Keith Mitchell | 21 Jul 19:57 2014
Picon

ISC Network Issue affecting OARC services

For those of you not already aware, many of OARC's services are being
impacted by a significant DDoS attack against ISC who host most of our
infrastructure. Please see below for a statement from them on this.

We've been seeing major packet loss to our systems hosted in Redwood
City, currently around 40% (down from over 80% at worst) - none of our
services are down, but many are working very slowly.

Obviously we're working with ISC to try and address this - we're sorry
for the inconvenience and will keep you updated as we know more from them.

Keith

On 07/21/2014 12:20 PM, Jim Martin wrote:
> Gentlepeople, Since approximately 3am Pacific this morning, ISC's 
> network has been subject to a significant Distributed Denial of 
> Service (DDoS) attack. We've been deploying various mitigation 
> techniques, and tuning over time, but the attack continues. We are 
> actively defending against the attack, and will let this alias know 
> when we believe it's been resolved. We apologize for the impact!
> 
> - Jim Martin, Director of Operations, ISC
Sebastian Castro | 20 Jul 23:00 2014
Picon

Call for Presentations - DNS-OARC Fall Workshop, October 2014

Call for Presentations - DNS-OARC Fall Workshop, October 2014

Next OARC Fall Workshop will take place in Los Angeles, California, USA
on October 11th to the 13th, the weekend before ICANN51. On Monday
October 13th there will be a joint session with ICANN Tech Day. OARC is
requesting proposals for presentations, with a preference for DNS data
analysis tools and techniques.

This workshop continues OARC's tradition of having meetings include a
strong operational component. Presentations from DNS operators are
particularly welcome.  We'll also gladly accept talks from DNS
researchers, as well as any other DNS-related subjects such as tools,
visualizations, DNSSEC and novel uses of the DNS.  If you are an OARC
member, and have a sensitive topic you would like to present for
members-only, we will accommodate those talks too. Adopting practice
from other conferences, a section of lighting talks will be available
for short presentations.

Workshop Milestones
* 20 July 2014, Call for Presentations posted
* 21 July 2014, Open for submissions
* 15 August 2014, Deadline for submission
* 29 August 2014, Final Program published

Details for abstract submission will be published here:

        https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/workshop-2014-10

The workshop will be organized on different tracks, depending on the
topics. On Sunday October 12th we will have the more in depth technical
(Continue reading)

Stephane Bortzmeyer | 20 Jul 19:04 2014
Picon

Another public DNS resolver, this time with DNSSEC

Note that they are validators:

https://dns.watch/

Unlike what they claim, I find them quite slow, specially outside of
Europe.

Julie Hedlund | 18 Jul 12:33 2014
Picon

Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 15 October 2014

Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 15 October 2014

 

The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at the ICANN 51 meeting in Los Angeles, California, on 15 October 2014.  The DNSSEC Workshop has been a part of ICANN meetings for several years and has provided a forum for both experienced and new people to meet, present and discuss current and future DNSSEC deployments.  For reference, the most recent session was held at the ICANN meeting in London on 25 June 2014. The presentations and transcripts are available at: http://london50.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec.  

 

We are seeking presentations on the following topics;

 

1.  DNSSEC activities in the North America region 

 

For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been involved in DNSSEC deployment in the North America region and also from those who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen interest in the challenges and benefits of deployment.  In particular, we will consider the following questions:  What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do?  What are the internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC? What did you learn in your deployment of DNSSEC?  We are interested in presentations from both people involved with the signing of domains and people involved with the deployment of DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers.

 

2. DANE / DNSSEC as a way to secure email

 

The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol is an exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates. We are both pleased and intrigued by the growing usage of DANE and DNSSEC as a means of providing added security for email. Multiple email servers have added support for DANE records to secure TLS/SSL connections. Some email providers are marketing DNSSEC/DANE support. We would like to have a panel at ICANN 51 focusing on this particular usage of DANE. Are you a developer of an email server or client supporting DANE?  Do you provide DANE / DNSSEC support in your email service? Can you provide a brief case study of what you have done to implement DANE / DNSSEC?  Can you talk about any lessons you learned in the process?

 

3.  Potential impacts of Root Key Rollover

 

Given many concerns about the need to do a Root Key Rollover, we would like to bring together a panel of people who can talk about what the potential impacts may be to ISPs, equipment providers and end users, and also what can be done to potentially mitigate those issues. In particular, we are seeking participation from vendors, ISPs, and the community that will be affected by distribution of new root keys.  We would like to be able to offer suggestions out of this panel to the wider technical community.  If you have a specific concern about the Root Key Rollover, or believe you have a method or solution to help address impacts, we would like to hear from you.

 

4.  New gTLD registries and administrators implementing DNSSEC

 

With the launch of the new gTLDs, we are interested in hearing from registries and operators of new gTLDs about what systems and processes they have implemented to support DNSSEC.  As more gTLDs are launched, is there DNSSEC-related information that can be shared to help those launches go easier?

 

5. The operational realities of running DNSSEC

 

Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries, registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC? What is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your customer support teams? What operational statistics have we gathered about DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form of best practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?

 

6.  DNSSEC automation

 

For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for which we would like to see presentations include:

* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key management?

* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?

* Where are the best opportunities for automation within DNSSEC signing and validation processes?

* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?

 

7.  When unexpected DNSSEC events occur

 

What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have seen over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to those just about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of information about the outage? What have you learned about communications planning? Do you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise with your CERT community?

 

8.  DANE and DNSSEC applications

 

There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:

* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC applications in new areas or industries?

* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?

* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable reality?

* How can the industry use DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?

 

We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC / DANE applications and services.  For example, a demonstration of the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that correctly validates would be welcome.  Demonstrations of new tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.

 

9.  DNSSEC and DANE in the enterprise

 

Enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the domains owned by the enterprise. We are seeking presentations from enterprises that have implemented DNSSEC on validation and/or signing processes and can address questions such as:

* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And how do they do so?

* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?

* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to implement DNSSEC?

* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the deployment of DNSSEC?

* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?

 

10.  Guidance for Registrars in supporting DNSSEC 

 

The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for registrars and resellers requires them to support DNSSEC from  January 1, 2014. We are seeking presentations discussing:

* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can registrars meet those requirements?

* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC support?

* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers and ultimately customers?

 

We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a plan for doing so. 

 

11.  Implementing DNSSEC validation at Internet Service Providers (ISPs)


Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers.  We have now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American ISPs and at ISPs around the world.  We are interested in presentations on topics such as: 

* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC validation?  

* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for the rollout of DNSSEC validation?  

* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation currently deployed?  

* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?

* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, CPU, bandwidth, technical support, etc.)?

 

12.  APIs between the Registrars and DNS hosting operators

 

One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically when these functions are provided by different entities.  Currently, the communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, often occurs by way of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web interface to another. How can this be automated?  We would welcome presentations by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information, or from people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.

 

13. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) use cases and innovation

 

We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs, presentations of HSM-related innovations and real world use cases of HSMs and key management. 

  

In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.

 

If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence) description of your proposed presentation to dnssec-losangeles-pYXoxzOOsG8@public.gmane.org by **Friday, 13 August 2014**

 

We hope that you can join us.

 

Thank you,

 

Julie Hedlund

 

On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:

Steve Crocker, Shinkuro

Mark Elkins, DNS/ZACR

Cath Goulding, Nominet UK

Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT

Jacques Latour, .CA

Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC

Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR

Russ Mundy, Sparta/Parsons

Ondřej Surý, CZ.NIC

Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS

Dan York, Internet Society

Attachment (smime.p7s): application/pkcs7-signature, 6818 bytes
<div><div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Call for Participation -- ICANN DNSSEC Workshop 15 October 2014<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The DNSSEC Deployment Initiative and the Internet Society Deploy360 Programme, in cooperation with the ICANN Security&nbsp;and Stability Advisory Committee (SSAC), are planning a DNSSEC Workshop at&nbsp;the ICANN 51 meeting in Los Angeles, California, on 15 October 2014.&nbsp;&nbsp;The DNSSEC&nbsp;Workshop has been a part of ICANN meetings for several years and has&nbsp;provided a forum for both experienced and new people to meet, present and&nbsp;discuss current and future DNSSEC deployments.&nbsp;&nbsp;For reference, the most&nbsp;recent session was held at the ICANN meeting in London on 25 June 2014. The presentations and transcripts are available&nbsp;at:&nbsp;</span><span lang="EN-GB"><a href="http://london50.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec">http://london50.icann.org/en/schedule/wed-dnssec</a></span><span lang="EN-GB">.&nbsp;&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We are seeking presentations on the following topics;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">1.&nbsp;&nbsp;DNSSEC activities in the North America region&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">For this panel we are seeking participation from those who have been&nbsp;involved in DNSSEC deployment in the North America region and also from those who have not deployed DNSSEC but who have a keen&nbsp;interest in the challenges and benefits of deployment. &nbsp;In particular, we will consider the following questions: &nbsp;What can DNSSEC do for you? What doesn't it do? &nbsp;What are the internal tradeoffs to implementing DNSSEC? What did you learn in your deployment of DNSSEC? &nbsp;We are interested in presentations from both people involved with the signing of domains and people involved with the deployment of DNSSEC-validating DNS resolvers.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">2. DANE / DNSSEC as a way to secure email<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) protocol is an exciting development where DNSSEC can be used to provide a strong additional trust layer for traditional SSL/TLS certificates.&nbsp;We are both pleased and intrigued by the growing usage of DANE and DNSSEC as a means of providing added security for email. Multiple email servers have added support for DANE records to secure TLS/SSL connections. Some email providers are marketing DNSSEC/DANE support. We would like to have a panel at ICANN 51 focusing on this particular usage of DANE. Are you a developer of an email server or client supporting DANE? &nbsp;Do you provide DANE / DNSSEC support in your email service? Can you provide a brief case study of what you have done to implement DANE / DNSSEC? &nbsp;Can you talk about any lessons you learned in the process?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">3.&nbsp;&nbsp;Potential impacts of Root Key Rollover<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Given many concerns about the need to do a Root Key Rollover, we would like to bring together a panel of people who can talk about what the potential impacts may be to ISPs, equipment providers and end users, and also what can be done to potentially mitigate those issues.&nbsp;In particular, we are seeking participation from vendors, ISPs, and&nbsp;the community that will be affected by distribution of new root keys. &nbsp;We would like to be able to offer suggestions out of this panel to the wider technical community. &nbsp;If you have a specific concern about the Root Key Rollover, or believe you have a method or solution to help address impacts, we would like to hear from you.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">4. &nbsp;New gTLD registries and administrators implementing DNSSEC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">With the launch of the new gTLDs, we are interested in hearing from registries and operators of new gTLDs about what systems and processes they have implemented to support DNSSEC. &nbsp;As more gTLDs are launched, is there DNSSEC-related information that can be shared to help those launches go easier?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">5. The operational realities of running DNSSEC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Now that DNSSEC has become an operational norm for many registries,&nbsp;registrars, and ISPs, what have we learned about how we manage DNSSEC?&nbsp;What is the best practice around key rollovers? How often do you review your&nbsp;disaster recovery procedures? Is there operational familiarity within your&nbsp;customer support teams? What operational statistics have we&nbsp;gathered about DNSSEC? Are there experiences being documented in the form&nbsp;of best practices, or something similar, for transfer of signed zones?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">6. &nbsp;DNSSEC automation<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">For DNSSEC to reach massive deployment levels it is clear that a higher level of automation is required than is currently available. Topics for which we would like to see presentations include:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools, systems and services are available to help automate DNSSEC key management?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* Can you provide an analysis of current tools/services and identify gaps?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* Where are the best opportunities for automation within DNSSEC signing and validation processes?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the costs and benefits of different approaches to automation?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">7. &nbsp;When unexpected DNSSEC events occur<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">What have we learned from some of the operational outages that we have&nbsp;seen over the past 18 months? Are there lessons that we can pass on to&nbsp;those just about to implement DNSSEC? How do you manage dissemination of&nbsp;information about the outage? What have you learned about communications&nbsp;planning? Do you have a route to ISPs and registrars? How do you liaise&nbsp;with your CERT community?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">8. &nbsp;DANE and DNSSEC applications<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">There is strong interest for DANE usage within web transactions as well as for securing email and Voice-over-IP (VoIP). We are seeking presentations on topics such as:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are some of the new and innovative uses of DANE and other DNSSEC applications in new areas or industries?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools and services are now available that can support DANE usage?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How soon could DANE and other DNSSEC applications become a deployable reality?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How can the industry use DANE and other DNSSEC applications as a mechanism for creating a more secure Internet?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We would be particularly interested in any live demonstrations of DNSSEC / DANE applications and services. &nbsp;For example, a demonstration of the actual process of setting up a site with a certificate stored in a TLSA record that correctly validates would be welcome. &nbsp;Demonstrations of new tools that make the setup of DNSSEC or DANE more automated would also be welcome.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">9. &nbsp;DNSSEC and DANE in the enterprise<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Enterprises can play a critical role in both providing DNSSEC validation to their internal networks and also through signing of the domains owned by the enterprise. We are seeking presentations from enterprises that have implemented DNSSEC on validation and/or signing processes and can address questions such as:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the benefits to enterprises of rolling out DNSSEC validation? And how do they do so?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the challenges to deployment for these organizations and how could DANE and other DNSSEC applications address those challenges?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How should an enterprise best prepare its IT staff and network to implement DNSSEC?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools and systems are available to assist enterprises in the deployment of DNSSEC?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How can the DANE protocol be used within an enterprise to bring a higher level of security to transactions using SSL/TLS certificates?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">10. &nbsp;Guidance for Registrars in supporting DNSSEC&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">The 2013 Registrar Accreditation Agreement (RAA) for registrars and resellers requires them to support DNSSEC from&nbsp;&nbsp;January 1, 2014. We are seeking presentations discussing:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the specific technical requirements of the RAA and how can registrars meet those requirements?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools and systems are available for registrars that include DNSSEC support?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What information do registrars need to provide to resellers&nbsp;and&nbsp;ultimately customers?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We are particularly interested in hearing from registrars who have signed the 2013 RAA and have either already implemented DNSSEC support or have a plan for doing so.&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">11. &nbsp;Implementing DNSSEC validation at Internet Service Providers (ISPs)<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><br></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Internet Service Providers (ISPs) play a critical role by enabling DNSSEC validation for the caching DNS resolvers used by their customers. &nbsp;We have now seen massive rollouts of DNSSEC validation within large North American ISPs and at ISPs around the world. &nbsp;We are interested in presentations on topics such as:&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What does an ISP need to do to prepare its network for implementing DNSSEC validation? &nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* How does an ISP need to prepare its support staff and technical staff for the rollout of DNSSEC validation? &nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What measurements are available about the degree of DNSSEC validation currently deployed? &nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What tools are available to help an ISP deploy DNSSEC validation?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">* What are the practical server-sizing impacts of enabling DNSSEC validation on ISP DNS Resolvers (ex. cost, memory, CPU, bandwidth, technical support, etc.)?<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p>&nbsp;</p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">12. &nbsp;APIs between the Registrars and DNS hosting operators<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">One specific area that has been identified as needing focus is the communication between registrars and DNS hosting operators, specifically when these functions are provided by different entities. &nbsp;Currently, the communication, such as the transfer of a DS record, often occurs by way of the domain name holder copying and pasting information from one web interface to another. How can this be automated? &nbsp;We would welcome presentations&nbsp;by either registrars or DNS hosting operators who have implemented APIs for the communication of DNSSEC information, or from people with ideas around how such APIs could be constructed.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p>&nbsp;</p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">13. Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) use cases and innovation<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB"><p>&nbsp;</p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We are interested in demonstrations of HSMs, presentations of HSM-related innovations and real world use cases of HSMs and key management.</span><span>&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">In addition, we welcome suggestions for additional topics.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">If you are interested in participating, please send a brief (1-2 sentence)&nbsp;description of your proposed presentation&nbsp;to&nbsp;</span><span lang="EN-GB"><a href="mailto:dnssec-losangeles@...">dnssec-losangeles@...</a></span><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;by&nbsp;**Friday, 13 August 2014**≤p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">We hope that you can join us.<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Thank you,<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Julie Hedlund<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">&nbsp;<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">On behalf of the DNSSEC Workshop Program Committee:<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Steve Crocker, Shinkuro<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Mark Elkins,&nbsp;DNS/ZACR<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Cath Goulding, Nominet UK<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Jean Robert Hountomey, AfricaCERT<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Jacques Latour, .CA<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Xiaodong Lee, CNNIC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Luciano Minuchin, NIC.AR<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Russ Mundy, Sparta/Parsons<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Ond&#345;ej Sur&yacute;, CZ.NIC<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Yoshiro Yoneya, JPRS<p></p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span lang="EN-GB">Dan York, Internet Society</span></p>
<p></p>
</div></div>
Keith Mitchell | 18 Jul 15:17 2014
Picon

OARC server outage

Unfortunately one of our (new) servers, ix2.dns-oarc.net, has suffered a
major hardware failure, and is currently out of service. This means that
number of OARC public-facing tools are not currently available:

- DODVR, Porttest, Reply Size Test, DLVtest, Don't Probe

Production services based on our ix1 server, including the public and
member websites, mailing lists, jabber, TLDmon, and our data
storage/analysis facilities remain unaffected.

We're working both to get the faulty hardware repaired, and to interim
migrate the services to another server, this may take a number of days.
We will of course post updates on this, with our apologies for any
inconvenience this causes.

Keith
john | 12 Jul 15:58 2014

Atlas nagios tools

Hello all,

i would like to introduce a tool[1] i have been developing on and off
for a bit of time.  its uses the atlas latest call[2] and sagan[3] to
preform nagios checks based on measurement results.  it supports
checking a wide range of ssl, dns and http parameters which i have tried
to document on github[1].  The dns checks currentl support checking most
if not all fields of A, AAAA,DS, DNSKEY, MX, NS & SOA records

The git hub repo contains some sample nagios configs which can be seen
in action at https://icinga.johnbond.org/ (ripeatlas/ripeatlas).

at $dayjob we dont use nagios/icinga so this is not well tested and one
should expect some bugs.  if you dare inspect the source you can
definitely expect spelling mistakes and hacks.

feedback, criticism and patches most welcome

John

*as http is a restricted measurement this has received little testing
[1]https://github.com/b4ldr/atlas
[2]https://labs.ripe.net/Members/suzanne_taylor_muzzin/ripe-atlas-latest-results-api-and-parsing-library
[3]https://github.com/RIPE-NCC/ripe.atlas.sagan
[4]https://labs.ripe.net/Members/suzanne_taylor_muzzin/introducing-ripe-atlas-status-checks
[5]https://github.com/RIPE-Atlas-Community/ripe-atlas-community-contrib/blob/master/scripts_for_nagios_icinga_alerts
James Cloos | 12 Jul 00:46 2014
Face

dnssec ecc

Are enough current verifiers capable of verifying ecdsa to make is
reasonable to deploy ECDSAP256SHA256 or ECDSAP384SHA384 keys?

-JimC
--

-- 
James Cloos <cloos@...>         OpenPGP: 0x997A9F17ED7DAEA6
Edward Peschko | 11 Jul 23:28 2014
Picon

different dns servers for different domains.

All,

I'm trying to create a /etc/resolv.conf where one dns server is used
in the case of one domain, and a different dns server is used for
another.

For example:

ping www.mydomain.com

    should lookup based off of 192.168.0.1

ping www.us-west.compute.internal

    should lookup based off of 172.16.0.1

This should be an exceedingly simple task, but its proving more
difficult than I thought (no examples on the internet, the docs are
not straightforward, etc)

Anyone have a simple example /etc/resolv.conf that does the above?

Thanks much,

Ed
Jared Mauch | 10 Jul 22:03 2014
Picon

fast-dns-query tool

i have been playing with what i call my 'fast dns query' tool for just over a year but recently made it more
user-friendly (not by much).

This lets you drop in a list of (IPv4) addresses and send out the same DNS query to all of them and post-process
the results.

Is this something the community would find valuable to be released?  It can run through the list of "well
behaved dns servers" (~4-7mil) in ~3-4 minutes.

- Jared
Stephen Malone | 10 Jul 15:42 2014
Picon

How Recursive Resolvers handle domains re-delegated at the same level

Hi Folks,

 

I’m looking to understand how recursive resolvers handle DNS domain re-delegations at the same level. For example:

 

=Parent zone: contoso.com=

<at>                             IN           SOA       ns1.contoso.com. hostmaster.contoso.com. (…

Subzone              IN           NS          ns1.IntermediateNS.com.

 

=Intermediate zone: Subzone.constoso.com; Name Server: ns1.IntermediateNS.com.=

<at>                             IN           SOA       ns1.IntermediateNS.com. hostmaster.contoso.com. (…

<at>                            IN           NS          ns1.RedelegatedNS.com.

 

=Re-delegated zone: Subzone.constoso.com; Name Server: ns1.RedelegatedNS.com.=

<at>                             IN           SOA       ns1.RedelegatedNS.com. hostmaster.contoso.com. (…

<at>                            IN           NS          ns1.RedelegatedNS.com.

 

Will any recursive resolvers products/versions break with the above configuration?

 

Thanks,

Stephen Malone

Microsoft



About Microsoft Ireland: www.microsoft.com/ireland
Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited. A company incorporated and registered in Ireland number 256796.
Microsoft Ireland Research. A company incorporated and registered in Ireland number 342235.
Registered office 70 Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland
<div>
<div class="WordSection1">
<p class="MsoNormal">Hi Folks,<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I&rsquo;m looking to understand how recursive resolvers handle DNS domain re-delegations at the same level. For example:<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">=Parent zone: contoso.com=<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <at> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; IN&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SOA&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ns1.contoso.com. hostmaster.contoso.com. (&hellip;<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Subzone &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; IN&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NS&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ns1.IntermediateNS.com.<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">=Intermediate zone: Subzone.constoso.com; Name Server: ns1.IntermediateNS.com.=<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <at> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; IN&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SOA&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ns1.IntermediateNS.com. hostmaster.contoso.com. (&hellip;<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <at>  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; IN&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NS&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ns1.RedelegatedNS.com.<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">=Re-delegated zone: Subzone.constoso.com; Name Server: ns1.RedelegatedNS.com.=
<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <at> &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; IN&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; SOA&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ns1.RedelegatedNS.com. hostmaster.contoso.com. (&hellip;<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"> <at>  &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; IN&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; NS&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; ns1.RedelegatedNS.com.<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Will any recursive resolvers products/versions break with the above configuration?
<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><p>&nbsp;</p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thanks,<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Stephen Malone<p></p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Microsoft<p></p></p>
</div>
<br><br>
About Microsoft Ireland: www.microsoft.com/ireland<br>
Microsoft Ireland Operations Limited. A company incorporated and registered in Ireland number 256796.<br>
Microsoft Ireland Research. A company incorporated and registered in Ireland number 342235.<br>
Registered office 70 Sir John Rogerson&rsquo;s Quay, Dublin 2, Ireland<br>
</div>
Mohamed Lrhazi | 6 Jul 20:02 2014
Picon

Why would a recusrive caching server not resolve a CNAME?

We had a little mail outage which turned out to be caused by one of our caching DNS servers returning the bellow incomplete reply.

Clearing the cache on the problematic server fixed the issue.... 

Am thinking it is now impossible for me to find the root cause in this instance... but wondering if you guys could hint at what could cause such a problem... bugs in the DNS servers involved? temporary misconfig at Google's servers? network issue?

The setup is a bit convoluted:

cache server --> resolver cache server --> Internet

The fix was clearing at the first server. so I am guessing at some point the resolver gave the incomplete answer.

Thanks a lot,
Mohamed.

➜  ~  dig mail.google.com <at> 141.161.100.201

; <<>> DiG 9.9.5-3-Ubuntu <<>> mail.google.com <at> 141.161.100.201
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 20414
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 4, ADDITIONAL: 5

;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096
;; QUESTION SECTION:

;; ANSWER SECTION:

;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
google.com. 96485 IN NS ns2.google.com.
google.com. 96485 IN NS ns3.google.com.
google.com. 96485 IN NS ns4.google.com.
google.com. 96485 IN NS ns1.google.com.

;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns3.google.com. 108462 IN A 216.239.36.10
ns4.google.com. 108462 IN A 216.239.38.10
ns1.google.com. 108462 IN A 216.239.32.10
ns2.google.com. 108462 IN A 216.239.34.10

;; Query time: 22 msec
;; SERVER: 141.161.100.201#53(141.161.100.201)
;; WHEN: Sun Jul 06 12:42:09 EDT 2014
;; MSG SIZE  rcvd: 207


<div><div dir="ltr">We had a little mail outage which turned out to be caused by one of our caching DNS servers returning the bellow incomplete reply.<div><br></div>
<div>Clearing the cache on the problematic server fixed the issue....&nbsp;</div>

<div><br></div>
<div>Am thinking it is now impossible for me to find the root cause in this instance... but wondering if you guys could hint at what could cause such a problem... bugs in the DNS servers involved? temporary misconfig at Google's servers? network issue?</div>

<div><br></div>
<div>The setup is a bit convoluted:</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>cache server --&gt; resolver cache server --&gt; Internet</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>The fix was clearing at the first server. so I am guessing at some point the resolver gave the incomplete answer.</div>

<div><br></div>
<div>Thanks a lot,</div>
<div>Mohamed.</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>
<div>&#10140; &nbsp;~ &nbsp;dig <a href="http://mail.google.com">mail.google.com</a>  <at> <a href="http://141.161.100.201">141.161.100.201</a>
</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>
; &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; DiG 9.9.5-3-Ubuntu &lt;&lt;&gt;&gt; <a href="http://mail.google.com">mail.google.com</a>  <at> <a href="http://141.161.100.201">141.161.100.201</a>
</div>
<div>;; global options: +cmd</div>
<div>;; Got answer:</div>

<div>;; -&gt;&gt;HEADER&lt;&lt;- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 20414</div>
<div>;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 4, ADDITIONAL: 5</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:</div>
<div>; EDNS: version: 0, flags:; udp: 4096</div>

<div>;; QUESTION SECTION:</div>
<div>;<a href="http://mail.google.com">mail.google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>IN<span class="">	</span>A</div>
<div><br></div>
<div>;; ANSWER SECTION:</div>

<div>
<a href="http://mail.google.com">mail.google.com</a>.<span class="">	</span>10213<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>CNAME<span class="">	</span><a href="http://googlemail.l.google.com">googlemail.l.google.com</a>.</div>

<div><br></div>
<div>;; AUTHORITY SECTION:</div>
<div>
<a href="http://google.com">google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>96485<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>NS<span class="">	</span><a href="http://ns2.google.com">ns2.google.com</a>.</div>

<div>
<a href="http://google.com">google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>96485<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>NS<span class="">	</span><a href="http://ns3.google.com">ns3.google.com</a>.</div>

<div>
<a href="http://google.com">google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>96485<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>NS<span class="">	</span><a href="http://ns4.google.com">ns4.google.com</a>.</div>

<div>
<a href="http://google.com">google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>96485<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>NS<span class="">	</span><a href="http://ns1.google.com">ns1.google.com</a>.</div>

<div><br></div>
<div>;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:</div>
<div>
<a href="http://ns3.google.com">ns3.google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>108462<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>A<span class="">	</span>216.239.36.10</div>

<div>
<a href="http://ns4.google.com">ns4.google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>108462<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>A<span class="">	</span>216.239.38.10</div>

<div>
<a href="http://ns1.google.com">ns1.google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>108462<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>A<span class="">	</span>216.239.32.10</div>

<div>
<a href="http://ns2.google.com">ns2.google.com</a>.<span class="">		</span>108462<span class="">	</span>IN<span class="">	</span>A<span class="">	</span>216.239.34.10</div>

<div><br></div>
<div>;; Query time: 22 msec</div>
<div>;; SERVER: 141.161.100.201#53(141.161.100.201)</div>
<div>;; WHEN: Sun Jul 06 12:42:09 EDT 2014</div>
<div>;; MSG SIZE &nbsp;rcvd: 207</div>
</div>
<div><br></div>
<div><br></div>

</div></div>

Gmane