Julie Hedlund | 16 Apr 16:48 2014
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Call for Participation: ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 25 June 2014

Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 25 June 2014

 

The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at the ICANN meeting in London on 25 June 2014.  The DNSSEC Workshop has been a part of ICANN meetings for several years and has provided a forum for both experienced and new people to meet, present and discuss current and future DNSSEC deployments.  For reference, the most recent session was held at the ICANN meeting in Singapore on 26 March 2014. The presentations and transcripts are available at: http://singapore49.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec

 

We are seeking presentations on the following topics:

 

1.  DNSSEC Activities in the European region: 

 

For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been involved in DNSSEC deployment in the European region and also from those who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen interest in the challenges and benefits of deployment.  In particular, we will consider the following questions:  What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do?  What are the internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC?

 

2. The Operational Realities of Running DNSSEC:

 

Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries, registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC? What is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your customer support teams? What operational statistics have we gathered about DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form of best practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?


3.  DNSSEC Automation:

 

For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for which we would like to see presentations include:

* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key management?

* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?

* Where in the various pieces that make up DNSSEC signing and validation are the best opportunities for automation?

* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?


4.  When Unexpected DNSSEC Events Occur:

 

What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have seen over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to those just about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of information about the outage? What have you learned about communications planning? Do you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise with your CERT community?


5.  DANE and DNSSEC Applications:

 

The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entitites (DANE) protocol is an exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates. There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:

* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC applications in new areas or industries?

* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?

* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable reality?

* How can the industry used DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?


We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC / DANE applications and services.  For example, a demonstration of the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that correctly validates would be welcome.  Demonstrations of new tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.

 

6.  DNSSEC and DANE In The Enterprise:

 

Similar to ISPs, enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the enterprises's own domains. We are seeking presentations from enterprises who have implemented DNSSEC on either or both validation and signing and can address questions such as:

* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And how do they do so?

* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?

* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to implement DNSSEC?

* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the deployment of DNSSEC?

* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?

7.  Guidance for Registrars in Supporting DNSSEC: 

 

The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for Registrars and Resellers requires the support of DNSSEC beginning on January 1, 2014. We are seeking presentations discussing:

* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can registrars meet those requirements?

* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC support?

* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers and ultimately customers?

 

We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a plan for doing so. 

8.  Implementing DNSSEC Validation At Internet Service Providers (ISPs):

 

Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers.  We have now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American ISPs and at ISPs around the world.  We are interested in presentations on topics such as: 

* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC validation?  

* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for the rollout of DNSSEC validation?  

* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation currently deployed?  

* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?

* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, cpu, bandwidth, technical support, etc.)?

9.  APIs Between the Registrars and DNS Hosting Operators:

 

One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically when these functions are provided by different entities.  Right now the communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, occurs primarily by way of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web interface to another. How can this be automated?  We would welcome presentations  by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information - or from people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.


10.  Panel Discussion/Demonstrations on Hardware Security Modules (HSMs):


HSMs are a key element in DNSSEC deployment, particularly in maintaining the security of the Zone Signing Key (ZSK).  We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs as well as presentations on HSM challenges and benefits.

 

11.  Preparing for Root Key Rollover

 

For this topic we are seeking input on issues relating to root key rollover.  In particular, we are seeking comments from vendors, ISPs, and the community that will be affected by distribution of new root keys.

 

 

In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.

 

If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence) description of your proposed presentation to dnssec-london-XMYgHUjnkMVWk0Htik3J/w@public.gmane.org by **Friday, 09 May 2014**

 

We hope that you can join us.

 

Thank you,

 

Julie Hedlund

 

On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:

Steve Crocker, Shinkuro

Mark Elkins, DNS/ZACR

Cath Goulding, Nominet UK

Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT

Jacques Latour, .CA

Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC

Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR

Russ Mundy, Sparta/Parsons

Ondřej Surý, CZ.NIC

Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS

Dan York, Internet Society

Attachment (smime.p7s): application/pkcs7-signature, 6818 bytes
<div><div>
<span><div><span><div><div><span><div><p class="MsoNormal">Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 25 June 2014<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security&nbsp;and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at&nbsp;the ICANN meeting in London on 25 June 2014.&nbsp;&nbsp;The DNSSEC&nbsp;Workshop has been a part of ICANN meetings for several years and has&nbsp;provided a forum for both experienced and new people to meet, present and&nbsp;discuss current and future DNSSEC deployments.&nbsp;&nbsp;For reference, the most&nbsp;recent session was held at the ICANN meeting in Singapore on 26 March 2014. The presentations and transcripts are available&nbsp;at:&nbsp;<a href="http://singapore49.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec">http://singapore49.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec</a>.&nbsp;</p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">We are seeking presentations on the following topics:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;DNSSEC Activities in the European region:&nbsp;<p></p></p></div>
</div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been&nbsp;involved in DNSSEC deployment in the European region and also from those who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen&nbsp;interest in the challenges and benefits of deployment. &nbsp;In particular, we will consider the following questions: &nbsp;What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do? &nbsp;What are the internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">2. The Operational Realities of Running DNSSEC:<p></p></p></div>
</div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries,&nbsp;registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC?&nbsp;What is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your&nbsp;disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your&nbsp;customer support teams? What operational statistics have we&nbsp;gathered about DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form&nbsp;of best practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?</p></div></span></div></div></span></div></span><div><br></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">3. &nbsp;DNSSEC Automation:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for which we would like to see presentations include:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key management?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* Where in the various pieces that make up DNSSEC signing and validation are the best opportunities for automation?<p></p></p></div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"></p>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">4. &nbsp;When Unexpected DNSSEC Events Occur:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal">What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have&nbsp;seen over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to&nbsp;those just about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of&nbsp;information about the outage? What have you learned about communications&nbsp;planning? Do you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise&nbsp;with your CERT community?<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span></span></p>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">5. &nbsp;DANE and DNSSEC Applications:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entitites (DANE) protocol is an exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates. There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:<p></p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC applications in new areas or industries?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable reality?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* How can the industry used DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?</p></div>
</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC / DANE applications and services. &nbsp;For example, a demonstration of the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that correctly validates would be welcome. &nbsp;Demonstrations of new tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.</div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">6. &nbsp;DNSSEC and DANE In The Enterprise:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Similar to ISPs, enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the enterprises's own domains. We are seeking presentations from enterprises who have implemented DNSSEC on either or both validation and signing and can address questions such as:<p></p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And how do they do so?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?<p></p></p></div>
</div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to implement DNSSEC?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the deployment of DNSSEC?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?</p></div>
</div>
</div>
<span><div></div></span><p></p>
</div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">7. &nbsp;Guidance for Registrars in Supporting DNSSEC:&nbsp;</p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for Registrars and Resellers requires the support of DNSSEC beginning on January 1, 2014. We are seeking presentations discussing:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can registrars meet those requirements?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC support?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers&nbsp;and&nbsp;ultimately customers?<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a plan for doing so.<span>&nbsp;</span></p></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<span><div><span><div>
<span><div><p class="MsoNormal">8. &nbsp;Implementing DNSSEC Validation At Internet Service Providers (ISPs):<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers. &nbsp;We have now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American ISPs and at ISPs around the world. &nbsp;We are interested in presentations on topics such as:&nbsp;<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC validation? &nbsp;<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for the rollout of DNSSEC validation? &nbsp;<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation currently deployed? &nbsp;<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?</p></div></span><div>* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, cpu, bandwidth, technical support, etc.)?</div>
</div></span></div></span><div><br></div>
<div>
<span><div><p class="MsoNormal">9. &nbsp;APIs Between the Registrars and DNS Hosting Operators:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically when these functions are provided by different entities. &nbsp;Right now the communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, occurs primarily by way of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web interface to another. How can this be automated? &nbsp;We would welcome presentations&nbsp;&nbsp;by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information - or from people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.</p></div></span><div><br></div>
</div>
<div>
<span><p class="MsoNormal">10. &nbsp;Panel Discussion/Demonstrations on Hardware Security Modules (HSMs):</p></span><div><br></div>
<div>HSMs are a key element in DNSSEC deployment, particularly in maintaining the security of the Zone Signing Key (ZSK). &nbsp;We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs as well as presentations on HSM challenges and benefits.</div>
<span><div><p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p></div>&nbsp;</span>
</div>
<span><div><span><div>
<span><p class="MsoNormal">11.&nbsp;&nbsp;Preparing for Root Key Rollover</p></span><span><div><p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">For this topic we are seeking input on issues relating to root key&nbsp;rollover.&nbsp;&nbsp;In particular, we are seeking comments from vendors, ISPs, and&nbsp;the community that will be affected by distribution of new root keys.<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p>&nbsp;</p></div>
</div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.</p></div></span><span><div><p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence)&nbsp;description of your proposed presentation&nbsp;to&nbsp;<a href="mailto:dnssec-london@...">dnssec-london@...</a>&nbsp;by&nbsp;**Friday, 09 May 2014**≤p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">We hope that you can join us.<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Thank you,<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Julie Hedlund<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Steve Crocker, Shinkuro<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Mark Elkins,&nbsp;DNS/ZACR<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Cath Goulding, Nominet UK<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT<p></p></p></div>
<div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Jacques Latour, .CA<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC</p></div>
</div></span><div>Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR</div>
<span><div><p class="MsoNormal"><p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Russ Mundy, Sparta/Parsons<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Ond&#345;ej Sur&yacute;, CZ.NIC</p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS<p></p></p></div>
<div><p class="MsoNormal">Dan York, Internet Society</p></div></span>
</div></span></div></span>
</div></div>
Chris Thompson | 10 Apr 20:48 2014
Picon
Picon

DNSKEY RRSIGs expired on xn--3bst00m & xn--6qq986b3xl

The signatures on the DNSKEY RRsets for two of the new generic TLDs have
expired (other RRSIGs seem to be OK):

  xn--3bst00m      start 2014-03-25 20:19:00  end 2014-04-09 01:26:10 UTC
  xn--6qq986b3xl   start 2014-03-25 12:19:01  end 2014-04-08 18:27:11 UTC

http://dnssec-debugger.verisignlabs.com/ agrees with me.

Is it significant that both TLDs were created on 2014-01-03?
http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/program-status/delegated-strings ascribes
them to different organisations, but they are hosted on the same
nameservers (zdnscloud.com).

--

-- 
Chris Thompson               University of Cambridge Information Services,
Email: cet1@...    Roger Needham Building, 7 JJ Thomson Avenue,
Phone: +44 1223 334715       Cambridge CB3 0RB, United Kingdom.
David C Lawrence | 9 Apr 22:09 2014

Open Source Resolver support for EDNS0 Client-Subnet?

Does anyone know of any FOSS resolvers that support the EDNS0
Client-Subnet option, and uses it for caching?
Stephane Bortzmeyer | 4 Apr 11:20 2014
Picon

Introducing CNAME Flattening: RFC-Compliant CNAMEs at a Domain's Root

[Warning: sloppy terminology, for instance, "root" is not used in the
usual DNS meaning.]

http://blog.cloudflare.com/introducing-cname-flattening-rfc-compliant-cnames-at-a-domains-root

Funny idea but it works only if your DNS is hosted at CloudFlare.

I was not able to find a real example: all the companies mentioned in
the article as being happy users have their Web server at CloudFlare,
where this service is useless. I assume that, from the outside, the
autoritative name server looks like an ordinary authoritative name
server even if, internally, it performs recursion to flatten the
CNAME. Anyone has a real example to show?
bert hubert | 3 Apr 10:38 2014
Picon

Small datapoint on current DoS mitigation

Hi everybody,

Like most people, we're currently seeing loads and loads of malicious DNS
traffic. In this post
http://blog.powerdns.com/2014/04/03/further-dos-guidance-packages-and-patches-available/
we describe a new PowerDNS feature that so far has been remarkably
effective. I think it was inspired by a feature from Unbound, but unsure. It
was contributed to us by PowerDNS user Paulo Anes (thanks!).

What this filter does is keep tabs on authoritative servers that don't answer. After not
answering for X times in a row, the server gets blacklisted for Y seconds. 

Then, after Y seconds the server gets a new chance to answer. If it doesn't,
it immediately gets blacklisted again for Y seconds. However, if it provides
only a single answer (even if incorrect), the blacklisting gets removed.

We hear from many operators that this has successfully mitigated the impact
of this DoS both on them and on the target.

	Bert
--

-- 
PowerDNS Website: http://www.powerdns.com/
Contact us by phone on +31-15-7850372
SM | 31 Mar 18:36 2014
Picon

Re: AAAA record for c.root-servers.net

Hi Jim,
At 16:23 30-03-2014, Jim Popovitch wrote:
>Hmmm, I see no problems from 5 spots on the globe:

Yes.

I posted the output for networks which cannot reach 
c.root-servers.net over IPv6.

Regards,
-sm

SM | 31 Mar 00:47 2014
Picon

Re: AAAA record for c.root-servers.net

Hi Stephan,
At 15:15 30-03-2014, Stephan Lagerholm wrote:
>c.root-servers.net is not reachable over v6 for everybody. There 
>appears to be some peering disputes between operators over v6 still. 
>Additionally, Leen Besselink told me on another mailing list 
>(unbound) that it is advertized as a /48 that might get filtered.

Route to IPv6 node 2001:500:2::c

   1    25 ms   25 ms   24 ms 2001:470:0:286::1
   2    82 ms   41 ms   50 ms 2001:470:0:270::2
   3    51 ms   48 ms   50 ms 2001:470:0:240::1
   4    74 ms  102 ms   72 ms 2001:470:0:1b4::1
   5    75 ms   74 ms   74 ms 2001:470:0:32::2
   6    *       *       *     ?

Route to IPv6 node 2001:500:2::c

   1    <1 ms   <1 ms   <1 ms 2001:470:0:2cd::1
   2    66 ms   77 ms   73 ms 2001:470:0:2cf::2
   3    83 ms   95 ms   98 ms 2001:470:0:298::1
   4   107 ms  100 ms  111 ms 2001:470:0:270::2
   5   112 ms  117 ms  107 ms 2001:470:0:240::1
   6   145 ms  145 ms  134 ms 2001:470:0:1b4::1
   7   137 ms  137 ms  145 ms 2001:470:0:32::2
   8    *       *       *     ?

Route to IPv6 node 2001:500:2::c

   1    36 ms   49 ms   64 ms 2001:470:0:29f::1
   2   113 ms   98 ms  134 ms 2001:470:0:26a::1
   3   190 ms  198 ms  199 ms 2001:470:0:294::1
   4   184 ms  226 ms  192 ms 2001:470:0:72::1
   5   191 ms  193 ms  199 ms 2001:470:0:2b7::1
   6   222 ms  193 ms  193 ms 2001:470:0:32::2
   7    *       *       *     ?

Regards,
-sm 

Simon Munton | 30 Mar 00:35 2014
Picon

dot-LV failing to resolve at ComCast

We've getting reports of problems getting dot-LV domains to resolve at ComCast

Using http://dns.comcast.net/index.php/tools/cachecheck we tested

rolex.lv
slots.lv
vi.lv
hps.lv
bovada.lv

All either fail to resolve at every single ComCast location or only resolve at one or two.

Is anybody else seeing this or know what might be going on?


<div>
    We've getting reports of
        problems getting dot-LV domains to resolve at ComCast<br><br>
        Using <a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://dns.comcast.net/index.php/tools/cachecheck">http://dns.comcast.net/index.php/tools/cachecheck</a> we
        tested<br><br>
        rolex.lv<br>
        slots.lv<br>
        vi.lv<br>
        hps.lv<br>
        bovada.lv<br><br>
        All either fail to resolve at every single ComCast location or
        only resolve at one or two.<br><br>
        Is anybody else seeing this or know what might be going on?<br><br><span><br></span>
  </div>
Stephane Bortzmeyer | 29 Mar 21:46 2014
Picon

Hijacking of Google Public DNS in Turkey documented

http://www.bortzmeyer.org/dns-routing-hijack-turkey.html

(with the help of RIPE Atlas probes)
Chris Thompson | 28 Mar 16:28 2014
Picon
Picon

AAAA record for c.root-servers.net

An AAAA record for c.root-servers.net (2001:500:2::c) has appeared in the
zone and in the additional section of priming responses from the root servers,
but ftp://{ftp,rs}.internic.net/domain/named.{cache,root} do not include it yet.

Should I just wait patiently until they do?  :-)

--

-- 
Chris Thompson               University of Cambridge Computing Service,
Email: cet1@...    Roger Needham Building, 7 JJ Thomson Avenue,
Phone: +44 1223 334715       Cambridge CB3 0RB, United Kingdom.
Barry Greene | 27 Mar 00:54 2014

Pointers to _good_ DNS on-line tutorials ....

Hi Team,

I've got a couple of teams here in Indonesia who need to get up to speed on detailed DNS architecture and
operations (not the basics - they have those). Does anyone have any pointers to good materials on-line.
There are lots of basic DNS materials. NLabs has a good workshop online (see
http://www.dns-school.org/). I've dusted off my old archive (from ISP Workshop days). If you have
favorites, please send. 

Thanks,

Barry

Hi Team,

I've got a couple of teams here in Indonesia who need to get up to speed on detailed DNS architecture and
operations (not the basics - they have those). Does anyone have any pointers to good materials on-line.
There are lots of basic DNS materials. NLabs has a good workshop online (see
http://www.dns-school.org/). I've dusted off my old archive (from ISP Workshop days). If you have
favorites, please send. 

Thanks,

Barry


Gmane