6 Jan 2004 00:07
Re: Establishment of SCTP association
Brian F. G. Bidulock <bidulock <at> openss7.org>
2004-01-05 23:07:36 GMT
2004-01-05 23:07:36 GMT
Mikael.Latvala, Doing so would destroy the reliability of a multi-homed association. As an operator's policy, the operator is welcome to prohibit multi-homed associations altogether. Then the operator can be sure that the INIT-ACK address is the same as the INIT. I think you speak of a operational issue rather than a protocol issue. --brian On Mon, 29 Dec 2003, Mikael.Latvala <at> nokia.com wrote: > Michael, > > I agree, that true man-in-middle can do lots of harm at the transport layer. However, association highjack is definately the worst one. > > If you want to use IPsec against such attacks, configuring IPsec becomes in no time mission impossible, if INIT-ACK's source IP address can be different than INIT's destination IP address. Simple because if this is allowed, person configuring IPsec policy database must know before hand any IP address that the peer may use in an SCTP assocation. > > However, if INIT-ACK's source IP address would be always the same than INIT's destination IP address, then person in charge of configuring IPsec policy database would have to know only one IP address. The other additional IP addresses negotiated during and possibly after SCTP association setup could be dynamically added to the IPsec policy database. > > Obviously one could use wildcard in a source selector field in IPsec policy database. Unfortunately there are plenty of companies who do not approve such security policy. >(Continue reading)
RSS Feed