations in the House to form a majority coalition to help solve the real problems facing the country.

This advantage is enhanced during APR’s general election when each citizen guarantees that her vote will be added to the ‘weighted vote’ in the legislative assembly of her most favoured representative (or the one most favoured by her first choice but eliminated candidate). It should also be understood that a foundation for the growth of this qualitative advantage would have been provided earlier by the way APR recruits its candidates.

Firstly, APR’s primary election discovers the voluntary organizations in the country that are most trusted by its citizens. It then helps politically to energizes these organizations by recognizing them as the official electoral ‘associations’ through which each citizen will later elect their own congressperson. This recognition, in turn, should stimulate more attractive candidates to seek to represent both one of these associations and the citizens with whom they have an ideological bond. In contrast to other electoral systems, APR’s later election of the most favoured of these better candidates would seem also to combine to raise the average quality of representation in the assembly even further, both from the points of view of citizens and associations.

Additionally:

The growth of these closer bonds between citizens and their representatives would seem to be assisted by another element of the “bottom-up” primary election itself. It asks citizens to start to familiarize themselves with the existing members, officials, and other potential candidates of their preferred organizations months before each voter has to finalize her ranking of candidates during the general election. If so, the average breadth and depth of knowledge so acquired by voters in order to rank individual candidates would also seem likely to be greater than is generally acquired by citizens using other electoral systems.

The average closer bond between each citizen using APR and her rep would also seem to grow partly as a result of the time between APR’s two elections. These months would allow each association, its candidates and its registered voters to coordinate their thinking and planning about how best to run their common campaign in the coming general election.

Because an APR congressperson would be more clearly expected to work and vote to promote the scale of values he shares with his largely homogeneous electorate, he would seem to be both more able and likely to negotiate solutions to common problems together with fellow but ideologically different congresspersons. This is because each APR rep would probably enjoy more trust from his electorate. Consequently, each member’s explanation of why he and his electorate should support a given compromise solution to a common problem is more likely to be accepted by this electorate. While no one may see the compromise as being perfect, each congressperson and his electorate is more likely to accept that it at least provides net benefits for each ideologically different sponsor and his electorate. A trusting voter is more likely to believe her own congressperson’s claim that a given compromise is necessary.

This closer bond between each rep and his electorate would also seem to make each congressperson’s work in the assembly more focused and known to be backed by his association and his electors. This greater clarity and focus would seem to help each APR congressperson to present the strongest possible case for his legislative proposals to the other members of the House. Consequently, an assembly composed of such able, different, well informed, clashing, and focused reps would seem to provide an optimal debating and negotiating chamber for the production of creative and evidence based solutions to common problems. The wisdom of any decisions resulting from this deliberative process is also likely to be aided by the simple fact that it would take place in an assembly whose composition most accurately reflects the real variety and intensity of the concerns of all citizens.

The extra ability with which APR reps would seem to be able to negotiate compromises, would also seem to make it more likely that APR congresspersons would respond to the imperative to form a working majority in the assembly. Without such a majority coalition, any wise legislative solutions to problems that such rational deliberations might have discovered could not be passed into law. Each APR rep is more likely to see that if he is not a part of the majority that will shape the assembly’s binding decisions, his own agenda, and that of his electorate, will not be advanced.

In a parliamentary system, the formation of such a coalition also has the advantage that the assembly can ensure that the government (the executive organ of the state) will be led by a chief executive (prime minister) who can be most trusted to apply the laws as expected by the assembly.

In summary, it is because APR is more likely to produce, on average, a closer ideological fit between each citizen and her congressperson that APR is more likely to help solve the real problems facing the country. They are more likely to do this because of the greater expectation on the part of their different electorates that progress must actually be made with respect to the goals of each of the ideological different electorates who elected them. To do this, compromises must be made and a working majority coalition formed. The likelihood of this happening contrasts with the gridlock that is frequently produced by the more defuse, vague, and often conflicting agendas held by the congresspersons and their electors using existing electoral systems.

APR’s primary elections and associations should also help to reduce the sometimes anti-democratic power of great wealth, celebrity, and the mass media. I see this as likely given the extent to which APR’s ‘associations’ would emerge from previously existing voluntary organizations in society. These associations could benefit from the loyalties among the population such organizations had enjoyed prior to them being recognized as 'associations'. Presumably, many of these organizations would already of have some communication and mobilization resources that are entirely independent of celebrity, the richest sections of society, and the mass media. Thus, the adoption of APR would probably help to reduce the relative power of these sometimes anti-democratic forces in determining how people and their representatives vote. APR’s official political recognition of these voluntary organizations would seem to assist many citizens more firmly, securely, and independently to see that their own abiding interests are best promoted and protected through the associational and representational connections validated by APR.

What do you think?

Steve

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

> Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2015 22:48:18 -0700
> From: ElectionMethods <at> VoteFair.org
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> CC: stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com
> Subject: Re: 17) APR: Steve's 17th dialogue with Richard Fobes
> On 4/8/2015 1:20 AM, steve bosworth wrote:
> > ...
S: >>2) ... unlike APR, VoteFair ranking cannot allow each
> > elector to guarantee that her one vote will continue to count in the
> > assembly through the elected candidate (i.e. rep) she ranked most
> > highly. ...

> > 3) Also, unlike APR, VoteFair rankings cannot allow each of its reps to
> > have a weighted vote in the assembly exactly equal to the number of
> > electors throughout California who had similarly ranked him most highly.
R: > Actually VoteFair ranking can achieve the equivalent of these goals --
> assuming, as you do, that highly proportional results are very important
> and the issue of how voting is done in the legislature is ignored. …
S: Do you accept that the “equivalences” which you claim would not offer either of these two advantages as completely as APR would?

S: At the same time, I do not “ignore” your improved method by which legislatures could vote. In fact, in an earlier dialogue, I agreed that your VoteFair Negotiation Tool would offer a very efficient way by which each proposed assembly decision could be finally formulated. Each such formulation should then be either accept or rejected by a majority vote in the assembly. An APR assembly should use your Tool in this way.

R: To see how, let's get specific:
> Currently the California State Assembly (the "lower house") has 80
> representatives (legislators), and each representative is elected from
> one of 80 districts. (A map of the districts is at: legislature.ca.gov)
>
> If VoteFair Ranking were used to elect these state representatives in a
> way that produces proportional results, the district boundaries would be
> changed to form (say) 32 districts. …


S: Yes, this offers an improvement on the existing system. However, in contrast to the way APR’s primary would allow citizen’s exactly to determine the “electoral associations” (e.g. districts) through which each wants to vote later for candidates, your suggestion would both be less comprehensive and require more arbitrary decisions to be made (e.g. perhaps some gerrymandered boundary decisions).

R: …Each of these districts would use VoteFair representation ranking to elect two representatives.

…………………
> * Two years before the current election, each voter will have ranked all
> the (qualified) political parties. …

S: Please consider that this would be more comprehensively achieved by APR’s primary.

………………………….

R: … The most popular of these candidates who are from the correct political parties are elected to fill the 16 statewide seats. This method would elect members of the California legislature in a way that ensures proportional results.

S: However, this “proportionality” is not as exact as APR’s. Again, you seem to accept this by saying below, that “the weight of each legislator's vote” only “approximately” matches “the number of people who elected that legislator”. Do you agree?
R: What you are overlooking is that each legislator elected this way represents the same number of voters. It is not necessary for the representatives to have different voting weights and represent different numbers of voters.


S: Please explain how you calculate that “each legislator” would “represent the same number of voters”. It seems to me that

the number of voters in each of your 32 districts would be at least marginally different;

the number of voters who have preferred the 2nd elected rep in a given district will probably have received fewer preferences than the 1st elected rep; and

some voters may not see either rep as representing them.

Is this not the case?
R: As for the linkage, let's consider an example. A voter in a very
> "conservative" district who is a lesbian can rank as her first choice a
> political party hypothetically named the Stay-Out-Of-My-Personal-Life --
> SOOMPL -- party. Her vote will directly translate into electing the
> proportional number of candidates from that political party.
> Specifically, if 10 percent of the voters rank the SOOMPL party as their
> first choice, then about 8 of the elected representatives (which is 10
> percent) will be from that party. …

S: But unlike APR, her candidate rankings will not help to determine which 8 from that party will be elected. Also, by say “about 8”, again, you seem correctly to accept that this proportionality would not be as exact as that offered by APR?

R: Unlike in your APR method, she will not know which representative she "elected," yet collectively the 8 representatives will know that they represent that specific 10 percent of the voters. …

S: So this is good, but not as good as APR. Do you agree?
> ……………………….

R: Now let's consider the two winning candidates from each district. Under
> current conditions most districts would elect one Republican and one
> Democrat. If a district is split into 60 percent Republicans and 40
> percent Democrats, the Republican winner represents the Republican
> voters, and the Democratic winner represents the Democratic voters. …

S: Yes, and this means that each voter in the 60% has a smaller share in the Republican’s one vote in the assembly, i.e. as contrasted with the larger share in the Democrat’s one vote held by each voter in the 40%. Unlike APR, this is not one-person-one-vote and it again illustrates the above point that your different VoteFair reps will represent different numbers of voters even though each rep will have only one vote in the assembly.

R: … Other districts would probably have the opposite bias, so the "roundoff
> errors" would tend to cancel out. Importantly, the overall balance of elected Republicans and elected Democrats would be very close to the statewide balance, because these numbers are adjusted to be as proportional as possible ….

S: Of course, this would be our hope but it might or might not work out in that way, i.e. we should say “might” rather than “probably”. APR’s exact proportionality and representativeness does not depend on “hope”.

R: … within the limitations of holding district-based elections -- which is an essential part of U.S. culture.

S: Please remember than APR will elect reps from every geographically defined “electoral association”, as well as any sufficiently popular non-geographically defined “associations”.

However, by saying that “holding district-based elections” is an “essential part of U.S. culture”, are you claiming that U.S. culture could not allow any reps to be elected from non-geographically defined associations? APR’s primaries would test this belief. If they are essential in this sense, this would be confirmed. At the same time, these primaries would allow each citizen whose political identity is not defined mainly by her geographical residence also to be more efficiently represented.

R: The biggest unfairness gap is if one party or the other wins "too many"
> of the district-based seats. Yet the other party would then get the
> advantage over tiny political parties, such that tiny parties might not
> win any seats.

S: What do you mean by “too many”? Appropriately, APR guarantees that each sufficiently popular association (e.g. party) will elect a number of reps with weighted votes exactly equal to the number of citizens who elected them. Is not this ideal from a democratic point of view?
…………………………………………
R: If you want to claim that these VoteFair-based linkages between a
> specific ballot and a specific representative are not as obvious as the
> linkage in your APR method, then I would not dispute that claim. Yet
> mathematics can identify the linkages.
> So, regarding the "wasted votes" concept that you like to refer to (with
> various wordings), both VoteFair ranking and your APR method have
> similar percentages of "wasted votes" -- as I indicated earlier.
>
> You ask how I arrived at those percentages. A rigorous measurement
> would require running lots of election scenarios through appropriately
> written software, and we don't have that. Instead I estimated mentally.
> Could my estimates be incorrect? Of course. As I said, they are
> estimates.

S: I can see how Vote-Fair methods could easily waste some votes, and, yes, perhaps we currently can only estimate the probably of these percentages. However, as yet I cannot see how any vote could be wasted using APR except by any citizens who does not participate at all, or perhaps by each citizen whose ranked candidates all fail to be elected when she has also not allowed her first choice candidate but eliminated candidate to transfer her one vote to the weighted vote of the rep most trusted by that candidate. This is why I say that APR would allow each Californian to guarantee that her vote will not be wasted, e.g. that it will be added to the weighted vote of the most trusted rep (among the 80).

……………………………….
R: I will argue that when VoteFair ranking is used, money cannot be used to
> promote -- in an effective way -- a voter to choose a candidate or party
> in a way that does not also undermine the voter's real preferences. …
S: The same claim should be made for APR.

R: This advantage is significant because all other voting methods that I know of -- including your APR method, and including STV (the single-transferable vote) -- are vulnerable to money-backed tactics that take advantage of counting weaknesses.
S: Please explain the “counting weakness” you see in APR in this regard.

……………..

Richard Fobes

Steve


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Gervase Lam | 9 Jun 22:47 2015

UK electoral systems "post mortem" discussion on radio

A few weeks back, I heard on the radio a reasonable discussion about the
chances of electoral reform in the UK.  It sounded like one of the
panellists in the discussion knew of the various ("complicated") PR
systems more than the average person.

In any case, only glancing mentions were made about other electoral
systems.  The panellist knew the target audience.  I think this is
understandable given that the target audience really want good results,
not a "technical" system.

Anyway, the link for the broadcast in question is below.

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p02q9wgx>

It starts around 2h08m at lasts just over 25 minutes with musical
breaks.  It ends with a brief discussion about maybe having politicians
being homeless people!

There's under 40 hours to listen to it as of writing this.

Sorry for the late notice for this.  I've been meaning to send this much
much earlier.  However, it was more difficult to track down than I
thought (I was searching wrong radio station until today!) plus I had
other things to attend to.  Better late than never...?

Thanks,
Gervase.

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Forest Simmons | 5 Jun 20:47 2015

Re: Example of Condorcet Missing the Highest Utility Center Candidate

Juho,

thanks for your insights.

In your excellent example, candidate D appears to be the IA-MPO winner, especially if we define implicit approval as "ranked above bottom."

Forest

On Fri, Jun 5, 2015 at 12:03 AM, Juho Laatu <juho4880 <at> yahoo.com> wrote:
One solution for this problem would be to use some rated method. If every voter votes according to his travel distances to each candidate center we could get ideal results. I mean that actually we are discussing here indirectly whether to use ranked or rated methods.

(In the example one could mandate each voter to vote based on the distance (in the rated method based election), or calculate the results based on the addresses of the voters, i.e. without having an election. This way we could get rid of any possible strategies.  :-) )

When compared to the rated methods, (plain) Condorcet methods focus only on counting the majorities, not the strength of opinions. In this example any two 33 voter groups could form a clear majority. They could agree to vote together to make the center between them the winner. Any sensible argument against the third 33 voter group could be a sufficient reason (for the two 33 groups) to do so.

One could say that Condorcet methods aim at electing stable winners. They try to seek a winner that will not be disliked by some clear majority. (I'm vague here because the behaviour of different Condorcet methods is somewhat different.) If you would elect C, there could easily be some majority alliance that would be interested in trying to change the elected center to another center. If you elect Mx, the outcome is probably more stable.

One can study this example also from strategic voting point of view. I guess the given votes are quite stable and there are no obvious strategies to improve one's (distance based) expected outcome. Condorcet could however make it possible to strategically make the result worse in the sense that the voters could reduce their expected outcome in terms of distance but make the expected outcome better in the sense that the whole society would benefit of it. I mean that many voters could see that C is obviously in some sense best for the society, and they could therefore rank C first in their ballots. No harm done and no risks doing so, if the voters truly prefer a solution that is good for all, and not just good for them personally. The point here is that Condorcet does not force them to make decisions that they consider stupid. If some solution looks stupid to us in some example, maybe the voters would see that stupidity too, and vote accordingly (changing their preferences to something more sensible).

Juho

P.S. I'm ok with electing Condorcet losers in some (extreme) scenarios. As I already said, Condorcet methods tend to seek stable solutions. In the following example the Condorcet loser (D) is disliked only very mildly in the pairwise comparisons, while all the others have a strong opposition against them (in favour of changing them to some other candidate).
17 A>B>D>C
16 A>D>B>C
17 B>C>D>A
16 B>D>C>A
17 C>A>D>B
16 C>D>A>B



On 05 Jun 2015, at 05:11, Forest Simmons <fsimmons <at> pcc.edu> wrote:


Suppose that a town with 100 voting citizens has 33 voters residing at each of the three vertices of an equilateral triangle (with two mile sides, say), and one voter residing within two hundred yards of the the center of the triangle.


Proposed sites for the new community center are M1, M2, and M3, at the respective midpoints of the three sides of the triangle, as well as site C at the center of the triangle’ a couple of hundred yards from the lone voter that we just mentioned.


Assuming that voters prefer closer sites over more distant sites the preferences are

 

33 M1=M2>C

33 M1=M3>C

33 M2=M3>C

01 C

Note that C is the Condorcet Loser, since each of the M’s beats C pairwise by almost a two-thirds majority, 66 to 34.


On the other hand, C is the IA winner with 100 percent implicit approval.


Candidate C is also the IA-MPO winner with a score of 100-66, compared with 66-33 for the other alternatives.


How about average distance of voters from each of the alternatives?

The average distance to alternative C is 0.66 times the square root of three miles, or about 1.14 miles.


The average distance to any of the M’s is about 1.24 miles.


If the M’s were moved directly away from their midpoint positions to a position nearly twice as far from the center as the midpoint position, the preference schedule based on distances would not change, but the average distance from voter to any of the M’s would go up from about 1.24 to about 1.52 miles, more than 33 percent farther than the average distance to C.


Think of it: the center location is about 33 percent better on average.  It cuts the distance in half for the faction that ends up furthest from the winning M, and doesn’t give a lopsided solution where 33 voters have to go twice as far (forever after) as the other 66 voters on the vertices of the triangle.  It is the geometrical center solution and the approval solution, but it is the Condorcet Loser.

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Forest Simmons | 5 Jun 04:11 2015

Example of Condorcet Missing the Highest Utility Center Candidate


Suppose that a town with 100 voting citizens has 33 voters residing at each of the three vertices of an equilateral triangle (with two mile sides, say), and one voter residing within two hundred yards of the the center of the triangle.


Proposed sites for the new community center are M1, M2, and M3, at the respective midpoints of the three sides of the triangle, as well as site C at the center of the triangle’ a couple of hundred yards from the lone voter that we just mentioned.


Assuming that voters prefer closer sites over more distant sites the preferences are

 

33 M1=M2>C

33 M1=M3>C

33 M2=M3>C

01 C

Note that C is the Condorcet Loser, since each of the M’s beats C pairwise by almost a two-thirds majority, 66 to 34.


On the other hand, C is the IA winner with 100 percent implicit approval.


Candidate C is also the IA-MPO winner with a score of 100-66, compared with 66-33 for the other alternatives.


How about average distance of voters from each of the alternatives?

The average distance to alternative C is 0.66 times the square root of three miles, or about 1.14 miles.


The average distance to any of the M’s is about 1.24 miles.


If the M’s were moved directly away from their midpoint positions to a position nearly twice as far from the center as the midpoint position, the preference schedule based on distances would not change, but the average distance from voter to any of the M’s would go up from about 1.24 to about 1.52 miles, more than 33 percent farther than the average distance to C.


Think of it: the center location is about 33 percent better on average.  It cuts the distance in half for the faction that ends up furthest from the winning M, and doesn’t give a lopsided solution where 33 voters have to go twice as far (forever after) as the other 66 voters on the vertices of the triangle.  It is the geometrical center solution and the approval solution, but it is the Condorcet Loser.

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Gmane