1 Dec 2006 03:52
Re: WinXP+PEAP+Cert Behavior
Jouni Malinen <jkmaline <at> cc.hut.fi>
2006-12-01 02:52:34 GMT
2006-12-01 02:52:34 GMT
On Thu, Nov 30, 2006 at 06:11:52AM +0100, Benn wrote: > Thanks for the well crafted answer, that was basically what I expected to hear, but was hoping otherwise :) The interesting thing is, the client is definitely sending out some kind of packet which gets turned into a request to the radius server: > > <<HOSTAPD > IEEE 802.1X: 9 bytes from 00:13:d3:6f:b1:4e > IEEE 802.1X: version=1 type=0 length=5 > EAP: code=2 identifier=1 length=5 (response) > ath0: STA 00:13:d3:6f:b1:4e IEEE 802.1X: received EAP packet (code=2 id=1 len=5) from STA: EAP Response-Identity (1) > ath0: STA 00:13:d3:6f:b1:4e IEEE 802.1X: STA identity '' If the client is using Microsoft's WZC, this frame is likely the probe it uses for autodetecting the network security parameters. If you are more interested in that, take a look at Wireless Provisioning Services (WPS). Microsoft has some documention available for it. -- -- Jouni Malinen PGP id EFC895FA
Yes. I know. I said the same thing, actually :)
> If anyone can associate and get a key, then I don't think the encryption
> that's in place for the other clients is really worth anything anymore
> either. I think it may be possible to start basically "stealing"
> traffic (see e.g. Ettercap) using ARP poisoning. If you're able to get
> the server to send you data that was meant for another machine, then
> your machine will be able to decrypt it.
Well, the key rotation should keep it from being interceptable simply from any point, but snarfing the
entire stream would, without a shared secret of some kind, of course compromise the whole setup. So
naturally if WinXP boxs were set up to default permit SSL signed certificates (which has the problems
you've previously mentioned, and others) that'd be avoidable. Otherwise, our friend Mallory will have a fieldday.
> But if that's still acceptable, and your management *really* only wants
> the appearance of security, then you could probably hack up the internal
> RADIUS server to always send Access-Accepts after the first packet.
> Actually, you could probably hack together a fairly small standalone
> RADIUS server that responds to anything on udp/1812 with an
> Access-Accept (and at that point, you might as well just not bother
> checking the RADIUS authenticator either -- although you would need to
RSS Feed