Woundy, Richard | 13 Apr 2002 03:48
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IPCDN meeting minutes from Minneapolis

Folks,

Below are the meeting minutes for the IPCDN WG meeting in Minneapolis held
on March 19, 2002.

-- Rich

IETF IPCDN Meeting 
Minneapolis, Minnesota USA 
March 19, 2002

Reported by Jason Schnitzer (jason <at> stargus.com)

Administrative Items

- Andrew Valentine stepped down as co-chair due to a career change.
- Rich Woundy moved from Cisco to AT&T Broadband.
- A new co-chair position is under discussion.
- Meeting attendees engaged in a discussion over the relationship between
IPCDN internet drafts and CableLabs DOCSIS specification references.
CableLabs often mandates the implementation of obsolete IDs out of necessity
to "freeze" DOCSIS OSS MIB specifications for testing and certification
purposes. As a result, CableLabs often certifies CMTS and CM devices against
obsolete IPCDN MIB IDs. Is there a practical way to synchronize? It was
proposed by Thomas Narten (IESG area advisor) that stable MIB IDs be
released as informative or experimental RFCs for CableLabs certification
reference. Early help from IETF MIB doctors on new IPCDN MIBs might ease the
transition as well.
- Question: should the "Account Management" section of the DOCSIS OSS
specification be moved to the IETF IPCDN space for future work? Much of this
(Continue reading)

Woundy, Richard | 18 Apr 2002 18:04
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DOCSIS IGMPv2 MIB

Folks,

I have received no further comments on the draft, "Application of the IGMP
MIB, RFC 2933, and Cable Device MIB, RFC 2669, to DOCSIS 1.1 Devices",
draft-ietf-ipcdn-igmp-mib-03.txt.

I am asking the area directors to forward the document to the IESG for
publication as an RFC with status of Proposed Standard.

-- Rich
Woundy, Richard | 18 Apr 2002 18:04
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DOCSIS Subscriber Management MIB

Folks,

I have received no further comments on the draft, "Management Information
Base for DOCSIS Cable Modem Termination Systems for Subscriber Management",
draft-ietf-ipcdn-subscriber-mib-06.txt.

I am asking the area directors to forward the document to the IESG for
publication as an RFC with status of Proposed Standard.

-- Rich
Woundy, Richard | 18 Apr 2002 18:45
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RE: draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt

Ran,

I am looking at the BGP MIBs, and don't see any language about SNMPv2c and
its lack of real security.

"Definitions of Managed Objects for the Fourth Version of Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP-4)"
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-idr-bgp4-mib-09.txt>

"Definitions of Managed Objects for the Fourth Version of Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP-4), Second Version"
<http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-ietf-idr-bgp4-mibv2-02.txt>

Am I looking at the right documents?

In the meantime:
- I am advancing some WG documents (DOCSIS IGMPv2 MIB and Subscriber
Management MIB) that use the text in <http://www.ops.ietf.org/security.html>
(no mention of SNMPv2c).
- I am drafting an email for <mibs <at> ops.ietf.org> asking about adding the
text about SNMPv2c being as insecure as SNMPv1, that I will send out today.

-- Rich

-----Original Message-----
From: RJ Atkinson [mailto:rja <at> extremenetworks.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 3:23 PM
To: 'Richard Woundy'
Cc: 'ipcdn <at> ietf.org'
Subject: Re: [ipcdn] draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt
(Continue reading)

Woundy, Richard | 18 Apr 2002 18:59
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RE: draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt

Folks,

The current Security Guidelines uses the following text to warn against
using SNMPv1:

   SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment.  Even if the network
   itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even then, there is no
   control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and
   GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.

Shouldn't this text also point out that SNMPv2c suffers from the same
security vulnerabilities? Note that SNMPv2c is explicitly mentioned in the
standard MIB boilerplate <http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-boilerplate.html>.

Thanks to Ran Atkinson for pointing this out.

-- Rich

-----Original Message-----
From: RJ Atkinson [mailto:rja <at> extremenetworks.com]
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 3:23 PM
To: Richard Woundy
Cc: ipcdn <at> ietf.org
Subject: Re: [ipcdn] draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt

On Tuesday, March 19, 2002, at 02:40 , Richard Woundy wrote:
> I want to put together an updated version of this internet-draft.

	Thanks very much.  My primary goal is to keep the I-Ds (and
RFCs) in sync with the current reality.
(Continue reading)

RJ Atkinson | 18 Apr 2002 19:11
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Re: draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt


On Thursday, April 18, 2002, at 12:45 , Woundy, Richard wrote:
> I am looking at the BGP MIBs, and don't see any language about SNMPv2c 
> and
> its lack of real security.

Apparently some of my inputs were ignored/watered-down.  I'll go
email the BGP folks again to remind them...

The stuff that *is* in the Security considerations in -09 of the BGP
MIB is a starting point, in that it discusses specific objects
and why those particular objects have specific described security
risks.

Ran
RJ Atkinson | 18 Apr 2002 19:13
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Re: draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt


On Thursday, April 18, 2002, at 12:59 , Woundy, Richard wrote:

> Folks,
>
> The current Security Guidelines uses the following text to warn against
> using SNMPv1:
>
>    SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment.  Even if the network
>    itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even then, there is no
>    control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and
>    GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.
>
> Shouldn't this text also point out that SNMPv2c suffers from the same
> security vulnerabilities? Note that SNMPv2c is explicitly mentioned in 
> the
> standard MIB boilerplate <http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-boilerplate.html>.

	Thanks.

MIB Folks,

	It should also explicitly note that SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c both use 
clear-text
disclosing passwords -- which are not considered to provide acceptable
security for an IETF protocol.

	We need to start having MIBs mandate that implementers implement
SNMPv3 now that has advanced to Full Standard, IMHO.

(Continue reading)

Woundy, Richard | 19 Apr 2002 17:05
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FW: Update on the DOCSIS DCI Suboption for the DHCP Relay Agent Information Option

Folks,

The information in this email pertains to the following requirement in the
DOCSIS 1.1 RFI, section 6.3.24:

"The CMTS MUST retain the device class information for use in the DHCP
Process. The CMTS MUST create a DHCP Agent Option 82 tuple with the device
class information and MUST insert this tuple in the DHCPDISCOVER from the
corresponding CM before forwarding that DHCPDISCOVER to the DHCP server."

This Option 82 suboption is now documented in RFC 3256. I have included the
RFC announcement below.

-- Rich

-----Original Message-----
From: RFC Editor [mailto:rfc-ed <at> ISI.EDU]
Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2002 7:00 PM
Cc: rfc-editor <at> rfc-editor.org; dhcwg <at> ietf.org
Subject: [dhcwg] RFC 3256 on The DOCSIS Device Class DHCP

A new Request for Comments is now available in online RFC libraries.

        RFC 3256

        Title:	    The DOCSIS (Data-Over-Cable Service Interface
                    Specifications) Device Class DHCP (Dynamic Host
                    Configuration Protocol) Relay Agent Information
                    Sub-option 
        Author(s):  D. Jones, R. Woundy
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Wijnen, Bert (Bert | 22 Apr 2002 12:27
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RE: draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt

I am working on a revised text for the guideline.

Bert 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: RJ Atkinson [mailto:rja <at> extremenetworks.com]
> Sent: Thursday, April 18, 2002 7:13 PM
> To: Woundy, Richard
> Cc: 'mibs <at> ops.ietf.org'; IPCDN (E-mail)
> Subject: Re: [ipcdn] draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, April 18, 2002, at 12:59 , Woundy, Richard wrote:
> 
> > Folks,
> >
> > The current Security Guidelines uses the following text to 
> warn against
> > using SNMPv1:
> >
> >    SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment.  Even if 
> the network
> >    itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even 
> then, there is no
> >    control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and
> >    GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.
> >
> > Shouldn't this text also point out that SNMPv2c suffers 
> from the same
(Continue reading)

C. M. Heard | 19 Apr 2002 22:15
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Favicon

RE: draft-ietf-ipcdn-device-mibv2-01.txt

Richard Woundy wrote:
> The wording of the Security Considerations in the drafts in this
> working group is constrained by the following guidance for MIB
> documents from the IETF O&M folks: <http://www.ops.ietf.org/security.html>.
>
> If we want to use text that specifically calls out the dangers/folly
> of using SNMPv2c, we should get feedback from the folks on the
> <mibs <at> ops.ietf.org> mailing list.

Please notice that the text of that page starts out with the words

   "This page defines guidelines [... ]"

Since these are guidelines, I would think that you are not constrained
to follow the text exactly if there are good reasons for a deviation.
In particular, strenghtening the standard admonitions might well be
in order for a MIB module that contains extraordinarily information.

> The current Security Guidelines uses the following text to warn against
> using SNMPv1:
> 
>    SNMPv1 by itself is not a secure environment.  Even if the network
>    itself is secure (for example by using IPSec), even then, there is no
>    control as to who on the secure network is allowed to access and
>    GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects in this MIB.
> 
> Shouldn't this text also point out that SNMPv2c suffers from the same
> security vulnerabilities? Note that SNMPv2c is explicitly mentioned in the
> standard MIB boilerplate <http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-boilerplate.html>.

(Continue reading)


Gmane