trans issue tracker | 27 Jan 11:48 2015
Picon

[trans] #56 (rfc6962-bis): "*" domain labels MUST NOT be redacted

#56: "*" domain labels MUST NOT be redacted

 I can't think of any legitimate reason to redact a "*" label.

 We should disallow redaction of "*" labels, so that a bad actor cannot
 attempt to hide their use of "*" labels in a disallowed context (e.g. EV
 certs).

 6962-bis needs to state this as a CA requirement.

--

-- 
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------
 Reporter:                           |      Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  rob.stradling <at> comodo.com           |  rfc6962-bis <at> tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect                   |     Status:  new
 Priority:  major                    |  Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis              |    Version:
 Severity:  -                        |   Keywords:
-------------------------------------+-------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/56>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>
Stephen Kent | 22 Jan 17:55 2015
Picon

sorry about the formatting problem for the attack taxonomy outline

looked good in my e-mail SW :-(

this version, using decimal numbering for the outline should be
easier to read even if the formatting is messed up ...


Steve

-----

1. CA

1.1.       Non-malicious CA

1.1.1.        Error

1.1.2.        Attack victim

1.1.2.1.         Certificate logged

1.1.2.1.1. Benign log

1.1.2.1.1.1.  Self-monitor

1.1.2.1.1.2.  Benign 3rd party Monitor

1.1.2.1.1.3.  Conspiring 3rd party Monitor

1.1.2.1.2. Conspiring log

1.1.2.2.         Certificate not logged

1.2.       Malicious CA

1.2.1.        Certificate logged

1.2.1.1.         Benign log

1.2.1.1.1. Self-monitor

1.2.1.1.2. Benign 3rd party Monitor

1.2.1.1.3. Conspiring 3rd party Monitor

1.2.1.2.         Conspiring log

1.2.2.        Certificate not logged

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Stephen Kent | 22 Jan 17:48 2015
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updated attack analysis

updated to reflect dropping TLS client behavior specs, no gossip protocol yet defined,
and no stand-alone Auditors.

comments welcome, but I'm abut to head off on vacation, so I won't be able to respond immediately

Steve

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XX. Attack Model and Discussion of Detection and Mitigation Options

 

Certificate mis-issuance may arise in one of several ways. The ways that CT enables a Subject (or others) to detect and redress mis-issuance depends on the context and the entities involved in the mis-issuance. This attack model applies to the Web PKI context. If CT is applied to other contexts, each will require its own attack model, although most of the model described here is likely to be applicable.

 

Certificates are issued by CAs, so the top level differentiation is whether the CA that mis-issued a certificate did so maliciously or not. If not, then the next point of differentiation is whether the mis-issuance was the result of an error, an attack, or malicious behavior by a CA. In the case of an attack or malicious behavior by a CA, it is necessary to consider whether the certificate was logged. If the certificate was logged, it is necessary to consider whether the log(s) may have conspired with the attacker. Finally, one must consider the possibility that a third party Monitor might collude with an attacker (or a malicious CA). Here’s an taxonomy of attacks and assumptions about the attack environment:

1. CA

a. Non-malicious CA

                                                                        i.   Error

                                                                     ii.   Attack victim

1. Certificate logged

a. Benign log

                                                                          i.   Self-monitor

                                                                                                                        ii.   Benign 3rd party Monitor

                                                                                                                      iii.   Conspiring 3rd party Monitor

b. Conspiring log

2. Certificate not logged

b. Malicious CA

                                                               i.   Certificate logged

1. Benign log

a. Self-monitor

b. Benign 3rd party Monitor

c. Conspiring 3rd party Monitor

2. Conspiring log

                                        ii.   Certificate not logged

 

 

The following sections examine each of these cases, for both syntactic and semantic mis-issuance. As noted above, the focus here is on the Web PKI context, although most of the analysis is applicable to other PKI contexts.

 

 

XX.1 Non-malicious Web PKI CA context

 

If a pre-certificate is submitted to a log, prior to issuance of a certificate, syntactic mis-issuance can (optionally) be detected, and noted. This will happen only if the log performs syntactic checks in general, and if the log is capable of performing the checks applicable to the submitted (pre-) certificate. (A pre-certificate will be logged even if it fails syntactic validation, thus logging takes precedence over detection of syntactic mis-issuance.) If syntactic validation fails, this will be noted in the SCT returned to the CA. Because this case assumes a non-malicious CA, the CA will remedy the syntactic problem and re-submit the pre-certificate to a log. In this case syntactic checking by a log helps avoid issuance of a malformed certificate.

 

If a certificate is submitted by its Subject, we assume that the Subject will contact the issuer and request a new certificate if a log indicates that the certificate failed the applicable syntactic check. Here too syntactic checking by a log enables a Subject to be informed that its certificate is malformed and thus may hasten issuance of a replacement certificate.

 

If the certificate was submitted by a third party, that party might contact the Subject or the issuer, but because the party is not the Subject of the certificate it is not clear how the issuer will respond.

 

Bottom line: Syntactic mis-issuance of a certificate can be avoided by a CA if it makes use of logs that are capable of performing these checks for the types of certificates that are submitted, and if the CA acts on the feedback it receives. If a CA uses a log that does not perform such checks, or if the CA requests checking relative to criteria not supported by the log, then syntactic mis-issuance will not be detected or avoided by this mechanism. Syntactic mis-issuance can be remedied if a Subject submits a certificate to a log that performs syntactic checks, and if the Subject requests the issuer to fix problems detected by the log. (The issuer is presumed to be willing to re-issue the certificate, correcting any problems, because the CA is not malicious.)

 

XX.1.1 A CA may issue the certificate to an unauthorized party (semantic mis-issuance), as a result of an error or because it was the victim of a social engineering attack. We will refer to such a certificate as “bogus”. In this case the CA has a record of the bogus certificate and it is prepared to revoke the bogus certificate once it has confirmed its error. If the CA is submitting (pre-) certificates for logging, there will be evidence of the mis-issuance in one or more logs. If a Monitor is “protecting” the affected Subject, it will detect the mis-issuance, and will alert the Subject. Because the CA has a record of the mis-issuance, it should be able to revoke the bogus certificate, after investigating, based on the information provided by the legitimate certificate Subject. The presence of an embedded SCT in the bogus certificate, or an SCT accompanying the bogus certificate is irrelevant to the mitigation procedure in this case. (See Note 1 below.) Because the mis-issuance was not malicious, there is no notion of a log operator or a Monitor conspiring with the CA.

 

XX.1.2 A non-malicious Web PKI CA may be the victim of an undetected attack (c.f., DigiNotar [cite]) which results in semantic mis-issuance of a certificate. In this case the CA is not aware of the mis-issuance and may have no record of the certificate content.

 

XX.1.2.1 The mis-issued certificate may have been submitted to one or more logs prior to issuance, to acquire an embedded SCT, or post-issuance to acquire a standalone SCT. In either case, a Monitor that is protecting the targeted Subject will detect the bogus certificate and can alert the Subject. The Subject, in turn, will request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the CA will make use of the log entry (supplied by the Subject) to determine the serial number of the mis-issued certificate, and revoke it (after investigation). (See Notes 1 + 2.) Since there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a certificate when no SCT is provided, the preferred strategy for an attacker is to not log bogus certificates. (See XX.1.2.2 and Note 3.)

 

XX.1.2.2 The bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. Since TLS clients are not required to reject a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, or even to notify a user in such situations, the attacker will not be thwarted in this case. (See Note 3.)

 

XX.1.2.3 The bogus certificate may have been submitted to logs that are conspiring with the attacker. In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate because the logs will suppress a bogus certificate log entry. TLS clients will not reject a bogus certificate in this case, because it is accompanied by an SCT. In this scenario, unless Monitors “gossip” to detect conspiring logs, the bogus certificate will not be detected. Because there are no requirements for such gossiping, an attack of this sort can succeed based on the current CT design.

 

XX.1.2.4 If a semantically bogus certificate is submitted to non-conspiring logs, a Subject performing self-monitoring will be able to detect the bogus certificate and request revocation. If a Subject relies on a third-party Monitor, and that Monitor conspires with the attacker, the Subject will not be alerted and thus will not request revocation.

 

 

XX.2 Malicious Web PKI CA context

 

XX.2.1 If a (pre-) certificate is submitted to a (non-conspiring) log, syntactic mis-issuance can be detected, and noted. This will happen only if the log performs syntactic checks in general, and if the log is capable of performing the checks applicable to the submitted certificate. A (pre-) certificate will be logged even if it fails syntactic validation, thus logging takes precedence over detection of syntactic mis-issuance.

 

Because the CA is presumed to be malicious, the CA may cause the log to not perform checks, in one of several ways.

1.           The CA may assert that the certificate is being issued w/o regard to any guidelines (the “no guidelines” reserved CCID).

2.           The CA may assert a CCID that has not been registered, and thus no log will be able to perform a check.

3.           the CA may check to see which CCIDs a log declares it can check, and chose a registered CCID that is not checked by the log in question. In this fashion the CA can prevent the log from performing checks, and the SCT and log entry will not contain an indication of a failed check.

4.           The CA may submit a (pre-) certificate to a log that is known to not perform any syntactic checks, and thus avoid syntactic checking.

 

Since there is no requirement that a TLS client can be configured to reject a certificate that has not been syntactically checked (as indicated by the SCT), a malicious CA need not worry about failing a log-based check. Similarly,

since there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a certificate that was logged by an operator that does not perform syntactic checks, the fourth approach noted above will succeed as well. If a client were configured to know which versions of certificate types are applicable to its use of a certificate, the second and third strategies noted above could be thwarted.

 

XX.2.2 Because the CA is presumed malicious, it may choose to not submit a certificate to a log. This avoids detection of syntactic mis-issuance by a log, but it also means there is no SCT for the certificate. Since there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, this form of mis-issuance will succeed. (See Note 3.)

 

XX.2.3 A malicious CA may submit a certificate to one or more logs that collude with this CA to not perform syntactic checks, even though they claim to do so. In this case syntactic mis-issuance will not be detected by logs.  The log entry and the SCT for a syntactically invalid certificate will assert that the certificate syntax was verified. Unless Monitors also perform syntactic checks, this form of mis-issuance will not be thwarted. TLS clients will believe that the certificate has been syntactically verified.

 

XX.2.4 A malicious CA may semantically mis-issue a certificate that is syntactically valid. Because it is syntactically valid, logs will not mark the bogus certificate as failing a syntax check. The semantically bogus certificate may have been issued because the CA was bribed or was compelled to issue the certificate. (A CA might be compelled to issue a bogus certificate by a government agency or a criminal organization.)  This CA might be one or more tiers below a trust anchor (aka root CA).

 

XX.2.4.1 A bogus certificate may not have been submitted to any logs. In this case, Monitors will not detect the bogus certificate. Since there is no requirement for a TLS client to reject a certificate that lacks (or is not accompanied by) an SCT, there is no motivation for an attacker to submit the certificate in this case. (See Note 3.)

 

XX.2.4.2 A bogus pre-certificate may have been submitted to one or more logs, to acquire an embedded SCT, a certificate may have been submitted post-issuance (to acquire a standalone SCT). In either case, a (non-conspiring) Monitor protecting the targeted Subject will detect a bogus certificate and alert that Subject. The Subject, in turn, will request the CA to revoke the bogus certificate. In this case, the CA may refuse, or substantially delay, to revoke the bogus certificate. It could make excuses about inadequate proof that the certificate is bogus, or argue that it cannot quickly revoke the certificate because of local, legal concerns, etc. In this case, the CT mechanisms have detected mis-issuance, but the information logged by CT does not help remedy the problem. (See Note 4.)

 

XX.2.4.3 If a third-party Monitor conspires with the malicious CA, then it will not notify the targeted Subject when a bogus certificate is logged. If a Subject performs self-monitoring this sort of attack will be avoided.

 

XX.2.5 A bogus certificate may have been submitted to one or more conspiring logs. These logs will issue SCTs, but will hide the log entries from some or all Monitors. Any Monitor (even a self-Monitor) from which the log is hiding data will not detect the bogus certificate, even if it is trying to protect the targeted Subject. If a client accepts an SCT from a conspiring log, then the client will not reject the bogus certificate on the basis of a missing SCT. In this case CT will not detect the bogus certificate.

 

The audit function is intended to detect logs that conspire to suppress log entries, based on consistency checking of logs and use of a “gossip” protocol. It is assumed that Monitors will perform the audit functions described in Section <insert #>.

A Monitor performing an audit function could alert its clients if the Monitor detects evidence of malfeasant log operation. This would cause Monitors to avoid using such a log, and clients would reject SCTs generated by such a log. Because there is no defined gossip protocol, CT does not provide the necessary info to detect this form of mis-issuance. (See Note 5 below.)

 

Notes:

 

1. If a CA submits a bogus certificate to one or more logs, but these logs are not watched by a Monitor that is protecting the targeted Subject, CT will not mitigate this type of mis-issuance attack. It is not clear whether every Monitor MUST offer to track every Subject that requests protection. Absent such a guarantee, how do Subjects know which set of Monitors will provide “sufficient” coverage? If a Subject acts as its own Monitor, this problem is solved for that Subject. It also is not clear how a Monitor becomes aware of all (relevant?) logs, including newly created logs. The means by which Monitors become aware of new logs MUST accommodate self-monitoring by a potentially very large number of web site operators.

 

2. A CA being presented with evidence of a bogus certificate, in the form of a log entry, will need to examine its records to determine if it has knowledge of the certificate in question. It also will likely require the targeted Subject to provide assurances that it is the authorized entity representing the Subject name (subjectAltname) in question. Thus a Subject should not expect immediate revocation of a contested certificate. The time frame in which a CA will respond to a revocation request usually is described in the CPS for the CA. Other certificate fields and extensions may be of interest for forensic purposes, but are not required to effect revocation nor to verify that the certificate to be revoked is bogus, based on applicable criteria. The SCT and log entry, because each contains a timestamp from a third party, is probably valuable for forensic purposes (assuming a non-conspiring log operator).

 

3. If a TLS client were to reject a certificate that lacks an embedded SCT, or is not accompanied by an SCT transported via the TLS handshake, this behavior needs to be defined in a way that is compatible with incremental deployment. Issuing a warning to a (human) user is probably insufficient, based on experience with warnings displayed for expired certificates, lack of certificate revocation status information, and similar errors that violate RFC 5280 path validation rules. Until a mechanism is defined that accommodates incremental deployment of this capability, attackers probably will avoid submitting bogus certificates to (non-conspiring) logs as a means of evading detection.

 

4. A targeted Subject might request the parent of a malicious CA to revoke the certificate of the non-cooperative CA. However, a request of this sort may be rejected, e.g., because of the potential for significant collateral damage. A browser might be configured to reject all certificates issued by the malicious CA, e.g., using a CA hot list distributed by a browser vendor. However, if the malicious CA has a sufficient number of legitimate clients, treating all of them as bogus still represents serious collateral damage. If this specification were to require that a browser can be configured to reject a specific, bogus certificate identified by a Monitor, then the bogus certificate could be rejected in that fashion. This mitigation strategy calls for communication between Monitors and browsers, or between Monitors and browser vendors. Such communication has not been specified, i.e., there are no standard ways to configure a browser to reject individual bogus certificates based on info provided by an external entity such as a Monitor. Moreover, the same or another malicious CA could issue new bogus certificates for the targeted Subject, which would have to be detected and rejected in this (as yet unspecified) fashion. Thus, for now, CT does not seem to provide a way to mitigate this form of attack, even though it provides a basis for detecting such attacks.

 

5. The combination of a malicious CA and one or more conspiring logs motivates the definition of an audit function, to detect conspiring logs. If a Monitor protecting s Subject does not see mis-issued certificates, it cannot alert the Subject. If one or more SCTs are present in a certificate, or passed via the TLS handshake, a client has no way to know that the logged certificate is not visible to Monitors. Only if Monitors and clients reject certificates that contains SCTs from conspiring logs (based on info from an audit) will CT be able to deter use of such logs. Thus the means by which a Monitor performing an audit function detect such logs, and inform TLS clients must be specified for this to be effective. Moreover, if a certificate (or TLS handshake) contains more than one SCT, unless the client verifies all of them if it is to counter the threat posed by conspiring logs.

 

Absent a “gossip” protocol that enables Monitors to verify that data from logs are reported in a consistent fashion, CT does not provide protection against logs that may conspire with, or are victims of, attackers effecting certificate mis-issuance. When a gossip protocol is defined and deployed, it will be necessary to describe how the CT system will deal with a mis-behaving or compromised log. For example, will there be a mechanism to alert all TLS clients to reject SCTs issued by such a log? Absent a description of a mitigation strategy to deal with mis-behaving or compromised logs, CT cannot ensure detection of mis-issuance.

 

Monitors play a critical role in detecting semantic certificate mis-issuance, for Subjects that have requested monitoring of their certificates. A monitor (including a Subject performing self-monitoring) examines logs for certificates associated with one or more Subjects. It must obtain a list valid certificates for the Subject being monitored, in a secure manner. 

Note:  A Monitor must not rely on a CA or RA database for this information or use certificate discovery protocols; this information must be acquired by the Monitor based on reference certificates provided by a Subject. If a Monitor were to rely on a CA or RA database (for the CA that issued a targeted certificate), the Monitor would not detect mis-issuance due to malfeasance on the part of that CA or the RA, or due to compromise of the CA or the RA.  If a CA or RA database is used, it does detect mis-issuance by an unauthorized CA.  A Monitor must not rely on certificate discovery mechanisms to build the list of valid certificates since such mechanisms might result in mis-issued certificates being added to the list.

 

As noted above, Monitors represent another target for adversaries who wish to effect certificate mis-issuance. If a Monitor is compromised by, or conspires with, an attacker, it will fail to alert a Subject to a mis-issued certificate targeting that Subject, as noted above. It is RECOMMENDED that a Subject request certificate monitoring from multiple sources to guard against such failures. Operation of a Monitor by a Subject, on its own behalf, avoids dependence on third party Monitors. However, the burden of Monitor operation may be viewed as too great for many web sites, and thus this mode of operation ought not be assumed to be universal when evaluating protection against Monitor compromise.

 

A final note: Now that certificate pinning has been approved as a standard (currently in the RFC Editor’s queue), it is appropriate to factor in its use by TLS clients. It would appear that pinning will dramatically reduce the set of TLS clients that are vulnerable to mis-issuance; a client that pins a certificate for a web site would reject a bogus certificate without use of any CT mechanisms. The security considerations section of 6962-bis needs to note this, since deployment of pinning appears to reduces the need for CT in the Web PKI context.

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trans issue tracker | 20 Jan 13:43 2015
Picon

Re: [trans] #31 (rfc6962-bis): incremental deployment and client behavior

#31: incremental deployment and client behavior

Comment (by eranm <at> google.com):

 Committed as https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/075ef0338f7d9e989a6a54027ca5c457e2586e9b
 Leaving ticket open as a reminder to include this situation when listing
 situations a client may encounter.

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-- 
--------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  kent <at> bbn.com  |       Owner:  eranm <at> google.com
     Type:  defect        |      Status:  new
 Priority:  critical      |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis   |     Version:
 Severity:  -             |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                |
--------------------------+-------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/31#comment:3>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>
trans issue tracker | 20 Jan 13:40 2015
Picon

Re: [trans] #21 (rfc6962-bis): Clarify signature checking purpose and mechanism

#21: Clarify signature checking purpose and mechanism

Changes (by eranm <at> google.com):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed

Comment:

 Committed as https://github.com/google/certificate-transparency-
 rfcs/commit/88c7bf44d6a5d81204276a637a1dd0a49c70b8b4

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-- 
-----------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  benl <at> google.com  |       Owner:  eranm <at> google.com
     Type:  defect           |      Status:  closed
 Priority:  major            |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis      |     Version:
 Severity:  -                |  Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:                   |
-----------------------------+-------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/21#comment:4>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>
trans issue tracker | 19 Jan 18:11 2015
Picon

Re: [trans] #17 (rfc6962-bis): Add advice on CNs

#17: Add advice on CNs

Changes (by rob.stradling <at> comodo.com):

 * owner:  draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis <at> tools.ietf.org =>
     rob.stradling <at> comodo.com
 * status:  reopened => new

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-- 
-----------------------------+---------------------------------------
 Reporter:  benl <at> google.com  |       Owner:  rob.stradling <at> comodo.com
     Type:  defect           |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major            |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis      |     Version:
 Severity:  -                |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                   |
-----------------------------+---------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/17#comment:6>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>
trans issue tracker | 19 Jan 18:09 2015
Picon

Re: [trans] #17 (rfc6962-bis): Add advice on CNs

#17: Add advice on CNs

Changes (by rob.stradling <at> comodo.com):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  duplicate =>

Comment:

 Replying to [comment:4 eranm <at> …]:
 > Ticket #54 addresses this, marking as duplicate.

 It turns out that the initial proposal in ticket #54 doesn't actually
 work.  Reopening this ticket.

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-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:               |       Owner:  draft-ietf-trans-
  benl <at> google.com        |  rfc6962-bis <at> tools.ietf.org
     Type:  defect       |      Status:  reopened
 Priority:  major        |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis  |     Version:
 Severity:  -            |  Resolution:
 Keywords:               |
-------------------------+-------------------------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/17#comment:5>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>

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Melinda Shore | 7 Jan 19:00 2015
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Addendum

To make it easier to review recent changes, you can see a
list of them here:
http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/query?changetime=2015-01-01..2015-01-07&col=id&col=summary&col=changetime&col=status&col=owner&col=type&col=priority&col=milestone&col=resolution&order=priority

Melinda
Melinda Shore | 7 Jan 18:59 2015
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Recent issue tracker activity

You may have noticed a recent burst of activity on the issue
tracker, including the closure of issues 17, 26, 37, 42, 43, and
45.  Please review the tickets with an eye towards identifying
items which might block consensus on future draft revisions.
A 6962-bis revision should be out shortly.

Melinda
trans issue tracker | 6 Jan 17:50 2015
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Re: [trans] #8 (rfc6962-bis): Need a way to obtain Merkle proofs for a batch for certificates around the SCT timestamp

#8: Need a way to obtain Merkle proofs for a batch for certificates around the
SCT timestamp

Comment (by eranm <at> google.com):

 Note:
 We should punt this to a separate document. This is a big change and it's
 yet unclear how good it is as a privacy-preserving proof retrieval
 mechanism.
 In the separate document we could explore (in addition to DNS), Private
 information retrieval.

--

-- 
------------------------------+-------------------------------
 Reporter:  eranm <at> google.com  |       Owner:  eranm <at> google.com
     Type:  defect            |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major             |   Milestone:
Component:  rfc6962-bis       |     Version:
 Severity:  -                 |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                    |
------------------------------+-------------------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/8#comment:9>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>
trans issue tracker | 6 Jan 17:37 2015
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Re: [trans] #39 (client-behavior): Monitor behavior

#39: Monitor behavior

Changes (by rob.stradling <at> comodo.com):

 * owner:  draft-ietf-trans-rfc6962-bis <at> tools.ietf.org =>

--

-- 
-----------------------------+------------------
 Reporter:  kent <at> bbn.com     |       Owner:
     Type:  defect           |      Status:  new
 Priority:  major            |   Milestone:
Component:  client-behavior  |     Version:
 Severity:  -                |  Resolution:
 Keywords:                   |
-----------------------------+------------------

Ticket URL: <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/wg/trans/trac/ticket/39#comment:2>
trans <http://tools.ietf.org/trans/>

Gmane