amg | 1 Jul 2003 02:11
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Re: Making PKI universally usable - was: Re: Acquisition Problem Solved for some certs?


Hi,

Isn't the telephone solution an "online" solution? ;-)

Antonio MaƱa.

> Peter - Tom - in addition to the really powerful set of verification rules
> that Tom came up with here (bravo TG!), there is another problem with making
> PKI acceptable to the real-world... and that problem is that this type of
> verification **mandates** online services and for any number of certificate
> based infrastructures.
> 
> The problem is that we as commercial users **would** really like to be able
> to use x509 PKI's offline, and that also can be done. To meet this need I
> would suggest that an OOB validation process using the Telephone (yes a
> standard Touch Tone POTS should work just fine)...
> 
> All you would have to do is to call the number and key in the finger print
> of the cert which the provider could tell you if its valid from them
> currently - or could the 'responder' issue a One-Time Token to satisfy some
> installer function with this certificate as part of OOB installer practice.
> 
> The way to do this is with a local OCSP or CRL responder applet that uses a
> soft-token as part of the verification process based on the certs
> fingerprint... or somesuch.
> 
> This simple addition to the technology base totally makes x509 certs capable
> of being used offline as well as the basis of a stand-alone process...
> 
(Continue reading)

Yasir Khan | 1 Jul 2003 11:59

A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP)

Hi,
 
I have a question about 'Signed Response Acceptance Requirements' in RFC-2560 (OCSP), I am quoting the part of the document related to my question.
 
3.2  Signed Response Acceptance Requirements

   Prior to accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients SHALL confirm that:

   1. The certificate identified in a received response corresponds to that which was identified in the corresponding request;
   2. The signature on the response is valid;
   3. The identity of the signer matches the intended recipient of the request.
   4. The signer is currently authorized to sign the response.
   5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent.
   6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is greater than the current time.
Requirement 4 is very ambiguous, there comes many possibilities to satisfy this requirement e.g.
 
a) EKU in signer certificate must contain OCSPSigning
b) Signer certificate is not revoked
c) Signer certificate is issued by the same CA that issed the target certificate to be checked for revocation
d) Issuer of the signer certificate is explicitly trusted 
 
I want to know the exact check(s) to satisfy the requiremtent 4.
 
Thanx,
 
Regards,
Yasir Khan
Attachment (smime.p7s): application/x-pkcs7-signature, 3299 bytes
Internet-Drafts | 1 Jul 2003 13:23
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I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: Simple Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP)
	Author(s)	: A. Malpani, R. Housley, T. Freeman
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt
	Pages		: 44
	Date		: 2003-6-30
	
SCVP allows a client to offload certificate handling to a server.  
The server can provide the client with a variety of valuable 
information about the certificate, such as whether the certificate 
is valid, a certification path to a trust anchor, and revocation 
status.  SCVP has many purposes, including simplifying client 
implementations and allowing companies to centralize trust and 
policy management.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-12.txt

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Faisal | 1 Jul 2003 14:35

SCVP Questions

Hi,
 
    Following things are not clear to me, can any one please do clear these:
  1. If SCVPServer goes for revocation checking of QuriedCertificate and did not find valid revocation information about certificate from local repository and problem to connect ldap with reason that ldap is not responding or temperaly off and same with ocsp too. In this case this should not called as Internal Error, so revocation status should be Unknown for the certificate.
    In this case SCVPServer has not any valid OCSPResponse or CRL related QuriedCertificate and in WantBack revocation information is required, so how we can handle this case?
  2. If SCVPServer recieves a request with one certificate for query and found a CRL in which issuer of the certificate is revoked but query certificate is not revoked in that CRL, what would be the response of the quried certificate, either Revoked or Good or ?
  3. If queried certificate is expired then what would be the response either Revoked or SCVPServer should process for revocation checking of the certificate?
    Also if on expired certificate SCVPServer should send back status as revoked then what would be the revocation information about Revoked status? because we have not checked any OCSPResponse or CRL for this condition.
There are more things but related above, may be your kind replies will do fix those automatically.
 
Thanks in advance for replies.
Regards,
Faisal Maqsood
 
Attachment (smime.p7s): application/x-pkcs7-signature, 3264 bytes
Miguel Rodriguez | 1 Jul 2003 17:26

FW: A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP)

Attachment (smime.p7m): application/pkcs7-mime, 19 KiB
Trevor Freeman | 1 Jul 2003 21:20
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RE: SCVP Questions

See below

 

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix <at> mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix <at> mail.imc.org] On Behalf Of Faisal
Sent:
Tuesday, July 01, 2003 5:36 AM
To: ietf-pkix <at> imc.org
Subject: SCVP Questions

 

Hi,

 

    Following things are not clear to me, can any one please do clear these:

1.     If SCVPServer goes for revocation checking of QuriedCertificate and did not find valid revocation information about certificate from local repository and problem to connect ldap with reason that ldap is not responding or temperaly off and same with ocsp too. In this case this should not called as Internal Error, so revocation status should be Unknown for the certificate.

[Trevor Freeman] If the ldap connection failed – unknown, if it succeeded but unavailable.


In this case SCVPServer has not any valid OCSPResponse or CRL related QuriedCertificate and in WantBack revocation information is required, so how we can handle this case?

2.     If SCVPServer recieves a request with one certificate for query and found a CRL in which issuer of the certificate is revoked but query certificate is not revoked in that CRL, what would be the response of the quried certificate, either Revoked or Good or ?

[Trevor Freeman] Revoked. The chain you describe would fail the algorithm described in RFC3280 section 6.

3.     If queried certificate is expired then what would be the response either Revoked or SCVPServer should process for revocation checking of the certificate?

[Trevor Freeman] certPathNotValid

Also if on expired certificate SCVPServer should send back status as revoked then what would be the revocation information about Revoked status? because we have not checked any OCSPResponse or CRL for this condition.

There are more things but related above, may be your kind replies will do fix those automatically.

 

Thanks in advance for replies.

Regards,

Faisal Maqsood

 

Masaki SHIMAOKA | 2 Jul 2003 16:07
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I-D: multi-domain PKI Interoperability


Hi all,

As Ryu said in last IETF meeting, I am writing a Inetenet-Draft for
multi-domain PKI interoperability as a best current practice. This fruit is based on several
multi-domain PKI interoperability experiments and documents.
# This is an individual submission.

Here is an abstract of this I-D.

	Title		: Memorandum for multi-domain PKI Interoperability
	Author(s)	: M. Shimaoka
	Filename	: draft-shimaoka-multidomain-pki-00.txt
	Pages		: 16
	Date		: June 2003

===== Abstract =====
This memo is used to share the awareness necessary to deployment of
multi-domain PKI. Scope of this memo is to establish trust
relationship and interoperability between plural PKI domains.  Both
single-domain PKI and multi-domain PKI are established by the trust
relationships between Certification Authorities (CAs).  Typical and
primitive PKI models are specified as single-domain PKI.  Multi-
domain PKI established by plural single-domain PKI is categorized as
multi-trust point model and single-trust point model. Multi-trust
point model is based on trust list model, and single-trust point
model is based on cross-certification.
===== Abstract =====

The I-D has already published on IETF repository, but I revised several parts after that.
So, please refer the following URLs:
    http://www.jnsa.org/mpki/
    http://www.jnsa.org/mpki/draft-shimaoka-multidomain-pki-00.txt

URL above invites you to our activity for multi-domain PKI
interoperability framework, as you know as what reported in past IETF
meetings.

If you are interested in this, please let me know.
Thanks in advance for any comments.

-----
Masaki SHIMAOKA

SECOM Trust.net
System Engineering Dpt.
Tel: +81 422 91 8493 (ext.3551)
Fax: +81 422 45 0536
e-mail: shimaoka <at> secom.ne.jp

Internet-Drafts | 3 Jul 2003 00:10
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I-D ACTION:draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt

A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
This draft is a work item of the Public-Key Infrastructure (X.509) Working Group of the IETF.

	Title		: X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers
	Author(s)	: C. Lynn et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt
	Pages		: 24
	Date		: 2003-7-2
	
This document defines two private X.509 v3 certificate extensions.
The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the
subject of a certificate.  The second binds a list of Autonomous
System Identifiers to the subject of a certificate.  These extensions
may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP
addresses and Autonomous System identifiers contained in the
extensions.

A URL for this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt

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Manger, James H | 3 Jul 2003 03:26

IP addr: 01: use NULL instead of BOOLEAN for inherit


1.
Instead of a BOOLEAN type for which TRUE is required and FALSE is forbidden, simply use a NULL type.

Change the type of the inherit fields in IPAddressChoice (2.2.3) and ASIdentifierChoice (3.2.3) to the following:

   IPAddressChoice     ::= CHOICE {
      inherit              NULL, -- Inherit from Issuer
      addressesOrRanges    SEQUENCE OF IPAddressOrRange }

   ASIdentifierChoice ::= CHOICE {
      inherit             NULL, -- Inherit from Issuer
      asIdsOrRanges       SEQUENCE OF ASIdOrRange }

The associated text describing the inherit fields (2.2.3.5 & 3.2.3.3) can be simplified accordingly.

2.
It seems unnecessary to set these extensions to CRITICAL.  A relying party is not misled by ignoring these
extensions -- it simply learns nothing new about IP address and AS allocations.

Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate is binding a public key to these
addresses instead of any other type of name so the subject (and subjectAltName) fields should be ignored. 
If this is the case, it may be better to formulate the extensions as OTHER-NAME types to be used in the
subjectAltName extension (in which case no other names needs to be included).

Perhaps making it CRITICAL is supposed to indicate that the certificate should only be used in, say, Secure
BGP and not for, say, secure e-mail.  If this is the case, defining a new purpose identifier for the
extendedKeyUsage extension may be more appropriate.

3.
Why does everything have to be sorted?  Does it really make it easy or faster for CAs and relying parties?

-----Original Message-----
From: Internet-Drafts <at> ietf.org [mailto:Internet-Drafts <at> ietf.org]
Sent: Thursday, 3 July 2003 8:10 AM
Cc: ietf-pkix <at> imc.org
Subject: IP addr: 01: draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt

	Title		: X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers
	Author(s)	: C. Lynn et al.
	Filename	: draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt
	Pages		: 24
	Date		: 2003-7-2
	
This document defines two private X.509 v3 certificate extensions.  The first binds a list of IP address
blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate.  The second binds a list of Autonomous System
Identifiers to the subject of a certificate.  These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of
the subject to use the IP addresses and Autonomous System identifiers contained in the extensions.

http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-pkix-x509-ipaddr-as-extn-01.txt

Ambarish Malpani | 3 Jul 2003 18:04

RE: A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP)

 
Hi Yasir,
    The client needs to "know" that it can trust the signer. This trust can happen
in one of 3 ways:
 
1. The CA signs the response
2. The CA delegates signing authority to a VA to sign the response
3. The client has a separate signing relationship with a VA who does
validation for it. In this case the signer is authorized to sign because
of a private relationship between the client and the VA.
 
Regards,
Ambarish
 
 

---------------------------------------------------------------------
Ambarish Malpani                                          650.759.9045
Malpani Consulting Services                                  ambarish <at> malpani.biz                         http://www.malpani.biz

-----Original Message-----
From: owner-ietf-pkix <at> mail.imc.org [mailto:owner-ietf-pkix <at> mail.imc.org]On Behalf Of Yasir Khan
Sent: Tuesday, July 01, 2003 3:00 AM
To: ietf-pkix <at> imc.org
Subject: A question about RFC-2560 (OCSP)

Hi,
 
I have a question about 'Signed Response Acceptance Requirements' in RFC-2560 (OCSP), I am quoting the part of the document related to my question.
 
3.2  Signed Response Acceptance Requirements

   Prior to accepting a signed response as valid, OCSP clients SHALL confirm that:

   1. The certificate identified in a received response corresponds to that which was identified in the corresponding request;
   2. The signature on the response is valid;
   3. The identity of the signer matches the intended recipient of the request.
   4. The signer is currently authorized to sign the response.
   5. The time at which the status being indicated is known to be correct (thisUpdate) is sufficiently recent.
   6. When available, the time at or before which newer information will be available about the status of the certificate (nextUpdate) is greater than the current time.
Requirement 4 is very ambiguous, there comes many possibilities to satisfy this requirement e.g.
 
a) EKU in signer certificate must contain OCSPSigning
b) Signer certificate is not revoked
c) Signer certificate is issued by the same CA that issed the target certificate to be checked for revocation
d) Issuer of the signer certificate is explicitly trusted 
 
I want to know the exact check(s) to satisfy the requiremtent 4.
 
Thanx,
 
Regards,
Yasir Khan

Gmane