⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 28 Jun 21:13 2016

[off topic] TauDay [/off topic]

	⸘Howdy‽

	We are all into Electoral Mathematics, which means that we are into Mathematics.  Today is TauDay:

	¡Today is TauDay!

	It is a day devoted to the 1 True CircleConstant:

	τ	=	(	c	/	r	)	≈	6.28318530717959

	It falls on this day because the decimal expansion looks like this date (yyyyy-06-28).

	For more information, go to TauDay.Com:

	http://TauDay.Com

	¡Peace!

--

-- 

	“⸘Ŭalabio‽” <Walabio <at> MacOSX.Com>

Skype:
	Walabio

An IntactWiki:
	http://intactwiki.org

	“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.”
	——
(Continue reading)

Kristofer Munsterhjelm | 28 Jun 14:14 2016
Picon

A more Condorcetian Hare-based proportional method

(This is a sketch of the method that I mentioned in my post to Robert,
that I haven't been able to make into an actual method because of a
particular snag.)

Suppose that X and Y are two lists of pairwise comparisons (e.g. X might
be "A>B B>C" and Y might be "C>A C>B B>A") so that the pairwise
combinations can be combined into a linear order (i.e. there are no cycles).

Then let X be stronger than Y if: X's first comparison has a stronger
defeat strength than Y's first, or if they're both equal and X's second
comparison has a stronger defeat strength than Y's, and so on (leximax).
Missing entries count as 0, so a list of defeat strengths (20 10 5) is
stronger than one of (20 10) but not one of (20 11).

Let such a list be maximal if no other list is better than it.
Clearly, when not further constrained, the maximal list gives the
orderings to be reassembled to find the Ranked Pairs winner in a
single-winner election[1].

The idea for multiwinner is then pretty simple, on a high level:

Let a particular ballot subset of size k be maximal if its
maximal list (when only considering the votes in this subset) is no
weaker than any maximal list from any other ballot subset of size k.
(Here, comparing lists from different subsets implies comparing defeat
strengths calculated from the respective subsets.)

Then:

1. Randomly pick a maximal Hare quota-sized subset of the ballots.
(Continue reading)

steve bosworth | 28 Jun 01:00 2016
Picon

The easiest method to 'tolerate'

 

To everyone:

 

Thank you Kevin for responding to my questions about IRV being nonmonotonic.  I think our dialogue would be assisted by me also understanding your views about the Majority Judgment method.  You said:  All proposed methods are unfair in some way, and people have different views on what is or isn't tolerable’.  Currently I do not yet see how Majority Judgment is in any way ‘unfair’.  MJ seems to resist manipulation more than any one of the other proposed methods.  Also, it seems fully to satisfy what I mean by the ‘one-citizen-one-vote’ principle

for electing a single-winner.  In this context, this principle requires that each citizen’s vote (preferences or ‘grades’) be counted equally as long as technically possible until the single-winner is discovered, i.e. the candidate who has received the highest average intensity available of majority support.

 

Do you agree or do you see a different method as easiest to ‘tolerate’?

 

From: Kevin Venzke <stepjak <at> yahoo.fr>
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2016 1:05 AM
To: steve bosworth; election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
Subject: Re: [EM] Wiki says IRV is monotonic--not fully democratic?

 

Hi Steve,

 

The first one on the list (mono-raise) is what people are referring to when they say IRV (or two-round) violates monotonicity. But certainly there are other ones from the list that it doesn't satisfy either.

 

You used the terms "democratic" and "one citizen one vote" but I don't really know of definitions for these terms at this level.

 

The reason mono-raise failures are criticized is that they involve situations where a candidate (or his supporters) could complain that they are penalized for getting better rankings. A perception of unfairness could undermine perceived legitimacy of the winner. All proposed methods are unfair in some way, and people have different views on what is or isn't tolerable.

 

Kevin

 

 

 

 

 

++++++++++++++++++++++++

To everyone:

Below, Steve is considering the following section of the following June 21, 2016 Wikipedia article:  Monotonicity criterion’.  He will refer to the author of that section as ‘Wiki’:

Instant-runoff voting and the two-round system are not monotonic[edit

Using an example that applies to instant-runoff voting (IRV) and to the two-round system, it is shown that these voting systems violate the mono-raise criterion. Suppose a president were being elected among three candidates, a left, a right, and a center candidate, and 100 votes cast. The number of votes for an absolute majority is therefore 51.

Suppose the votes are cast as follows:

Number of votes

1st preference

2nd preference

28

Right

Center

5

Right

Left

30

Left

Center

5

Left

Right

16

Center

Left

16

Center

Right

According to the 1st preferences, Left finishes first with 35 votes, Right gets 33 votes, and Center 32 votes, thus all candidates lack an absolute majority of first preferences. In an actual runoff between the top two candidates, Left would win against Right with 30+5+16=51 votes. The same happens (in this example) under IRV, Center gets eliminated, and Left wins against Right with 51 to 49 votes.

[STEVE’S Additions:

S: Given these preferences, the Center candidate rather than the Right candidate should get eliminated because he receives fewer 1st preference votes.  Still, the principle of one-citizen-one-vote requires that the preference of each of these supporter be counted until a majority winner is discovered.  Since 16 of them preferred the Left candidate next and 16 preferred the Right candidate next, the Left candidate receive a total of 51 votes and the Right candidate 49.  Given both that only one candidate can win in this election and the principle of one-citizen-one-vote, no citizen would be able to sustain an objection to this result.

Author’s

1st IRV

COUNT

Left

Center

Right

1

35

32

33

2

51

 

49

Wiki: But if at least two of the five voters who ranked Right first, and Left second, would raise Left, and vote 1st Left, 2nd Right; then Left would be defeated by these votes in favor of Center. Let's assume that two voters change their preferences in that way, which changes two rows of the table:

Number of votes

1st preference

2nd preference

3

Right

Left

7

Left

Right

Now Left gets 37 first preferences, Right only 31 first preferences, and Center still 32 first preferences, and there is again no candidate with an absolute majority of first preferences. But now Right gets eliminated, and Center remains in round 2 of IRV (or the actual runoff in the Two-round system). And Center beats its opponent Left with a remarkable majority of 60 to 40 votes.

1-[STEVE’S IRV exploration:

Wiki’s changed preferences (2nd Set of Ballots)

Number of votes

1st preference

2nd preference

28

Right

Center

3

Right

Left

2

Left

Right

30

Left

Center

5

Left

Right

16

Center

Left

16

Center

Right

 

2nd IRV

COUNT

Left

Center

Right

1

37

32

31

2

40

60

0

3

 

60

 

S: These 28 make the Center candidate’s total of 60 (and the winner) while the 2 make the total of the Left candidate 40.  While it is true that this change in preferences changes the win for the Left candidate to a defeat, they still helped the Left candidate both by increasing the number of first preferences he received and the average intensity of preference given to him.  At the same time, he could not expect to win because he had received only a total of 40 to the total of 60 votes received by the Center candidate.

Consequently, currently I do not yet see this example as containing any anti-democratic element. As I see it, the principle of ‘one-citizen-one vote’ only requires that each citizen’s vote (preferences) be counted equally as long as technically possible until the single-winner is discovered, i.e. the candidate who has received the highest intensity possible of majority support.  Accordingly, before the 2 preferences were changed by Wiki, the Left candidate won with 51 votes with an average intensity of 9.76 on a scale of 10.  After the change, the Center candidate won with 60 votes with an average intensity of 9.53. 

Intensity of support calculations:

1st Set of Ballots

35X10 +16X9=350+144=494

494 divided by 51=9.76

2nd Set of Ballots

32X10 +28X9=320+252=572

572 divided by 60=9.53

In contrast, the intensity of support for a forced win by the Center candidate from the 1st Set of Ballots would only be 9.36:

32 X 1st preferences and 58 X 2nd preferences for the Center candidate:

32X10+58X9=320+522=842

842 divided by 90= 9.36

S: Again, using IRV, the originally winning Left candidate was defeated after the author changed the two voters’ preferences.  This happened even though the Left candidate was now given two 1st, rather than two 2nd, preferences.  Wiki sees this as a violation of the ‘mono-raise criterion’: ‘giving higher preferences to a candidate should never harm him’.  However, at least in some senses, these two higher preferences did help the Left candidate, i.e. they gave him two more 1st preferences. They also helped him by reducing the intensity of 2 preferences given to one of his competitors, i.e. by giving the Right candidate two 2nd rather than two 1st preferences.  By themselves, these changes would make it more likely that the Left candidate would win.  It is only because more other citizens gave their 1st preference to the Center candidate over the Right candidate that the Right candidate correctly had to be eliminated in the second count.  In turn, this appropriately required candidate Right’s 2nd preferences to be transferred:  28 to the Center candidate and 3 to the Center candidate.  Given these two change made by these two citizens, the particular preferences given by the other voters required that the Left candidate not be elected.  Consequently, it was not the isolated giving of two higher preferences to the Left candidate that ‘harmed’ him.  It was how these preferences had to be combined with the preferences of all the other citizens that required the Left candidate to be defeated.  This follows from the principle of one-citizen-one-vote.  Again, given both this principle and the fact that only one candidate can win in this election, no one would seem to be able to sustain an objection to this result.

S: Nevertheless, Wiki claims that IRV is not monotonic (i.e. violates the mono-raise criterion).  Does Wiki have Woodall’s definition of a mono-raise random criterion (see below) in mind [Douglas R. Woodall Discrete Applied Mathematics 77 (1997) 81-98]?

In the light of the above discussion and the following definitions, I would very much appreciate it if anyone could explain why they might still want to criticize IRV for being nonmonotonic.  Is IRV fully democratic in the sense defined above?

Section 1.3 in Woodall’s article defines how a nonmotonic set of rules might ‘harm’ or ‘help’ candidate x:  ‘We shall say a candidate x is either helped or harmed by a change in the profile if the result, respectively, is to increase or decrease [the probability of electing x, i.e] PE(x). The following two properties are well known to hold for STV [which reduces to IRV in a single-winner raced].

  • Later-no-help:  Adding a later preference to a ballot should not help any candidate already listed.

  • Latter-no-harm:  Adding a later preference to a ballot should not harm any candidate already listed.’

Next, Woodall goes on to define nine different ‘versions of monotonicity.  The basic theme is that a candidate x should not be harmed by a change in the profile that appears to give more support to candidate x.

Monotonicity:

1-(mono-raise) x is raised on some ballots without changing the orders of other candidates;

2-(mono-raise delete) x is raised on some ballots and all the candidates now below x on those ballots are deleted from them;

3-(mono-raise random) x is raised on some ballots and the positions now below x are filled (or left empty) in any way that results in a valid ballot;

4-(mono-append) x is added to the end of some ballots that did not previously contain x;

5-(mono-sub-plump) some ballots without x are replace by ballots with x placed top and with no second choice;

6-(mono-sub-top) some ballots that do not have x placed top are replaced with ballots that do place x top (and are otherwise arbitrary);

7-(mono-add-plump) further ballots are added that place x top and with no second choices;

8-(mono-sub-top) further ballots are added that place x top (and are otherwise arbitrary);

9-(mono-remove-bottom) some ballots are removed, all of which have x at bottom, below all other candidate.’

I look forward to any of your replies.

Steve

 


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Richard Lung | 25 Jun 14:44 2016

Science is Ethics as Electics.



To all,
Recently I published my third book on election method and science:
Science is Ethics as Electics.
Political elections are only the tip of the iceberg, where human choice is concerned.
The science does have practical relevance. For instance, scientific statements are conditional statements, like agreement depends on consent, or, to put it another way: liberty is the condition of unity. This is given practical expression in an election system that enables a unifying freedom of individual choice. This is discussed in my chapter: the moral sciences as the ethics of scientific method.
Please consult free from Smashwords
Peace-making Power-sharing:
https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/542631

Scientific Method of Elections:
https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/548524

Science is Ethics as Electics
https://www.smashwords.com/books/view/643703
 
There are various ways of obtaining alternative formats, such as from virus-checked affiliate sites, or by downloading the Calibre program.
Amazon charge a discretionary fee.
Peace-making Power-sharing:
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00XM3CE2O
 
"Scientific Method of Elections"
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B00Z4QIAPC

Science is Ethics as Electics
http://www.amazon.com/dp/B01H4G2O10
 

Thankyou for your time.
Richard Lung.



 
-- Richard Lung. E-books (mostly available free or reader-sets-price) http://www.voting.ukscientists.com/colverse.html Includes the series of books on: Democracy Science (starting with electoral reform and research); Commentaries (literature and liberty; science and democracy); Collected verse (in five books).
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Forest Simmons | 22 Jun 03:18 2016

question about electoral college in the USA

In a recent counterpunch article Dave Lindorff suggested that Sanders should go ahead and run on the Green ticket, but with the following agreement:  if Trump gets more electoral votes than either Clinton or Sanders, then (of these two) the one with lesser support should withdraw from the race and direct his electors (in the electoral college) to vote for the other.

It seems reasonable, but I wonder if the rules really do allow that.


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steve bosworth | 22 Jun 00:07 2016
Picon

Wiki says IRV is monotonic--not fully democratic?

 

To everyone:

Below, Steve is considering the following section of the following June 21, 2016 Wikipedia article:  Monotonicity criterion’.  He will refer to the author of that section as ‘Wiki’:

Instant-runoff voting and the two-round system are not monotonic[edit

Using an example that applies to instant-runoff voting (IRV) and to the two-round system, it is shown that these voting systems violate the mono-raise criterion. Suppose a president were being elected among three candidates, a left, a right, and a center candidate, and 100 votes cast. The number of votes for an absolute majority is therefore 51.

Suppose the votes are cast as follows:

Number of votes

1st preference

2nd preference

28

Right

Center

5

Right

Left

30

Left

Center

5

Left

Right

16

Center

Left

16

Center

Right

According to the 1st preferences, Left finishes first with 35 votes, Right gets 33 votes, and Center 32 votes, thus all candidates lack an absolute majority of first preferences. In an actual runoff between the top two candidates, Left would win against Right with 30+5+16=51 votes. The same happens (in this example) under IRV, Center gets eliminated, and Left wins against Right with 51 to 49 votes.

[STEVE’S Additions:

S: Given these preferences, the Center candidate rather than the Right candidate should get eliminated because he receives fewer 1st preference votes.  Still, the principle of one-citizen-one-vote requires that the preference of each of these supporter be counted until a majority winner is discovered.  Since 16 of them preferred the Left candidate next and 16 preferred the Right candidate next, the Left candidate receive a total of 51 votes and the Right candidate 49.  Given both that only one candidate can win in this election and the principle of one-citizen-one-vote, no citizen would be able to sustain an objection to this result.

Author’s

1st IRV

COUNT

Left

Center

Right

1

35

32

33

2

51

 

49

Wiki: But if at least two of the five voters who ranked Right first, and Left second, would raise Left, and vote 1st Left, 2nd Right; then Left would be defeated by these votes in favor of Center. Let's assume that two voters change their preferences in that way, which changes two rows of the table:

Number of votes

1st preference

2nd preference

3

Right

Left

7

Left

Right

Now Left gets 37 first preferences, Right only 31 first preferences, and Center still 32 first preferences, and there is again no candidate with an absolute majority of first preferences. But now Right gets eliminated, and Center remains in round 2 of IRV (or the actual runoff in the Two-round system). And Center beats its opponent Left with a remarkable majority of 60 to 40 votes.

1-[STEVE’S IRV exploration:

Wiki’s changed preferences (2nd Set of Ballots)

Number of votes

1st preference

2nd preference

28

Right

Center

3

Right

Left

2

Left

Right

30

Left

Center

5

Left

Right

16

Center

Left

16

Center

Right

 

2nd IRV

COUNT

Left

Center

Right

1

37

32

31

2

40

60

0

3

 

60

 

S: These 28 make the Center candidate’s total of 60 (and the winner) while the 2 make the total of the Left candidate 40.  While it is true that this change in preferences changes the win for the Left candidate to a defeat, they still helped the Left candidate both by increasing the number of first preferences he received and the average intensity of preference given to him.  At the same time, he could not expect to win because he had received only a total of 40 to the total of 60 votes received by the Center candidate.

Consequently, currently I do not yet see this example as containing any anti-democratic element. As I see it, the principle of ‘one-citizen-one vote’ only requires that each citizen’s vote (preferences) be counted equally as long as technically possible until the single-winner is discovered, i.e. the candidate who has received the highest intensity possible of majority support.  Accordingly, before the 2 preferences were changed by Wiki, the Left candidate won with 51 votes with an average intensity of 9.76 on a scale of 10.  After the change, the Center candidate won with 60 votes with an average intensity of 9.53. 

Intensity of support calculations:

1st Set of Ballots

35X10 +16X9=350+144=494

494 divided by 51=9.76

2nd Set of Ballots

32X10 +28X9=320+252=572

572 divided by 60=9.53

In contrast, the intensity of support for a forced win by the Center candidate from the 1st Set of Ballots would only be 9.36:

32 X 1st preferences and 58 X 2nd preferences for the Center candidate:

32X10+58X9=320+522=842

842 divided by 90= 9.36

S: Again, using IRV, the originally winning Left candidate was defeated after the author changed the two voters’ preferences.  This happened even though the Left candidate was now given two 1st, rather than two 2nd, preferences.  Wiki sees this as a violation of the ‘mono-raise criterion’: ‘giving higher preferences to a candidate should never harm him’.  However, at least in some senses, these two higher preferences did help the Left candidate, i.e. they gave him two more 1st preferences. They also helped him by reducing the intensity of 2 preferences given to one of his competitors, i.e. by giving the Right candidate two 2nd rather than two 1st preferences.  By themselves, these changes would make it more likely that the Left candidate would win.  It is only because more other citizens gave their 1st preference to the Center candidate over the Right candidate that the Right candidate correctly had to be eliminated in the second count.  In turn, this appropriately required candidate Right’s 2nd preferences to be transferred:  28 to the Center candidate and 3 to the Center candidate.  Given these two change made by these two citizens, the particular preferences given by the other voters required that the Left candidate not be elected.  Consequently, it was not the isolated giving of two higher preferences to the Left candidate that ‘harmed’ him.  It was how these preferences had to be combined with the preferences of all the other citizens that required the Left candidate to be defeated.  This follows from the principle of one-citizen-one-vote.  Again, given both this principle and the fact that only one candidate can win in this election, no one would seem to be able to sustain an objection to this result.

S: Nevertheless, Wiki claims that IRV is not monotonic (i.e. violates the mono-raise criterion).  Does Wiki have Woodall’s definition of a mono-raise random criterion (see below) in mind [Douglas R. Woodall Discrete Applied Mathematics 77 (1997) 81-98]?

In the light of the above discussion and the following definitions, I would very much appreciate it if anyone could explain why they might still want to criticize IRV for being nonmonotonic.  Is IRV fully democratic in the sense defined above?

Section 1.3 in Woodall’s article defines how a nonmotonic set of rules might ‘harm’ or ‘help’ candidate x:  ‘We shall say a candidate x is either helped or harmed by a change in the profile if the result, respectively, is to increase or decrease [the probability of electing x, i.e] PE(x). The following two properties are well known to hold for STV [which reduces to IRV in a single-winner raced].

  • Later-no-help:  Adding a later preference to a ballot should not help any candidate already listed.

  • Latter-no-harm:  Adding a later preference to a ballot should not harm any candidate already listed.’

Next, Woodall goes on to define nine different ‘versions of monotonicity.  The basic theme is that a candidate x should not be harmed by a change in the profile that appears to give more support to candidate x.

Monotonicity:

1-(mono-raise) x is raised on some ballots without changing the orders of other candidates;

2-(mono-raise delete) x is raised on some ballots and all the candidates now below x on those ballots are deleted from them;

3-(mono-raise random) x is raised on some ballots and the positions now below x are filled (or left empty) in any way that results in a valid ballot;

4-(mono-append) x is added to the end of some ballots that did not previously contain x;

5-(mono-sub-plump) some ballots without x are replace by ballots with x placed top and with no second choice;

6-(mono-sub-top) some ballots that do not have x placed top are replaced with ballots that do place x top (and are otherwise arbitrary);

7-(mono-add-plump) further ballots are added that place x top and with no second choices;

8-(mono-sub-top) further ballots are added that place x top (and are otherwise arbitrary);

9-(mono-remove-bottom) some ballots are removed, all of which have x at bottom, below all other candidate.’

I look forward to any of your replies.

Steve

 


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Ralph Suter | 18 Jun 22:05 2016
Picon

Re: French Region uses Condorcet Voting

I wish the focus of this list was broader than just elections.

Condorcet and other kinds of alternative voting methods could also be 
used in legislative bodies and organizations as well as informal groups 
to decide among three or more alternative proposals, making it possible 
to avoid or bypass the kinds of parliamentary and informal voting rules 
that now prevent consideration more than two alternatives at a time.

Furthermore, as the use of alternative methods in non-election 
situations became more frequent and (I hope) more popular, it would 
become much easier to advocate their use for elections, since far more 
people would have become familiar with them and comfortable using them.

-Ralph Suter
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Markus Schulze | 17 Jun 22:40 2016
Picon

French Region uses Condorcet Voting

Hallo,

on 1 January 2016, the French regions Midi-Pyrenees
and Languedoc-Roussillon have been united to form
a new region. Between 9 May and 10 June 2016, there
was a referendum on the new name for this region.
The voters could choose between five alternatives:

* Languedoc
* Languedoc-Pyrenees
* Occitanie
* Occitanie-Pays Catalan
* Pyrenees-Mediterranee

The voters could rank these alternatives in order of
preference. And Condorcet voting was used to determine
the winner.

Here is the final result:

    There have been 203,993 valid ballots.

    Occitanie : Occitanie-Pays Catalan = 75% : 25%
    Occitanie : Languedoc = 69% : 31%
    Occitanie : Pyrenees-Mediterranee = 62% : 38%
    Occitanie : Languedoc-Pyrenees = 58% : 42%
    Languedoc : Occitanie-Pays Catalan = 50% : 50%
    Languedoc-Pyrenees : Languedoc = 71% : 29%
    Languedoc-Pyrenees : Occitanie-Pays Catalan = 64% : 36%
    Languedoc-Pyrenees : Pyrenees-Mediterranee = 57% : 43%
    Pyrenees-Mediterranee : Languedoc = 60% : 40%
    Pyrenees-Mediterranee : Occitanie-Pays Catalan = 59% : 41%

    Therefore, Occitanie is a Condorcet winner.

To the best of my knowledge, this was the largest
Condorcet poll ever.

Markus Schulze

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Jameson Quinn | 9 Jun 18:17 2016
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Gravatar

Panelists for KC, MO, ca. Aug 17-21?

I will be attending MidAmeriCon II, the World Science Fiction Society's "Worldcon" in Kansas City, Missouri, from August 17-21, in order to help explain various proposals that have been put forward to fix the nomination system for the Hugo awards to deal with the "rabid puppy" situation (a group of strategic voters who have gained disproportionate representation among the finalists for the last two years; google it for more info). I have been offered time for a panel discussion on the future of democracy, elections, and voting. Does anybody on these lists know anyone besides me who would be good for such a panel? Anybody who's interested in these issues, whether it's voting rights, abstract election systems, voting technology, moderation or reputation systems in social networks, or anything related, would be great. A certain amount of disagreement makes for a more interesting panel, so I'm not looking for conformity and I'd love people with less of a focus on abstract voting theory. Any suggestions welcome; I'd be happy to do the follow-up myself.
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Peter Zbornik | 1 Jun 18:53 2016
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Gravatar

Implementation of STV with same/duplicate/tied preference/ranking?

Dear all,

do any one of you know of any implemenation or software package, which deals with tied/same preferences, i.e. a ballot where two candidates have the same preference.

Example: Candidates A, B, C, D, E
Ballots:
1: A=B>C>D>E
1: A>B>C>D>E
1: A>B=C=D>E

The first and the last ballots give the same preference to two candidates.

In "standard" STV, where we only follow the number of "first" preferences. after "deleting" elected and eliminated candidates from the ballot, the same preference can be resolved during the count by
a) splitting the tied first preferences into n ballots, each with weight 1/n, where n is the number of candidates which at the current stage in the count are all most prefered on the ballot. Each of these ballots will have a different candidate most preferred and the rest with tied second preference.

Example: let's return to the example above. We elect two seats: at this point in the count A is elected, none is eliminated. On the last ballot of the three ballots above thus B, C and D are tied and all most preferred. 
We thus split the ballot into n=3 ballot, each with weight 1/3 of the original weight, with a different candidate most preferred and the rest tied:
Thus the ballot 1: A>B=C=D>E, is at this point in the count, after the election of A, treated as three ballots:
1/3 B>C=D>E
1/3 C>B=D>E
1/3 D>B=C>E
Thus we resolve the tie by simply adding 1/3 of the to the (currently) "first" preferences of B, C and D in the count.

This is the only computationally efficient way to resolve ties in STV as far as i know.

Does anyone of you know of any implementation of the algoritm above?
It seems to be a useful feature, when the voter does not want to be forced to prefer one candidate over another.

I discussed this issue on the EM list several years ago. 
No implementation was then available, so I give this a try now again.

Best regards

Peter Zbornik
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steve bosworth | 31 May 01:32 2016
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Re: (28): Steve's 28th dialogue with Richard

 

   1. Re: (28): Presidential Election:  Steve's 28th dialogue with Richard

      Fobes (VoteFair)

 

Richar wrote:

[….]

If I should find time to do any writing about election-method reform,

I'll use that time to write an article about what's going on in the U.S.

Presidential elections ….

This would be a great time to write about the link between single-mark

ballots and the crazy Presidential primary results, and the need for

better ballots and better vote-counting methods….

Richard Fobes

+++++++++++++++++++++++++

Hi Richard,

In your last reply, you again express your interest in writing an article on ‘the need for better ballots and better vote-counting methods’ for electing the President.  Perhaps your article would start with the suggestions you offer in Chapter 10 (‘Presidential Smokescreen…’) and in Chapter 11 (‘Get Real ….’) of your book (Ending the Hidden Unfairness …).  However, before discussing those more complex suggestions, I need some clarification of your related but simpler suggestions in Chapter 17 (‘What’s Up Gov…’)… for electing mayors and governors.

On page 5 (of Chapter 17), you say that ‘VoteFair popularity ranking identifies the most popular candidate’.  Please correct me if I am mistaken in saying the following:  By using VoteFair (i.e. Kenemy), this ‘most popular’ winner might not have been expressly preferred even by a plurality of all the voters.  This conclusion results from the example below in which 7 candidates are running for governor.

As a result of using IRV in this extreme example, candidate F is elected with a 61% majority and with an average intensity of preference of 9.62 out of 10.  In contrast, by counting the same 100 ballots using MAM (I assume the result would be the same using VoteFair), candidate E is elected with the explicit support of only 39% and with an average intensity of preference of 9.28.

If this is correct, your ‘most popular’ winner would have been explicitly support by only 39%.  Therefore, would it not be better to use a form of IRV?  Am I mistaken?

I hope you can find the time to respond.

Best regards,

Steve

Example:

100 citizens vote to elect one winner.  They rank the 7 candidates as follows:

IRV COUNT

100 CITIZENS RANK CANDIDATES EFGKMNP AS FOLLOWS:

38

23

25

9

5

F

G

E

M

K

 

F

 

N

P

 

 

 

E

E

 

 

COUNT USING IRV

FIRST

38

23

25

9

0

0

5

 

F

G

E

M

N

P

K

SECOND

38

23

25

9

0

5

ELIMINATE

THIRD

38

23

30

9

0

ELIMINATE

 

FOURTH

38

23

30

ELIMINATE

9

 

 

FIFTH

38

23

39

 

ELIMINATE

 

 

SIXTH

61

ELIMINATE

39

 

 

 

 

 

WINNER

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Using IRV, F wins with a 61% majority, and with a preference intensity of 9.62 out of 10.

Note:  Separately, I have already emailed to Richard a copy of the exact calculations which discovered E as the MAM winner having only 39% of the expressed preferences and having an average intensity of support of 9.28 out of 10.  These and other relevant passage are print in green within Appendix 4 (‘Comparing Rival System’) to my article: ‘Super Equality for Each Citizen’s Vote in the Legislature’.  I would be happy to send this appendix (and/or article) to anyone who requests this (stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com).

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On 2/19/2016 11:47 AM, steve bosworth wrote:

> [EM] (27) APR: Steve's 27th dialogue on NUTS with Richard Fobes

>>  Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 23:48:29 -0800

>>  From: ElectionMethods <at> VoteFair.org

>>  To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com

>>  CC: stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com

>>  Subject: Re: [EM] (26) APR: Steve's 26th dialogue with Richard Fobes


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