The IESG | 2 Jan 2008 22:33
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Document Action: 'Mobility Services Transport: Problem Statement' to Informational RFC

The IESG has approved the following document:

- 'Mobility Services Transport: Problem Statement '
   <draft-ietf-mipshop-mis-ps-05.txt> as an Informational RFC

This document is the product of the Mobility for IP: Performance, 
Signaling and Handoff Optimization Working Group. 

The IESG contact persons are Jari Arkko and Mark Townsley.

A URL of this Internet-Draft is:
http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-mipshop-mis-ps-05.txt

Technical Summary

  The document provides a problem statement for the exchange of
  information to support handover in heterogeneous link environments.
  This mobility support service allows more sophisticated handover
  operations by making available information about network 
  characteristics, neighboring networks and associated characteristics,
  indications that a handover should take place, and suggestions for
  suitable target networks to which to handover. The mobility support
  services work complementarily with IP mobility mechanisms to enhance
  the overall performance and usability perception. 

Working Group Summary

  This is a product of the MIPSHOP WG.

Protocol Quality
(Continue reading)

Jari Arkko | 15 Jan 2008 15:00

Re: AD review of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis

Continuing the discussion with this document....

>> Ok. But still, I think it would be beneficial to describe what
>> the other data structures are that you need. (At a conceptual
>> level.)
>>
>>     
>
> I will see how to keep this at a high level.
>   

Ok, good.

>>> It may, but that's not something this protocol explicitly supports. May be
>>> we could specify it for such devices in a different spec, if there is
>>> interest..
>>>   
>>>       
>> I don't think that is the way we should do this. Existing switches, router
>> behavior, ND, MLD snooping --- all of that should be taken as a given,
>> and you should generally be able to live with it, unless there is a
>> significant
>> reason to not to.
>>
>> The high level question in this case is who dictates the ND/DNA/DAD/MLD/etc
>> behaviour of the FMIP mobile node? This spec? Someone else?
>>
>> I would say that you should refer to other specifications where
>> possible. E.g.,
>> this specification does not change anything in the requirements of 4861
(Continue reading)

Jari Arkko | 15 Jan 2008 15:39

New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis

FYI -- I have looked a the new revision (-04). I'm generally
happy with the changes except for a few issues noted below.
I have not gone through my own original comments to see
if everything has been addressed. I will do so later today,
hopefully.

Section 7, related protocol considerations.

  The contents are good, but I'm uncertain if
  there are considerations that you have missed.
  Depending on what you specify the mobile node must
  do when it attaches to a new router, this may
  have implications for MLD snooping switches.
  (Unless, of course, you require all the usual
  steps to be taken at the ND/RD/MLD/DHCP level
  when you enter a new link, but that was unclear
  to me by reading the document).

Section 9, the router - router security.

  I do not recall the context of this change,
  but generally speaking you cannot leave
  mandatory-to-implement security mechanism
  out of your protocol.

Page 7, the dhcp instruction.

  It says:

     The information provided in the PrRtAdv message
(Continue reading)

zfaqeer | 15 Jan 2008 18:18
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RE: New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis

Hello,
 
I have submitted a new draft related to FMIPv6 titled "Pro-active Bindings for FMIPv6" that deals will reducing the tunnel duration and hence preserve resources at PAR and NAR.
 
The draft is available under the following link:
http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-yousaf-ietf-mipshop-pbfmipv6-00.txt
 
I would appreciate expert comments and critique on it.
 
Looking forward
 
Best Regards
 
Faqir Zarrar Yousaf




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Jari Arkko | 16 Jan 2008 16:35

AD review of mipshop-4140bis

I have made my AD review of this document. Please find detailed comments
below.

Overall, I was pleasantly surprised by this specification. It is in
relatively good shape and while there are issues, there are generally
minor and mostly solvable by removing the offending parts. I was happy
with the security parts. The main issues that I have are the flooding
scheme and the error recovery parts.

I expect some discussion and a new draft revision. After that we can go
to IETF Last Call.

Technical:

>    This specification allows a mobile node to use more than one RCoA if
>    it received more than one MAP option.  In this case, the mobile node
>    MUST perform the binding update procedure for each RCoA. 

This MUST seems overly strong. Why would the mobile node be forced to
use more than one MAP, if it only wanted to use one? See also further
below where some inconsistencies with the above have been detected.

>    Note that a mobile node may send a BU containing its LCoA (instead of
>    its RCoA) to correspondent nodes, which are connected to its same
>    link.  Packets will then be routed directly without going through the
>    MAP.
How does this happen? If two nodes sit on the same link and employ
MAP(s) and home agent(s), they will only see each other's RCoAs and/or
HoAs. They would see each other's care-of addresses when route
optimization is attempted. But per your specification above you may not
attempt it with your local address unless you already know the other
node is on the same link. Chicken and egg...

Suggestion: do not restrict the type of address the nodes may use in
route optimization.

>    Upon reception of a router advertisement with the MAP option, the
>    receiving router MUST copy the option and re-send it after
>    incrementing the Distance field by one.  
I hope you do not mean re-sending every RA again on another interface,
triggered by the reception. This would disturb the router's own timing
and processing of RAs. Please clarify the text to indicate that the
received RAs are only used for learning the information, and then the
information is used in the router's own independent RA sending process.

>    The MAP option is propagated towards ARs in its domain.
I'm not convinced that the dynamic distribution of MAP information is
useful. First of all, its a very small configuration task compared to
some of the other things you would have to have in this environment
(e.g., security policies and key material allowing each mobile node to
talk to each MAP securely).

Secondly, you seem to be assuming that the MAP is placed in the router
hierarchy. I would actually expect that a local domain's MAP would be
placed in the same network as other servers and services exists, not
necessarily in the aggregated router hierarchy that leads to the
Internet. This would imply that a MAP RA would have to be distributed
not just "down" but also "sideways" or even "up" if you draw the router
placement in the network in a hierarchical manner. Of course, you can
configure the routers to do this. But at the end of the day, you've
created a complicated flooding scheme to achieve very little. And there
may be error modes that we have not thought of.

I would suggest removing the support for dynamic distribution, and
simply requiring ARs to be configured with this information.

>    A mobile node MUST store the received option(s) in order to choose at
>    least one MAP to register with.  Storing the options is essential, as
>    they will be compared to other options received later for the purpose
>    of the movement detection algorithm.
>   

The "at least one" part is right, in my opinion. But it is inconsistent
with what I quoted earlier: "MUST perform the binding update procedure
for each RCoA"

>    If no MAP options are found in the router advertisement, the mobile
>    node MUST use the Mobile IPv6 protocol, as specified in [1 <http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mipshop-4140bis-01#ref-1>].
>   

Hmm. I think MUST NOT use HMIP would be more appropriate within the
specification of how to deal with MAP options. You are assuming that
whoever implements your spec will also implement and be able to use
Mobile IPv6 (including, for instance, having a home agent).

> 10. Detection and Recovery from MAP Failures

Paragraph 1 is good, but the rest seems suspect.  For instance, on a
large domain having every AR send this many pings to the MAP would by
itself create a problem. And I am not sure this document should be
dictating a specific mechanisms where service provider infrastructure
keeps aware of what's up and what's not. I would suggest removing
everything else except the ability of mobile nodes to react to zero
lifetime. Or perhaps even that could be removed, if you simply
recommended that if routers become aware of inability to reach the MAP,
the MAP option is deleted from RAs.

Editorial:

Please correct the issues from

http://tools.ietf.org/wg/mipshop/draft-ietf-mipshop-4140bis/draft-ietf-mipshop-4140bis-01.nits.txt

>    It is pertinent to note that the use of the MAP does not reply or
>    assume that a permanent Home Agent is present. 

s/reply/rely/

>    The mobile node can communicate with a correspondent node through the
>    HA, or in a route-optimised manner, as described in [1
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mipshop-4140bis-01#ref-1>].  When
>    communicating through the HA, the message formats in [1
<http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-mipshop-4140bis-01#ref-1>] can be re-
>    used.
s/can be re-used/are used/

> This specification does not provide an algorithm
>    for the distance-based MAP selection.  However, such an algorithm may
>    be introduced in future extensions utilising information about the
>    speed of mobility from lower layers.
>
>    ... The following algorithm is simply based on selecting the
>    MAP that is most distant, provided that its preference value did not
>    reach a value of zero.  The mobile node operation is shown below:
>
>    1.  Receive and parse all MAP options
An apparent inconsistency. Do you provide a distance-based algorithm or
not? Note that there might be different algorithms, better/perfect,
etc., but that was not what the text was claiming.

>    This is achieved by using the RCoA as the identity in IKE Phase 2
>    negotiation.  This step is identical to the use of the home address
>    in IKE phase 2.
>   
I think you mean child SA creation, not phase 2. Phase 2 was an IKEv1
concept. I see that Vijay noted this as well in his review.

Jari
Rajeev Koodli | 16 Jan 2008 19:57
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Re: New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis


Hi Jari,


On Jan 15, 2008 6:39 AM, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko <at> piuha.net> wrote:

Section 7, related protocol considerations.

 The contents are good, but I'm uncertain if
 there are considerations that you have missed.
 Depending on what you specify the mobile node must
 do when it attaches to a new router, this may
 have implications for MLD snooping switches.
 (Unless, of course, you require all the usual
 steps to be taken at the ND/RD/MLD/DHCP level
 when you enter a new link, but that was unclear
 to me by reading the document).

The additional requirement specified by this document is to send UNA as soon as attachment to NAR is detected. Other than that, it does not impose any other requirements. Hence, there are no implications as stated in Section 7.
 

Section 9, the router - router security.

 I do not recall the context of this change,
 but generally speaking you cannot leave
 mandatory-to-implement security mechanism
 out of your protocol.

The context is that you agreed the protocol does not have to specify the security configuration (I would have to dig out the e-mail). Agree that you cannot leave mandatory parts. However, here we are assuming that the network between the routers is secure (established by means beyond the scope of this document). 
 

Page 7, the dhcp instruction.

 It says:

    The information provided in the PrRtAdv message
    can be used even when DHCP [rfc3315] is used to
    configure an NCoA on the NAR's link. In this case,
    the protocol supports forwarding for PCoA and the MN
    performs DHCP once it attaches to the NAR's link
    even though it formulates an NCoA for transmitting FBU.

 This is good otherwise, but I don't understand the
 part about "even though". Do you intend to use the
 address before it is assigned by DHCP? This maybe
 problematic. In any case, please clarify.

No, NCoA is not used before DHCP grants address. Packet forwarding happens using PCoA.
NCoA is used only in FBU following the usual semantics. This is explained further in Section 6.1 

" A Proxy Router Advertisement with Code 5 means that the MN may use the new router information present for detecting movement to a new subnet, but the MN must perform DHCP [rfc3315] upon attaching to the NAR's link. The PAR and NAR will forward packets to the PCoA of the MN. The MN must still formulate an NCoA for transmitting FBU (using the information sent in this message), but that NCoA will not be used for forwarding packets."

-Rajeev
 

Jari


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Jari Arkko | 16 Jan 2008 20:44

Re: New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis

Rajeev,

>
>     Section 9, the router - router security.
>
>      I do not recall the context of this change,
>      but generally speaking you cannot leave
>      mandatory-to-implement security mechanism
>      out of your protocol.
>
>
> The context is that you agreed the protocol does not have to specify
> the security configuration (I would have to dig out the e-mail). Agree
> that you cannot leave mandatory parts. However, here we are assuming
> that the network between the routers is secure (established by means
> beyond the scope of this document). 

But that's just the issue. General IESG rule: Means have to be
specified. You may leave up to the admin to be turned on, but you must
have a specification of how to secure your protocol, and the
implementation of that has to be mandatory.

Jari
Rajeev Koodli | 16 Jan 2008 21:34
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Re: New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis


Below are couple of exchanges on this (going back to Oct/Nov)..
I revised version 03 based on this. 

-Rajeev

.............................
>> In the security considerations section you say that IPsec is used for >> this purpose. I would actually not talk about security associations as >> such. But you need to specify mandatory-to-implement security >> functionality and the expected configuration: >> >> - use of IPsec >> - use of key management protocol for IPsec >> - security policy and credential/shared secret configuration >> >> > > Isn't this deployment-specific? The protocol is not specifying key > management, SA configuration. > I have taken a new look at this part of the document and BCP 107, and reconsidered. You do not actually have a situation that would absolutely require a mandatory to implement key management protocol to be specified. (You may want to specify an optional one for interoperability purposes, however. This should not be hard. But I'll let you decide.)
..................


On Jan 16, 2008 11:44 AM, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko <at> piuha.net> wrote:
Rajeev,

>
>     Section 9, the router - router security.
>
>      I do not recall the context of this change,
>      but generally speaking you cannot leave
>      mandatory-to-implement security mechanism
>      out of your protocol.
>
>
> The context is that you agreed the protocol does not have to specify
> the security configuration (I would have to dig out the e-mail). Agree
> that you cannot leave mandatory parts. However, here we are assuming
> that the network between the routers is secure (established by means
> beyond the scope of this document).

But that's just the issue. General IESG rule: Means have to be
specified. You may leave up to the admin to be turned on, but you must
have a specification of how to secure your protocol, and the
implementation of that has to be mandatory.

Jari


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Jari Arkko | 16 Jan 2008 21:40

Re: New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis

Rajeev,

> Below are couple of exchanges on this (going back to Oct/Nov)..
> I revised version 03 based on this. 

Ah. Thanks for digging this up! Now I can recall what we talked about.

However, my comment that for this specific purpose *key management* is
something that you could leave out. Not the security mechanism itself.
I.e., you have to at least specify what mechanism you use to secure the
messages, and if your answer is IPsec, talk about what kind of
configuration (security policies etc) need to be used.

Sorry for being unclear about this earlier.

(Even key management is still highly recommended for everything, but
your case does not fall under the MUST clause in BCP 107 Section 2.1)

Jari
Rajeev Koodli | 16 Jan 2008 22:48
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Re: New revision of draft-ietf-mipshop-fmipv6-rfc4068bis


All right. I will add some text.
I do need to add the codepoint for NETLMM case for PrRtAdv we had talked about. Other than that, I think I have addressed all the issues we had discussed.

-Rajeev


On Jan 16, 2008 12:40 PM, Jari Arkko <jari.arkko <at> piuha.net> wrote:
Rajeev,

> Below are couple of exchanges on this (going back to Oct/Nov)..
> I revised version 03 based on this.

Ah. Thanks for digging this up! Now I can recall what we talked about.

However, my comment that for this specific purpose *key management* is
something that you could leave out. Not the security mechanism itself.
I.e., you have to at least specify what mechanism you use to secure the
messages, and if your answer is IPsec, talk about what kind of
configuration (security policies etc) need to be used.

Sorry for being unclear about this earlier.

(Even key management is still highly recommended for everything, but
your case does not fall under the MUST clause in BCP 107 Section 2.1)

Jari


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