draft-morris-dnsop-dnssec-key-timing-00
2009-04-01 14:40:42 GMT
Hello, I have studied your I-D, draft-morris-dnsop-dnssec-key-timing-00 and find it a very useful exposition. I have (A) one point for discussion and (B) a few nits to polish. (A) The draft generally assumes a single active key used for zone signing (or as a KSK for secure delegation). IIRC, the core DNSSEC specifications call out for one set of signatures *per algorithm supported in a zone*. Since currently crypto algorithm agility is a hot topic (e.g. transition to SHA-2 and ECDSA), it should be worth being considered in the draft. The important detail is that, due to long transition phases to be expected for validating resolvers, there will be long periods of coexistence of signatures for secure zones that are deemed worth the algorithm transition, and hence the common operational need for more than one 'active' key. My first impression is that the algorithms in the draft could be (and should be) easily applied unchanged *per signature algorithm*. Is that true? Thoughts? (B) Editorial nits:(Continue reading)
>But the draft really isn't about DNS. It's about SMTP.
The question of NULL MX came up last year during a discussion about
SMTP. The SMTP question is about how to locate the target host. As
the proposal in the expired I-D has an operational impact on DNS
operations, the SMTP folks will probably ask for the opinion of DNSOP.
Regards,
-sm
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