13 Nov 2001 23:48
AS#1
<ricardo.johnson <at> att.net>
2001-11-13 22:48:10 GMT
2001-11-13 22:48:10 GMT
I have read eith great interest your MIME-based Secure EDI draft document and I have come to a dicovered some very serious problems that may diserve special attention. In Section 2.3.1 you state: "This specification assumes that a typical EDI interchange is the lowest level object that will be subject to security services". In my view, this assuption is extremely dangerous and may be at the heart of several important limitations to the present and future use of EDI over internet. The lowest level of sercurity services should not be limited to an envelope level. The next paragraph in your draft points out one immediate consequence of the above limitation: In EDI terms (ANSI or EDIFACT), that means "anything between and including..the envelope segments". "Congruent with the above statement, EDI envelop headers are NOT visoble in the MIME package. In order to optimize VAN-(Continue reading)to- internet routing, work may need to be done in the future to define ways to pull out some of the envelope information to make them sisible, however, this specification does not go into any detail on that". Indeed, by encrypting the entire EDI interchange, including the envelope headers, you are no longer able to route the message to/from VANs without decrypting the message. This is a serious, and in many cases unacceptable limitation. In other words, by using S/MIME as the encrypting standard for EDI over internet, you are are de-facto
RSS Feed