Kristofer Munsterhjelm | 14 May 12:28 2016
Picon

Voting systems site proposed on StackExchange

I've been very busy lately, but I just thought I'd let the list know
about this:

https://area51.stackexchange.com/proposals/97790/voting-systems

It's a proposal to set up a voting systems section of
StackExchange/StackOverflow. It'd need more followers and questions to
be judged sufficiently relevant or popular, though.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 13 May 06:37 2016

Re: Two mathematicians propose new voting method, Majority

Date: Thu, 12 May 2016 10:31:40 -0400
From: Ralph Suter <RLSuter <at> aol.com>
To: election-methods <at> lists.electorama.com
Subject: [EM] Two mathematicians propose new voting method, Majority Judgment
Message-ID: <f40a7cd1-ffd7-635a-6fb9-89766bab3bdd <at> aol.com>

Two French mathematicians, who say they have spent the last dozen years studying voting systems, have proposed a new method they call Majority Judgment.

This system is about as new as the pyramids.  We covered this already.  I even answered your question about a Score-Hybrid:

* Have score candidates on a scale of -9 to +9 skipping over 0 (this forces voters to come down 1 way or another about a candidate) and allowing them to skip candidates, with skipped candidates receiving a score of -9.
* Take the median.

Their system can lead to multiple candidates tying.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Ralph Suter | 12 May 16:31 2016
Picon

Two mathematicians propose new voting method, Majority Judgment

Two French mathematicians, who say they have spent the last dozen years studying voting systems, have proposed a new method they call Majority Judgment. In a US presidential election, it would ask voters to judge how good or bad a president they believe each candidate would be if elected. There would be 6 options:

Great President
Good President
Average President
Poor President
Terrible President
Never Heard of Candidate

Their proposal was posted May 9, 2016 at The Conversation and May 11 at Salon.com:
https://theconversation.com/trump-and-clinton-victorious-proof-that-us-voting-system-doesnt-work-58752
http://www.salon.com/2016/05/11/two_faces_of_a_rotting_system_partner/
The authors make the following claim, among others:
"Majority judgment resolves the conundrum of Arrow’s theorem: neither the Condorcet nor the Arrow paradox can occur.
I'd appreciate any thoughts about their proposal and about how Majority Judgment compares to other voting methods, particularly Range Voting.

Thanks,
Ralph Suter
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 11 May 20:34 2016

Electoral-Vote.Com mentions Approval Voting and IRV (instant-RunOff Voting).

	⸘Howdy‽

	Here is the link:

	http://electoral-vote.com/evp2016/Pres/Maps/May11.html#item-5

	One can write to the VoteMaster explaining why Approval and Score are the bestest voting systems evar and
IRV is the worstest voting system evar here:

	“Professor Andrew S. Tanenbaum” <VoteMaster12 <at> Yahoo.Com>

	When you write to the VoteMaster, please be polite; indeed, if you cannot be polite, please do not write at all.

	¡Peace!

--

-- 

	“⸘Ŭalabio‽” <Walabio <at> MacOSX.Com>

Skype:
	Walabio

An IntactWiki:
	http://intactwiki.org

	“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.”
	——
	Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
dnow1 | 27 Apr 21:13 2016
Picon

Number Votes, 10 Apr 2016

Number Votes - 10 April 2016


1. Use Number Votes (1, 2, 3, etc.) for each choice.

A Voter MUST put a number vote for ALL choices.


2. Vote YES or NO for each choice.


3. Ballot Form -

Numbered Boxes 1 2 3 etc. (i.e. total choices)

YES/NO Boxes  Name


4. Do Head to Head combinations math (would require computer voting in any large election).

Test Winner(s) (TW) -- Test Loser (TL) -- Test Others (TO)

Each TO 2nd or later choice vote goes to a TW or TL.


5. If a TW wins in all combinations, then it wins.


6. If a TW loses in all combinations, then it loses (and repeat step 5).


7. Tiebreaker - If no TW, then add 1st plus 2nd plus etc. choices to get a Droop Quota (majority for 1 seat winner).  If 2 or more get a Droop Quota, then any other non-Droop Quota choices lose (and repeat step 5).

8. OR -- have the lowest YES choice lose (and repeat step 5).

-----

Legislative bodies - each final winner would have a voting power equal to the final votes received.


For multiple executive/judicial offices (e.g. elect 3 judges) the N highest Number Votes count - for TO transfer purposes.

----

Theory - Condorcet in France in the 1780s (repeat 1780s) noted that a third choice could beat two existing choices head to head --

A beats B

C comes along.

C beats A and C beats B.

---

Divided majority example -

26 AB

25 BA

49 Z


The Z voters (i.e. all voters) would be required to make number votes for ALL choices.


i.e. example might result in --

26 ABZ

25 BAZ

26 ZBA

23 ZAB

Z is beat by both A and B and thus loses.

51 B beats 49 A.

-----

Possible circular tie -

34 ABC

33 BCA

32 CAB

99


Adding 1st plus 2nd votes -

34 + 32 = 66 A

33 + 34 = 67 B

32 + 33 = 65 C  Loses.

66 A beats 33 B.


OR use Approval Votes - Lowest would lose.

One of the two remaining would win.


Note - 

Number Votes are *relative* only.

Approval Votes are *absolute* only.

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Markus Schulze | 23 Apr 22:12 2016
Picon

Re: Name of this Criterion

Hallo,

I have now added a proof that the Schulze method
satisfies this criterion. See section 4.12 of
my paper:

http://m-schulze.9mail.de/schulze1.pdf

Markus Schulze

 > Hallo,
 >
 > I remember that we discussed the following
 > criterion at this mailing list. Unfortunately,
 > I forgot the name of this criterion. Could
 > someone please tell me the name of this criterion?
 >
 >    Suppose M is the number of candidates.
 >
 >    Suppose there is a k with 2 <= k <= (M-1) such
 >    that candidate A wins every sub-election between
 >    candidate A and (k-1) other candidates. Then
 >    candidate A should also be the overall winner.
 >
 > Markus Schulze

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 19 Apr 22:04 2016

Re: 1/r as a voting system.

	Date: 	 Tue, 19 Apr 2016 09:45:39 -0400
	From: 	 Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>
	Subject: 	 Re: 	 [EM] 1/r as a voting system.

> 	The problem with petition-type systems is that they are exploited by rabble-rousers; people who are
experts are inflaming the public passion on issues like women’s rights or terrorism.

	We have no way of preventing rich people from ending up on the ballot; but then again however, we do not want a
million names on the ballot, most of whom are people running for a lark.  The idea of having to reach the
number of signatures greater than the square-root of the population is that, in addition to the rich, poor
devoted people wanting to make a positive change in the world can achieve this goal:

	Let us suppose that one has average wealth and income and lives in a country with a population of
100,000,000 people.  One runs as a joke.  One probably would not bother to gather the myriad (10,000)
signatures, so probably would not get on the ballot.  If one is seriously committed to making the country a
better place and has average wealth and income, if one is willing to use all of one’s spare time for
gathering signatures, getting a myriad signatures in an years, is difficult, but doable.  Certainly, the
rich could easily pay a myriad people for their signatures, but once they are on the ballot, they can use
only public financing, which is a great equalizer because all candidates receive the same amount and can
only campaign using public financing.

	Once on the ballot, candidates can only use public money for campaigning, all candidates receive the same
about of money, and candidates cannot lie and stay on the ballot.  The limiting all candidates to the same
amount of public money is a great equalizer, allowing good candidates to bubble to the top.

	Allowing write-ins is a way of letting the voters choose someone not on the ballot because of chicanery. 
The vast majority of writ-ins probably will be rich people trying to buy elections, but I would not
write-in such a person:

	In my country, we have a man running for president who lies like a rug.  If candidates could not lie, he would
be struck from the ballot.  If he would be struck from the ballot, I am pretty sure that he would start an
expensive write-in campaign with his wealth.  No matter how-many of his advertisements I would see, I
would never write his name onto my ballot.

	The reason for the primaries with top-2 runoffs and general election with top-2 ruff is information-overload:

	Let us suppose that we have a score (20) of parties, each with a score of candidates and a score of
independents.  That is 420 candidates.  None could research that many candidates.  Each party has a primary
and the independents have a primary.  Each voter need only research 20 candies.  After the primary, each
voter need research only 2 candidates.

	For the general election, we have a score of parties, each running 1 candidate, and 1 independent.  That is
only 21 candidates for researching.  After the general election, we have only 2 candidates for
researching for the runoff.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 17 Apr 23:20 2016

Re: 1/r as a voting system.

	Date: 	 Sun, 17 Apr 2016 14:43:35 -0400
	From: 	 Fred Gohlke <fredgohlke <at> verizon.net>
	Subject: 	 Re: 	 [EM] 1/r as a voting system.

> 	Can you suggest a practical way for a large electorate to sift among themselves to find the best advocates
of the public interest?

> 	Fred Gohlke

	This is technically beyond the scope of the post, but to get on the ballot, candidates would need to get more
signatures than the square-root of the population who will vote by the filing deadline:

	Let us suppose that a candidate runs for president of a country with a population of 100,000,000.  The
candidate would have to get over a Myriad (10,000) signatures by the filing deadline.

¿What if shenanigans keep a candidate off of the ballot?
	Always have a space on the ballot for write-ins.

	This is how I would imagine the election would work:

	0.	Gather signatures before the deadline.
	1.	Once on the ballot, candidates can use only governmental money for campaigning (we waste at least 10%,
probably 20%, and maybe as much as 30% on tax breaks, subsidies, and pork the rich buy in
campaign-contributions, so using 1% of the budget for campaigning, but requiring candidates to only use
that money and forbidding lying would be a great investment) and will be struck from the ballot for lying. 
Write-Ins are always allowed.
	2.	Hold a primary with the independents treated like a party.
	3.	Have a Top-2 RunOff.
	4.	Have the general election.
	5	Have a Top-2 RunOff.

	I hope that I answered your questions satisfactorily.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 16 Apr 10:19 2016

1/r as a voting system.

	⸘Howdy‽

	This is not a new idea.  It has much prior art.  Still, its mathematical properties are such that one should
investigate it.  Before I continue, I stipulate that I have another idea, but this is important for
expressing that idea, so list this 1stly:

	1/r where r is rank.  Umm the votes.  Those for whom one supports receive positive rs; while those whom one
rejects, receives negative votes.  It could work thus:

Alpha:
	-1/6

Bravo:
	+½

Charlie:
	+1/1

Delta:
	-⅓

Echo:
	-1/7

Foxtrot:
	-1/1

Golf:
	+1/6

Hotel:
	+⅓

India:
	-1/9

Juliet:
	-⅛

Kilo:
	+1/7

Mike:
	+1/1

November:
	-¼

Oscar:
	+¼

Papa:
	-⅛

Quebec:

	+⅛

Romeo:
	+1/9

	For making the mathematics easier, multiply the numbers by 2,520, which is the least common multiple of
all natural numbers up to 9.  The voters need only give positive and negative ranks up to an absolute value of |9|:

	-5 means -1/5 which is -504.  We can limit the range of ranks to single-digit numbers because the reason for
an extended range is burying bad candidates like Hitler & Stalin, but we allow negative ratings, so this is unnecessary.

	We allow equal rankings, but require consecutive rankings and starting these consecutive ratings at
|1/1|.  This is a sanity-rule (ranking everyone either +9 (+1/9 (+280)) or -9 (-1/9 (-280)) would weaken
one’s vote to the point that one might as well not have voted at all).

	¡Peace!

--

-- 

	“⸘Ŭalabio‽” <Walabio <at> MacOSX.Com>

Skype:
	Walabio

An IntactWiki:
	http://intactwiki.org

	“You are entitled to your own opinion, but you are not entitled to your own facts.”
	——
	Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
dnow1 | 15 Apr 08:49 2016
Picon

Number Votes - 10 April 2016

Number Votes - 10 April 2016


1. Use Number Votes (1, 2, 3, etc.) for each choice.

A Voter MUST put a number vote for ALL choices.


2. Vote YES or NO for each choice.

    3. Ballot Form -

Numbered Boxes 1 2 3 etc. (i.e. total choices)

YES/NO Boxes  Name

    4. Do Head to Head combinations math (would require computer voting in any large election).

Test Winner(s) (TW) -- Test Loser (TL) -- Test Others (TO)

Each TO 2nd or later choice vote goes to a TW or TL.


5. If a TW wins in all combinations, then it wins.


    6. If a TW loses in all combinations, then it loses (and repeat step 5).

    7. Tiebreaker - If no TW, then add 1st plus 2nd plus etc. choices to get a Droop Quota (majority for 1 seat winner).  If 2 or more get a Droop Quota, then any other non-Droop Quota choices lose (and repeat step 5).
    8. OR -- have the lowest YES choice lose (and repeat step 5).

-----

Legislative bodies - each final winner would have a voting power equal to the final votes received.


For multiple executive/judicial offices (e.g. elect 3 judges) the N highest Number Votes count - for TO transfer purposes.

----

Theory - Condorcet in France in the 1780s (repeat 1780s) noted that a third choice could beat two existing choices head to head --

A beats B

C comes along.

C beats A and C beats B.

---

Divided majority example -

26 AB

25 BA

49 Z


The Z voters (i.e. all voters) would be required to make number votes for ALL choices.


i.e. example might result in --

26 ABZ

25 BAZ

26 ZBA

23 ZAB

Z is beat by both A and B and thus loses.

51 B beats 49 A.

-----

Possible circular tie -

34 ABC

33 BCA

32 CAB

99


Adding 1st plus 2nd votes -

34 + 32 = 66 A

33 + 34 = 67 B

32 + 33 = 65 C  Loses.

66 A beats 33 B.


OR use Approval Votes - Lowest would lose.

One of the two remaining would win.


Note - 

Number Votes are *relative* only.

Approval Votes are *absolute* only.

----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
⸘Ŭalabio‽ | 14 Apr 20:03 2016

[offtopic] The mathematics of a fair rational progressive IncomeTaxSystem with Mincome [/offtopic]

	We are all into mathematics, so I figured I would share something I wrote about the mathematics of a fair
rational progressive IncomeTaxSystem with Mincome I wrote for US-TaxDay (YYYYY-04-15):

	It is almost TaxDay in the USA (YYYYY-04-15).  I present a rational TaxSystem for IncomeTax:

	TaxOwed = ( Income / TaxRate ) - ( Constant + Deductions )

	It is that simple. Let us throw in some dumb numbers:

	*	TaxRate = 2
	*	Constant = 10,000.00 U$D

	Ignoring deductions, the TaxOwed can be seen here:

	http://wolframalpha.com/input/?i=y%3D(x%2F2)-10000

	As of can see, if one has an income of 0.00 U$D, one receives + 10,000.00 U$D, not enough to live, but will keep
one going until one gets back on one’s feet.  This is called income.

	As income increases, the TaxOwed approaches 50%. For high incomes, the tax is pretty flat but still a bit progressive.

	Let us look at how the deductions help the typical working person:

	Let us suppose that we have 2 people earning 30,000.00 U$D annually.  One lives rent free with parents;
while the other, pays 1,000.00 U$D / month in rent:

	The rent-free person has no deductions:

	( 30,000.00 U$D / 2 ) - 10,000.00 U$D = 5,000.00 U$D

	This person owes 5,000.00 U$D; so now, has 25,000.00 U$D after taxes.

	The rent-paying pony pays thus after deductions rent:

	( 30,000.00 U$D / 2 ) - ( 10,000.00 U$D + 12, 0000.00 U$D ) = - 7,000.00 U$D

	The rent-paying person 12,000.00 U$D on rent, so the 30,0000.00 U$D became 18,000.00 U$D after rent and
after receiving the - 7,000.00 U$D in tax, this person has 25,000.00 U$D.

	Both people have the same amount of money after taxes and rent.

	Rich people are always looking for loopholes to get out of paying their fair share.  I have hacks for fixing that:

	*	Reduce the total deductions on the books to 99.
	*	Allow only a score (20) deductions on each return.
	*	Limit the value of all deductions on a TaxReturn combined to 1,000,000.00 U$D.

	We have too many loopholes. Limiting the deductions on the books to double-digit numbers makes it hard to
slip in loopholes.  The average working person qualifies for only 5-10 deductions.  I figure that an honest
rich person should only qualify for some teen deductions (a dozen (12) to a score (20) deductions).  Rich
people overstate their deductions.  We should limit them to a total value of 1 million U$Ds so that rich
people will have to pay their fair share.
----
Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info

Gmane