Cullen Jennings | 1 Aug 2005 15:29
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FW: Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, REQ-7

sorry accidentally replied instead of reply all on this one.

From: Cullen Jennings [mailto:fluffy <at> cisco.com]
Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:31 PM
To: 'Francois Audet'
Subject: RE: [Ietf-behave] Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, REQ-7

I have no idea how Bryan can think I would be OK with that. But anyways, to clarify, I'm not.
 
(obviosly not as chair)
 

From: Francois Audet [mailto:audet <at> nortel.com]
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 2:03 AM
To: 'Cullen Jennings'
Subject: RE: [Ietf-behave] Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, REQ-7

Cullen,

We are waiting for you to tell us what you really meant: "SHOULD" or "MAY"
in 7a.

Please say so on the list so we can put this issue to rest...

To refresh your memory, I have:

 REQ-7: If application transparency is most important, it is
        RECOMMENDED that a NAT have an "Endpoint independent filtering"
        behavior. If a more stringent filtering behavior is most
          important, it is RECOMMENDED that a NAT have an "Address
        dependent filtering" behavior.

        a) The filtering behavior MAY be an option configurable by the
           administrator of the NAT.

Bryan is OK with 7, but wants to change the "MAY" to a "SHOULD" in 7a, and
claims that you are OK with it.

As you know, I really don't give a &*(*#? at this point.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org
> [mailto:ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org] On Behalf Of
> Bryan Ford
> Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 12:22
> To: Saikat Guha
> Cc: 'Behave'
> Subject: Re: [Ietf-behave] Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, REQ-7
>
>
> On Tuesday 21 June 2005 19:07, Saikat Guha wrote:
> > On Tue, 2005-06-21 at 09:59 -0600, Bryan Ford wrote:
> > > On Thursday 09 June 2005 16:17, Francois Audet wrote:
> > > >        a) The filtering behavior MAY be an option
> configurable by
> > > > the
> > >
> > > I still feel strongly that the MAY should be
> > > a SHOULD in the second.  I don't recall hearing any
> objections from
> > > Cullen or anyone else after my earlier suggestion that we
> keep the
> > > SHOULD but change "user configurable" to "configurable by the
> > > administrator of the NAT".
> >
> > I agree with Cullen (below) that changing the MAY to should doesn't
> > change any interoperability issues. Even if "user configurable" is
> > changed to "configurable by the administrator", all of Cullen's
> > objections still hold.
>
> In what way do they still hold?  As far as I can tell,
> Cullen's objections
> were primarily based on his comment that "In many case[s] the
> administrator
> of the NAT is very different from the user of it" and
> therefore it was
> unreasonable to expect a NAT's behavior to be
> "user-configurable".  That
> statement I agree with.  It is entirely reasonable, however,
> to expect a
> NAT's behavior to be "administrator-configurable".  Every NAT
> on the planet
> is already "administrator-configurable" - even locked-down
> NATs supplied by
> ISPs, which are configured by the ISP's administrator
> (perhaps before they
> are even shipped to the user).  The problem was merely a
> minor semantic
> confusion caused by the distinction between "user" and
> "administrator".  I
> always meant "administrator-configurable"; it just
> accidentally came out
> "user-configurable" at some point because I wasn't thinking
> carefully about
> that distinction at the time.
>
> > Changing it to SHOULD/RECOMMENDED in REQ-7a
> > introduces a hidden recommendation that a NAT SHOULD implement both
> > filtering behaviors (so it can have an option configurable by the
> > admin) ... which is not what REQ-7 says. I support "MAY" in REQ-7a.
>
> That hidden recommendation that a NAT SHOULD implement both filtering
> behaviors is precisely the point.  I feel that if a NAT
> implements EF=A
> filtering (which is a problematic but reasonable security
> feature), then it
> SHOULD also provide a way for the NAT's administrator to turn
> that filtering
> feature off.  Since an EF=A NAT minus filtering effectively
> becomes an EF=I
> NAT, what we have is a NAT that is configurable for either
> EF=I or EF=A. 
> This will take an absurdly small amount of implementation
> effort by the NAT
> implementor - every NAT on the planet has a zillion
> configuration options
> already; this is just one more, and all it does is turn off a
> particular
> security feature that sometimes gets in the way of
> application connectivity. 
> Can you explain why it is unreasonable or undesirable for NAT
> vendors to be
> expected to provide this small but potentially important bit of
> configurability?
>
> Bryan
>
> > On Wed, 2005-06-01 at 09:25 -0400, Cullen Jennings wrote:
> > > > a) The filtering behavior SHOULD be a user configurable option.
> > >
> > > I could deal with this if we change to MAY but strongly object to
> > > the SHOULD. There are going to be devices where this is
> difficult.
> > > There are going to be devices that only support one type. In many
> > > case the administrator of the NAT is very different from
> the user of
> > > it. There is no reason why the WG should tell vendors how
> to build
> > > this. Having it as MAY or SHOULD does not change any
> > > interoperability issues between devices. Any standards
> body should
> > > focus on things that it needs to specify to ensure
> interoperability.
> > > Once vendors start down the slipper slope of not being fully
> > > compliant, pain and suffering will ensue - I'd rather avoid that.
> > > It's about as useful for the draft to say that all NAT
> user manuals
> > > SHOULD be in gender neutral language. It has no effect on
> > > interoperability. I can not see any good come it and I
> can see harm
> > > caused by it when key vendors that are not fully complaint start
> > > justifying why it is not useful to be fully complaint
> with BEHAVE. I
> > > know it sounds weird to care about this, but I would like
> to have a
> > > chance of getting the largest vendor of residential and corporate
> > > NATs to do this and this is not going to help.
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf-behave mailing list
> Ietf-behave <at> list.sipfoundry.org
> https://list.sipfoundry.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-behave
>
>

<div>
<div dir="ltr" align="left"><span class="083034012-01082005">sorry accidentally replied instead of reply all on this 
one. </span></div>
<br><div class="OutlookMessageHeader" lang="en-us" dir="ltr" align="left">
From: Cullen Jennings [mailto:fluffy <at> cisco.com] 
<br>Sent: Sunday, July 31, 2005 12:31 PM<br>To: 'Francois 
Audet'<br>Subject: RE: [Ietf-behave] Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, 
REQ-7<br><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<div dir="ltr" align="left"><span class="170101220-30072005">I have no idea how Bryan can think I would be OK with that. But 
anyways, to clarify, I'm not.</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" align="left">
<span class="170101220-30072005"></span>&nbsp;</div>
<div dir="ltr" align="left"><span class="170101220-30072005">(obviosly not as chair)</span></div>
<div dir="ltr" align="left">
<span class="170101220-30072005"></span>&nbsp;</div>
<br><div class="OutlookMessageHeader" lang="en-us" dir="ltr" align="left">
From: Francois Audet [mailto:audet <at> nortel.com] 
<br>Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2005 2:03 AM<br>To: 'Cullen 
Jennings'<br>Subject: RE: [Ietf-behave] Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, 
REQ-7<br><br>
</div>
<div></div>
<p>Cullen, </p>
<p>We are waiting for you to tell us what you really meant: 
"SHOULD" or "MAY" <br>in 7a. </p>
<p>Please say so on the list so we can put this issue to 
rest... </p>
<p>To refresh your memory, I have: </p>
<p>&nbsp;REQ-7: If application transparency is most important, it 
is <br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
RECOMMENDED that a NAT have an "Endpoint independent filtering" <br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; behavior. If a more stringent 
filtering behavior is most <br>&nbsp; 
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp; important, it is RECOMMENDED that a NAT 
have an "Address <br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; dependent filtering" 
behavior. </p>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; a) The filtering 
behavior MAY be an option configurable by the <br>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; 
administrator of the NAT. </p>
<p>Bryan is OK with 7, but wants to change the "MAY" to a "SHOULD" 
in 7a, and <br>claims that you are OK with it. </p>
<p>As you know, I really don't give a &amp;*(*#? at this 
point. </p>
<p>&gt; -----Original Message----- <br>&gt; 
From: ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org <br>&gt; [<a href="mailto:ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org">mailto:ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org</a>] 
On Behalf Of <br>&gt; Bryan Ford <br>&gt; Sent: Tuesday, June 21, 2005 12:22 <br>&gt; To: 
Saikat Guha <br>&gt; Cc: 'Behave' <br>&gt; Subject: Re: [Ietf-behave] Re: draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-01, 
REQ-7 <br>&gt; <br>&gt; <br>&gt; On Tuesday 21 June 2005 19:07, Saikat Guha wrote: <br>&gt; &gt; On Tue, 2005-06-21 at 09:59 -0600, Bryan Ford wrote: 
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; On Thursday 09 June 2005 16:17, Francois Audet 
wrote: <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; 
&gt;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; a) The filtering behavior MAY be 
an option <br>&gt; configurable by <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; the <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; 
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; I still feel strongly that the MAY should 
be <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; a SHOULD in the second.&nbsp; I don't 
recall hearing any <br>&gt; objections from <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; Cullen or anyone else after my earlier suggestion that we 
<br>&gt; keep the <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; 
SHOULD but change "user configurable" to "configurable by the <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; administrator of the NAT". <br>&gt; 
&gt; <br>&gt; &gt; I agree with Cullen (below) that changing 
the MAY to should doesn't <br>&gt; &gt; change any 
interoperability issues. Even if "user configurable" is <br>&gt; &gt; changed to "configurable by the administrator", all of Cullen's 
<br>&gt; &gt; objections still hold. <br>&gt; <br>&gt; In what way do they still hold?&nbsp; 
As far as I can tell, <br>&gt; Cullen's objections 
<br>&gt; were primarily based on his comment that "In many 
case[s] the <br>&gt; administrator <br>&gt; of the NAT is very different from the user of it" and 
<br>&gt; therefore it was <br>&gt; 
unreasonable to expect a NAT's behavior to be <br>&gt; 
"user-configurable".&nbsp; That <br>&gt; statement I agree 
with.&nbsp; It is entirely reasonable, however, <br>&gt; to 
expect a <br>&gt; NAT's behavior to be 
"administrator-configurable".&nbsp; Every NAT <br>&gt; on 
the planet <br>&gt; is already "administrator-configurable" 
- even locked-down <br>&gt; NATs supplied by 
<br>&gt; ISPs, which are configured by the ISP's 
administrator <br>&gt; (perhaps before they <br>&gt; are even shipped to the user).&nbsp; The problem was merely a 
<br>&gt; minor semantic <br>&gt; 
confusion caused by the distinction between "user" and <br>&gt; "administrator".&nbsp; I <br>&gt; always meant 
"administrator-configurable"; it just <br>&gt; accidentally 
came out <br>&gt; "user-configurable" at some point because 
I wasn't thinking <br>&gt; carefully about <br>&gt; that distinction at the time. <br>&gt; 
<br>&gt; &gt; Changing it to SHOULD/RECOMMENDED in 
REQ-7a <br>&gt; &gt; introduces a hidden recommendation that 
a NAT SHOULD implement both <br>&gt; &gt; filtering 
behaviors (so it can have an option configurable by the <br>&gt; &gt; admin) ... which is not what REQ-7 says. I support "MAY" in 
REQ-7a. <br>&gt; <br>&gt; That hidden 
recommendation that a NAT SHOULD implement both filtering <br>&gt; behaviors is precisely the point.&nbsp; I feel that if a NAT 
<br>&gt; implements EF=A <br>&gt; 
filtering (which is a problematic but reasonable security <br>&gt; feature), then it <br>&gt; SHOULD also provide a 
way for the NAT's administrator to turn <br>&gt; that 
filtering <br>&gt; feature off.&nbsp; Since an EF=A NAT 
minus filtering effectively <br>&gt; becomes an EF=I 
<br>&gt; NAT, what we have is a NAT that is configurable for 
either <br>&gt; EF=I or EF=A.&nbsp; <br>&gt; This will take an absurdly small amount of implementation 
<br>&gt; effort by the NAT <br>&gt; 
implementor - every NAT on the planet has a zillion <br>&gt; 
configuration options <br>&gt; already; this is just one 
more, and all it does is turn off a <br>&gt; particular 
<br>&gt; security feature that sometimes gets in the way of 
<br>&gt; application connectivity.&nbsp; <br>&gt; Can you explain why it is unreasonable or undesirable for NAT 
<br>&gt; vendors to be <br>&gt; expected 
to provide this small but potentially important bit of <br>&gt; configurability? <br>&gt; <br>&gt; Bryan <br>&gt; <br>&gt; &gt; 
On Wed, 2005-06-01 at 09:25 -0400, Cullen Jennings wrote: <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; &gt; a) The filtering behavior SHOULD be a user 
configurable option. <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; I could deal with this if we change to MAY but strongly 
object to <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; the SHOULD. There are going to 
be devices where this is <br>&gt; difficult. 
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; There are going to be devices that only 
support one type. In many <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; case the 
administrator of the NAT is very different from <br>&gt; the 
user of <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; it. There is no reason why the WG 
should tell vendors how <br>&gt; to build <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; this. Having it as MAY or SHOULD does not change any 
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; interoperability issues between devices. 
Any standards <br>&gt; body should <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; focus on things that it needs to specify to ensure 
<br>&gt; interoperability. <br>&gt; &gt; 
&gt; Once vendors start down the slipper slope of not being fully 
<br>&gt; &gt; &gt; compliant, pain and suffering will ensue 
- I'd rather avoid that. <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; It's about as 
useful for the draft to say that all NAT <br>&gt; user 
manuals <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; SHOULD be in gender neutral 
language. It has no effect on <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; 
interoperability. I can not see any good come it and I <br>&gt; can see harm <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; caused by it 
when key vendors that are not fully complaint start <br>&gt; 
&gt; &gt; justifying why it is not useful to be fully complaint <br>&gt; with BEHAVE. I <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; know it sounds 
weird to care about this, but I would like <br>&gt; to have 
a <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; chance of getting the largest vendor of 
residential and corporate <br>&gt; &gt; &gt; NATs to do this 
and this is not going to help. <br>&gt; 
_______________________________________________ <br>&gt; 
Ietf-behave mailing list <br>&gt; 
Ietf-behave <at> list.sipfoundry.org <br>&gt; <a href="https://list.sipfoundry.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-behave" target="_blank">https://list.sipfoundry.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-behave</a> 
<br>&gt; <br>&gt; </p>
</div>
Francois Audet | 11 Aug 2005 22:36
Favicon

UDP draft and Fragmentation

Hi guys,

As per the agreement of last week's BEHAVE meeting, Bryan Ford has
created
some text to address the Fragmentation aspects of the document.

Also as per the agreement, David Oran, Cullen Jennings and myself have
looked
at it and agree unanimously that the text should go in.

The question to the group is do everybody agree with the new proposal
below:

REQ-13: A NAT MUST support receiving in order and out of order
fragments,
        so it MUST have "Received Fragment Out of Order" behavior.

Replace REQ-13a with:

REQ-13(a): A NAT's out of order fragment processing mechanism MUST be
           designed so that fragmentation-based DoS attacks do 
           not compromise the NAT's ability to process in-order and 
           unfragmented IP packets.

Unless anybody complains, it's in.
Dan Wing | 12 Aug 2005 01:16
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draft-wing-behave-symmetric-rtprtcp

I'd like draft-wing-behave-symmetric-rtprtcp to become an RFC.  Should we
turn it into a WG item first, or just ask for an IETF 4 week last call on
it?

-d
Cullen Jennings | 14 Aug 2005 21:18
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Re: Rough minutes for BEHAVE


Paul, thank you for taking notes...

Just to add a few more bits of information... On the last topic of in Paul's notes, the topic Bryan Ford had brought up with the group was the adoption of gen and overall organization of the documents.

The blue sheets had 102 names on them.

Cullen


On 8/8/05 8:20 AM, "Paul Kyzivat" <pkyzivat <at> cisco.com> wrote:

Attached are my notes from the BEHAVE session. There is a point down
near the ned that I didn't get good notes on.

 Paul
Notes: Behave WG – IETF63, Tuesday 2-aug-2005
Scribe: Paul Kyzivat
Draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-03
Presented by Francois Audet
Discussed status and changes. There were two open issues:
1.     Removal of Section 5.2.
Final Resolution: Approved.
2.     In new REQ-7 (a) there is debate whether to use MAY or SHOULD in: the filtering behavior {MAY/SHOULD} be an option configurable by the administrator of the NAT. Brian Ford advocated SHOULD, Cullen Jennings advocated MAY.
  • Cullen said applications can’t depend on this favor anyway, so no point in requiring it.
  • Paul Hoffmann noted that SHOULD must include the rationale when it can be violated, and he thought that may be hard to do in this case.
  • Jon Peterson thought there was confusion regarding the target for this requirement – a NAT builder or administrator.
  • Brian said just having the option is helpful for self organizing peer-to-peer systems where some of the nodes need to be super nodes that require special NAT behavior. He postulated that the objection to SHOULD was that some NAT vendors might object to meeting it. He asked if there were NAT vendors in the room that could answer, but none did.
  • Jon asked for anybody other than Brian in favor of SHOULD to respond. Nobody did.
  • Someone from Juniper (I didn’t catch who) spoke as a NAT vendor.  He said they are concerned about security in their NAT, and that if they were convinced to implement the option they would strongly encourage customers not to enable it.
Final resolution: this stays a MAY.
Other discussion on the draft:
  • Dan Wing suggested that maybe the document should be targeted at application developers (what they should expect) rather than what NAT vendors should do.
  • Brian Ford brought up an issue regarding fragmented UDP packets. He said some operating systems routinely send fragmented packets out of order, and this breaks applications. This was identified as a change from a MAY to a MUST in Requirement 13. Cullen claimed it is impossible because it opens up DOS attacks. Dave Oran said there is no DOS attack if reassembly of fragmented packets is done right. (By reserving a fixed number of reassembly buffers and only doing reassembly when a buffer is available.)
Final resolution: Agreed in principle to this change pending a write-up by Brian Ford.
  • Brian brought up another issue: Twice NAT is becoming a big issue. Almost all consumer NATs use DHCP to obtain their IP address. If this gets an address from another NAT, then the downstream and upstream addresses could end up the same. Some NATs have been observed to fail in this case. He requested language that NAT vendors be sure to cope with this. There was some question of whether use of twice NAT is increasing or decreasing. However no one in the room had first hand knowledge of this situation – only hearsay.
Final resolution: Brian and Cullen will come up with wording to address this.
  • Brian had an issue regarding document organization.
Final Resolution: Paul Hoffman said that can be done by chairs and AD – it doesn’t require consensus.
  • Brian had another issue about terminology. Jon Peterson thought it appropriate.
  • [ed: I didn’t catch what the actual issue was, and this item doesn’t make much sense to me now.]
  • Brian complained he hasn’t had a hearing on all the documents he has tried to offer. Jon Peterson thought this has had ample hearing on the list. The room was polled for others agreeing with Brian. No one responded, so Brian agreed to drop his objections.
The end of the meeting was then at hand so there was no time to discuss other documents.


<div>
<span><br>
Paul, thank you for taking notes...<br><br>
Just to add a few more bits of information... On the last topic of in Paul's notes, the topic Bryan Ford had brought up with the group was the adoption of gen and overall organization of the documents.<br><br>
The blue sheets had 102 names on them.<br><br>
Cullen<br><br><br>
On 8/8/05 8:20 AM, "Paul Kyzivat" &lt;pkyzivat <at> cisco.com&gt; wrote:<br><br></span><blockquote>
<span>Attached are my notes from the BEHAVE session. There is a point down <br>
near the ned that I didn't get good notes on.<br><br>
&nbsp;Paul<br></span><span>Notes: Behave WG &ndash; IETF63, Tuesday 2-aug-2005<br></span><span>Scribe: Paul Kyzivat<br>Draft-ietf-behave-nat-udp-03<br>
Presented by Francois Audet<br>Discussed status and changes. There were two open issues: <br>
1. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Removal of Section 5.2. <br>Final Resolution: Approved.<br>2. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In new REQ-7 (a) there is debate whether to use MAY or SHOULD in: the filtering behavior {MAY/SHOULD} be an option configurable by the administrator of the NAT. Brian Ford advocated SHOULD, Cullen Jennings advocated MAY. <br></span><ul>
<li><span>Cullen said applications can&rsquo;t depend on this favor anyway, so no point in requiring it. 
</span></li>
<li><span>Paul Hoffmann noted that SHOULD must include the rationale when it can be violated, and he thought that may be hard to do in this case. 
</span></li>
<li><span>Jon Peterson thought there was confusion regarding the target for this requirement &ndash; a NAT builder or administrator. 
</span></li>
<li><span>Brian said just having the option is helpful for self organizing peer-to-peer systems where some of the nodes need to be super nodes that require special NAT behavior. He postulated that the objection to SHOULD was that some NAT vendors might object to meeting it. He asked if there were NAT vendors in the room that could answer, but none did. 
</span></li>
<li><span>Jon asked for anybody other than Brian in favor of SHOULD to respond. Nobody did. 
</span></li>
<li><span>Someone from Juniper (I didn&rsquo;t catch who) spoke as a NAT vendor.&nbsp; He said they are concerned about security in their NAT, and that if they were convinced to implement the option they would strongly encourage customers not to enable it. <br></span></li>
</ul>
<span>Final resolution: this stays a MAY.<br>Other discussion on the draft:<br></span><ul>
<li><span>Dan Wing suggested that maybe the document should be targeted at application developers (what they should expect) rather than what NAT vendors should do. 
</span></li>
<li><span>Brian Ford brought up an issue regarding fragmented UDP packets. He said some operating systems routinely send fragmented packets out of order, and this breaks applications. This was identified as a change from a MAY to a MUST in Requirement 13. Cullen claimed it is impossible because it opens up DOS attacks. Dave Oran said there is no DOS attack if reassembly of fragmented packets is done right. (By reserving a fixed number of reassembly buffers and only doing reassembly when a buffer is available.) <br></span></li>
</ul>
<span>Final resolution: Agreed in principle to this change pending a write-up by Brian Ford.<br></span><ul><li><span>Brian brought up another issue: Twice NAT is becoming a big issue. Almost all consumer NATs use DHCP to obtain their IP address. If this gets an address from another NAT, then the downstream and upstream addresses could end up the same. Some NATs have been observed to fail in this case. He requested language that NAT vendors be sure to cope with this. There was some question of whether use of twice NAT is increasing or decreasing. However no one in the room had first hand knowledge of this situation &ndash; only hearsay. <br></span></li></ul>
<span>Final resolution: Brian and Cullen will come up with wording to address this.<br></span><ul><li><span>Brian had an issue regarding document organization. <br></span></li></ul>
<span>Final Resolution: Paul Hoffman said that can be done by chairs and AD &ndash; it doesn&rsquo;t require consensus. <br></span><ul>
<li><span>Brian had another issue about terminology. Jon Peterson thought it appropriate. 
</span></li>
<li><span> [ed: I didn&rsquo;t catch what the actual issue was, and this item doesn&rsquo;t make much sense to me now.] 
</span></li>
<li><span>Brian complained he hasn&rsquo;t had a hearing on all the documents he has tried to offer. Jon Peterson thought this has had ample hearing on the list. The room was polled for others agreeing with Brian. No one responded, so Brian agreed to drop his objections. <br></span></li>
</ul>
<span>The end of the meeting was then at hand so there was no time to discuss other documents.<br><br></span>
</blockquote>
<span><br></span>
</div>
Francois Audet | 15 Aug 2005 04:58
Favicon

UDP draft: Conflicting Internal and External IP address spaces

Hi all,

This is the new proposed text from Bryan Ford on the issue
of overlapping IP address spaces, for the UDP draft.

This is a per the agreement in IETF 63.

The text has been reviewed and agreed-to by Cullen and myself.

Any objections?

--------------------------------------------------------------------

4.4. Conflicting Internal and External IP Address Spaces

   Many NATs, particularly consumer-level devices designed to be
   deployed by nontechnical users, routinely obtain their external IP
   address, default router, and other IP configuration information
   for their external interface dynamically from an external network
   such as an upstream ISP.  The NAT in turn automatically sets up
   its own internal subnet in one of the private IP address spaces
   assigned to this purpose in RFC 1918, typically
   providing dynamic IP configuration services for hosts on this
   internal network.

   Auto-configuration of NATs and private networks can be problematic,
   however, if the NAT's external network is also in RFC 1918 private
   address space.  In a common scenario, an ISP places its customers
   behind a NAT and hands out private RFC 1918 addresses to them.
   Some of these customers in turn deploy consumer-level NATs,
   which in effect act as "second-level" NATs, multiplexing their own
   private RFC 1918 IP subnets onto the single RFC 1918 IP address
   provided by the ISP.  There is no inherent guarantee in this
   case that the ISP's "intermediate" privately-addressed network
   and the customer's internal privately-addressed network will not use
   numerically identical or overlapping RFC 1918 IP subnets.
   Customers of consumer-level NATs further cannot be expected to have
   the technical knowledge to prevent this scenario from occurring
   by manually configuring their internal network with non-conflicting
   RFC 1918 subnets.

   NAT vendors need to design their NATs to ensure that they function
   correctly and robustly even in such problematic scenarios.  One
   possible solution is for the NAT to ensure that whenever its
   external link is configured with an RFC 1918 private IP address,
   the NAT automatically selects a different, non-conflicting
   RFC 1918 IP subnet for its internal network.  A disadvantage of
   this solution is that if the NAT's external interface is
   dynamically configured or re-configured after its internal
   network is already in use, then the NAT may have to renumber its
   entire internal network dynamically if it detects a conflict.

   An alternative solution is for the NAT to be designed
   so that it can translate and forward traffic correctly even when
   its external and internal interfaces are configured with
   numerically overlapping IP subnets.  In this scenario, for
   example, if the NAT's external interface has been assigned
   an IP address P in RFC 1918 space, then there might also
   be an internal node I having the same RFC 1918 private
   IP address P.  An IP packet with destination address P
   on the external network is directed at the NAT,
   whereas an IP packet with the same destination address P on
   the internal network is directed at node I.  The NAT therefore
   needs to maintain a clear operational distinction between
   "external IP addresses" and "internal IP addresses" to avoid
   confusing internal node I with its own external interface.
   In general, the NAT needs to allow all internal nodes (including I)
   to communicate with all external nodes having public (non-RFC 1918)
   IP addresses or having private IP addresses that do not conflict
   with the addresses used by its internal network.

   REQ-XX: A NAT device whose external IP interface can be configured
   dynamically MUST either (1) automatically ensure that its internal 
   network uses IP addresses that do not conflict with its external 
   network, or (2) be able to translate and forward traffic between all
   internal nodes and all external nodes whose IP addresses do not 
   numerically conflict with the internal network.

   Justification:

    If a NAT's external and internal interfaces are configured
    with overlapping IP subnets, then there is of course no way
    for an internal host with RFC 1918 IP address Q to initiate a
    direct communication session to an external node having the
    same RFC 1918 address Q, or to other external nodes with IP
    addresses that numerically conflict with the internal subnet.
    Such nodes can still open communication sessions indirectly via
    NAT traversal techniques, however, with the help of a third-party
    server such as a STUN server having a public, non-RFC 1918
    IP address.  In this case, nodes with conflicting private
    RFC 1918 addresses on opposite sides of the second-level NAT
    can communicate with each other via their respective
    temporary public endpoints on the main Internet, as long as
    their common first-level NAT (e.g., the upstream ISP's NAT)
    supports hairpinning behavior as described later in Section 6.

Francois Audet | 15 Aug 2005 05:10
Favicon

UDP draft: Conflicting Internal and External IP address spaces

Hi all,

This is the new proposed text from Bryan Ford on the issue
of overlapping IP address spaces, for the UDP draft.

This is a per the agreement in IETF 63.

The text has been reviewed and agreed-to by Cullen and myself.

Any objections?

--------------------------------------------------------------------

4.4. Conflicting Internal and External IP Address Spaces

   Many NATs, particularly consumer-level devices designed to be
   deployed by nontechnical users, routinely obtain their external IP
   address, default router, and other IP configuration information
   for their external interface dynamically from an external network
   such as an upstream ISP.  The NAT in turn automatically sets up
   its own internal subnet in one of the private IP address spaces
   assigned to this purpose in RFC 1918, typically
   providing dynamic IP configuration services for hosts on this
   internal network.

   Auto-configuration of NATs and private networks can be problematic,
   however, if the NAT's external network is also in RFC 1918 private
   address space.  In a common scenario, an ISP places its customers
   behind a NAT and hands out private RFC 1918 addresses to them.
   Some of these customers in turn deploy consumer-level NATs,
   which in effect act as "second-level" NATs, multiplexing their own
   private RFC 1918 IP subnets onto the single RFC 1918 IP address
   provided by the ISP.  There is no inherent guarantee in this
   case that the ISP's "intermediate" privately-addressed network
   and the customer's internal privately-addressed network will not use
   numerically identical or overlapping RFC 1918 IP subnets.
   Customers of consumer-level NATs further cannot be expected to have
   the technical knowledge to prevent this scenario from occurring
   by manually configuring their internal network with non-conflicting
   RFC 1918 subnets.

   NAT vendors need to design their NATs to ensure that they function
   correctly and robustly even in such problematic scenarios.  One
   possible solution is for the NAT to ensure that whenever its
   external link is configured with an RFC 1918 private IP address,
   the NAT automatically selects a different, non-conflicting
   RFC 1918 IP subnet for its internal network.  A disadvantage of
   this solution is that if the NAT's external interface is
   dynamically configured or re-configured after its internal
   network is already in use, then the NAT may have to renumber its
   entire internal network dynamically if it detects a conflict.

   An alternative solution is for the NAT to be designed
   so that it can translate and forward traffic correctly even when
   its external and internal interfaces are configured with
   numerically overlapping IP subnets.  In this scenario, for
   example, if the NAT's external interface has been assigned
   an IP address P in RFC 1918 space, then there might also
   be an internal node I having the same RFC 1918 private
   IP address P.  An IP packet with destination address P
   on the external network is directed at the NAT,
   whereas an IP packet with the same destination address P on
   the internal network is directed at node I.  The NAT therefore
   needs to maintain a clear operational distinction between
   "external IP addresses" and "internal IP addresses" to avoid
   confusing internal node I with its own external interface.
   In general, the NAT needs to allow all internal nodes (including I)
   to communicate with all external nodes having public (non-RFC 1918)
   IP addresses or having private IP addresses that do not conflict
   with the addresses used by its internal network.

   REQ-XX: A NAT device whose external IP interface can be configured
   dynamically MUST either (1) automatically ensure that its internal 
   network uses IP addresses that do not conflict with its external 
   network, or (2) be able to translate and forward traffic between all
   internal nodes and all external nodes whose IP addresses do not 
   numerically conflict with the internal network.

   Justification:

    If a NAT's external and internal interfaces are configured
    with overlapping IP subnets, then there is of course no way
    for an internal host with RFC 1918 IP address Q to initiate a
    direct communication session to an external node having the
    same RFC 1918 address Q, or to other external nodes with IP
    addresses that numerically conflict with the internal subnet.
    Such nodes can still open communication sessions indirectly via
    NAT traversal techniques, however, with the help of a third-party
    server such as a STUN server having a public, non-RFC 1918
    IP address.  In this case, nodes with conflicting private
    RFC 1918 addresses on opposite sides of the second-level NAT
    can communicate with each other via their respective
    temporary public endpoints on the main Internet, as long as
    their common first-level NAT (e.g., the upstream ISP's NAT)
    supports hairpinning behavior as described later in Section 6.

Dan Wing | 16 Aug 2005 03:40
Picon
Favicon

DNS ALG, REQ-9

-ietf-behave-nat-udp-03 reads:

   REQ-9: If a NAT includes ALGs, it is RECOMMENDED that all of those
      ALGs (except for DNS [19] and FTP [18]) be disabled by default.

This implies the converse -- that a DNS ALG SHOULD be enabled.  Is that the
intention of your text?  

I understand the FTP ALG, it's well described in section 7.1 of RFC2663.
However, I don't understand what the DNS ALG is supposed to do especially in
a Dlink/Netgear/Linksys-class device; section 4.3 of RFC2663 implies it
would only be necessary if you're doing "twice NAT" (see RFC2663 for
details) and only during pure NAT (that is, not doing port address
translation).

I would like a better explanation of the intended function of the DNS ALG in
-ietf-behave-nat-udp-, or a cite to a specific section and RFC.  I'm
concerned the existing text might cause proliferation of DNSSEC-breaking DNS
ALG functions in seldom-upgraded consumer NATs.

-d
Francois Audet | 16 Aug 2005 18:10
Favicon

RE: DNS ALG, REQ-9

I don't remember why we put DNS in there.

Srisuresh, was it you that requested it?

PS: I will add the reference to 7.1/RFC 2663 for FTP ALG.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org 
> [mailto:ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org] On Behalf Of Dan Wing
> Sent: Monday, August 15, 2005 18:41
> To: ietf-behave <at> list.sipfoundry.org
> Subject: [Ietf-behave] DNS ALG, REQ-9
> 
> 
> -ietf-behave-nat-udp-03 reads:
> 
>    REQ-9: If a NAT includes ALGs, it is RECOMMENDED that all of those
>       ALGs (except for DNS [19] and FTP [18]) be disabled by default.
> 
> This implies the converse -- that a DNS ALG SHOULD be 
> enabled.  Is that the intention of your text?  
> 
> I understand the FTP ALG, it's well described in section 7.1 
> of RFC2663. However, I don't understand what the DNS ALG is 
> supposed to do especially in a Dlink/Netgear/Linksys-class 
> device; section 4.3 of RFC2663 implies it would only be 
> necessary if you're doing "twice NAT" (see RFC2663 for
> details) and only during pure NAT (that is, not doing port 
> address translation).
> 
> I would like a better explanation of the intended function of 
> the DNS ALG in -ietf-behave-nat-udp-, or a cite to a specific 
> section and RFC.  I'm concerned the existing text might cause 
> proliferation of DNSSEC-breaking DNS ALG functions in 
> seldom-upgraded consumer NATs.
> 
> -d
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf-behave mailing list
> Ietf-behave <at> list.sipfoundry.org 
> https://list.sipfoundry.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-behave
> 
> 
David Barrett | 18 Aug 2005 02:37
Gravatar

Unidirectional or Bidirectional Manual Port Forwarding?

I'm experimenting with a particular user, and I'm experiencing 
unexpected behavior with regard to UDP port forwarding.  I'm not sure if 
something is broken, or if I just misunderstand how it's supposed to 
work.  Can you offer me any clarity on what BEHAVE says should occur in 
this situation?

Specifically, a user has configured his NAT (some DLink, 
address-restricted filtering model) to manually forward external traffic 
sent to a given port a specific internal IP:port.  And this works fine 
-- traffic sent to the external endpoint X is in fact forwarded without 
trouble to internal endpoint Y.  This this works great when a remote 
host is initiating a UDP session to the internal host.

However, the reverse doesn't work so great.  What I *expected* would 
happen is that all UDP sessions initiated from internal endpoint Y would 
be advertised to remote users as coming from external endpoint X.  ie, I 
expected internally-initiated connections would "go out" through the 
manually-configured port-forwarded mapping.  Thus regardless of which 
side initiated the connection, the remote side would see and use 
external endpoint X.

But in practice, it appears the NAT ignores the port mapping when the 
internal machine initiates the connection, and instead establishes a new 
external mapping -- with the very address-restricted filtering 
properties I was hoping to avoid.

So I guess what I'm asking is:

1) Are manually-forwarded NAT port mappings typically unidirectional or 
bidirectional?  Does this depend on the NAT model?

2) Is it possible to manually configure the outbound mapping (ie, force 
all traffic originating from an internal endpoint to use a specific 
external endpoint)?

2) What type of mapping does UPnP attempt to establish?

Thanks, and sorry for the meandering question -- I don't know enough to 
phrase it more succinctly!

-david
Francois Audet | 18 Aug 2005 02:45
Favicon

RE: Unidirectional or Bidirectional Manual PortForwarding?

I guess this behavior will kill any hope of symmetic operation...

I must say I am not surprised... My expectations are very low.

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org 
> [mailto:ietf-behave-bounces <at> list.sipfoundry.org] On Behalf Of 
> David Barrett
> Sent: Wednesday, August 17, 2005 17:38
> To: 'Behave'
> Subject: [Ietf-behave] Unidirectional or Bidirectional Manual 
> PortForwarding?
> 
> 
> I'm experimenting with a particular user, and I'm experiencing 
> unexpected behavior with regard to UDP port forwarding.  I'm 
> not sure if 
> something is broken, or if I just misunderstand how it's supposed to 
> work.  Can you offer me any clarity on what BEHAVE says 
> should occur in 
> this situation?
> 
> Specifically, a user has configured his NAT (some DLink, 
> address-restricted filtering model) to manually forward 
> external traffic 
> sent to a given port a specific internal IP:port.  And this 
> works fine 
> -- traffic sent to the external endpoint X is in fact 
> forwarded without 
> trouble to internal endpoint Y.  This this works great when a remote 
> host is initiating a UDP session to the internal host.
> 
> However, the reverse doesn't work so great.  What I *expected* would 
> happen is that all UDP sessions initiated from internal 
> endpoint Y would 
> be advertised to remote users as coming from external 
> endpoint X.  ie, I 
> expected internally-initiated connections would "go out" through the 
> manually-configured port-forwarded mapping.  Thus regardless of which 
> side initiated the connection, the remote side would see and use 
> external endpoint X.
> 
> But in practice, it appears the NAT ignores the port mapping when the 
> internal machine initiates the connection, and instead 
> establishes a new 
> external mapping -- with the very address-restricted filtering 
> properties I was hoping to avoid.
> 
> So I guess what I'm asking is:
> 
> 1) Are manually-forwarded NAT port mappings typically 
> unidirectional or 
> bidirectional?  Does this depend on the NAT model?
> 
> 2) Is it possible to manually configure the outbound mapping 
> (ie, force 
> all traffic originating from an internal endpoint to use a specific 
> external endpoint)?
> 
> 2) What type of mapping does UPnP attempt to establish?
> 
> Thanks, and sorry for the meandering question -- I don't know 
> enough to 
> phrase it more succinctly!
> 
> -david
> _______________________________________________
> Ietf-behave mailing list
> Ietf-behave <at> list.sipfoundry.org 
> https://list.sipfoundry.org/mailman/listinfo/ietf-behave
> 
> 

Gmane