1 Dec 2004 01:01
RE: Attacking Domain Keys
Hallam-Baker, Phillip <pbaker <at> verisign.com>
2004-12-01 00:01:20 GMT
2004-12-01 00:01:20 GMT
> -----Original Message----- > From: owner-spf-discuss <at> v2.listbox.com > [mailto:owner-spf-discuss <at> v2.listbox.com] On Behalf Of Seth Goodman > HMAC-SHA1 is a form of MAC, as I'm sure you'll agree. SES > uses HMAC-SHA1 signatures and SHA-1 digests, so it seems to > meet your exception. Apparently, it is possible to have a > signature scheme that is less complex and costly than RSA. And as I pointed out, a symmetric keyed MAC algorithm does not work for the problem that DK is addressing. The use in SES is only possible because the signature only needs to be verified by the party that generated it. It is possible to apply similar techniques in the manner of Kerberos and SSL but these are both complex mult-trip protocols that would require an entire redesign of the email communication protocol to make use of. The use of these techniques was not rejected through ignorance of them as you appear to believe. > Non-existent? SPF-Discuss has archives and so does > SES-Devel. Read the archives, search under my name and SES > and please stop the name-calling. If you give no hint as to the context then there is no way that I can tell what you might be referring to. I have been designing crypto protocols for over a decade. You do not have the standing in that community to dismiss others with 'go read the(Continue reading)
Bye, Frank
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