4 Dec 2010 16:41
Re: Turning --enable-password-save on by default on Windows builds?
yegle <cnyegle <at> gmail.com>
2010-12-04 15:41:51 GMT
2010-12-04 15:41:51 GMT
Any conclution to this problem? Is it enabled by default now in openvpn-2.2 beta build? Thx 
On Sat, Aug 28, 2010 at 5:38 PM, Jason Haar <Jason.Haar <at> trimble.co.nz> wrote:
On 08/28/2010 06:02 AM, Morten Christensen wrote:In my world I don't see the point in forcing a false sense of security
> In my world there is a big difference between when some criminal runs a
> keylogger on a PC and the risk, that the employee's children by mistake
> gets into our campany-server, if they are early home from school on a
> rainy day.
>
in open source software. There is *nothing* to stop any valid user
getting their hands on the openvpn sourcecode (or a different binary
build) and bypassing such a check - so why make the *default* position
so fake?
If you really want to ensure your users cannot store a password locally,
then you shouldn't use openvpn. Or firefox. Or MSIE. Or anything else
that allows users to store passwords. Or move to SecurID - that would
make this argument moot of course.
If you want to limit the opportunity of work machines being used by
employees' children then you should look at:
1. only allow work-supplied computers to access work via openvpn/whatever
2. policy saying employees aren't allowed to share their account details
or computers with anyone
3. SCREENSAVER POLICIES!!!!! If the screen is locked, how did the child
get on? (see 2.)
4. what was an employee's computer doing at home when they weren't and
their child was? Shouldn't it be at work with them?
i.e. standard corporate security measures manage this
--
Cheers
Jason Haar
Information Security Manager, Trimble Navigation Ltd.
Phone: +64 3 9635 377 Fax: +64 3 9635 417
PGP Fingerprint: 7A2E 0407 C9A6 CAF6 2B9F 8422 C063 5EBB FE1D 66D1
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.
--
Morten Christensen
> | On Sat, Aug 28, 2010 at 5:38 PM, Jason Haar<Jason.Haar <at> trimble.co.nz
> |<mailto:Jason.Haar <at> trimble.co.nz>> wrote:
> |
> | On 08/28/2010 06:02 AM, Morten Christensen wrote:
> |> In my world there is a big difference between when some criminal
> | runs a
> |> keylogger on a PC and the risk, that the employee's children by
> | mistake
> |> gets into our campany-server, if they are early home from school on a
> |> rainy day.
> |>
> | In my world I don't see the point in forcing a false sense of security
> | in open source software. There is *nothing* to stop any valid user
> | getting their hands on the openvpn sourcecode (or a different binary
> | build) and bypassing such a check - so why make the *default* position
> | so fake?
> |
> | If you really want to ensure your users cannot store a password locally,
> | then you shouldn't use openvpn. Or firefox. Or MSIE. Or anything else
> | that allows users to store passwords. Or move to SecurID - that would
> | make this argument moot of course.
> |
> | If you want to limit the opportunity of work machines being used by
> | employees' children then you should look at:
> |
> | 1. only allow work-supplied computers to access work via
> | openvpn/whatever
> | 2. policy saying employees aren't allowed to share their account details
> | or computers with anyone
> | 3. SCREENSAVER POLICIES!!!!! If the screen is locked, how did the child
> | get on? (see 2.)
> | 4. what was an employee's computer doing at home when they weren't and
> | their child was? Shouldn't it be at work with them?
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