1 Mar 2003 07:34
Re: draft-eisler-nfsv4-ccm-00.txt
Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams <at> sun.com>
2003-03-01 06:34:59 GMT
2003-03-01 06:34:59 GMT
On Fri, Feb 28, 2003 at 10:42:25AM -0500, Dai_Peng <at> emc.com wrote: > This is prevented by ensuring the binding between the CCM context and the > secure channel is legit, as outlined in 2a. Additional crypto is not needed > here to achieve authentication because of IPSec. Yes, you're right, this is crucial. Fortunately GSS-API provides a mechanism for dealing with channel bindings. CCM has to ensure that GSS contexts established through it are correctly bound to the underlying network layer security. I think it will; there's certainly nothing to impede it. We[*]'ve had some conversations about this here at Connectathon '03 and the upshot is that CCM has to have channel bindings binding CCM GSS contexts to the underlying network security mechanisms. IPsec, IKEv2, SSHv2, etc... must each have a CCM channel binding type. The channel bindings in question will have to bind to cryptographically secure channel identifiers. GSS channel bindings can be optional, of course, at the accpeptor's discretion. In practice this means that the initiator's tokens must provide for the optional inclusion of typed CCM channel binding data and the acceptor's tokens must provide for the optional inclusion of a MIC of the typed CCM channel binding data. One very neat side effect of having CCM channel bindings for binding to the underlying network is that you can have anonymous IPsec/whatever connections and still use CCM - Secure NFS over anonymous IPsec if you wish. [*] Sam Hartman, Tom Yu, Mike Eisler, myself.(Continue reading)
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