Jared Mauch | 26 Nov 18:37 2014
Picon

Bind v6 TCP listen?

Is there some specific configuration magic that I’m missing to make bind listen to TCPv6 sockets?

Looking at what it’s doing via lsof it seems to not be listening to v6/tcp:

named   909 named   20u     IPv4              24571      0t0      TCP 204.42.254.5:domain (LISTEN)
named   909 named   21u     IPv4              28306      0t0      TCP 127.0.0.1:rndc (LISTEN)
named   909 named  512u     IPv4              24570      0t0      UDP 204.42.254.5:domain 
named   909 named  513u     IPv4              24570      0t0      UDP 204.42.254.5:domain 
named   909 named  514u     IPv6              28319      0t0      UDP [2001:418:3f4::5]:domain 
named   909 named  515u     IPv6              28319      0t0      UDP [2001:418:3f4::5]:domain 

My configuration is fairly straightforward, including manual listen-on segments, e.g.:

        listen-on { 204.42.254.5; };
        listen-on-v6 { 2001:418:3f4::5; };

- Jared
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Julie Hedlund | 26 Nov 15:52 2014
Picon

REMINDER Re: Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 52

Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 52 in Singapore

 

The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at the ICANN 52 meeting on 11 February 2015 in Singapore.  The DNSSEC Workshop has been a part of ICANN meetings for several years and has provided a forum for both experienced and new people to meet, present and discuss current and future DNSSEC deployments.  For reference, the most recent session was held at the ICANN meeting in Los Angeles on 15 October 2014. The presentations and transcripts are available at: http://la51.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec.   

 

We are seeking presentations on the following topics:

 

1.  DNSSEC activities in Asia 

 

For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been involved in DNSSEC deployment in Asia and also from those who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen interest in the challenges and benefits of deployment.  In particular, we will consider the following questions:  What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do?  What are the internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC? What did you learn in your deployment of DNSSEC?  We are interested in presentations from both people involved with the signing of domains and people involved with the deployment of DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers.

 

2.  Potential impacts of Root Key Rollover

 

Given many concerns about the need to do a Root Key Rollover, we would like to bring together a panel of people who can talk about what the potential impacts may be to ISPs, equipment providers and end users, and also what can be done to potentially mitigate those issues. In particular, we are seeking participation from vendors, ISPs, and the community that will be affected by distribution of new root keys.  We would like to be able to offer suggestions out of this panel to the wider technical community.  If you have a specific concern about the Root Key Rollover, or believe you have a method or solution to help address impacts, we would like to hear from you.

 

3.  New gTLD registries and administrators implementing DNSSEC

 

With the launch of the new gTLDs, we are interested in hearing from registries and operators of new gTLDs about what systems and processes they have implemented to support DNSSEC.  As more gTLDs are launched, is there DNSSEC-related information that can be shared to help those launches go easier?

 

4.  Guidance for Registrars in supporting DNSSEC 

 

The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for registrars and resellers requires them to support DNSSEC from  January 1, 2014. We are seeking presentations discussing:

* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can registrars meet those requirements?

* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC support?

* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers and ultimately customers?

 

We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a plan for doing so. 


5.  APIs between the Registrars and DNS hosting operators

 

One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically when these functions are provided by different entities.  Currently, the communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, often occurs by way of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web interface to another. How can this be automated?  We would welcome presentations by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information, or from people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.

 

6.  Implementing DNSSEC validation at Internet Service Providers (ISPs)


Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers.  We have now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American ISPs and at ISPs around the world.  We are interested in presentations on topics such as: 

* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC validation?  

* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for the rollout of DNSSEC validation?  

* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation currently deployed?  

* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?

* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, CPU, bandwidth, technical support, etc.)?

 

7. The operational realities of running DNSSEC

 

Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries, registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC? What is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your customer support teams? What operational statistics have we gathered about DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form of best practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?

 

8.  DNSSEC automation

 

For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for which we would like to see presentations include:

* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key management?

* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?

* Where are the best opportunities for automation within DNSSEC signing and validation processes?

* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?

 

9.  When unexpected DNSSEC events occur

 

What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have seen over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to those just about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of information about the outage? What have you learned about communications planning? Do you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise with your CERT community?

 

10.  DANE and DNSSEC applications

 

There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:

* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC applications in new areas or industries?

* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?

* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable reality?

* How can the industry use DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?

 

We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC / DANE applications and services.  For example, a demonstration of the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that correctly validates would be welcome.  Demonstrations of new tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.


11. DANE / DNSSEC as a way to secure email

 

The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol is an exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates. We are both pleased and intrigued by the growing usage of DANE and DNSSEC as a means of providing added security for email. Multiple email servers have added support for DANE records to secure TLS/SSL connections. Some email providers are marketing DNSSEC/DANE support. We would like to have a panel at ICANN 51 focusing on this particular usage of DANE. Are you a developer of an email server or client supporting DANE?  Do you provide DANE / DNSSEC support in your email service? Can you provide a brief case study of what you have done to implement DANE / DNSSEC?  Can you talk about any lessons you learned in the process?

 

12.  DNSSEC and DANE in the enterprise

 

Enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the domains owned by the enterprise. We are seeking presentations from enterprises that have implemented DNSSEC on validation and/or signing processes and can address questions such as:

* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And how do they do so?

* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?

* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to implement DNSSEC?

* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the deployment of DNSSEC?

* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?

 

13. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) use cases and innovation

 

We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs, presentations of HSM-related innovations and real world use cases of HSMs and key management. 

  

In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.

 

If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence) description of your proposed presentation to dnssec-singapore-pYXoxzOOsG8@public.gmane.org by **Wednesday, 10 December 2014 (deadline extended by one week)**

 

We hope that you can join us.

 

Thank you,

 

Julie Hedlund

 

On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:

Mark Elkins, DNS/ZACR

Cath Goulding, Nominet UK

Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT

Jacques Latour, .CA

Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC

Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR

Russ Mundy, Parsons

Ondřej Surý, CZ.NIC

Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS

Dan York, Internet Society

Attachment (smime.p7s): application/pkcs7-signature, 6818 bytes
<div><span><div>
<div>
<span><div><span><div><span><div><span><div><span><div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop at ICANN 52 in Singapore<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security&nbsp;and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at&nbsp;the ICANN 52 meeting on 11 February 2015 in Singapore.&nbsp;&nbsp;The DNSSEC&nbsp;Workshop has been a part of ICANN meetings for several years and has&nbsp;provided a forum for both experienced and new people to meet, present and&nbsp;discuss current and future DNSSEC deployments.&nbsp;&nbsp;For reference, the most&nbsp;recent&nbsp;session was held at the ICANN meeting in Los Angeles on 15 October 2014. The presentations and transcripts are available&nbsp;at:&nbsp;</span><a href="http://la51.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec">http://la51.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec</a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We are seeking presentations on the following topics:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;DNSSEC activities in Asia&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been&nbsp;involved in DNSSEC deployment in Asia and also from those who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen&nbsp;interest in the challenges and benefits of deployment. &nbsp;In particular, we will consider the following questions: &nbsp;What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do? &nbsp;What are the internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC? What did you learn in your deployment of DNSSEC? &nbsp;We are interested in presentations from both people involved with the signing of domains and people involved with the deployment of DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>2.&nbsp;&nbsp;Potential impacts of Root Key Rollover</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Given many concerns about the need to do a Root Key Rollover, we would like to bring together a panel of people who can talk about what the potential impacts may be to ISPs, equipment providers and end users, and also what can be done to potentially mitigate those issues.&nbsp;In particular, we are seeking participation from vendors, ISPs, and&nbsp;the community that will be affected by distribution of new root keys. &nbsp;We would like to be able to offer suggestions out of this panel to the wider technical community. &nbsp;If you have a specific concern about the Root Key Rollover, or believe you have a method or solution to help address impacts, we would like to hear from you.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">3. &nbsp;New gTLD registries and administrators implementing DNSSEC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">With the launch of the new gTLDs, we are interested in hearing from registries and operators of new gTLDs about what systems and processes they have implemented to support DNSSEC. &nbsp;As more gTLDs are launched, is there DNSSEC-related information that can be shared to help those launches go easier?</span></p>
</div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span><div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">4. &nbsp;Guidance for Registrars in supporting DNSSEC&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for registrars and resellers requires them to support DNSSEC from&nbsp;&nbsp;January 1, 2014. We are seeking presentations discussing:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can registrars meet those requirements?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC support?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers&nbsp;and&nbsp;ultimately customers?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a plan for doing so.&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">5. &nbsp;APIs between the Registrars and DNS hosting operators<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically when these functions are provided by different entities. &nbsp;Currently, the communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, often occurs by way of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web interface to another. How can this be automated? &nbsp;We would welcome presentations&nbsp;by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information, or from people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.</span></p>
<p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">6. &nbsp;Implementing DNSSEC validation at Internet Service Providers (ISPs)<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers. &nbsp;We have now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American ISPs and at ISPs around the world. &nbsp;We are interested in presentations on topics such as:&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC validation? &nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for the rollout of DNSSEC validation? &nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation currently deployed? &nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, CPU, bandwidth, technical support, etc.)?</span></p>
</div>
<span><div><span><div><span><div><span><div><span><div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">7. The operational realities of running DNSSEC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries,&nbsp;registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC?&nbsp;What is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your&nbsp;disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your&nbsp;customer support teams? What operational statistics have we&nbsp;gathered about DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form&nbsp;of best practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">8. &nbsp;DNSSEC automation<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for which we would like to see presentations include:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key management?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* Where are the best opportunities for automation within DNSSEC signing and validation processes?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">9. &nbsp;When unexpected DNSSEC events occur<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have&nbsp;seen over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to&nbsp;those just about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of&nbsp;information about the outage? What have you learned about communications&nbsp;planning? Do you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise&nbsp;with your CERT community?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">10. &nbsp;DANE and DNSSEC applications<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC applications in new areas or industries?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable reality?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How can the industry use DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC / DANE applications and services. &nbsp;For example, a demonstration of the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that correctly validates would be welcome. &nbsp;Demonstrations of new tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.</span></p>
</div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span><div><br></div>
<div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">11. DANE / DNSSEC as a way to secure email<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol is an exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates.&nbsp;We are both pleased and intrigued by the growing usage of DANE and DNSSEC as a means of providing added security for email. Multiple email servers have added support for DANE records to secure TLS/SSL connections. Some email providers are marketing DNSSEC/DANE support. We would like to have a panel at ICANN 51 focusing on this particular usage of DANE. Are you a developer of an email server or client supporting DANE? &nbsp;Do you provide DANE / DNSSEC support in your email service? Can you provide a brief case study of what you have done to implement DANE / DNSSEC? &nbsp;Can you talk about any lessons you learned in the process?</span></p>
</div>
<span><div><span><div><span><div><span><div><span><div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">12. &nbsp;DNSSEC and DANE in the enterprise<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the domains owned by the enterprise. We are seeking presentations from enterprises that have implemented DNSSEC on validation and/or signing processes and can address questions such as:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And how do they do so?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to implement DNSSEC?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the deployment of DNSSEC?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p>&nbsp;</p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span>13. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) use cases and innovation</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p>&nbsp;</p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs, presentations of HSM-related innovations and real world use cases of HSMs and key management.</span>&nbsp;</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence)&nbsp;description of your proposed presentation&nbsp;to&nbsp;</span><a href="mailto:dnssec-singapore@...">dnssec-</a><a href="mailto:dnssec-singapore <at> isoc.org">singapore@...</a>&nbsp;by&nbsp;**Wednesday, 10 December 2014 (deadline extended by one week)**≤/p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We hope that you can join us.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Thank you,<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Julie Hedlund<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Mark Elkins,&nbsp;DNS/ZACR<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Cath Goulding, Nominet UK<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Jacques Latour, .CA<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Russ Mundy, Parsons<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Ond&#345;ej Sur&yacute;, CZ.NIC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Dan York, Internet Society</span></p>
</div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span></div></span>
</div>
<span><blockquote><div><div><div><p></p></div></div></div></blockquote></span>
</div></span></div>
Stephane Bortzmeyer | 26 Nov 15:25 2014
Picon

Looking for a public blackhole/sinkhole IP address

I'm trying to find out if it exists a public IP address which is a
black hole, swallowing every packet sent to it.

I can do that on my network but I'm wondering if it already exists
somewhere, may be as an anycasted service (AS112-style).

The idea is to delegate some domain names to unresponsive name servers
(deleting the domain name is less efficient, since the negative TTL is
smaller than the delegation TTL).

It must work from everywhere on the Internet. 127/8 does not (the
packets are not dropped but delivered to the resolver itself when it
will try to follow the delegation). Same thing for RFC 1918 (there are
often such addresses in the local network).

I was thinking of non-routed addresses like 198.18.0.0/15 or
203.0.113.0/24 but it's not their normal use. AFAIK, there are no
"public sinkholes" IPv4 addresses. For IPv6, there is 100::/64 but it
is only internal, there is no public 100::/64 service.
Franck Martin | 25 Nov 01:22 2014
Picon

OT: looking for a Systems Engineer with strong DNS skills

I’m not sure it is right to post job opportunities on this list, but I’m taking my chances :P

We are looking for someone with strong skills in DNS, Kerberos, NTP,… to work in Sunnyvale, CA.

See this link for the complete job description: https://www.linkedin.com/jobs2/view/28523166

Feel free to contact me off list if questions.
Mark Andrews | 25 Nov 00:35 2014

Handling of unknown EDNS versions


The correct response to unknown EDNS versions is to return BADVERS.
This was spelt out in RFC 2671 in 1999 and has not been changed in
RFC 6891.

Nameservers should not ignore the versions field.
Nameservers should respond to unknown EDNS versions.
Nameservers should not return FORMERR.

Returning the answer as if it was EDNS(0) with the rcode set to
BADVERS is pointless as this doesn't work for negative answers.
One vendor has already fixed this.

http://users.isc.org/~marka/ts/gov.edns1fail.html

If you are a DNS vendor can you please ensure that your software
handles unknown EDNS versions correctly.

Mark
--

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE:	+61 2 9871 4742		         INTERNET: marka@...
Mark Andrews | 25 Nov 00:19 2014

DNS Cookies and unknown EDNS option handling


We are looking to deploy DNS Cookies or SIT soon and the handling
of unknown EDNS options is atrocious.

	http://users.isc.org/~marka/ts/gov.optfail.html

Unknown EDNS options are supposed to be ignored. See RFC6891, 6.1.2
Wire Format.

	They should not generate FORMERR.
	They should not generate BADVERS.
	They should not be echoed back.
	They should be responded to.

We are seeing all of the above mis-behaviours when testing.

FORMERR often results in responses that are indistigishable from not
supporting EDNS at all.  See ednsopt and edns1opt.

leighton.com.au.  <at> 202.93.248.33 (ns2.infoplex.com.au.): dns=ok edns=formerr,nosoa
edns1=formerr,version edns <at> 512=formerr ednsopt=formerr,echoed,nosoa
edns1opt=formerr,version,echoed do=formerr,nosoa ednsflags=formerr,mbz,nosoa

suncorpbank.com.au.  <at> 203.0.222.71 (pbnedns2002.suncorpmetway.com.au.): dns=ok edns=ok edns1=ok
edns <at> 512=ok ednsopt=formerr,echoed,nosoa edns1opt=formerr,version,echoed do=ok ednsflags=ok

version = no opt record or wrong version in response
echoed = the option was echoed back

If you are a vendor and you nominally support EDNS can you please
check your software to ensure that it correctly handles unknown
EDNS options.

Mark
--

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE:	+61 2 9871 4742		         INTERNET: marka@...
Stephane Bortzmeyer | 24 Nov 12:10 2014
Picon

The Largest Cyber Attack In History Has Been Hitting Hong Kong Sites

CloudFlare claims it is a DNS attack. I thought amplifications attacks
using the DNS were old-fashioned, everybody moving to NTP and SNMP?

http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/11/20/the-largest-cyber-attack-in-history-has-been-hitting-hong-kong-sites/
Mehmet Akcin | 24 Nov 11:11 2014
Picon

Domain Registrar-lock

Hello,

this might be little off topic, apologies if it's.

which registrars provide registrar-lock enabled by default to improve security, if any?

i have been trying to educate mysefl and understand why registrars don't enable this by default and only document I was able to find was https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-transfers-2014-07-02-en which I am not even sure if it's the right one.

any pros/cons you can think of this being enabled by default other than obvious additional steps being required for domain transfers, and this adding burden for registrars, etc.

ps: yes , looking at craigslist.org's incident, i am wondering why don't we have this by default

mehmet
<div><div dir="ltr">
<div>Hello,</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>this might be little off topic, apologies if it's.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>which registrars provide registrar-lock enabled by default to improve security, if any?</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>i&nbsp;have been trying to educate mysefl and understand why registrars don't enable this by default and only document I was able to find was <a href="https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-transfers-2014-07-02-en">https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/policy-transfers-2014-07-02-en</a>&nbsp;which I am not even sure if it's the right one.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>any pros/cons you can think of this being enabled by default other than obvious additional steps being required for domain transfers, and this adding burden for registrars, etc.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>ps: yes , looking at <a href="http://craigslist.org">craigslist.org</a>'s incident, i am wondering why don't we have this by default</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>mehmet</div>
</div></div>
Brad Volz | 24 Nov 04:38 2014
Picon

cache flush request - craigslist.org


The craigslist account at one of our registrars was compromised and the NS records migrated away from their rightful home.  That issue has since been corrected, but the various caches around the Internet are still holding the old data.

If you could take a look at your caches to see if craigslist.org has the following NS records:


If you see something else there, then you have a poisoned cache.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.

Brad Volz
Network Engineer

<div><div dir="ltr">
<div><br></div>
<div>The craigslist account at one of our registrars was compromised and the NS records migrated away from their rightful home.&nbsp; That issue has since been corrected, but the various caches around the Internet are still holding the old data.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>If you could take a look at your caches to see if <a href="http://craigslist.org">craigslist.org</a> has the following NS records:</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>
<a href="http://ns1p.craigslist.org">ns1p.craigslist.org</a>&nbsp;</div>
<div><a href="http://ns2p.craigslist.org">ns2p.craigslist.org</a></div>
<div><a href="http://ns1f.craigslist.org">ns1f.craigslist.org</a></div>
<div><a href="http://ns2f.craigslist.org">ns2f.craigslist.org</a></div>
<div><br></div>
<div>If you see something else there, then you have a poisoned cache.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Thank you for your assistance in this matter.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>Brad Volz</div>
<div>Network Engineer</div>
<div><br></div>
</div></div>
Dan Durrer | 20 Nov 01:15 2014

denic contact

Hey,

I am looking for  a DNS contact over at deNIC.  Any help would be much appreciated.

Regards,

Dan Durrer
No-IP

Mark Andrews | 20 Nov 05:16 2014

Firewall defaults and EDNS


	If you are running a firewall in front of your nameserver
	and it is blocking EDNS Verion 1 queries or EDNS queries
	with flag bits set or EDNS queries with unknown options by
	default could you send the vendor and release image so I
	can generate a list of broken by default for EDNS firewalls.

	dig +edns=1 $zone  <at> $server
	dig +ednsopt=100 $zone  <at> $server	[1]
	dig +ednsflags=0x40 $zone  <at> $server [1]

	Mark

	[1] Requires dig from BIND 9.11 available in the master branch
	at source.isc.org

--

-- 
Mark Andrews, ISC
1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia
PHONE:	+61 2 9871 4742		         INTERNET: marka@...

Gmane