steve bosworth | 26 Jul 03:14 2015
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Steve's 2nd Real Democracy, APR and SPPA dialogue with Stephane

 

[EM] Steve's 2nd Real Democracy, APR and SPPA dialogue with Stephane

> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 20
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 19:56:12 -0700
>
> 2. Re: Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane
> Rouillon (St?phane Rouillon)
> [---]
> Message: 2
> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2015 22:55:59 -0400
> From: St?phane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon <at> sympatico.ca>
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane
> Rouillon
> Message-ID: <BLU436-SMTP140D793C8BDDBFDF1386B538F830 <at> phx.gbl>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"
>
> Stephane Rouillon (R) wrote:

>
> R: 1) The whole document is available from http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-1.php tohttp://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/pages199397/p199397-10.php
> You can copy (Ctrl-C) any of the 10 pages in a text document...
>
> 2) I will read your APR document as soon I find which software opens
> .odt document...
>

>>S: I have re-sent it using Rich Text (.rtf) format. I hope this will make it easier to read.


>Rouillon (R): For the moment I can only give some comments on your APR comparison. I
> am sorry if it sounds negative but it is not. I just want more details
> about the few differences between APR and SPPA:
>
> 3) Does APR "geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary
> organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups)" /that/ "will be
> officially recognized as electoral 'associations" prevent
> outsiders to infiltrate artificially an electoral 'associations? Like
> partisan of a mainstream idea that would decide to sink another debate
> using their strong majority...? Lets suppose that massive
> supporters of gay weddings want to dilute a more 50%-50% debate about
> adoption from homosexual parents (just an example). Would APR detect
> organized infiltration movements?
>
>>S: Firstly, for the primary, any voluntarily organization applying to become an 'association' could decide officially to exclude all citizens from becoming a part of its registered voters for general election purposes other than those conforming to any criteria it might publicly specify. These criteria would have to be specified within its application to the FEC and widely published before the relevant APR primary. Any citizens not conforming to these criteria could know in advance that they would not be accepted as registered voters in that 'association'.

If any such citizen ignored this bar to them and initially seemed to become a registered voter in the relevant association as a result of the way she ranked the organizations during the primary, she would later be excluded from this membership immediately upon the association discovering that she did not satisfy the criteria. At that point, she would, by default, become a registered voter within the geographically defined association within which she resides.


At the same time, each applicant organization would want to think very carefully before excluding anyone because it expects to have more voting power in the assembly in proportion to the number of citizen who help to elect its rep(s). Also, the more registered votes it gains, the more MPs it would be allowed to send to the assembly.


Finally, it seems to me that no rational citizen would choose to join an association she opposes when this means, as a result, she will not be able to join and support her most favored association during the primary an thus not be able to help it send more MPs to the assembly in this way.


>R: 4) What happens if a very low number of APR representatives controls a
> majority (more than 50%) of the parliament voices? Oligarchy?


> >S: My article stipulates that no MP would be allowed to retain more that 10% of the weighted votes in the assembly. Any extra votes received by a very popular MP would have to be non-returnably transferred to her trust colleagues.


> 5) SPPA garantees a stable bipartite coalition around the main political
> parties, despite balanced national split supports like 30%, 18%, 17%,
> 14%, 11% and 10%.
> In such a case, it would boost the main party to 50% and reduce the
> mandate to 3/7 of tis original length to ensure fairness. How does APR
> handle unstable splits?


>>S: Firstly, I have to admit that at least the 1st APR elected assembly could be even more 'split' than your above numbers suggest. However, because the ideology and policy agenda of each APR MP is likely to be much closer to her electorate, I think this also makes it more likely that each will be trusted, able, and motivated to negotiate any necessary compromises (even with her opposing MPs) to form and be an essential part of a working majority coalition. Separately, I will email to you (or anyone else) my reason for this expectation (see the attachment: 'Common Ground').


That attachment explains especially why an APR MP would have a strong incentive to negotiate to become an essential part of a working majority coalition so she can have at least some of her own policy aims passed into law. However, even these incentives by themselves do not guarantee that such a majority will always be formed. This is why I will also separately email to you a second attachment outlining some constitutional arrangements that some states already have and which rationally address the potential danger that a state might otherwise become paralyzed if its legislative assembly fails to form a working majority. The contingency plans contained in these constitutional arrangements also make it even more likely that such a majority will be formed. This is because they remove the option for any MP or group of MPs to hold the assembly or the state to ransom simply by refusing to cooperate with all other minorities of MPs (see attachment: 15-secure-executive. I will also email anyone else these attachments upon requests).
>
> 6) How do you organize fair debates when a voter can choose between a
> huge amount of candidates?


>>S: Firstly, ideally all candidates' campaigns should be basically facilitated by a public media provider like the BBC. Also, each campaign should be basically financed by the state in proportion to the numbers of registered voters each association has received as a result of APR's primary. Also, the amount of additional private funds each association and candidate can spend should be carefully limited by law.

Secondly, it must be recalled that the very basic information about every association would be made widely available to the public before APR's primary, as guaranteed by the central electoral commission. The basic information about each candidate in the country would be similarly published well before the general election.

Thirdly, each association would want to organize debates between all the candidates seeking to represent it. For example, the publicly controlled internet would be able to facilitate such debates between the candidates seeking to represent even a small and non-geographically defined association.

Also, coalitions of associations would coordinate their campaigns, both to present their common policies and to attack opposing coalitions or parties. Parties (together with any 'associations' that might be affiliated to them) would presumably campaign in a similar way.


>>S: I look forward to receiving your feedback.

Steve
>
> R: It might take some time before I comment: plenty of work...
> S. Rouillon
>

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steve bosworth | 22 Jul 01:53 2015
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Real Democracy (1): Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane Rouillon



 


> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 17
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Sun, 19 Jul 2015 12:01:59 -0700
> …..........................
> 1. Real Democracy (St?phane Rouillon)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Date: Sat, 18 Jul 2015 23:09:04 -0400
> From: St?phane Rouillon <stephane.rouillon <at> sympatico.ca>
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com

> Subject: [EM] Real Democracy (1):  Steve 1st dialogue with Stephane Rouillon


> Message-ID: <BLU437-SMTP1063BACDACEABF3872910208F860 <at> phx.gbl>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1"; Format="flowed"
>


Stephane Rouillon wrote:
>
>R: I do not know if you would find it real democracy, but SPPA is what I
> have to offer best...
> http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/1/9/9/3/9/p199397_index.html
> http://votebook.ca/pdf/SPPAforMPSA13042007.pdf
>
> Dr Rouillon.
>


>>Steve (S): I have studied your very useful but brief bullet-point-type-presentation of SPPA. Thank you. I hope you will send me more details, partly in response to my following points and suggestions.


Our aims and values seem to be almost identical. Therefore, if you have the time, I would appreciate it if you would study my article ('Equal Voting Sustained') to see whether or not Associational Proportional Representation (APR) might not serve your aims even more completely than your current version of SPPA. I will send you (or anyone else) this article separately upon request.


For example, with regard to your list of SPPA's benefits, APR would seem to compare as follows:


  • still needs only one visit to the polling station: Yes.

  • maintains the accountability link with elected members: Yes.

  • gathers sincere preferences: Yes.

  • allows ordering of the issues by the electorate: APR allows this to some extent during its 'primary election' which determines which geographically or non-geographically defined voluntary organizations (e.g. political parties, interest groups) will be officially recognized as electoral 'associations'. At the same time, each citizen chooses through which one she will rank as few or as many candidates in the whole country as she might wish during the later general election.

  • reduces the antagonism between candidates: APR candidates would have every incentive both to be very clear and exact about her own scale of values and policy proposals, and to negotiate, even with opponents, any compromises necessary, to achieve agreements (e.g. to help form a majority coalition) to legislate at least some of her policy goals.

  • vanishes vote splitting issues: APR give no incentive (or possibility) to split votes.

  • raises the individual approbation rate of elected members: Each APR rep will have a 'weighted vote' in the legislative assembly exactly equal to the number of citizens who have helped her to be elected – no vote is wasted and continues into the assembly.

  • treats all candidates equally (independents included)! Completely! For example, 'independents' could either form an 'association' by themselves, or seek to represent any association's agenda that any of them might favor.

  • eliminates the democratic deficit: Completely!

  • treats all political parties equally (no quota): Completely!

  • gives to every voter the same weight: Completely!

  • elects party-line builder: Yes, if this refers to the building and sustaining of a working majority coalition (and also its government in a parliamentary system).

  • guarantees stable coalitions of two parties: see previous response.

  • guarantees twice the number of MPs in the worst case: No, APR guarantees only the exact proportional election of the pre-established number of MPs.

  • preserves learning [about] a small number of candidates to vote [for]: If she wishes, APR allows a citizen to vote for only one candidate in the country. Alternatively, she can rank as few or as many candidates in the whole country as she might wish.

  • reduces strategic nominations: Completely!

  • hinders bribing electorate [for]support: as much as possible.

  • avoids regional confrontation: APR provides alternatives to regional conflicts yet would allow any such conflicts to be represented, i.e. exactly in proportion to the number of citizens who care most about them.

  • eliminates gerrymandering: Completely!


To facilitate any of our future discussions, it might sometime be helpful if I could 'cut and paste' some of your words (like the above) to comment upon them. Thus, might it be possible for you separately to email me your relevant SPPA works in a suitable [?Word?] format so that I could do this?

I look forward to your feedback.




Steve






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steve bosworth | 21 Jul 20:46 2015
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Re: (4) Steve's 4th dialogue with Fred Gohlke


  > From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 18
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 12:01:42 -0700
>
> 1. Re: (2&3) Steve's 2nd and 3rd dialogue with Fred Gohlke
> (Fred Gohlke)
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 10:43:04 -0400
> From: Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] (2&3) Steve's 2nd and 3rd dialogue with Fred Gohlke
> Message-ID: <55AD08F8.8000300 <at> verizon.net>
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>
Fred wrote:
>
> F: Thank you for the description of the method you suggest. It seems
> straightforward.
>
> You asked what I think. I hope you find my comments thoughtful and
> worth your effort to consider.
>
> You presuppose a "Paper (or computer) ballot counting method". I take
> issue with that presupposition and will explain why later in the discussion.
>
>
> re: "Imagine that you are a citizen of this village and 15
> of your fellow citizens want to be elected."
>
> That's reasonable.
>
> What do I know about the people who seek public office? For any of them
> that I do not know personally, the only knowledge I have is the stand
> they profess and the fact that they seek public office. From that, I
> must try to figure out their suitability for election. Here are a
> couple of thoughts that come to mind:
>
> a) They see themselves as politicians. I share the public perception
> that politicians are deceitful individuals. Anyone who, of their own
> volition, casts themselves as a politician raises a question in my mind
> as to their integrity. That fact, by itself, does not close the door on
> them. It is simply one factor that must be considered.
>
> b) They see themselves as worthy of public office. That may be an
> indication that their ego exceeds their intellect. It raises the
> question of whether they have the humility to serve the public interest.
> Without humility, public servants will not learn from their peers.
>
> c) They are assertive. That's a double-edged sword: If their
> assertiveness is exercised in the public interest it will be a good
> thing. If it is exercised in pursuit of their personal advantage, it
> will be destructive.




>>S: Yes.
>
> re: "To discover which 7 of the 15 are to be elected, each
> candidate initially stands at a different place in the
> Village Hall surrounded by the citizens who most favor
> him or her."
>
> R: How are we to decide which is the best candidate? The description
> implies that citizens must make their decision based on where a
> candidate stands. How does the fact that a candidate takes a stance
> help me determine the candidate's character?




>>S: In the Village, you might already know a lot about the candidates. In APR for electing your nation's legislative assembly, you might already know a lot about some the candidates seeking to represent the 'associations' that you already have had many dealings even before APR's primary. However, all each citizen can and should do is also to spend as much additional time as they can to research the abilities, history, and scale of values of as many of all the candidates as they can so as to be able to rank as many as possible during the general election on the basis of evidence.
>
>F: It doesn't, and a candidate's character is infinitely more important
> than where he or she stands.
>
> Does the process you suggest expect citizens to take candidates'
> character on faith?




>>S: No




That is inadequate, as is demonstrated so clearly
> by the degradation of modern so-called democracies into oligarchies.
> [….]
> >
> I said I would have additional comments on a "Paper (or computer) ballot
> counting method". This, too, must be brief. I just want to point out
> that there are many ways for people to vote. Casting a ballot is the
> least democratic of them.


>>S: Please both explain what you see as the most democratic 'way' and try to give me your definition of 'democracy'.


>
>F: The way we currently elect politicians to public office is why modern
> governments are undemocratic. In the party-based political systems that
> dominate modern governments, the right to vote is not evidence of
> democracy, it shows that the people are subjects of the parties that
> decide the options available to the voters. This subjugates the people
> because:
>
> THOSE WHO CONTROL THE OPTIONS, CONTROL THE OUTCOME!!!
>
> If we are ever to achieve democracy, we must devise a political process
> that lets the people select the candidates and choose the issues on
> which they must decide.




>>S: When you have the time, I hope you let me know the extent to which APR's concept of 'democracy' matches yours. So far, I see APR as an essential part of the 'political process
> that [would let] the people select the candidates and choose the issues on
> which they must decide.' It would maximally help to solve the problems you have mentioned.




I look forward to your feedback.




Steve
>
> Fred Gohlke


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steve bosworth | 17 Jul 23:47 2015
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Re: (2&3) Steve's 2nd and 3rd dialogue with Fred Gohlke

From: stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com
To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com; fredgohlke <at> verizon.net
Subject: RE: (2) Steve's 2nd dialogue with Fred Gohlke
Date: Fri, 17 Jul 2015 20:29:19 +0000

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> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 133, Issue 12
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> >
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> Message: 1
> Date: Thu, 16 Jul 2015 14:40:53 -0400
> From: Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Re: [EM] Alexander Praetorius, regarding Frome, U.K.
> Message-ID: <55A7FAB5.5060406 <at> verizon.net>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed
Hi Fred,
 
In your last paragraph in your most recent post, you write:
 
 
> It is unfortunate that the many bright and thoughtful people who post on
> this site do not think it worthwhile to help the Frome Town Council find
> a way for every member of the community to help decide which of their
> peers are the most attuned to the needs of the community and have the
> qualities required to advocate the common good.
>
> Fred Gohlke
 
>>S:  However, I would ask you to consider how the following solution, i.e. it is a:
 
'Paper (or computer) ballot counting method which is most simply illustrated by the face to face way the following imaginary village elects the 7 Members of its Village Council:

Imagine that you are a citizen of this village and 15 of your fellow citizens want to be elected. To discover which 7 of the 15 are to be elected, each candidate initially stands at a different place in the Village Hall surrounded by the citizens who most favor him or her. If more than 7 candidates have such supporters, the one with the fewest is eliminated. Each of his or her supporters now moves to stand by their 2nd choice candidates. This process continues until only 7 candidates remain. These 7 are elected.

Each of these 7 Members will have a ‘weighted vote’ in the Council equal to the number of citizens standing by them at the end of the count. No citizen’s vote is wasted. Each citizen’s vote will continue to count in every decision made by the Council. Each citizen has voted most positively. If you participated in this election, your concerns would be represented by the Member you trust most.2

Similarly with APR, each vote would continue to count quantitatively by being added to the weighted vote of the most favored representative each citizen had helped to elect, i.e. this weighted vote would be exactly equal to the number of electors who had rectly or indirectly ranked this representative'.


>>S:  This is introductory paragraph in the article which I offered to send you earlier.  However, perhaps I neglected to send you my 2nd post to you as I had intended.  This post would help you make sense of this proposal.  Consequently, I have taken the liberty of adding the contents of that 2nd post to this 3rd post.
 
I look forward to your replies.
 
Steve
2nd Post:

Thank you for your reply. I'll tag my responses with S:


F: re: "I would like to understand exactly what you mean by the difference
> between 'internal and external proportionality'."
>
> External proportionality is the relatively static division of political
> interests, as reflected by party representation in a legislature.
>
> Internal proportionality is the relatively dynamic division of political
> interests as reflected by the range of thoughts and feelings about the
> world around us that each of us carry within ourselves.

S: Using your definitions, I see each person's somewhat different 'internal proportionality' as what would guide each citizen as how to participate or not in electing a rep, e.g. to choose which candidate(s) to rank. This 'proportionality' is what I sometimes refer to as a person's 'scale of values'.
>
F: re: "I see the proportionality that could be guaranteed by APR (as
> mentioned) above my comments to James Gilmour) would offer what you seem
> to want: 'to choose representatives that represent the entire community'."
>
> Although I've seen your comments about APR, I have no deep understanding
> of the method. As far as I've been able to tell, it is a way to weigh
> votes for party candidates. However, that is not what I'm concerned
> about. I'm concerned about the way influence on the political process
> is distributed throughout the community. I, and many others like me,
> are not members of, and do not subscribe to the positions proclaimed by,
> any party. Can you tell me how much influence APR will give us on the
> choice of candidates for public office?

…............ how does APR let non-partisans seek out the members of the community best suited to lead it?


S: If APR already existed in your country, and you only wanted to rank (vote for) attractive candidates whose scale of values are closely matched with your own 'internal proportionality', you could do this without 'joining' any organization, face to face. You would do this as follows:

During APR's primary election you would rank (1,2,3, etc.) all the voluntary, social organizations that had applied directly to elect their own rep(s) during the next general election, i.e applied to the central electoral commission to become and official electoral 'association'. These organization would presumably not only include all the existing geographically defined associations (electoral districts) and political parties, but also a number of nongeographically defined organizations (e.g. interest groups: economic, religious, social, environmental, etc.)You would rank these according to the degree to which each organization seemed to mirror your own. In any case, you would, as a result, become a registered vote for general election purposes through the surviving organization (i.e. association) that you had ranked most highly. You would expect that the candidates who later would run to represent this organization would also have similar aims and concerns to your own, and that at least one of them would represent you very well in the legislative assembly.


For the general election itself, the central electoral commission would ensure that you would receive your official ballot at your most local polling station, i.e. even if your official association and ballot is different from the list of candidates for that local district. Each ballot paper originating from each association would also contain a Section B which would also allow a voter to rank as few or as many candidates seeking to represent associations other than the one in which she is registered. Consequently, you would rank as few or as many of the hundreds of candidate in the whole country during the general election as you might wish. As a result, you would be represented by the one elected candidate in the whole assembly you had ranked most highly. She would have a weighted vote in the assembly exactly equal to the number of citizens who had elected her. If none of the candidates you ranked received enough votes to be elected, APR's ballot allows you to require your first choice but eliminated candidate to transfer your vote to the weighted vote of the elected candidate she favors most, e.g. the elected candidate highest on her pre-declared list.


In this way, I see APR as offering you 'the means to seek out and elect
> those who have the particular blend of qualities needed to address and
> resolve the issues that are of current concern'.
>

What do you think?

I look forward to your feedback.

P.S. If you wish, ask Steve to email you a copy of his more systematic explanation of APR.


Steve

stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com



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Richard Fobes | 12 Jul 06:05 2015

Re: 19) APR: Steve's 19th dialogue with Richard Fobes

On 6/30/2015 7:39 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
 > ...
 >  >>>S: I accept that your method might mathematically at most provide
 > 'nearly full proportionality'. However, APR offers the advantage of
 > 'full proportionality'. Do you dispute this?

Yes I dispute this.  As I have said before (and I think someone else 
made a similar point), your APR method does not achieve full 
proportionality.  Specifically, with APR, not every voter is represented 
by hisher first choice.

No method can achieve 100% percent proportionality.  If you want to say 
that APR gets as close as is easily possible, then I'll agree with that 
on the condition that you also acknowledge that VoteFair ranking also 
can (if desired) achieve that same high level of proportionality.

 > ... APR also removes even the
 > small degree of gerrymandering that may continue with regard to the
 > establishment, for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
 > seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly. Do you agree?

No I do not agree.

I do agree that your APR method cannot be gerrymandered.  But that 
advantage occurs at the loss of demographic proportionality.

I don't understand what you are specifically saying above in the part of 
your sentence that says:

 > ... for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
 > seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly.

Regarding:

 >  >>>S: Perhaps you did not notice that Section A of each 'association's'
 > ballot would only list the candidates seeking to represent that 
association.

If plurality is replaced, lots and lots of citizens will want to jump 
into politics to fix what's wrong.  I don't see where the initial number 
of candidates will be anything but large.

 >  > R: Remember that debates between dozens of candidates become 
impractical.
 >
 >  >>>S: As with every electoral system, candidates will debate with
 > whichever other candidates they choose. APR has the advantage of
 > prompting citizens to observe, study, and rank as few or as many of all
 > the candidates running in the state or nation as they wish.

You seem to say, on the one hand, that APR imposes no limits on the 
number of candidates, yet on the other hand you say that comparing those 
many candidates will not be a problem.

How do you envision voters finding the time to compare even more 
candidates than currently?  Getting specific, the U.S. presidential 
election currently has more than 20 candidates.  In APR there is only 
one chance to rank candidates (because there is nothing like a primary 
election), so how do people choose which candidates to focus on learning 
more about in order to rank them?

 >  > I'll argue that VoteFair ranking greatly reduces the effectiveness of
 >  > campaign contributions compared to most other election methods.
 >
 >  >>>S: You have frequently asserted this but I have not yet seen that
 > you have 'argued' for this yet, especially in preference to APR.

What?  In multiple messages I have described multiple ways in which APR 
is vulnerable to manipulation through the use of money.

In addition, "Ending The Hidden Unfairness In U.S. Elections" explains 
in detail how money is currently used to influence election results, and 
your APR method is vulnerable to some of the same tactics, plus APR is 
vulnerable to new tactics that I have previously explained in earlier 
messages to you.

 >  >>>S: Equally, I do not yet see that you have addressed my following
 > claims in our 18^th dialogue:
 >
 >  >> Aside from these important relative weaknesses of VoteFair when 
compared
 >  > > to APR for electing an assembly, I see VoteFair's greater 
mathematical
 >  > > complexity, its remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral
 >  > > districts, and its still wasting some votes (for example by its
 > offering
 >  > > a more limited choice of candidates for electors) as seeming to 
make it
 >  > > less likely (and less worthy than APR) to replace the existing
 > system in
 >  > > California. More Californians would understand APR.

Repeating myself, yes more voters/citizens would understand APR's 
counting method.

Yet from a voter's perspective, marking ballots would be much simpler 
using VoteFair ranking.  Only the calculations done on a computer are 
"complex" in terms of VoteFair ranking not being simple to understand.

In contrast, figuring out how to mark an APR ballot is complex.  It is 
APR's counting method that is simpler.

Why do you regard "remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral 
districts" as a disadvantage?  The best defense against gerrymandering 
is to ensure that gerrymandering is not possible.

As for "[limiting the] choice of candidates for electors," the 
voters/electors are the ones who do that limiting in the primary 
election.  (In the primary election, VoteFair ranking does not need to 
impose any limit on the number of candidates.)

As for worthiness for use in California, you are the person who is 
promoting APR for use there.  VoteFair ranking would be a better choice. 
  Yet the reality is that election reform in California is a very long 
way into the future.

If I have missed answering any of your latest questions, please note 
that your non-standard way of marking your most recent 
comments/questions is difficult to follow (as someone else has also 
pointed out).

As you may have noticed, I haven't had lots of time lately.  (I'm 
writing this in haste.)  Yet if you do have specific questions, and they 
are not repeats of questions I've already answered, please do ask.

Thank you for taking the time to better understand election-method 
complexities.

Richard Fobes

On 6/30/2015 7:39 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
> (19) APR: Steve's 19th dialogue with Richard Fobes
>
>  > Date: Thu, 25 Jun 2015 15:21:19 -0700
>  > From: ElectionMethods <at> VoteFair.org
>  > To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
>  > CC: stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com
>  > Subject: Re: (18) APR: Steve's 18th dialogue with Richard Fobes
>  >
>  > On 6/15/2015 1:56 PM, steve bosworth wrote:
>
>
>  > > Yes, as a result of reading your book ("Ending The Hidden
> Unfairness…”),
>  > > I think I do understand how both VoteFair popularity and representation
>  > > rankings could work. [...]
>  > > However, I still see it as offering less proportionality and
>  > > representativeness than APR for electing a legislative assembly. In
>  > > fact, you seem to acknowledge this APR advantage below:
>  > >
>  > > You explicitly say that you do not “dispute” the fact that “these
>  > > VoteFair-based linkages between a specific ballot and a specific
>  > >representative are not as obvious as … in your APR method”.
>  > >
>  > > “I do not dispute your claim that your APR method has the advantage
> that
>  > > a voter can directly associate their vote with a particular elected
>  > > representative's voting influence. …
>  >
>  > R: My comments about your APR method being relatively easy to use, and
>  > relatively easy to understand, have nothing to do with degree of
>  > proportionality.
>  >
>  > You don't mention VoteFair partial proportional ranking, so please read
>  > or reread, the chapter titled "It's Party Time!" (in my book "Ending the
>  > Hidden Unfairness in U.S. Elections"). And note that this method can
>  > implement nearly full proportional ranking simply by increasing the
>  > number of "statewide seats."
>
>
>  >>>S: I accept that your method might mathematically at most provide
> 'nearly full proportionality'. However, APR offers the advantage of
> 'full proportionality'. Do you dispute this? APR also removes even the
> small degree of gerrymandering that may continue with regard to the
> establishment, for example, of any of your smaller than 'state wide
> seats' for electing California's Legislative Assembly. Do you agree?
>  >
>  > > ... I see VoteFair's ... remaining arbitrariness in determining its
>  > electoral districts ...
>  >
>  > R: The best election methods cannot be gerrymandered, which means that
>  > district boundaries can be adjusted in nearly any way
>
>
>  >>>S: This is one of the reasons I see APR as offering the 'best
> method'. It removes all the anti-democratic influence of gerrymandered
> boundaries, as well as any districts that have produced safe-seats by
> chance.
>
>  > [….]
>  > >S: ... still wasting some votes (for example by its offering
>  > > a more limited choice of candidates for electors)
>  >
>  > R: This is the flip side of your method's disadvantage that a ballot
> would
>  > list too many candidates.
>
>
>  >>>S: Perhaps you did not notice that Section A of each 'association's'
> ballot would only list the candidates seeking to represent that association.
>
>
>  > R: Remember that debates between dozens of candidates become impractical.
>
>
>  >>>S: As with every electoral system, candidates will debate with
> whichever other candidates they choose. APR has the advantage of
> prompting citizens to observe, study, and rank as few or as many of all
> the candidates running in the state or nation as they wish.
>  >
>  > > S: However, against this APR advantage you again claim that it is more
>  > > vulnerable to money corruption. Several times before you have suggested
>  > > that APR would be more vulnerable in this regard but I still have not
>  > > seen your exact reasons for believing this. Please try again to specify
>  > > the nature of the extra vulnerability you see APR having in this
> regard.
>  >
>  > R: Once again you claim that you do not understand how your APR
> method is
>  > vulnerable to strategies that involve money. Rather than repeating the
>  > reasons I've already explained, I'll explain yet another reason for its
>  > vulnerability.
>  >
>  > You seem to be assuming that an interest group can shift from [being] a
>  > nonpolitical organization to a political organization without
>  > corruption. The reality is that the moment an organization gains
>  > significant influence in politics, (outside) money is used to pay
>  > (inside) individuals to shift their opinions in ways that the financial
>  > contributors desire.
>  >
>  > As a simple example in the United States, the organization named the
>  > Sierra Club became so popular that it begin to have an influence on
>  > politics. As a result, money was used to entice top leaders to support
>  > positions that were not consistent with environmental protection, which
>  > was a core priority for most Sierra Club members.
>  >
>  > I suspect that Green parties in Europe have experienced something
>  > similar, namely a shift in priorities as a result of monetary influence.
>  >
>  > The point is that an organization that was previously trusted becomes at
>  > least partially corrupt when enough money is supplied to influence key
>  > members in the organization. Note that money will be supplied in
>  > proportion to the organization's influence on politics -- or more
>  > specifically in proportion to the effectiveness of those contributions.
>
>
>  > I'll argue that VoteFair ranking greatly reduces the effectiveness of
>  > campaign contributions compared to most other election methods.
>
>
>  >>>S: You have frequently asserted this but I have not yet seen that
> you have 'argued' for this yet, especially in preference to APR. Of
> course, I believe that every system (including APR) is somewhat
> vulnerable to the corruptions you mention. But you seem not yet to have
> explained why you think APR in more vulnerable than is your VoteFair
> ranking proposal. In this connection, neither have you as yet also
> explained why you doubt the validity of my explanation of how APR should
> be less vulnerable for the reasons given at the end of my contribution
> to 18^th dialogue, the contribution that ended with the following paragraph:
>
>  > > APR’s primary elections and associations should also help to reduce the
>  > > sometimes anti-democratic power of great wealth, celebrity, and the
> mass
>  > > media. I see this as likely given the extent to which APR’s
>  > > ‘associations’ would emerge from previously existing voluntary
>  > > organizations in society. These associations could benefit from the
>  > > loyalties among the population such organizations had enjoyed prior to
>  > > them being recognized as 'associations'. Presumably, many of these
>  > > organizations would already have some communication and mobilization
>  > > resources that are entirely independent of celebrity, the richest
>  > > sections of society, and the mass media. Thus, the adoption of APR
> would
>  > > probably help to reduce the relative power of these sometimes
>  > > anti-democratic forces in determining how people and their
>  > > representatives vote. APR’s official political recognition of these
>  > > voluntary organizations would seem to assist many citizens more firmly,
>  > > securely, and independently to see that their own abiding interests are
>  > > best promoted and protected through the associational and
>  > > representational connections validated by APR.
>
>  >>>S: Equally, I do not yet see that you have addressed my following
> claims in our 18^th dialogue:
>
>  >> Aside from these important relative weaknesses of VoteFair when compared
>  > > to APR for electing an assembly, I see VoteFair's greater mathematical
>  > > complexity, its remaining arbitrariness in determining its electoral
>  > > districts, and its still wasting some votes (for example by its
> offering
>  > > a more limited choice of candidates for electors) as seeming to make it
>  > > less likely (and less worthy than APR) to replace the existing
> system in
>  > > California. More Californians would understand APR.
>  > >
>  >
>  > R: I think these are the main answers to your latest questions.
>  >
>  > If you should want further details about how (the full system of)
>  > VoteFair ranking achieves proportional results, please ask.
>  >
>  > I continue to appreciate your progress in better understanding
>  > election-method complexities.
>  >
>  > Richard
>

----
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Kristofer Munsterhjelm | 1 Jul 22:14 2015
Picon

Thresholded weighted multiwinner elections

I think I see why the cloning attack is possible in two-stage weighted 
voting. If I'm right, then it is possible to make voting methods that 
produce results that fit weighted voting better -- at least when the 
voters are honest. However, I'm not sure if it is possible at all if 
enough voters are strategic. It might turn out that the only way of 
making weighted voting work is through either varying the number of 
winners (like in party list) or by an unconventional (nondeterministic) 
voting system or the Asset version of this.

First, why the cloning attack is possible: when we use (call them semi-
majoritarian[1]) methods like IRV or Plurality, if candidates represent 
parties who can clone as many as they want, then I think the strategic 
equilibrium gives each party a number of seats equal to their number of 
Droop quotas. If we instead use an unweighted multiwinner method (STV, 
Schulze STV, etc), then the Droop proportionality criterion gives each 
party at least their Droop quotas' worth in seats without strategy.

Simply, when the number of winners is fixed, the semi-majoritarian 
methods have an implicit threshold of a Droop quota, and the unweighted 
multiwinner methods  have an explicit threshold of the same.

In that light, the cloning strategy in three-seat
	26: A1 > A2 > B > C > D
	26: A2 > A1 > C > B > D
	25: B > C > A1 > A2 > D
	10: C > B > A2 > A1 > D
	 5: D > A1 > A2 > B > C
works because the A-group has more than two Droop quotas (a Droop quota 
being 23 here).

Perhaps we'd want to have no threshold at all, something like minimax 
Approval where we want to find the outcome that satisfies the voter who 
likes it the least the most. But it'd seem unreasonable to elect {A1, B, 
C} in this extreme variant of the above:
	1000: A1 > A2 > B > C > D
	1000: A2 > A1 > C > B > D
	 500: B > C > A1 > A2 > D
	   2: C > B > A2 > A1 > D
	   1: D > A1 > A2 > B > C

and hence, that implies there should be some kind of threshold, but that 
it should be lower than a Droop quota[2]. A lower threshold would mean 
that the assembly would be more broad than deep: it would choose a 
compromise among popular candidates to make room for more specialized 
candidates.

For instance, in a two-seat election with an augmented LCR example like
	50: L > C > R > S
	40: R > C > L > S
	10: C > R > L > S
	20: S

the method could elect {LR} with a high threshold, but instead elect 
{CS} if the threshold were lower. In return, the candidate C would have 
a much greater weight in the latter case than either L or R would have 
in the former.

The next thing to do would be to find a proof of concept method that 
would have a tunable threshold just to show that it'x possible (at least 
under honesty). Here's one that reduces to Bucklin (if one picks a 50% 
threshold):

==

Let X be a set of winners and t a threshold (in number of voters). Then 
evaluate(X, t) is a function that works on the ballots and returns a 
list of numbers in sorted order from least to most. evaluate(Y, t) is 
"better" than evaluate(X, t) if the first number where the output from 
evaluate(Y, t) differs from evaluate(X, t) is one where evaluate(Y, t)'s 
number is greater than evaluate(X, t)'s. The best set is the one that is 
better than every other, and that set wins.

Evaluate itself just counts the ranks of the ballots (of the candidates 
in the set X), where first place is n, second place is n-1, all the way 
to nth place is 1 (and unranked is 0). It then sorts these and removes 
the t worst.

==

Here's the two-seat LCR example above with a Droop quota (40) and with a 
  threshold of 10. {LR} wins with a Droop quota and {CS} with the 
threshold of 10. To skip, just search for #. I have omitted other sets 
like CL, CR, LS, etc.

	evaluate({LR}, 40):
                 rank number:    4       3       2       1
                 50:             *L      C       R       S
                 40:             *R      C       L       S
                 10:             C       *R      L       S
                 20:             S

                 So we have 50 4s, 40 4s, 10 3s and 20 0s, or

                 20 0s, 10 3s, 90 4s

                 Threshold of 40 removes the 40 least, so the output is
                 80 4s.

         evaluate({CS}, 40):
                 rank number:    4       3       2       1
                 50:             L       *C      R       S
                 40:             R       *C      L       S
                 10:             *C       R      L       S
                 20:             *S

                 So we have 50 3s, 40 3s, 10 4s, 20 4s, or

                 90 3s, 30 4s

                 Threshold of 40 removes the 40 least, giving 50 3s and
                 30 4s.

         So here {LR} with 80 4s wins over {CS} with 50 3s and 30 4s.

With a threshold of 10:

         evaluate({LR}, 10):
                 As above, before truncating, we have 20 0s, 10 3s, 90 4s

                 But now we can only remove 10 worst. So the final
                 output is 10 0s, 10 3s, 90 4s

         evaluate({CS}, 10):
                 90 3s, 30 4s.

                 Removing 10 worst gives
                         80 3s, 30 4s.

         So now {CS} with 80 3s and 30 4s wins over {LR} with 10 0s
         first, because 3 is clearly greater than 0.

#

Hence it's possible to make something that has a tunable threshold under 
honesty.

But here's a problem. In the single-seat case, this behaves like Borda: 
it may violate the majority criterion to elect a candidate that has more 
second-place votes. That is, in something like
	55: A>B>C
	35: B>C>A
	10: C>B>A
Borda will elect B, and with a threshold of say, 10, so will the method 
above:
	evaluate({B}, 10) gives (truncated) 55 2s, 35 3s
	evaluate({A}, 10) gives (truncated) 35 1s, 55 3s
	evaluate({C}, 10) gives (truncated) 45 1s, 35 2s, 10 3s
All well and good. But for Borda, a strategic majority can force a 
winner by acting like an unreasonable group or an aggregate of different 
smaller groups so that the method considers the majority winner to be 
the broad-support candidate. The problem with this is that if that's a 
general property, then it might turn out that a Droop quota can force 
the election of a particular candidate in a weighted voting method with 
a lower threshold just by pretending to be very unreasonable or to be 
many different smaller groups.

It certainly is possible for the proof of concept method. For instance, 
the L-first voters can truncate after L, after which the outcome changes 
from {CS} to {LS}. Part of this, however, is due to that the method 
above passes LNHelp but not LNHarm (because it's Bucklinesque and 
because voters are assigned completely to their first preferences). If 
the strategy is particular to certain weighted voting/tunable threshold 
methods, then there's no problem. But if it's general (and it might 
intuitively be), that's another matter.

If it is general, I can think of three ways to keep weighted voting:
	1. Let the number of seats/winners be adjustable.
	2. Accept the Droop quota.
	3. Use a (randomized) consensus method.

Some combination of 1 and 3 might also be possible.

The first option is to let the number of winners be adjustable. The 
general idea would be to have the same threshold and if a party clones 
itself, it does get another winner - but the number of winners also 
increases so that there's no benefit. Or, conversely (if one accepts the 
Droop quota), a candidate who gets more than a Droop quota's worth 
removes as many seats as he has Droop quotas. E.g. in the clone example 
above, without cloning, the outcome would then be {A, B}, and with 
cloning, it would be {A1, A2, B}. Again, there's no benefit. Both of 
these make weighted voting more like party list PR.

The second option is to just accept the Droop quota and use a 
multiwinner method as basis. The cloning is still possible, but at least 
one gets more varied winners without cloning and there's no need to 
engage in strategic nomination. With IRV, a party could split itself too 
thin by overestimating its support, but that won't happen with say, STV. 
A party just has to field enough candidates (say enough to fill the 
council) and doesn't have to worry about fielding too many.

The third option is to use consensus. If it's an Asset variant, we could 
just "stick the candidates in a room and have them negotiate until they 
agree" with a supermajority, but there's an incentive for the status quo 
to block the consensus. That can be fixed with randomized consensus - 
some kind of variant of the methods Jobst and Forest Simmons have 
proposed[3]. Randomized consensus can be done either before the election 
(as a general method) or after (as a variant of Asset), but the former 
is much less likely to work.

Basically, these methods consist of every voter (candidates in case of 
Asset) voting for a consensus outcome as well as for a favorite outcome. 
If fewer voters than the threshold disagree about the consensus outcome, 
then it is picked, otherwise a random favorite outcome is picked. As 
random ballot is suboptimal but gives nobody an advantage, so everybody 
would want to find a consensus outcome to the extent they can work 
together to do so. The equivalent of a cloning attack would be for a 
majority candidate to stick to his guns and only propose a council 
consisting of his own party. But if he tries to block the consensus, 
then it falls through to random ballot which favors nobody and only 
degrades the quality of the solution.

Generalizing this to multiwinner might be trickier because we want 
something that with high probability returns a low-threshold assignment 
and that is strategically unbiased. The consensus ballot can simply be a 
set of winners. If fewer voters than the threshold disagree about the 
consensus, then it is picked. But the fallback is hard. If we just do 
"pick a winner from voters' first preferences at random, eliminate, 
repeat", then that favors Droop quota cloning because only one of the 
clones get eliminated at once. "Pick a proposed winner set at random" 
favors extreme outcomes. It would be fair, but have very high variance: 
one could end up with a council controlled completely by a single party, 
it's just which party would control it that would be random in a 
low-threshold unbiased manner.

---

[1] These are methods that never elect candidates with zero first 
preference votes and where giving someone more first preferences always 
helps. I think the observation above holds for all of these; it does at 
least seem to hold for Plurality and IRV.

[2] We could also argue that there should be a threshold less than a 
Droop quota by saying that if the threshold is a Droop quota, then 
(under strategy) the outcome for weighted voting and unweighted voting 
is the same, so why bother with weights? Thus the point of having a 
weight should be to make weighted voting be more representative with 
fewer seats than ordinary unweighted voting can be. If, on the other 
hand, a Droop quota is good enough (and we just want weighting to handle 
excess beyond the Droop quota), then we shouldn't use semi-majoritarian 
methods but instead unweighted multiwinner methods to decide upon the 
winners in the first stage.

[3] 
https://www.pik-potsdam.de/members/heitzig/presentation-slides/some-chance-for-consensus
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Fred Gohlke | 30 Jun 17:42 2015
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Re: (2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and Fred Gohlke

Good Morning, Alexander Praetorius

re: Becoming "Self Employed" is as easy as it was NEVER BEFORE.

That's interesting.  I've had four businesses during my lifetime.  I 
guess you could say starting them was not real difficult, but keeping 
them going was a challenge.  I lost that challenge the first two times I 
tried.  The third business was stable enough that I gave it to our 
oldest daughter when the demands of the fourth started to require my 
full attention.  It's still functioning.  I shut the fourth one down 
when I was forced out by one of the executives in my only client (i.e., 
one of my bosses).  Ah, well, by then it was time to retire, anyway 
(although I didn't think so at the time).

These businesses allowed me to maintain my independence, and, with the 
blessing of a wife who handled money much better than I - allowed me 
(us, actually) to provide for and raise a large family.  However, it 
wasn't without its problems.  I suppose I could list the difficulties, 
but that would be boring.

re: While self-reliance is possible as an employee, it's
     totally passive.  You do as you have been told.  You
     execute goals set by employers.

When you have a business, you do what your customers tell you to do.  In 
my business, when a customer told me he wanted a truck to pick up this 
afternoon and deliver Thursday, that's what I had to do,  My goal was 
execute my customer's goals.  I doubt that a restaurant is much 
different.  If a customer wants bacon and eggs, he probably won't accept 
pancakes.

re: You do not judge what you have been told to do, you
     execute and use your skills and knowledge to do so to
     the best of your ability and in return you get paid.

I think that's true - both of employees and small businesses.  There are 
differences between having a small business and working for someone. 
The biggest is the amount of risk you have to accept.  We should note 
that the more people who depend on you for their existence, the more 
difficult it is to put their welfare at risk.

re: With regard to your comments about the difference between
     employees and self-employed people shaping reality:

    "Employees do not participate in shaping the world around
     them based on their values/morals/philosophies/worldview/...

and

    "Self-Employed ... in the sense of being a small-scale
     entrepreneur amongst many many other entrepreneurs have
     to participate in shaping reality consciously.

These ideas are a bit expansive.  To the extent that I understand them, 
they do not square with my experience.  It's true that I met with many 
other people because of my business; my customers, their employees, my 
competitors and their employees, and a multitude of others ranging from 
waitresses to salesmen.  Our discussions were dominated by the business 
that brought us together.  Philosophy and morality might occasionally 
come up, but only as they affected some incident or aspect of our 
business.  The most common alternate topic was sports,  There was no 
discussion of democracy or politics.

The reason we didn't discuss democracy or politics is because we could 
do nothing about them.  We could not change anything.  Our time was too 
precious to waste discussing things we couldn't change.

While I don't think self-employed people are in any better position to 
influence the development of democracy than anyone else, there is 
extensive work being done, by scholars and others, in the use of 
collaboration to achieve democratic results.  Participedia 
(http://participedia.net), for example, is dedicated to strengthening 
democracy through shared knowledge and contains a multitude of examples 
of work being done around the world, by all kinds of people.

If we are ever to achieve the kind of collaborative discourse you 
envision, the very first and most important feature must be to provide a 
way for the discussions to bear fruit, to change things.  Absent that, 
it will never be anything but talk.

Do you have some experience in making this kind of thing work?  Can you 
explain the specifics?

Fred Gohlke
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⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 27 Jun 08:23 2015

[non-electoral mathematics] TauDay [/non-electoral mathematics]

	Email not displaying correctly? View it in your browser. (http://us1.campaign-archive1.com/?u=6bc9db65a2cad2f007429499c&id=0fb7cfe59c&e=2d6512672d)
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	**	State of the Tau 2015

	------------------------------------------------------------

	Note: This message can also be read online at the State of the Tau
(http://tauday.com/state-of-the-tau?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) .

	Happy Tau Day (http://tauday.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) 2015! Interest in the true
circle constant (τ = C/r = 6.283185…) and The Tau Manifesto
(http://tauday.com/tau-manifesto?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) continued unabated this
year, highlighted by a surge of attention on the “Pi [Half Tau] Day of the Century” (3/14/15). (Tau
will have its revenge on 6/28/31—party at my place!) As one of the leaders of the “opposition”, I was
invited to the Pi Day festivities at the Exploratorium
(http://www.exploratorium.edu/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) in San Francisco—the
organization that originally created Pi Day—but I was on vacation in Barcelona at the time and was
unable to attend. (I know, rough life!) That the invitation was proffered in the first place is an
excellent sign, though, as it serves as proof that even the Paladins of Pi recognize tau as a legitimate rival.

	Before getting to the full update, here are three quick announcements:

	*	If you’d like to celebrate Tau Day with me and some of my fellow tauists, RSVP for the First
International Virtual Tau Day Meetup
(http://taudaymeetup.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) , which starts at 11:00 a.m.
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	*	For this fifth anniversary of Tau Day, I’ve prepared ebook versions of The Tau Manifesto (EPUB, MOBI,
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available for only $9 at sales.tauday.com
(http://sales.tauday.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) .

	Here are some of the other highlights since last year’s Tau Day:

	*	I gave a well-received 15-minute talk at the BIL Conference
(http://youtu.be/2hhjsSN-AiU?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) (Los Angeles regional). BIL
(http://bilconference.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) was founded as a sort of
counter-conference
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to TED (https://www.ted.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) , and it was my pleasure to have the
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(http://youtu.be/H69YH5TnNXI?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) suitable for a general audience.
	*	Inspired by feedback from the BIL talk
(http://youtu.be/2hhjsSN-AiU?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) , I’ve updated The Tau
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	*	In case you missed it, tau/2 at Google
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3.14159… This got a big ovation at the BIL Conference talk
(http://youtu.be/2hhjsSN-AiU?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) !
	*	In advance of Half Tau Day, Taylor University hosted the Indiana Mathematical Association of America
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Check it out, and decide for yourself who makes the better argument!
	*	Robin Whitty continued to use tau freely in on his site Theorem of the Day
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that tau is now well-known enough among his readers that it doesn’t require additional explanation,
writing that “Four out of the last 10 theorems I’ve posted at theoremoftheday.org have featured tau
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	*	Joseph Thiebes has created some tau-inspired merchandise at Tau Stuff
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pendant designs.
	*	To improve his trigonometry course, mathematics teacher Phil Smith modified a couple of open-source
math textbooks to use tau, and has posted the results online at Tau for Trigonometry
(http://taufortrig.org/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) . Thanks, Phil!
	*	Jose Luis Garcia del Castillo from Fathom Information Design
(http://fathom.info/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) reports on the success of a second “tau
fiesta” called ¡FiesTau!
(http://fathom.info/latest/7850?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) , which involved the
“whole office playing Taupardy!, our own Jeopardy-inspired Tau quiz game written in Processing
(https://www.processing.org/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) [a programming language that
supports tau].” They’ve even released the source of Taupardy!
(https://github.com/garciadelcastillo/Taupardy?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) , so now
anyone can play! Fathom Information Design is also the maker of Peep in Tau
(http://fathom.info/tau?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID]) , an app that lets you search for a
number of your choice in the digits of tau.
	*	Joseph Lindenberg
(https://sites.google.com/site/taubeforeitwascool/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID])
shares an analogy he’s found useful in explaining tau to the uninitiated:

	Using tau instead of pi makes math clearer, and thus easier to understand.

	Using pi is like having a weird car whose odometer and speedometer display half-miles and
half-miles-per-hour, while all the road signs show miles and miles-per-hour.

	(The road signs of math are naturally in units of tau.)

	So you constantly have to convert between what your car says and what the road signs say. 55 mile-per-hour
speed limit? Make sure your speedometer needle doesn’t go over 110. But instead of nice round numbers
like 55, imagine the sign says 68.7 miles-per-hour. So your speedometer needle shouldn’t go above…
how much? Your trip odometer reads 35.7. So you’ve traveled… how many miles?

	Sometimes you must multiply by 2. Sometimes you must divide by 2. And before doing either, you must always
stop and decide which to do in this particular case. If you’re driving in heavy traffic, or bad weather,
or you’re lost, you don’t want that distraction. The same is true if you’re lost while trying to
learn trigonometry.

	Thanks for all the support! For me, that makes for a very happy Tau Day.

	Michael Hartl
	Founder, Tau Day (http://tauday.com/?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID])
	Author, The Tau Manifesto (http://tauday.com/tau-manifesto?mc_cid=0fb7cfe59c&mc_eid=[UNIQID])
	You are receiving this email because you read the Tau Manifesto and joined the mailing list.

	Our mailing address is:
	Michael Hartl
	556 S Fair Oaks Ave
	101-28
	Pasadena, CA 91105
	USA
	Copyright (C) 2015 Michael Hartl All rights reserved.
	Email Marketing Powered by MailChimp
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steve bosworth | 26 Jun 22:42 2015
Picon

: UK 'post mortem', Steve's 1st dialogue with Alexander Praetorius


 
> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 132, Issue 19
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 12:01:41 -0700
> 1. Re: (2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and
> Fred Gohlke (Alexander Praetorius)
>
>
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
Hi Alexander Praetorius citizen <at> serapath.de,
 
As requested, attached is my article,
 
Please feel free to ask questions, criticize, offer suggestions, etc.  Also, feel free also to ask me to also send you the illustrative missing items in the Appendix:  2 flow charts and 3 tables.
Steve
Re: > Message: 1
> Date: Fri, 26 Jun 2015 17:43:57 +0200
> From: Alexander Praetorius <citizen <at> serapath.de>
> To: Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>
> Cc: Election Methods <election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com>
> Subject: Re: [EM] (2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve Alexander Praetorius
> and Fred Gohlke
> Message-ID:
> <CADPDqjE=BVtoyXm6WJqoJGeUcz_niFPZk85VYTBjFc6G9XG5EQ <at> mail.gmail.com>
> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8"
>
> Help people to become self employed (sole proprietors or owners of 1-person
> limited liability company)
> Thats where democracy starts.
>
> What are we mumbeling about democracy when 40+ hours every week - people go
> to work and do what they are told to do.
> They have to start co-deciding with the people they meet every day and
> about the way they want to do business.
>
> A "Ltd." can be founded and maintained these days for as cheap as 30 GBP a
> month flat price... this is something everyone can afford and it can be
> managed online.
> At the click of a button, people could "invite" others to collaborate (thus
> join their business) ... Everyone can have a personal "HOLDING Ltd." which
> ones 0+ other Ltd. for all the entrepreneurial projects they are engaging
> in. This kind of culture has to happen and.... THE TIME IS NOW :-) The
> "self employed sector" is growing like never before - and if you already
> have to create:
> "Model Article Of Association" (which can be enforced by an APP), then this
> is how people can start to practice democracy in every day life.
>
> Only if they do that, they will discover and want more influence in all
> kinds of aspects of their lives.... if they do not make that step, they
> will stay wage slaves forever...
> >
> On Fri, Jun 26, 2015 at 4:42 PM, Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net> wrote:
>
> > Good Morning, Steve
> >
> > This will be a slow process. Empowering the people is not a trivial
> > issue. It has many facets.
> >
> >
> > re: I see each person's somewhat different 'internal
> > proportionality' as what would guide each citizen
> > as how to participate or not ...
> >
> > I agree, particularly with regard to "each citizen". A democratic process
> > is (or, rather, should be) bottom-up. It must be inclusive but it cannot
> > be coercive. Each of us must be allowed to participate in the political
> > process to the full extent of our desire and ability. In the U. S., the
> > people have been excluded from the political process for so long that many
> > of them have been schooled in the art of disinterest. Such people will not
> > trust an inclusive process until they have seen it work.
> >
> > When we devise an inclusive democratic process, some people will
> > participate, others will learn to participate, and some will never
> > participate. From the point of view of the community, those who will not
> > participate in its government add no value to the political process.
> > However, all the rest do, so the first step in devising an inclusive
> > process must be to distinguish between the two types of citizens. It has
> > been shown, by Archon Fung of Harvard and many others, that, when people
> > who want to participate in the political process, deliberate on the issues
> > that concern the community, their efforts can be productive.
> >
> >
> > re: ... in electing a rep, e.g. to choose which candidate(s)
> > to rank.
> >
> > This raises the most important question in politics: Who names the
> > candidates? I see you mentioned this issue, as follows:
> >
> >
> > re: During APR's primary election you would rank (1,2,3, etc.)
> > all the voluntary, social organizations that had applied
> > directly to elect their own rep(s) during the next general
> > election, i.e applied to the central electoral commission to
> > become and official electoral 'association' ... You would
> > rank these according to the degree to which each organization
> > seemed to mirror your own.
> >
> > How would I know, with any degree of certainty, the aims of the
> > organizations? Is AARP an organization to help retired people or a
> > marketing enterprise? Is it reasonable to think the lay citizen will do
> > the exhaustive research necessary to rank the multitude of organizations
> > seeking to increase their power and influence by placing an advocate in the
> > government?
>>>S:   I do not think 'certainty' on such matters can be expected.  Each person can only do all they can to find out and judge which organizations and candidates are most likely to represent him or her for each primary election and general election.
> >
> > You mentioned sending me a more complete explanation of APR. I'd like to
> > see the explanation of the groundwork.
 
>>>S:  Yes find my article attached, Alexander Praetorius.
 
>  I don't think it's difficult to
> > arrange for the people to decide who they want to represent them in their
> > government and I'm anxious to see your approach. I may offer a
> > counter-suggestion
>>>S:  Yes, pleas do.
>as a step in the slow process of re-thinking our
> > political infrastructure.
 
> End of Election-Methods Digest, Vol 132, Issue 19
> *************************************************
Attachment (15-June-EqualVotingSustained.odt): application/octet-stream, 55 KiB
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Kristofer Munsterhjelm | 24 Jun 15:52 2015
Picon

SNTV-like reduction for weighted majoritarian voting

While writing my reply to Steve Bosworth, I think I found a problem with 
some types of weighted voting.

Let's consider a very general setup for weighted voting, consisting of 
two stages. In the first stage, one uses some kind of election method to 
reduce the field of C candidates into one of W winners, W <= C. In the 
second stage, one assigns voters to the winners to give the winners 
different weight (proportional to the number of voters assigned to them).

When we split the weighted voting process in two like this, it's 
possible to use a whole bunch of different election methods for the 
first stage. The APR proposal uses IRV, for instance. Similarly, it's 
possible to use a bunch of different assignment methods for the second 
stage: the simplest and most obvious one is to assign each voter to the 
winner he voted first (or gave highest rating, if it's a rated method).

But if the first stage is to use a majoritarian method (i.e. a method 
ordinarily used to find a single winner or social ordering), and that 
method is cloneproof, then we might get a strategy that (unless I'm 
wrong) severely compromises the weighted aspect.

If there are W winners and W is fixed, then any majority party has an 
incentive to field a certain number of clones to crowd out the others. 
For instance, say the initial election is something like:

52: A > B > C
25: B > C > A
-----
10: C > B > A

with two winners. A and B win, so A gets a weight of 52/87 and B gets a 
weight of 35/87.

Then A has an incentive to clone itself into A1 and A2 and tell its 
supporters to split, voting for these evenly:

26: A1 > A2 > B > C
26: A2 > A1 > B > C
------
25: B > C > A2 > A1
10: C > B > A2 > A1

Now B has been pushed off, and A has gone from controlling 60% to 
controlling 100%. In a council with a majority vote, that makes no 
difference since 60% is enough, but hopefully it should be clear how the 
strategy can be generalized.

Each party faces pressure in two directions. If there was a three-seat 
election like

52: A > B > C > D
25: B > C > D > A
10: C > B > A > D
  5: D > A > B > C

Then B would face pressure from C and D which it could alleviate by 
cloning; but doing so would permit A to clone even more widely in turn 
and perhaps push many of B's clones off. If I am correct, the 
equilibrium turns out to be an SNTV-like strategy, which in essence 
reduces the system to party list proportional representation.

An intuitive way of considering this is: if a party can split itself 
into k parts without any part having less support than the winner with 
the least support, then it is to that party's benefit to do so; doing so 
will push someone who's not of that party out of the winning group. A 
party's weight can be used no matter whether it's distributed or 
concentrated as long as the party leadership controls all the 
candidates. Furthermore, this could be used to avoid upper thresholds 
like the Asset limit in APR: a party simply fields enough candidates 
that no single candidate exceeds the upper threshold.

So, again unless I'm wrong, majoritarian systems do not seem to be 
suitable as the first stage of a weighted voting process, because they 
would give unfair benefit to organized groups of candidates who could 
coordinate and clone as shown above.

-

This problem doesn't occur in party list PR itself because the number of 
parties is not fixed beforehand. So if you start with (Plurality for the 
sake of simplicity)

52: A
25: B
10: C

with 10 seats using Webster/Sainte-Lague, the share is

A: 6, B: 3, C: 1

If A tries to clone:

26: A1
26: A2
25: B
10: C

A1: 3, A2: 3, B: 3, C: 1

to no benefit.

However, trying to run party list PR with majoritarian systems like 
Condorcet doesn't work very well, at least not with the allocation 
mechanism given above[1]. Since the majoritarian systems can put 
candidates with no FPP votes first in their social ranking, you end up 
with the weird result that the candidate that the election method 
unambiguously considers the best corresponds to a party that, according 
to the allocation method, has no voters associated with it and should 
thus have no seats.

I think I have found some Condorcet-like methods that handle weighted 
voting and party list PR, and I may write about them later. The 
exhaustive versions of the methods have exponential runtime in the 
number of parties, but (thankfully) not in the number of seats.

-

[1] I suspect that the reason Plurality works for party list is closely 
related to the reason that it's not a good single-winner method. A 
single-winner method gives a social ordering that places the candidate 
that would be best when you *have* to pick only one (according to its 
logic), then the one that would be second best, and so on. That's why 
cloning the winner (if the method is cloneproof) has all the clones of 
the original winner appearing after the winner: if the original winner 
would not be able to stand, the clone is the next best. But for party 
list PR, you'd want a group representing many opinions, not just copies 
of the best compromise. If that reasoning is right, then a proportional 
ranking method would fit much better, and that's sort of what one of the 
Condorcet-like methods become.
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steve bosworth | 24 Jun 06:54 2015
Picon

(2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and Fred Gohlke

 


(2): UK 'post mortem', 2nd discussion between Steve and Fred Gohlke



> From: election-methods-request <at> lists.electorama.com
> Subject: Election-Methods Digest, Vol 132, Issue 14
> To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
> Date: Mon, 22 Jun 2015 12:01:57 -0700
>
…......................................


Hi Fred,


Thank you for your reply. I'll tag my responses with S:


F: re: "I would like to understand exactly what you mean by the difference
> between 'internal and external proportionality'."
>
> External proportionality is the relatively static division of political
> interests, as reflected by party representation in a legislature.
>
> Internal proportionality is the relatively dynamic division of political
> interests as reflected by the range of thoughts and feelings about the
> world around us that each of us carry within ourselves.

S: Using your definitions, I see each person's somewhat different 'internal proportionality' as what would guide each citizen as how to participate or not in electing a rep, e.g. to choose which candidate(s) to rank. This 'proportionality' is what I sometimes refer to as a person's 'scale of values'.
>
F: re: "I see the proportionality that could be guaranteed by APR (as
> mentioned) above my comments to James Gilmour) would offer what you seem
> to want: 'to choose representatives that represent the entire community'."
>
> Although I've seen your comments about APR, I have no deep understanding
> of the method. As far as I've been able to tell, it is a way to weigh
> votes for party candidates. However, that is not what I'm concerned
> about. I'm concerned about the way influence on the political process
> is distributed throughout the community. I, and many others like me,
> are not members of, and do not subscribe to the positions proclaimed by,
> any party. Can you tell me how much influence APR will give us on the
> choice of candidates for public office?

…............ how does APR let non-partisans seek out the members of the community best suited to lead it?


S: If APR already existed in your country, and you only wanted to rank (vote for) attractive candidates whose scale of values are closely matched with your own 'internal proportionality', you could do this without 'joining' any organization, face to face. You would do this as follows:

During APR's primary election you would rank (1,2,3, etc.) all the voluntary, social organizations that had applied directly to elect their own rep(s) during the next general election, i.e applied to the central electoral commission to become and official electoral 'association'. These organization would presumably not only include all the existing geographically defined associations (electoral districts) and political parties, but also a number of nongeographically defined organizations (e.g. interest groups: economic, religious, social, environmental, etc.)You would rank these according to the degree to which each organization seemed to mirror your own. In any case, you would, as a result, become a registered vote for general election purposes through the surviving organization (i.e. association) that you had ranked most highly. You would expect that the candidates who later would run to represent this organization would also have similar aims and concerns to your own, and that at least one of them would represent you very well in the legislative assembly.


For the general election itself, the central electoral commission would ensure that you would receive your official ballot at your most local polling station, i.e. even if your official association and ballot is different from the list of candidates for that local district. Each ballot paper originating from each association would also contain a Section B which would also allow a voter to rank as few or as many candidates seeking to represent associations other than the one in which she is registered. Consequently, you would rank as few or as many of the hundreds of candidate in the whole country during the general election as you might wish. As a result, you would be represented by the one elected candidate in the whole assembly you had ranked most highly. She would have a weighted vote in the assembly exactly equal to the number of citizens who had elected her. If none of the candidates you ranked received enough votes to be elected, APR's ballot allows you to require your first choice but eliminated candidate to transfer your vote to the weighted vote of the elected candidate she favors most, e.g. the elected candidate highest on her pre-declared list.


In this way, I see APR as offering you 'the means to seek out and elect
> those who have the particular blend of qualities needed to address and
> resolve the issues that are of current concern'.
>

What do you think?

I look forward to your feedback.

P.S. If you wish, ask Steve to email you a copy of his more systematic explanation of APR.


Steve

stevebosworth <at> hotmail.com

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