Hodges, Jeff | 17 Oct 02:22 2014
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wrt closing the websec WG (was: DISCUSS positions on draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning

On 10/11/14, 1:03 PM, "Barry Leiba" <barryleiba <at> computer.org> wrote:

>  The working group will officially remain open until the RFC is
>published, after which I'll close it, but will leave the mailing list
>open for any continued discussion.

Yes, please do leave the mailing list open, the Web is a percolating pot
and there may well be more protocol-level security stuff boiling over into
IETF territory (I don’t have a firm example right now, but something along
the lines of defining more generic policy-expression format(s) is not hard
to imagine), and so perhaps similar to what we did with HTTP-State, who
knows, we might have a need to re-spin it up.

Thanks,

=JeffH

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IETF Secretariat | 13 Oct 17:13 2014
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ID Tracker State Update Notice: <draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21.txt>

IESG has approved the document and state has been changed to Approved-announcement sent
ID Tracker URL: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

Jeffrey Walton | 14 Oct 18:33 2014
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Question on Pinning Overrides

Section 2.7 states:

   UAs MAY choose to implement additional sources of pinning
   information, such as through built-in lists of pinning information.
   Such UAs should allow users to override such additional sources,
   including disabling them from consideration.

>From section 2.7, I understand a _user_ can provide an override to a
_preloaded_ pinset. But I don't see where a user is provided the
authority to override a non-preloaded pinset. And I don't see where an
external entity is provided authority to override a preloaded or
non-preloaded pinset.

Is this correct?

If correct, shouldn't the user be allowed to override both preloaded
and non-preloaded pinsets?

If correct, won't that break Chrome with respect to
http://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/05/04/pinning.html (see section
"What about MITM proxies, Fiddler etc?")?

The IESG | 13 Oct 17:13 2014
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Protocol Action: 'Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP' to Proposed Standard (draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21.txt)

The IESG has approved the following document:
- 'Public Key Pinning Extension for HTTP'
  (draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21.txt) as Proposed Standard

This document is the product of the Web Security Working Group.

The IESG contact persons are Barry Leiba and Pete Resnick.

A URL of this Internet Draft is:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

Technical Summary

This spec describes an extension to the HTTP protocol allowing web
host operators to instruct user agents to remember ("pin") the hosts'
cryptographic identities for a given period of time.  During that
time, UAs will require that the host present a certificate chain
including at least one Subject Public Key Info structure whose
fingerprint matches one of the pinned fingerprints for that host.  By
effectively reducing the number of authorities who can authenticate
the domain during the lifetime of the pin, pinning may reduce the
incidence of man-in-the-middle attacks due to compromised
Certification Authorities.

Review and Consensus

Previous versions of this document received useful reviews on the 
mailing list. Many changes were introduced due to working group 
consensus, including to pin format, an includeSubdomains directive,
and interaction with private trust anchors. 
(Continue reading)

IETF Secretariat | 11 Oct 21:52 2014
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ID Tracker State Update Notice: <draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21.txt>

IESG state changed to Approved-announcement to be sent from IESG Evaluation::AD Followup
ID Tracker URL: http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

Kathleen Moriarty | 11 Oct 21:10 2014
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Kathleen Moriarty's No Objection on draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21: (with COMMENT)

Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)

Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.

The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for the adjustments to address my concerns/questions.

Stephen Farrell | 9 Oct 14:42 2014
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Stephen Farrell's Yes on draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21: (with COMMENT)

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21: Yes

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)

Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.

The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for clearing up my discuss points. One possible
remaining nit though:

- In 2.2 you say: "(1) the processing rules for HTTP
   request messages received over a secure transport (e.g.
   authenticated, non-anonymous TLS); "

Should the "e.g." be an "i.e." ? It's probably fine either
way but just wondered.

-- OLD comments below, didn't check 'em

abstract and elswhere: SubjectPublicKeyInfo doesn't usually
(Continue reading)

Ted Lemon | 8 Oct 17:02 2014

Ted Lemon's No Objection on draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21: (with COMMENT)

Ted Lemon has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21: No Objection

When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
introductory paragraph, however.)

Please refer to http://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.

The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

----------------------------------------------------------------------
COMMENT:
----------------------------------------------------------------------

I've cleared my DISCUSS.   For the record, here it is, but there is no
further action required:

This mechanism relies on there being no MiTM attack from a compromised
signing key either prior to a legitimate pinning, or in a situation where
the host being "protected" doesn't actually do pinning.   I think this
should be mentioned in the security considerations section.   I raise
this to the level of DISCUSS because I think this actually creates a new
attack surface for government censorship: you MiTM the host you're
attacking, pin it to a cert signed using a compromised CA, and then that
UA can't communicate with the host again for the duration of the pin.

The scenario would be that the government has a transparent web cache in
(Continue reading)

internet-drafts | 6 Oct 03:23 2014
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New Version Notification - draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21.txt


A new version (-21) has been submitted for draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21.txt

The IETF datatracker page for this Internet-Draft is:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning/

Diff from previous version:
http://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-websec-key-pinning-21

Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.

IETF Secretariat.

Nazmul Bablu | 26 Sep 02:33 2014
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networking

pray for rebecca meius

Hill, Brad | 16 Sep 23:09 2014
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Review request for a few WebAppSec specs.

BCC: public-webappsec <at> , FYI.
CC: <WebAppSec editors/chairs>

Hello IETF WebSec folks,

The WebAppSec WG over at the W3C has a few specifications in flight for which we're actively seeking
feedback. One or more of them might be interesting to you; if you have some spare time, we'd very much
appreciate your feedback:

CSP2: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/content-security-policy/
Mixed Content: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/mixedcontent/
Referrer Policy: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/referrer-policy/
Subresource Integrity: https://w3c.github.io/webappsec/specs/subresourceintegrity/

The first three are in pretty good shape both in terms of the spec text and implementations. The last (SRI)
would be more of a pre-review, but would still be helpful for us.

Thanks!

Brad Hill

Gmane