Zwiebelcode | 17 Apr 20:11 2014
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Core of OpenIdent is ready


hi developers,

some time ago I wrote about OpenIdent. The core of OpenIdent is now
finished.

.- How it can help freenet -.

OpenIdent can solve the problem, that an attacker can log into the
freenet network with thousands of ip adresses.

.- Introduction -.

In the internet, there are some problems, that have not been fully
solved, yet. Spam can still not be controlled. Fraud only can
be fighted in a limited way. In the internet, democratic decision
processes are only possible with some limitations. All of these
problems have one point in common: The problems could be solved,
if the participants would identify themselves, but that
would reduce their privacy. OpenIdent wants to solve this problem
and provide an identification mechanism without reducing
the privacy.

.- OpenIdent -.

OpenIdent is a Server-Client-Software that allows people
to provide their unique identity without exposing them. So,
users are unique and can be blocked in case of fraud or spamming
for a long time. With that, the problems pointed above could be
solved.
(Continue reading)

Zwiebelcode | 17 Apr 20:10 2014
Picon

Core of OpenIdent is ready


hi developers,

some time ago I wrote about OpenIdent. The core of OpenIdent is now
finished.

.- How it can help freenet -.

OpenIdent can solve the problem, that an attacker can log into the
freenet network with thousands of ip adresses.

.- Introduction -.

In the internet, there are some problems, that have not been fully
solved, yet. Spam can still not be controlled. Fraud only can
be fighted in a limited way. In the internet, democratic decision
processes are only possible with some limitations. All of these
problems have one point in common: The problems could be solved,
if the participants would identify themselves, but that
would reduce their privacy. OpenIdent wants to solve this problem
and provide an identification mechanism without reducing
the privacy.

.- OpenIdent -.

OpenIdent is a Server-Client-Software that allows people
to provide their unique identity without exposing them. So,
users are unique and can be blocked in case of fraud or spamming
for a long time. With that, the problems pointed above could be
solved.
(Continue reading)

Matthew Toseland | 4 Apr 21:16 2014
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Datastore probing

For several reasons I think we need to discuss the dubious security
assumption of "it's hard to probe your peers' datastores", and the
performance tradeoffs that go with it ...

Why is this important now?
- Darknet bloom filters. Okay, it's darknet; there's more trust; so
that's okay then? Maybe.
- Opennet bloom filters (for long-lived peers). We'll need to identify
long-lived peers anyway for tunnels and security (MAST countermeasures).
So it'd be good to do bloom filter sharing with them.
- Opportunistic data exchange (possibly with CBR) (on both darknet and
opennet).
- Broadcast probes at low HTL. Same effect as bloom filter sharing but
work with low uptime nodes. Can be made cheap; we don't have to wait for
them before forwarding, and we because latency isn't a big deal we can
aggregate them and make them cheap. (We might want to wait for them,
with timeouts, before finishing with DNF) Would probably have to be
non-forwardable, to cut costs ... so it's a true probe. But then the
security model is the same for bloom filter sharing - except for the
bandwidth cost, which makes probing bloom filters a bit more costly...

What is the model?
- Censorship: We want it to be hard for bad guys to identify nodes
containing a specific key and eliminate them. Classically, fetching a
key tells you where it's stored (the data source, used for path
folding), but in fetching it you have propagated it. The problem with
this theory is you've only propagated it to *caches*, not stores.
-- Does this mean we need to give more protection to the store than the
cache? E.g. only do bloom filter sharing for stores, only read store for
broadcast probes?
(Continue reading)

Arne Babenhauserheide | 31 Mar 15:56 2014
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adding a friend: default values for visibility and trust

Hi,

misaakidis wants to add default values to visibility and trust for
friends, so we now have to take a decision.

Which do you think is the most appropriate option for each one: 

trust:

- HIGH
- NORMAL
- LOW

visibility (keep in mind that we need this for FOAF!):

- YES
- NAME-ONLY
- NO

As identified at CTS4, it is *our* job to define the default value for
that, because new users have no chance of understanding the
implications of taking either choice.

See bug #6151 for details:
https://bugs.freenetproject.org/view.php?id=6151

Best wishes,
Arne
Steve Dougherty | 30 Mar 09:06 2014

Freenet 0.7.5 build 1461 released

Changes in 1461:

1460 was a non-functional release. freenet.jar was signed, which we did
not realize would require freenet-ext.jar to be signed as well because
it has classes in the same packages as freenet.jar. In the interest of
getting the build out I'll put off signing freenet.jar until a future
release.

Specifically the node would fail to initialize with a
java.lang.SecurityException: class "freenet.node.ExtVersion"'s signer
information does not match signer information of other classes in the
same package.

Changes in 1460:

The Mac and Linux web installers are now properly signed. The Windows
installer is now signed too. Translation updates for Fred, Freemail,
FlogHelper, and KeyUtils are included - largely thanks to volunteers on
Transifex. There are also translation updates for Web of Trust, but Web
of Trust staging is not stable enough to be deployed, so updating the
translation requires more work and runs the risk of no longer matching
the stable code's localization.

Changes in Fred:
 * Add Brazilian Portuguese translation.
 * Update Swedish, Simplified Chinese, and Traditional Chinese
   translations.
 * Add CSS filter support for "nth" psuedoclasses. Thanks paul <at> jCa8...!
 * Limit length of log displayed on startup page. Thanks Vaughan
   Woodzell!
(Continue reading)

Matthew Toseland | 30 Mar 00:23 2014
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ShadowWalker tunnel setup algorithm for opennet

ShadowWalker apparently provides respectable anonymity up to ~ 20%
compromised nodes. PISCES claims to be dramatically better but assumes
darknet i.e. social connections. Can we use PISCES on both? Would it be
better to use ShadowWalker on opennet and PISCES on darknet when we have
sufficiently large darknets? Obviously this is problematic for hybrid
networks?

Like PISCES, ShadowWalker depends on a "secure lookup" on the DHT to
keep nodes' peer lists honest; PISCES assumes a 1-hop X-Vine DHT, but it
looks like we can adapt this. ShadowWalker we should probably just
implement directly as a separate set of connections, but it needs more work.

http://www.princeton.edu/~pmittal/publications/shadowwalker-ccs09.pdf
https://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~hopper/shadows_wpes.pdf

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Arne Babenhauserheide | 28 Mar 22:23 2014
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DoS resistant WoT introductions

Hi,

This should have been a brief draft for DoS resistant introductions to WoT, 
but it grew a bit when I added the math.

Its objective in terms of spam prevention is that if I am in good standing 
I can authorise a limited number of introductions from my peers, 
in such a way that I can't trace who was actually introduced.

Despite its length, this is just a rough draft. Ways to improve it could be 
M out of N tokens (N tokens are released. if you hold at least M 
uncompromised tokens, you can join. This makes life harder for spammers) and 
group decisions (Alice selects 5 other WoT IDs and asks them to issue a 
shared introduction-code which can be used for either of them). Also effective
ways to blind tokens would be very useful, so I cannot know who issued them.

I use the term introduction-code or introduction as the means you need to 
make a WoT-ID give you a trust of 0. A replacement for CAPTCHAs.

Also it is not cryptographically sophisticated. It is a pretty simple 
gossipping scheme. Important is, that it only uses WoT functions. 
And now enough pre-talk.

Assumption: WoT works at keeping out spammers.

Therefore the proof-of-work we have is “I am part of the WoT. I have
positive trust, so I am no spammer”.

Using this, we can design a scheme to allow people to introduce new IDs.

(Continue reading)

Matthew Toseland | 28 Mar 04:24 2014
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Pay-for-opennet proposal: latest iteration

Proposal:

Implement transient mode:
- No routing.
- No real anonymity (but may use tunnels later).
- Can do requests and inserts.
- Seednodes give transient node a Transient Announcement Token, and
relay the announcement, give the node a bunch of random peers.
- Such tokens are limited by time and IP address.
- Transient nodes get lower priority than "real" peers.
- Useful in some special cases e.g. webcafe, over Tor, etc, especially
if we have tunneling.
- Makes more sense than core opennet for people with really slow
connections who aren't on darknet.

New installs:
- Start off in transient mode.
- Can add darknet peers.
- Can pay to become a Core Opennet Node.
- We can avoid most of the wizard questions, and talking about uptime,
until after the user starts looking at upgrading to core status.
- Make sure the node is working before taking payment; avoid a lot of
technical support aggravation!

Payment:
- *One time fee* for creating a Core Opennet Node.
- Amount to be discussed. Lets say $5 (too low -> credit card overhead /
bitcoin inconvenience becomes dominant).
- Some of it may go to FPI.
- In the long run maybe other charities (would have to be a whitelist).
(Continue reading)

Arne Babenhauserheide | 26 Mar 23:49 2014
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freenet description for potentioal funding

Hi freenetters and interested,

Over the last few weeks I discussed with a few people about help in getting funding (thanks to Sandra from
OpenITP for making the connections!). During these exchanges I wrote some stuff about freenet which I
want to share. This will be unstructured, because my time is too limited right now to make it coherent.
Please bear with me…

# Freenet for Journalists (use-case)

To make “Freenet as tool for Journalists” a bit clearer, I worked on a use-case. All the following is
already possible with the current capabilities of freenet, but much less convenient than described here.

The usecase is similar to secure-drop¹, but instead of relying
on tor, GnuPG and a centralized hidden-service, we use the inherently
distributed freenet-store with the freemail plugin which have a
smaller attack surface for the organization - and the
friend-to-friend-mode in freenet (darknet) offers a way to increase
the security against institutional surveillance (simply finding all
users of the software).

¹: https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/securedrop

------

Nick is a Journalist. He has been active in Freenet for a few months, using a small plug-computer running in
his . He maintains a website in Freenet which he links from his site in the clearnet, and he republishes some
of his articles to Freenet to spread information about his work to anonymous people. On this website he
publishes an email-address for contacting him over Freenet, and he regularly gets feedback to his
articles from anonymous and non-anonymous people alike. On his business-card he publishes the link to
this website as well as a link to Freenet, so potential sources can get information about him without
(Continue reading)

Steve Dougherty | 23 Mar 18:53 2014

Client layer rewrite branch

Is there a branch with the in-progress client layer rewrite to remove
DB4O? I haven't been able to find it by searching my IRC logs or my devl
archives.

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Steve Dougherty | 21 Mar 05:42 2014

Meeting with Professor Halderman

On Tuesday - March 25th - I have a meeting scheduled with Professor J.
Alex Halderman [0] to talk about security and Freenet. He is one of the
people behind such research as Green Dam arbitrary code execution, [1]
cold boot attacks on disk encryption, [2] and insufficient entropy on
embedded systems leading to weak encryption keys. [3]

What should I say? I'm planning to mention:

0) Overview of Freenet's functionality and that of plugins/applications.
1) Do you have suggestions on where the Freenet project can find
security auditors or additional developers?
2) Would it be possible to run a seed node on campus?
3) Open research questions: [4][5]
    * Pitch black - what mitigations have we come up with?
    * Can opennet be secured?
    * Is the network topology stable - does it settle? My simulation
work in GSoC 2012 suggested it did not. As the simulation moved away
from Sandberg's model and toward more of what Freenet does it got less
stable. Does this have practical implications?
    * How can forums scale? PSKs? [6] What about real-time chat?
    * Can load balancing be improved?

- Steve

[0] https://jhalderm.com/
[1] https://jhalderm.com/pub/gd/
[2] https://citp.princeton.edu/research/memory/
[3] https://factorable.net/paper.html
[4] https://wiki.freenetproject.org/Research_challenges
[5] https://emu.freenetproject.org/pipermail/devl/2012-October/036569.html
(Continue reading)


Gmane