draft-ietf-ips-iscsi-nodearch-key-01.txt
Dave Wyso <deepthinkingguy <at> yahoo.com>
2006-09-08 04:54:54 GMT
IP Storage Working Group D. Wysochanski
Internet-Draft September 7, 2006
Intended status: Informational
Expires: March 11, 2007
Declarative Public Extension Key for iSCSI Node Architecture
draft-ietf-ips-iscsi-nodearch-key-01.txt
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Copyright Notice
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2006).
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Internet-Draft iSCSI Node Architecture September 2006
Abstract
The iSCSI protocol, described in RFC 3720 [2], allows for extension
items to the protocol in the form of Private or Public Extension
Keys. This Internet-Draft describes a Public Extension Key for the
purpose of enhancing iSCSI supportability. The key accomplishes this
objective by allowing iSCSI nodes to communicate architecture details
during the iSCSI login sequence. The receiving node can then use
this information for enhanced logging and support.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Terminology
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [1].
1.2. Overview
This Internet-Draft describes a declarative Public Extension Key as
defined by section 12.22 of RFC 3720 [2] that may be used to
communicate additional iSCSI node information to the opposite node in
a session. The information carried in the described key has been
found to be valuable in real iSCSI customer environments as initiator
and target vendors collaborate to resolve technical issues and better
understand the evolving iSCSI market.
The key has been modeled after the "Server" and "User-Agent" header
fields as specified in sections 14.38 and 14.43 of RFC 2616 [3], with
the text-value(s) of the key roughly equivalent to Product Tokens in
section 3.8 of RFC 2616 [3]. Note however that the text-value(s) in
the keys list-of-values MUST conform to the Text Format as specified
in section 5.1 of RFC 3720 [2].
The key is sent during operational parameter negotiation of an iSCSI
session's login phase. The intended use of this key is to provide
enhanced logging and support capabilities, and to enable collection
of iSCSI implementation and usage information. Functional behavior
of the iSCSI node (this includes the iSCSI protocol logic -- the
SCSI, iSCSI, and TCP/IP protocols) MUST NOT depend on the presence,
absence, or content of the key. The key MUST NOT be used by iSCSI
nodes for interoperability, or exclusion or deception of other nodes.
To ensure proper use, key values SHOULD be set by the node itself,
and there SHOULD NOT be provisions for the key values to contain
user-defined text.
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2. Definition
The definition of the key is as follows, conforming to sections 11
and 12 of RFC 3720 [2], with example list-of-values conforming to
section 5.1 of RFC 3720 [2].
The key is defined with a Use of "LO", making it a Leading Only key,
and does not amend sections 11 or 12 of RFC 3720 [2]. Thus, the key
MUST only be sent on the leading connection, MUST NOT be changed
after the leading connection login, and MUST only be sent after the
security negotiation login stage has completed (during operational
negotiation login stage). The key may be sent during normal or
discovery sessions.
2.1. X#NodeArchitecture
Use: LO, Declarative
Senders: Initiator and Target
Scope: SW
X#NodeArchitecture=<list-of-values>
Examples:
X#NodeArchitecture=ExampleOS/v1234,ExampleInc_SW_Initiator/1.05a
X#NodeArchitecture=ExampleInc_HW_Initiator/4010,Firmware/2.0.0.5
X#NodeArchitecture=ExampleInc_SW_Initiator/2.1,CPU_Arch/i686
The initiator or target declares the details of its iSCSI node
architecture to the remote endpoint. These details may include, but
are not limited to, iSCSI vendor software, firmware, or hardware
versions, the OS version, or hardware architecture.
The length of the key value (total length of the list-of-values) MUST
NOT be greater than 255 bytes.
X#NodeArchitecture MUST NOT be redeclared.
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3. Implementation
Nodes implementing this key may choose to only transmit the key, only
log the key values received from other nodes, or both transmit and
log the key values. Each node choosing to implement transmission of
the key values MUST be prepared to handle the response of RFC 3720
[2] compliant nodes that do not understand the key (RFC 3720 [2]
states that compliant nodes MUST respond with
X#NodeArchitecture=NotUnderstood).
Nodes that implement transmission and/or logging of the key values
may also implement switches which disable and/or change the logging
and key transmission detail (see Security Considerations). Thus, a
valid implementation of this key may be that a node is completely
silent (the node does not transmit any key value, and simply discards
any key values it receives).
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4. Security Considerations
This extension key transmits specific implementation details about
the node that sends it; such details may be considered sensitive in
some environments. For example, if a certain software or firmware
version is known to contain security weaknesses, announcing the
presence of that version via this key may not be desirable. The
countermeasures for this security concern are:
o sending less detailed information in the key values, or
o not sending the extension key, or
o using IPsec to provide confidentiality for the iSCSI connection on
which the key is sent (see RFC 3720 [2] and RFC 3723 [4]).
To support the first and second countermeasures, all implementations
of this extension key MUST provide an administrative mechanism to
disable sending the key. In addition, all implementations SHOULD
provide an administrative mechanism to configure a verbosity level of
the key value, thereby controlling the amount of information sent.
For example, a lower verbosity might enable transmission of node
architecture component names only, but no version numbers.
The choice of which countermeasure is most appropriate depends on the
environment. However, the first countermeasure may be acceptable in
many environments, since it provides a compromise between sending too
much information and the other more complete countermeasures of not
sending the key at all or using IPsec.
In addition to security considerations involving transmission of the
key contents, any logging method(s) used for the key values MUST keep
the information secure from intruders. For all implementations, the
requirements to address this security concern are:
o display of the log MUST only be possible with administrative
rights to the node
o options to disable logging to disk and to keep logs for a fixed
duration SHOULD be provided
Finally, it is important to note that different nodes may have
different levels of risk, and these differences may affect the
implementation. The components of risk include assets, threats, and
vulnerabilities. Consider the following example iSCSI nodes, which
demonstrate differences in assets and vulnerabilities of the nodes,
and as a result, differences in implementation:
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o One iSCSI target based on a special-purpose operating system.
Since the iSCSI target controls access to the data storage
containing company assets, the asset level is seen as very high.
Also, because of the special-purpose operating system, in which
vulnerabilities are less well-known, the vulnerability level is
viewed as low.
o Multiple iSCSI initiators in a blade farm, each running a general-
purpose operating system. The asset level of each node is viewed
as low, since blades are replaceable and low cost. However, the
vulnerability level is viewed as high, since there are many well-
known vulnerabilities to the general-purpose operating system.
For the above target, an appropriate implementation might be logging
of received key values, but no transmission of the key. For the
initiators, an appropriate implementation might be transmission of
the key, but no logging of received key values.
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5. IANA Considerations
This document defines the iSCSI Extension Key NodeArchitecture to be
registered in the IANA iSCSI extended key registry.
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6. References
6.1. Normative References
[1] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
[2] Satran, J., Meth, K., Sapuntzakis, C., Chadalapaka, M., and E.
Zeidner, "Internet Small Computer Systems Interface (iSCSI)",
RFC 3720, April 2004.
6.2. Informative References
[3] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., Masinter, L.,
Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext Transfer Protocol --
HTTP/1.1", RFC 2616, June 1999.
[4] Aboba, B., Tseng, J., Walker, J., Rangan, V., and F. Travostino,
"Securing Block Storage Protocols over IP", RFC 3723,
April 2004.
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Appendix A. Acknowledgements
The IP Storage (ips) Working Group in the Transport Area of IETF has
been responsible for defining the iSCSI protocol (apart from a host
of other relevant IP Storage protocols). The editor acknowledges the
contributions of the entire working group.
The following individuals directly contributed to identifying issues
and/or suggesting resolutions to the issues found in this document:
David Black, Mallikarjun Chadalapaka, Paul Koning, Julian Satran,
John Hufferd, Claire Kraft, Ranga Sankar, Joseph Pittman, Greg Berg,
John Forte, Jim Yuill, and William Studenmund. This document
benefited from all these contributions.
Finally, the author recognizes Network Appliance, Inc. for
sponsorship and support during the development of this work.
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Author's Address
Dave Wysochanski
8311 Brier Creek Parkway
Suite 105-296
Raleigh, NC 27617
US
Phone: +1 919 696 8130
Email: wysochanski <at> pobox.com
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